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CHARLES A. MOORE, for many years senior professor of philos-
ophy at the University of Hawaii, died in April, 1967, before his
work on this volume was completed. Long an advocate of the pro-
motion of greater tolerance between people of the East and West,
Professor Moore was known internationally as the innovator and
driving force behind the East-West Philosophers' Conferences, held
in Honolulu in 1939, 1949, 1959, and 1964, which brought together
some of the leading thinkers of the Orient and the Occident to ex-
change ideas and to enhance their understanding of other traditions.
Every effort has been made by those involved in· finishing this
book to maintain the high standards set by Professor Moore. A
special recognition is owing to Professors Peter Lee, Lily Winter~,
Chung-ying Cheng, Edward H. Schafer, Mr. Shien-min Jen, and Mr.
Chi-ping Chen for their help in preparing this posthumous work.






THIS VOLUME is composed exclusively of chapters selected from
the proceedings volumes resulting from the four East-West Philoso-
phers' Conferences held at the University of Hawaii in 1939, 1949,
1959, and 1964." Each of the chapters here was originally a paper
presented at one of these conferences and discussed at that time.
(Incidentally, some of the discussion which took place is included
at the end of some of the papers, in the form of Questions and
Answers.)
This volume-and two succeeding volumes on India and Japan
-are intended both for the general reader and for the philosophy
student and scholar. These are not textbooks as such, but are pre-
sented with this possibility strongly in mind, since they provide
an excellent basis for courses in their respective fields. The papers
are substantial and authoritative, but not overly technical, presenta-
tions on Chinese philosophy in general and also on specific aspects
of Chinese life and culture in their philosophical and social contexts.
While this is essentially a reprint volume, the papers have
been re-edited by their authors (except Hu Shih and E. R. Hughes,
who are no longer living) and by the editor of this volume, and
some changes in style, translation, transliteration, etc., have been
.. The four volumes from which these papers are taken, all edited by Charles
A. Moore, are: Philosophy-East and West, published by Princeton University
Press (1944); and three published by the University of Hawaii Press, Essays
in East-West Philosophy: An Attempt at World Philosophical Synthesis (1951);
Philosophy and Culture, East and West (1962); The Status of the Individual
in East and West (1967).
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made. However, there are no major revisions of the substance of
the papers.
An attempt has been made to bring about unity and consist-
ency of style as far as possible, although the four volumes were not
always consistent in style; in fact, within the same volume some of
the authors themselves insisted on following different styles.
As in all the conference volumes, several editing difficulties
were encountered. Among these are the usual ones of capitaliza-
tion, hyphenation, italicizing, and transliteration from Oriental lan-
guages. Another concerned the order of names of Far Easterners
mentioned in the text.
Far Eastern tradition calls for the family name to be given
first, but this practice has been abandoned by some contemporary
Asians; this results in confusion. Usually, classical names are given
in traditional style, modern and contemporary names in Western
style. The proper name-order will be found in the index in all cases.
The matters of capitalization and hyphenation in romanized
Chinese are extremely difficult because competent scholars in the
field are not in agreement as to what constitutes correct style. An
effort to achieve uniformity and consistency has been made, but
there are undoubtedly some discrepancies. An attempt to correct
all such discrepancies will be made in the index.
The editor assumes responsibility for revising usage employed
by some of the authors-and common usage-in cases of published
items which are in fact articles or chapters or parts of standard
works. These are enclosed within quotation marks and are not
italicized. (There are some unavoidable discrepancies here.)
On matters of detail:
( 1) The fear is that there is too much capitalization-because
some of the authors strongly wished it that way. Usually, the capi-
tal letter is used for "ambiguous" terms when they refer to meta-
physical ultimates, the lower-case when reference is to empirical
matters. For example, the Buddha, but buddha-nature, buddha-
dharma, etc.; Heaven and heaven, Ying-Yang for the school, but yin
and yang for the two forces in Nature, and so on. In some cases
authors insisted otherwise and the editor complied.
(2) Dates (sometimes varying slightly because of personal
interpretations) are given frequently so as to provide the unac-
quainted reader with a better historical sense of the development
of ideas.
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(3) Transliterated Chinese is often in the text or within pa-
rentheses to provide the opportunity for those who can to check
interpretations given in the translations.
(4) In a few cases, common usage is observed rather than
technically correct spellings.
(5) The same Chinese term or title is sometimes differently
translated-in accordance with the preferences of the several au-
thors but clarity is not thereby sacrificed. (One example is Ii: rea-
son, law, principle, etc.)
(6) Alternate names are frequently used for some of the im-
portant thinkers whose views are described and explained here-
their "true" name and their pen name, or adopted name, or hon-
orific name. For example: Wang Shon-jen and Wang Yang-ming;
Chu Hsi and Chu Yuan-hui; Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng Ming-tao;
Ch'eng I and Ch'eng I-ch'uan, etc. Double listings are provided
in the index.
An alphabetical list of Chinese names, titles, terms, etc., with
corresponding Chinese characters, is given as an appendix.
Appreciation is hereby extended to Professor Peter H. Lee of
the University of Hawaii and Professor Edward H. Schafer of the
University of California, Berkeley, for their great assistance in the
most difficult matter of transliteration, to Mrs. Floris Sakamoto for
work far beyond the call of duty, and to Princeton University Press
for permission to republish Professor Wing-tsit Chan's "The Story
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ESSENTIALS OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE

CHARLES A. MOORE Introduction:
The Humanistic Chinese Mind
IN THE CONTEMPORAR y world a knowledge of the basic prin-
ciples of Chinese philosophy is indispensable for the educated man
and for the philosopher, both in the West and throughout Asia.
Simply to be educated requires that we understand the Chinese
people and Chinese culture. To understand the contemporary'"
world of Asia-and to be able to live at peace, or at war, if need be,
with any other people-we must know them. This is impossible
without a substantial knowledge of the fundamental characteristics
and also the variety of points of view that constitute, in this case,
the Chinese mind or Chinese philosophy. This necessitates under-
standing these principles in themselves and in their applications
to the various aspects of Chinese life-its culture and civilization
as a whole.
It has often been said that philosophy is more significant in v
China, in the life of even the common man, than in any other
civilization in the history of the world. It has been said, too, that in
China it is not necessary to be religious but it is necessary to be
philosophical, or at least possessed of a knowledge of philosophy.
For the Chinese, philosophy takes the place of religion-certainly
for the educated and intellectual Chinese.
The philosopher, even the technical philosopher-not merely
those who simply want to know and understand other peoples-
must know the fundamentals of Chinese philosophy if he would be
worthy of the title "philosopher." By definition, the philosopher
must have, or at least seek, comprehensive knowledge of all the
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data of experience and reality if he is to accomplish the time-
honored tasks of philosophy. Not only that, but Chinese philosophy
has much in general point of view and in terms of many specific
philosophical doctrines to contribute to the total magazine of the
philosopher's mind, and to philosophy itself.
Dr. Hu Shih, the great Chinese intellectual and philosopher,
has been quoted as saying that every people has a unique character
in terms of which that particular people must be understood-
and that this essential character or mind of a given people consists
essentially of its deepest philosophical convictions. And this is
certainly true. This volume follows this interpretation.
Here we have a series of what might be called living essays
on various aspects of the Chinese mind, all written by authors of
exceptional philosophical competence who also have a living
knowledge and experience of the philosophy and culture they
represent-an ideal combination for the presentation of studies and
explanations which can and do reflect the academic and technical
principles involved and also the living and practical significance
of these principles in the lives of the Chinese people.
The over-all question of this volume is: What are the basic,
and possibly the unique-the «rock-bottom"-characteristics of the
Chinese philosophical tradition and of Chinese culture as based
upon that thought-tradition? In a sense, however, it will be the
reader's responsibility to determine what these basic principles of
the Chinese philosophical tradition as a whole are in the light of
the several less general and sometimes more specific treatments
of particular problems, attitudes, and philosophical theories. No
attempt is made to simplify the mind of the Chinese. From many
'<J angles, the Chinese mind, Chinese philosophy, and Chinese culture
are very complex indeed-any simplification would necessarily be
oversimplification and therefore falsification.
There is nothing "inscrutable" about the Chinese or Chinese
mentality. However, there is much that is subtle, at first unclear,
and, to a Westerner, sometimes even enigmatic and paradoxical.
j There are many gray areas. However-and this is part of the pur-
pose (and achievement) of the chapters that follow-these some-
times puzzling, sometimes difficult, doctrines and points of view, are
clarified for non-Chinese by experts who both know and have ex-
perienced, have lived, the essence of Chinese philosophy. They are
steeped in the knowledge and wisdom of China, both academically
(or intellectually) and personally.
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In one way and at least to some extent, this volume makes an
understanding of Chinese philosophy and the Chinese mind more
difficult, not less. This is because it consists of a number of distinct
chapters dealing with distinct and seemingly separate aspects of
the over-all situation. There is a certain artificiality, and some actual
inaccuracy, in approaching Chinese philosophy in this piecemeal
manner. This questionable "compartmentalization" is used pri-
marily for the sake of Westerners. In view of the manner and I
spirit of Western thought ever since Aristotle, Westerners have
seemed to need departmentalization-analysis-of the totality of I
truth, experience, life, and philosophy itself into what the West \
has come to think of as the basic separate or at least separable
aspects of the knowledge which the philosopher is seeking. This
division of philosophical labor in the West and its strong tendency
toward analysis are responsible for this manner of presenting the
over-all picture in its various parts. And, since this volume is di-
rected primarily to Westerners, this method has seemed to be
adVisable. However, it is not fully permissible, because Chinese I
philosophers, more than those in any other philosophical tradition,.
past and present, look at life and philosophy in its totality, not in
its parts. Perhaps this manner of presentation will make for clarity
in one sense; but it must not be forgotten that it is a questionable
procedure, even though any other procedure would very probably
be much more difficult for the Western reader. As a matter of fact,
in some of these papers the reader will find overlapping of areas
of study and of life. This is unavoidable.
There are many distinct systems in the history and totality of
Chinese philosophy. Furthermore, in the course of its history many
sub-systems and many individual so-called followers of particular
systems have developed what could well be called n~w systems,
thus adding greatly to the complexity and variety of· the scope
of Chinese philosophy. The tendency in China-as in India-is for
later thinkers to consider themselves as mere commentators upon
or followers of the major classical schools or of the great early
thinkers. They are not necessarily followers in the strict sense of
the word. They are guided, rather, by a sense of personal humility
which prevents them from claiming originality despite the fact that
their doctrines are sometimes so much out of harmony with the
"original" that the creativity of their work is unmistakable.
All the papers here originated in and were presented at philo-
sophical conferences devoted exclusively to the attempt-by
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comparative study-to bring about mutual understanding between
the philosophies and philosophers of Asia and the philosophies and
philosophers of the West. However, this volume is as exclusively
as possible on the philosophies of China alone and is,not specifically
or directly a comparative study. Comparisons-similarities and con-
trasts, affinities and conflicts-are here, however, to be discovered,
realized, and appreciated, or denied, by those who are interested
in such philosophical relationships.
A further purpose underlying the conferences at which these
papers were first presented was that of enriching the philosophical
minds of all the major traditions involved in those discussions-
China, India, Japan, and the West-and also in seeking out specific
contributions from each tradition to the total perspective which is
philosophy. In other words, we shall find here philosophical prin-
ciples, basic convictions, and attitudes of mind without which the
Chinese people and Chinese culture cannot be understood. But
we shall also find an astounding number of Vital, suggestive, even
provocative new ideas, new perspectives, new methods, new atti-
tudes. These are exciting in themselves. They demand serious
consideration by substantial thinkers far beyond the reaches of the
Chinese tradition. The expression 'Western knowledge and East-
ern wisdom" is far from being true or accurate. However, there
are in the chapters to follow many examples of both the knowledge
and the wisdom of one of the greatest philosophical traditions and
one of the greatest cultures the world has ever known.
This volume is concerned with the entire range and scope of
the Chinese philosophical tradition-except, as will be explained
later, the Communist order of today. Both for understanding and
for what China can contribute to Western philosophy and to the
totality of the data of philosophy in terms of original and possibly
unique ideas, it is essential that we know the entire range of the
( Chinese tradition. As has been so truly said, "To understand China,
) one must start at least as early as Confucius. One must consider
) the great thinkers because they have played a principal part in
making China what she is.... One must know something about
China's traditional thought even to understand Chinese Commu-
nist theory."
By way of some anticipatory suggestion, it might help to cite
some of the interesting and exciting ideas and attitudes-to indi-
cate, in advance, how very rewarding this experience can be. The
following are among the most important basic principles of Chinese
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philosophy-and all of them find clear and authoritative explana-
tion and defense in these studies.
( 1) There is what might be considered the unique and cer-"
tainly the fundamental problem of Chinese philosophy-and one
great Chinese philosopher has said that the best clue to any philo-
sophical tradition is the problem with which it is primarily con-
cerned. This problem for Chinese philosophy is that of achieving
"sageliness within and kingliness without," a truly significant con-
cept and interestingly different from both the West and India in
its twofold emphasis. .
(2) There is the profound and all-pervading inseparability of
philosophy and life and even of theory and practice-a major atti-
tude of the Chinese philosophical mind, old and new.
(3) There is the universally recognized doctrine-and atti-
tude-of humanism, which is unquestionably more pervasive and
more significant in China than in any other philosophical tradition.
"People come first in China." This attitude requires-and receives
here-comprehensive treatment both in general and in its specific
applications to the many affected sides of Chinese thought and life.
(4) There is the predominance of ethical consciousness-both
inner and outer-as the essence of all human living and as the
highest goal for man. In a very real sense, the ethical and the
spiritual are one in China.
( 5) There is the uniquely Chinese concept of spirituality-
coupled with, and defining its expression in, the fullest pOSSible
development of the ethical character (and innate. goodness) of
man. Another unique concept and attitude.
(6) There is the very famous-and equally fundamental-but
usually thoroughly misunderstood doctrine of filial piety, possi-
bly the very essence of Chinese ethical and social life.
(7) There is the great emphasis upon man as a social being,
with all the problems attendant to that interpretation, but without
many of its alleged anti-individual connotations.
(8) There is what one writer has called "the art of social
living in China," an attitude in and toward life in society which
characteristically identifies Chinese thought in this area as distinct
from that in all other cultures-an attitude which, by the way,
Leibniz described as far superior to the Western, or Christian, way
of civil life.
(9) There is, in spite of China's unquestioned emphasis upon
the social nature of man, a deep respect for the individual, includ-
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ing the fundamental concept of the original equality and the
original goodness of all individuals-the two emphases being joined
in China's typical attitude of hannony.
It is true that there is respect for the individual and his
; dignity and a sense of equality and "the democratic spirit," but
\
all of these seem to be conceived of in a strictly Chinese-and there-
fore a unique-form and meaning. All men are originally and/or
LPotentially and/or ultimately equal but not "actually" or literally
equal. Qualitative and personal criteria seem to take precedence
over actual individuality and equality. Only the sage, it seems at
times, is a genuine individual-and very few attain this status,
IJ 'although it is open to all. Rights are either seriously neglected or
have a decidedly secondary status relative to duties. And the
"rights" of an individual are all but unthinkable if in fact they
jeopardize society or the state. All this would seem to pose serious
problems for the Westerner.
( 10) There is the optimistic-and thoroughly democratic-
doctrine of what is called the "universal attainability of sagehood."
( 11) There is the already-mentioned supreme importance of
philosophy and the lesser importance of religion-especially for
the intellectual but also for all educated men.
( 12) There is the pervasive theoretical and practical principle
and ideal of harmony-a general Oriental characteristic of life
and thought, but perhaps more fully developed and "implemented"
in China than in any other tradition, Eastern or Western.
(13) There is the famous Chinese synthetic attitude-some-
times called "mere eclecticism," although it is much more than that.
This doctrine applies the Chinese spirit of harmony in the realm
of the intellect and in the realm of religion as well as in the practical
and ethical life of man.
( 14) Coupled with this is the somewhat difficult-to-under-
stand attitude of "both-and"-as contrasted with the Western tend-
ency to think in terms of "either/or," such that the fine lines of
distinction and exclusiveness so typical of Western life and thought
and even religion are not common to the Chinese mind.
( 15) Along the same lines, there is the comprehensive attitude
of tolerance, which pervades the Chinese mentality and Chinese
society.
( 16) In legal and political philosophy, too, OI)e finds two of
these fundamental elements-again in considerable disagreement
with the West. One is the element of humanism, in which the
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individual person is more important than the abstract rule (in law,
as in ethics), and the concept of "both-and," or non-black-or-white. /
The other-also humanism-is the tendency toward rule by man
rather than rule of law, although this is one area where much
misunderstanding still seems to exist.
(17) Also in line with the general attitude of ''both-and'' and
tolerance is the ethical attitude of moderation. The Golden Mean
is vital to China, as it was to the Greeks. But there is also the
"un-moderate" attitude of profound ethical sincerity of will.
( 18) The Golden Rule is also fundamental despite its famous
-and therefore ridiculously criticized-negative expression in
Confucius.
( 19) On the intellectual side, there is a great love of learning,
and a demand for the fullest possible "investigation of things"-and,
in seeming conflict with the doctrine of ''both-and,'' the doctrine of
the rectification of names, and living in accord with this rectification
of names. Professor William Ernest Hocking has cited this attitude
as one of the greatest contributions of Chinese philosophy and
culture. .
(20) There are two Neo-Confucian metaphysical considera-
tions of rather special importance, especially because of their philo-
sophical significance and also because of their possible uniqueness
among the traditions of Asia, thus separating China from the other
Asian traditions with which it is frequently-and so fallaciously-
united in "the philosophy of the East." These are, first, the doctrine
of the mutual necessity of the ultimate reason or pri,nciple of real-
ity and the material element (or vital force) which necessitates
the expression of the "absolute," if it can be called that, in the
empirical world; and, second, the doctrine of the one in the many
and the many in the one, and the impossibility of one without the
other.
(21) And, finally, to keep this list from extending endlessly-
there is the famous "argument" (an almost all-inclusive sorites)
in one of the Confucian classics, in which, in brief, the investigation
of things leads to sincerity of will, and that to personal moral
integrity, and that to the well-established family, and that to the
well-ordered state, and that to peace in the world-the essence of
the argument, according to one interpretation, being that knowl-
edge and the personal integrity of the individual constitute the
root principle of all Chinese thought and culture.
In sum, the Chinese thought-and-culture tradition may be
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characterized by humanism, by its emphases upon the ethical, the
intellectual (primarily with relation to life and activity), the
aesthetic, and the social (not necessarily in that order of impor-
tance), without any aversion to material welfare and the normal
enjoyments of life-and with an inner tranquillity of spirit that
pervades life in both prosperity and adversity, a tranquillity born
of a sense of harmony with Nature and one's fellow men.
Each of these specific doctrines is interesting, significant, and
possibly provocative in itself. And, taken together, they constitute
the essentials of a unique and important philosophical tradition
and a veritable storehouse of important ideas.
While we are concerned with a positive understanding of the
Chinese philosophical mind and the Chinese character and with
the positive recognition of interesting and valuable new ideas,
there is also the necessity on the part of every Westerner to elimi-
nate from his mind the many misunderstandings which have almost
been bred into his knowledge and mentality by the distortions of
the past and by the sheer ignorance of basic Chinese thought that
has been prevalent throughout most of Western philosophical his-
tory. "Answers" to these many falsifications, or to many of them at
least, will be found here, but sometimes only indirectly, to be seen
and appreciated by the discerning. They may be missed or mis-
understood unless one brings to this task a serious concern with
fundamental accuracy of interpretation.
Among the many misunderstandings of Chinese thought and
" culture for which one will find corrective clarifications here are:
{ that Chinese philosophy has 110 interest in metaphysics; that there
is no logic in Chinese philosophy; that China is dominated by
intuition-or mere common sense; that in China-as everywhere
else in Asia!-philosophy and religion are identical; that Chinese
philosophy and culture are pessimistic; that the individual is of no
significance whatever in China, being dominated completely by
the family and filial piety; that there is no genuine philosophy in
China; ~~t.Q1_e .. very earliestEhil()~()p'I~~E~-==Con!l!~_1!~L!:-ao!zu,
_ and their contemporaries-iire the essence of Chinese philosophy
and that they, because of the "peculiar" ways in which they .. ex-
pressed their thought, are not genuine philosophers; that science
and the scientific method are non-existent in China; and that Chi-
nese philosophy has nothing to contribute either to the West or to
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philosophy as such. All of these and other equally false, sometimes
even malicious, misapprehensions must be removed and corrected
and revealed for the errors they are if one is to understand the
Chinese mind. They must be answered pointedly and convinc-
ingly-and that is just what is done in the chapters in this volume.
Not to be considered necessarily as a misunderstood, but cer-
tainly as a very controversial, interpretation, is Professor F. S. C.
Northrop's extremely well-known view of the Chinese philosophical
and intellectual tradition as characterized by a "natural-history,"
a "pointing," a purely denotative attitude and method, as domi-
nated by "concepts of intui!i~on"-all of which characterizations set
China off against the West, with its domination by "concepts by
postulation," scientific method, etc. This view is indirectly chal-
lenged-at least by implication-in several of the papers in this
volume and specifically and pointedly in the papers by E. R. Hughes
and Hu Shih. This is a vital point and a vital problem in any
attempt by the Westerner to achieve general and technical under-
standing of China and the Chinese mind, and here it receives
responsible and penetrating examination from the Chinese point
of view. In view of the great prominence given to Northrop's view
over the years, special attention is called to its consideration here.
There is especially concentrated attention in this volume upon
the status of the individual and the relationships among individ-
uals and the relationship between the individual and the many
aspects of thought and life and the many institutions of society
and society itself which might seem to conflict with the dignity
and significance of the individual. This emphasis is due to the fact
that the contemporary world is probably more concerned with the
problem of the status of the individual and his dignity as a human
being than with any other single problem, and also because the
status of the individual, especially in relation to the family, has
long been one of the most misunderstood principles of Chinese
life and thought. (There is, too, the involved question of the ulti-
mate status of authority and freedom-and of rights and duties-
in Chinese philosophy and culture as a whole.) In the light of the
contemporary emphasis upon this problem-as well as its historical
importance-and also in the light of the necessity of understanding
the traditional Chinese point of view relative to the individual in
relation to the family, to society, and to the state in the contem-
porary situation involving the communistic take-over in Mainland
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China, this particular problem receives more attention than any
other specific problem under study here-but no more than it
deserves and demands.
This volume does not deal with the political philosophical
development in mainland China since the communists assumed
power. This entire movement, philosophically speaking, is so much
a period of transition and is characterized by so much confusion
that it simply cannot be examined or described intelligently and
clearly. This is partly because of the effort of the communists to
follow both Western communist doctrines and at the same time
whatever in the Chinese tradition they can find (or interpret) to
suit their purpose. Part of the confusion lies in the fact that com-
munism is a Western doctrine, whereas tradition has such a solid
foundation among the Chinese people. This volume is concerned
with those Chinese philosophical concepts and attitudes which
have been basic to the Chinese mind and to Chinese society for
centuries as "rock-bottom" ideas, and which have guided China
through many historical changes of conditions and even of atti-
tudes-and through revolution after revolution.
It seems to be the thought of most free Chinese that the basic
principles found in this volume are so strongly imbedded in the
mind of the Chinese people, are so uniquely Chinese, and are so
fundamentally sound that they will undoubtedly playa great part
in the eventual restoration of China to its pre-communist intellec-
tual and cultural stature. This conviction receives added support
from the fact that historical fluctuations are almost intrinsic to the
history of Chinese thought-but that the "rock-bottom" ideas of the
great China-as Dr. Hu Shih calls them-will win out because they
are the life blood of China and the Chinese people.
A prominent American scholar of China recently posed the
question as to whether the contemporary situation in Mainland
China (what he calls "modern China") "represents aggressive,
expansionist communism or an ancient culture seeking to re-
establish itself and its influence." The essays in this volume will
provide the reader with ample knowledge and basic evidence
to enable him to answer that question for himself. It is likely that
he will decide to agree with another authoritative Sinologist who
recently reported to the U.S. Congress that the communists are
beginning to realize that "the world cannot be remade in a day"-
especially in China where such a strong tradition has been ac-
cepted and lived for so many centuries.
WING-TSIT CHAN Chinese Theory
and Practice, with Special Reference
to Humanism
IN ORDER to understand the relation between Chinese philo-
sophical theories and practical affairs, it is necessary, first, to see
what the Chinese have conceived that relation to be, and then to
see how theory is related to actual practice. This paper is therefore
divided into two parts: (1) the Chinese concepts of truth and (2)
humanism in practice, humanism being taken as the most dominant
doctrine.
It is Often said that there is a closer relationship between I
philosophical theories and practice in China than in other lands.
Whether this is true or not, it is certainly a fact that the relation-
ship between philosophical doctrines and actual pra'ctice in China
has been very close indeed. As to why this has been the case, it
is sometimes said that the system that has dominated Chinese
thought throughout most of Chinese history, namely, Confucianism,
is the system that has controlled Chinese education, society, and
government for some 2,000 years, and therefore there has been an
unusually close affinity between theory and practice. It is also sug-
gested that Chinese philosophers have not been much interested
in abstract theories, and have, instead, directed their thinking
chiefly to practical problems. There is also the theory that Chinese
philosophy is essentially pragmatic and devoid of absolute, in-
flexible theories and is therefore more easily applicable to human
affairs.
There is some element of truth in each of these assertions, but
the matter goes much deeper. In order to find an adequate ex-
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planation of the practical character of Chinese philosophy, we must
understand the Chinese concept of truth. First of all, truth is not
understood as something revealed from above or as an abstract
principle, however logically consistent, but as a discoverable and
f demonstrable principle in human affairs. In other words, the real
test of truth is in human history. Therefore, when Confucius (551-
.479 B.C.) frequently referred to the legendary Sage-Emperors Yao
and Shun and when he repeatedly looked to the past, he was
looking for historical evidence of truth. If that was conservatism,
it was only incidental to that search. The fact that China has had
a long and continuous history in which Confucianism has had a
long and continuous domination makes the belief in the close re- '.
lationship between theory and practice all the more certain. In the
history of Chinese philosophy, there has been a continuing contra-'
versy over the question whether principles are transcendent to or
immanent in events. Roughly speaking, the school of Chu Hsi
(1130-1200), which represents the rationalistic wing of Neo-
Confucianism, insists that principles are inherent in things and
events, while the school of Wang Yang-ming (Wang Shou-jen,
1472-1529), which represents the idealistic wing of Neo-Confucian-
ism, insists that principles are inherent in the mind. However, they
both agree that the validity of principles can be tested only in
actual events. As a matter of fact, Chinese philosophers generally
do not distinguish between reality and actuality. From the point of
view of technical philosophy, this Chinese position lacks refine-
ment, but the Chinese spirit of stressing the affinity of theories and
practical affairs is clear.
Since truth can be discovered and tested only in events-and
that means chiefly human events-it follows that the records of
truth are found in historical documents. Confucius repeatedly
looked to such records, whether written or not. Eventually these
records came to constitute what may be called the Chinese Canon,
, notably the Four Books and the Five Classics.! It is generally
understood that these Classics are the foundation stones of Con-
fucian teachings. It is not so generally understood, however, that
they have been regarded by most Confucians as histories also. They
are not merely histories of changing human events but histories of
events as the unfolding and functioning of eternal principles. The
Chinese word for Classics, "ching," means constancy, that is, what
is immutable and invariable. As Dr. Hu Shih has aptly remarked,
the Chinese Classics have served China as a Natural Law, for they
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have exercised supreme authority over government, society, reli-
gion, and other aspects of Chinese culture.2 Historically, the Classics
were set up as authority by Confucian scholars in the second
century B.C. for the purpose of checking the power of the emperor.
They were advanced as the highest authority, even over and above
that of the sovereign, whose power had been supposed to be
absolute. In 124 B.C., a national university was established with five
colleges corresponding to the Five Classics, each with fifty nation-
ally prominent scholars attached to it. The simpler of the Four
Books were required as texts in school education. From the begin-
ning of the fourteenth century, the Classics were accepted as
/
standard texts for the civil service examinations, on the basis of
which civil officials were selected. Until 1905 they were regarded
as the norm for all aspects of life. As such, they have provided
China with a set of standards which are open to discussion and
examination at all times. They have maintained the unity and
harmony of Chinese culture and life for a remarkably long period.
Most important of all, they have been living testimonies of the
conviction that truth finds its validity primarily in history, and, as
a Confucian would say, "can wait a hundred generations for a sage
[to confirm it] without doubt." 3 At the same time, they grew to be
so powerful as to dominate Chinese thought, restrict creative phil-
osophical thinking, and discourage intellectual variety. At times,
their study even degenerated into pure scholasticism. There can
be no doubt that the belief in the supreme authority of the Classics
delayed the advent of both the intellectual renaissance and natural
science in China.
The fact that the Classics have been accepted as the highest
standards for human activity implies that the eternal truths which
they embody are essentially moral. This is another important aspect
of the Chinese concept of truth. The Natural Law covers all events,
so that all events, whether human or natural, have a moral char-
acter. When the Confucian of the second century B.C. advocated a
philosophy of correspondence between political events and astro-
nomical phenomena, they were not believers in astrology. To a
great extent they were politically motivated, for they purposely
utilized certain objective laws and events to control the emperor.
Behind this political activity, however, there was the fundamental
conviction about truth, that it is essentially moral. That is to say,
all truths, whether evident in Nature or in human history, are
meant for the purpose of moral cultivation. The Chinese make no
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absolute distinction between physical things and human activities,
both being represented by the word "shih." (Only the Whitehead-
ian term "event" approximates this word.) They both obey the
same set of laws, of which the Moral Law is considered the ulti-
mate. As a result, there has been very little discussion on the
problem of truth and falsehood but much discussion on the
problem of good and evil. In fact, the question of good and evil
has been one of the most important in philosophical inquiry
throughout Chinese history, whether in Confucianism, Taoism, or
Buddhism. On the transcendental level, Buddhism denies the dis-
tinction between good and evil. Taoism to some extent does the
same. And, under the influence of Buddhism and Taoism, Neo-
Confucianism made similar assertions. But Chinese philosophers
have been quick to add that the having of no distinction of good
and evil in the transcendental state is itself good. As Ch'eng Hao's
(Ch'eng Ming-tao, 1032-1085) famous saying has it, "Good and
evil are natural principles. What is called evil is not originally
evil." 4 And Chu Hsi added, "All natural principles are good." 5 It is
significant to note that the term "shih-fei" (true or false) almost
invariably has moral connotations.
However, it is not enough simply to read the Classics and
learn the moral truths contained therein. Truth comes to life only
when it is genuinely and concretely realized by one's person
through actual polishing and training in human affairs. This is the
concept of t'i-jen, or personally realizing and witnessing truth, a
term that defies simple translation. It involves a critical and ra-
tional understanding of things, a personal conviction as to their
meaning and significance, and, finally, an intuition of their ultimate
reality. Such realization can come about only after rich experience
in human affairs. One of the strongest advocates of such realization
was the idealistic Neo-Confucian Wang Yang-mingo He was no
Meditation Buddhist in Confucian disguise, as has been charged,
for he always insisted that realization must be preceded by "always
be doing something." 6 To him, ultimate truth is to be realized in
the midst of human affairs and can be understood only in the light
of human affairs. Of course, Wang, Ch'eng, and Chu were all
talking about moral truths. But, then, to most Chinese philoso-
phers, no truth is amoral.
This close relation between truth and experience is expressed
in yet another concept, namely, the close relation between action
and words. Confucius was one of the very first Chinese thinkers to
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lay equal emphasis on both. He always insisted that words and
actions should correspond. He said, "I listen to a person's words
and watch his action." 7 He also said, 'What the superior man says
can be carried out." 8 In The Doctrine of the Mean it is said, "A
superior man's words correspond to his action, and his action cor-
responds to his words." 9 The whole doctrine of the rectification
of names in ancient Chinese philosophy, as well as the whole
extensive discussion on the correspondence between names and
actuality 10 in ancient China, was ethical in intent rather than
epistemological or metaphysical. In the entire Neo-Confucian
movement, this equal emphasis on words and action was faithfully
maintained. According to Ch'eng I (Ch'eng I-ch'uan, 1033-1107)
and his elder brother, Ming-tao, efforts for the extension of knowl-
edge (of which words are but expressions) and actual demonstra-
tion are to be exerted simultaneously.ll Chu Hsi said, "Knowledge
and action always require each other. It is like a person who cannot
walk without legs although he has eyes and who cannot see with-
out eyes although he has legs. With respect to order, knowledge
comes first, and, with respect to importance, action is more im-
portant." 12 Again, he said, "The efforts of both knowledge and
action must be exerted to the utmost. As one knows more clearly, he
acts more earnestly, and, as he acts more earnestly, he knows more
clearly." 13 The final result was Wang Yang-ming's famous doctrine
of the unity of knowledge and action. He said, "Knowledge is the
crystallization of the will to act, and action is the task of carrying
out that knowledge; knowledge is the beginning of action, and ac-
tion is the completion of knowledge." 14 Wang is usually credited
with the innovation of the doctrine, but, while he was the first one
to identify knowledge and action, the stress on their equal impor-
tance, and by implication on their mutual involvement, is an
ancient one. Actually, in all this emphasis on the equality or identity
of knowledge and action, the stress has always been on the side of
action. This tradition can be traced to The Book of History, where
it is said, "It is not difficult to know but difficult to act." 15 It was
continued by Confucius, who taught that "the superior man acts
before he speaks and afterwards speaks according to his actions." 16
We have already noted that to Chu Hsi action is more important
than knowledge. When Sun Yat-sen turned the ancient doctrine
around and said that "it is difficult to know but easy to act," he was
really upholding the long tradition of emphasizing action.
From the above it is clear that in the Chinese tradition theories
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and practice have been thought of as complementary, interdepend-
ent, mutually penetrating, and even identical. Along with this
conviction, or perhaps because of it, several significant develop-
ments have taken place in the history of Chinese thought. One is
that in traditional China philosophy never became a separate
discipline of study. This discipline came into existence only as a
result of Western influence. Not that there has been no meta-
physics. Neo-Taoist philosophy and much of Buddhist philosophy
are highly metaphysical. But they are outside the main currents
of Chinese thought. In the major tradition, philosophy was not
set aside as an independent discipline but was regarded as a study
of all human affairs in all their connections and ramifications. The
word for philosophy, "che," means the same as the Greek "sophia."
Etymologically it consists of the "mouth" and the "hand" (or the
axe) as integral parts, thus suggesting words and action. But we
are not sure of this etymology. At any rate, philosophy has been
understood basically as wisdom. Among the Confucian Classics, the
book that corresponds to philosophy is The Book of Changes, which
was originally used for divination. To interpret Chinese philosophy
as an outgrowth of ancient oracles is to miss the essential point.
The connection between Chinese philosophy and divination has
nothing to do with supernaturalism or revelation. Rather, divination
performed the function of philosophy in early Chinese society
because divination was a search for decisions for action, which is
the very purpose of Chinese philosophy as the Chinese have under-
stood it. In short, philosophy is dedicated to everyday life and
ordinary action. Consequently, the Chinese did not develop a
special terminology for philosophy different from everyday lan-
guage and beyond the understanding of the simple man. As The
Doctrine of the Mean puts it, the Way of the superior man "can
be understood by, the men and women of Simple intelligence." 17
Major terms such as "Ii" (principle), "ch'i" (material force or
matter-energy), "yin," "yang," ";en" (humanity), and so forth are
ordinary words connected with various aspects of life, including
art, government, medicine, and even cooking. To be sure, the Neo-
Taoists and Buddhists used very technical philosophical terms, and
some terms, e.g., "ch'i," can become very technical, but they are
exceptions rather than the rule.
Another interesting development parallel with or growing out
of the close relation between theories and practice is that, aside
from a few philosophers, notably Chuang Tzu (b. 36g B.C.), the
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Taoist Kuo Hsiang (d. A.D. 312), and Neo-Taoist and Buddhist
philosophers, all have been men active in social and political
affairs. Confucius was, of course, the one who set the pattern. As
was said of him, "If for three months he was not in government
employment he would be at a loss," 18 so anxious was he for an
active life. From Tung Chung-shu (ca. 176-104 B,C.) through Chu
Hsi down to K'ang Yu-wei (1857-1927), with only a few excep-
tions, all prominent scholars have been active public figures. A
typical case is that of Wang Yang-mingo After he started his public
career at twenty-eight, all the rest of his life, with the exception of
seven or eight years, was devoted to government service-as a
magistrate, a governor, or a military governor suppressing several
rebellions, and so forth. In our own day, Chinese philosophers
have been intimately involved in social and political movements.
Because Chinese philosophers have emphasized action more
than words, and because they themselves were dedicated to social
and political action, few have shut themselves up in an ivory
tower to write long treatises on philosophy or any theoretical sub-
ject. This explains the scarcity of such materials in the huge body
of Chinese literature. More often than not, they have propounded
their doctrines in conversations, letters, and official documents.
Hence, the teachings of Confucius, Lao Tzu, and others are found
in conversations. Books like the Chuang Tzu seem to consist of
systematic essays. Actually, they are a series of conversations. The
two most important works of Ch'eng Hao are his "Ting-hsing shu"
(On Calming Human Nature) and "Shih-jen p'ien': (On Under-
standing len [Humanity]).19 The former is part of a letter, and
the latter is a conversation. Similarly, the most important piece of
work by Wang Yang-ming is his Records of Instructions for Prac-
tical Living, which is recorded dialogues, especially the essay on
"Pulling up the Root and Stopping up the Source," which is part
of a letter included in the Records.20 The source of Chu Hsi's
philosophy is his conversations, recorded and published in 140
chapters.
These facts, that Chinese Philosophy finds its being and ex-
pression in the common life and common speech of the Chinese,
that most Chinese philosophers have been active men, and that
their philosophical works have been chiefly writings connected
with actual living, should convince us that the close relationship
between theories and practice is not just a conviction in China but
a demonstrated fact. However, we need to examine at least one
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basic doctrine and see how it has actually been applied to practical
affairs. In order to do so, we must find the most representative
doctrine, one that has been prevalent over a long period of time
and has been characteristic not only of Confucianism but of Taoism
and Buddhism as well. Fortunately, such a doctrine is not difficult
to find. Most students of Chinese thought will immediately mention
humanism, for humanism is evident in all aspects of Chinese life,
is characteristic of all three traditional systems, and has prevailed
in China for many centuries.
The emergence of man as of supreme importance took place
very early in Chinese history, probably before Confucius. During
the Shang Dynasty (1751-1112 B.C.), spiritual beings exercised
direct control over men and their affairs. By the Chou period
(1111-249 B.C.), however, their influence gradually declined. The
Mandate of Heaven, by which a ruler obtained his power to rule,
used to be absolute but now came to be looked upon with mis-
giving. "The Mandate of Heaven is not constant," an early Chou
poet declared.21 He also said, "Never mind your ancestors! Cultivate
your virtue." 22 The new emphasis was now on man and his moral
character. The emphasis on human virtue instead of on the powers
of spirits or the might of the Lord-on-High represented a radical
transition from the Shang to the Chou. The conquest of the Shang
must have required a great deal of ingenuity and ability, and the
importance of man could not have failed to impress thinking men.
New talents were needed for new trades and the building of new
towns. Thus, the role of man became greater and greater. The time
finally came when a slave became a prime minister. By 645 B.C., a
prime minister had declared that "the way of Heaven is far away
and the way of man is near," 23 and, in 547 B.C., some famous words
were uttered that were to become the established expression for
the traditional Chinese concept of immortality. "The best is to
establish virtue," so went the words, "the next best is to establish
achievement, and still the next best is to establish words. When
these are not abandoned with time, it may be called immortality." 24
It was Confucius, of course, who brought Chinese humanism
to its climax. When he was asked about knowledge, he said it was
to know man.25 When he was asked about serving spirits, he an-
swered, "If you cannot serve man, how can you know to serve
spirits?" 26 When he was asked about wisdom, he said it was "to
attend to the welfare of the people." 27 Confucius was so concerned
with man that, when a stable was burned down, he asked only if
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any person was hurt and did not ask about the horses.28 In gov-
ernment, he shifted its center from the rulers to the people, urging
the feeding and educating of the people as the primary functions
of government.29 The traditional concept of the superior man meant
superiority in blood, for the term "chiin-tzu" literally meant sons
of rulers. Confucius changed it to mean superiority in character.
This radical change in concept practically amounted to a social
revolution, and it definitely contributed to the steady decline of
feudalism, which finally collapsed in the third century B.C. The
climax of humanism can be summed up in this celebrated saying
of Confucius: "It is man that can make the Way great and not the
Way that can make man great." 30 His humanism is complete.
At this point we must immediately add that Confucian hu-
manism does not imply in the least that the Supreme Being is
either non-existent or unimportant. When he said, "Respect the
spirits but keep them at a distance," 31 he merely wanted people
to solve their own problems and direct their own destiny instead
of depending on spirits or ancestors. Confucius clearly said that the
superior man stands in awe of Heaven.32 He said that at fifty he
knew the will of Heaven.33 While genuinely believing in a Supreme
Being, Confucianism unmistakably teaches that man is the center
of things.
It may be objected that, while Confucianism is unmistakably
humanistic, Taoism is certainly naturalistic and Buddhism other-
worldly. No one can deny naturalism in Taoism or otherworldli-
ness in Buddhism. It is not generally realized, however, that both
Taoism and Buddhism are humanistic also. It may be surprising,
but it is true.
On the surface, the Lao Tzu (Tao-te ching) seems to teach
withdrawal from the human world. Actually, at least a third of the
book deals with the art of governing, including a few chapters on
military operations.34 Chuang Tzu did say that "man, compared
to the myriad things, is like the tip of a hair upon a horse's skin." 35
He also urged us "not to violate the Way with the human heart or
to assist Nature with man." 36 But three of the seven so-called
"inner" chapters of the Chuang Tzu, which are considered to be
the authentic chapters, deal with the mundane world, the ideal
teacher, and the ideal ruler. The ideal being, to him as to Lao Tzu,
is the sage, and is not one who withdraws from the human world.
He takes no action (wu-wei), but, according to Kuo Hsiang, "By
taking no action is not meant folding one's arms and closing
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one's mouth." 37 He also said, "Although the sage is in the midst of
government, his mind seems to be in the mountain forest. . . . His
abode is in the myriad things, but it does not mean that he does
not wander freely." 38 His ideal is what the Taoists have called
"sageliness within and kingliness without." 39 This ideal was ac-
cepted in later Confucianism as well. By following Nature, then,
Taoism simply means to be natural, which does not mean to be
any less human. After all, the main theme in the long develop-
ment of Taoism, both as a philosophy and as a religion, has been
the cultivation of a long life, an everlasting life if possible. This
theme is prominent in both Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, and was
even translated into action in the Taoist religion. For centuries, it
tried various ways and means, including exercise, diets, medicine,
and alchemy, in an effort to prolong life on earth.
As to Buddhism, most people agree that it has its otherworldly
aspects. It is important to point out, however, that it was in an
intensively humanistic atmosphere that Buddhism entered China
and thrived. Consequently, from the very beginning, the Buddha
was understood in human terms. In the treatise, "The Disposition
of Error" (Li-huo lun) by Mou Tzu (second century A.D.?),
perhaps the first Chinese treatise on Buddhism, there is repeated
emphasis on the Buddha as a man of moral achievements, claiming
that he "accumulated many virtues," "aimed at virtue," "was the
progenitor of virtue," etc.40 The Chinese translation for the Buddha's
name, Sakyamuni, was "neng-jen," literally "the ability to be good."
Temples dedicated to him were called "jen-tz'u," "temples of
goodness."
To be sure, the Buddha has been worshipped in China as a
deity. In fact, the Chinese people worship three Buddhas, or,
rather, the Buddha in Three Bodies or three aspects. But the most
popular Buddhist deity in China has been Avalokitesvara or Kuan-
yin, and Kuan-yin has been almost humanized. In India, from the
third to the twelfth century, and in Japan today, he retains his
transcendental and heavenly features, but in China he has been
devoid of these qualities and has become a human figure, and,
from the T'ang period (618-g07) on, a woman, or the Goddess of
Mercy, "Mother" to millions of devotees. In pictorial representa-
tions, the Indian rosaries are still present, but, more often than
not, they are carried by a crane, a Chinese symbol for longevity.
Kuan-yin holds a flower vase from which all kinds of blessings are
poured over all of humanity. And these blessings are not nirviiTJa,
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a world transcending our own, but such human blessings as health,
wealth, long life, and, most important of all, children. Instead of
sitting in the high heavens looking upon us with compassion, she
is likely to be sitting by a bamboo grove, carrying a baby or holding
a fish basket. A story was even invented in the eleventh century
that she was originally a girl who became a goddess because of her
filial piety. Kuan-yin is so close to mankind as to be almost human.
The story of Chinese Buddhism is too complicated to go into
here. It is often said, however, that the Pure Land and Meditation
schools have provided Chinese Buddhism with a general pattern
of practice. It is significant that in both these schools Buddhism
has been humanized.
It sounds strange to say that the Pure Land school is hu-
manistic, for to pray to be reborn in paradise means to get away
from the human world. Nevertheless, man occupies a central posi-
tion in this movement. Technically speaking, the school is not
indigenous to China, for the doctrine was taught in India and
the basic texts are Indian. But in spirit and character it is truly
Chinese, and it now exists nowhere else but in China and Japan,
in both of which it is the most popular Buddhist sect. While in
India rebirth in the Pure Land meant a complete break with earthly
life, which was considered a life of suffering, in the Chinese Pure
Land school it means an extension of earthly living. There is no
deprecation of mundane life. Human relations are continued in the'
Pure Land. This is why one should transfer his merits to his an-
cestors, and to the Buddhists this act is considered one of the most
meritorious. One cannot, help hearing here the ring of a Con-
fucian note.
In the Meditation school the most important tenet is the belief
that buddha-nature is inherent in one's own mind and that the best
means to salvation is to look into one's mind to see buddha-nature
there. This is what later Buddhists called "directly pointing to the
human mind and becoming a buddha by seeing one's own nature."
The result is the doctrine of salvation by oneself. What is more
interesting, salvation is to be achieved here and now. And, most
interesting of all, it is to be achieved "in this very body." One can-
not help recalling that Confucians have always regarded the body
as a gift from parents and, as such, as a sacred trust and therefore
to be well taken care of, and, that for centuries, as has already
been noted, the Taoists tried many ways to make the body suit-
able for everlasting life on earthY
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From the above it is clear that in China the note of humanism
has been strong, not only in Confucianism, but in Taoism and Bud-
dhism also. It is not necessary to argue any further that humanism
is the keynote in Chinese thought. That keynote vibrates through-
out Chinese history. What we need to do now is to see how this
uncompromising humanism has affected Chinese practices and in-
stitutions. For this purpose we shall concentrate on two questions:
( 1) Has man in fact occupied a central position in Chinese institu-
tions? (2) Has man in fact been regarded as important?
With respect to the central position of man in Chinese life, it
is significant to note that man, rather than law, has been the con-
trolling factor in Chinese political life. As early as Confucius, man
was considered the most important element in government. "The
administration of government depends on men," declared the Sage.
"Let there be men, and the government will flourish," he said, "but,
without men, government will decay and cease." 42 Up to our own
time, government in Chinese history has been based on man rather
than law or systems. Not that there were no laws or systems, but
man was considered the deciding factor. Consequently, govern-
ment officials were selected through an open competitive civil serv-
ice examination which resulted in the institution of government by
scholar-gentlemen, that is, government by the elite. Generally
speaking, the record of these scholar-gentlemen has been a worthy
one. It was good enough to be praised and imitated in eighteenth-
century Europe. Nevertheless, it has given China a tremendous
handicap in her transition from government by men to govern-
ment by law, and personal considerations in Chinese government
have been a curse.
Not only in government but also in art has man been the
center in China. From its earliest days, Chinese poetry has been
concerned with man's fortune and misfortune, his joys and sor-
rows, and his family and friends. It is man's sentiments that poets
strive to express. This idea is stated more than once in the Classics.
In The Book of History it is said that "poetry is to express the
will." 43 This dictum is repeated in Tso's Commentary on The Spring
and Autumn Annals.44 And in The Book of Rites it is declared that
"poetry is to express the will." 45 When Confucius said that the odes
can arouse the mind, can help us observe social conditions, can
assist us in living as a group, can express our feelings of dissatisfac-
tion, and can help us fulfill the more immediate duty of serving
---
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our fathers and the remoter one of serving one's ruler, as well as
becoming acquainted with the names of birds, animals, and plants,46
he was describing the function of Chinese poetry that has been
accepted in Chinese history ever since his time. It is true that
there have been Nature poetry and religious poetry in China, but
they are exceptions rather than the rule. While it has been the
convention for poets to devote the first half of a poem to the
description of natural scenery, the purpose is chiefly to create a
mood for the expression of human sentiments in the-latter half.
Like drama in many lands, Chinese drama had a religious
origin and, consequently, in its early stages had supernatural char-
acters and supernatural themes. But, as it developed, it quickly
gave way to the portrayal of historical events and social life and
the expression of sentiments. What is true of Chinese poetry and
drama is also true of Chinese music, for it has always been a part
of the poetic and dramatic arts.
It may be argued that in Chinese painting man occupies a
rather insignificant place. In the traditional classification of paint-
ing, landscape and flowers-and-birds precede people-and-things.
Landscape is the crowning art of China, in which the fundamental
principles of art are embraced and the greatest artistic talents have
been immortalized. It is truly the representative art of China. Here
man seems to be subordinated to Nature, for human figures are
usually very small, often incidental, and sometimes totally absent.
This fact has led some Western writers to conclude that man is not
important in China.
To understand the true meaning of Chinese landscape painting,
however, one must understand its relation to poetry. It is well
known to students of Chinese art that in Chinese painting there is
poetry and in Chinese poetry there is painting, or, as Kuo Hsi
(ca. 108S) put it, "Poetry is formless painting, and painting is
poetry in visual form." In short, the two arts are not only related
but identical as far as their ultimate functions are concerned. What
is their function? It is none other than to express human senti-
ments of joy and sorrow, happiness and anger, and feelings of
peace, nobility, loneliness, and so on. Chinese artists paint land-
scape for the same reason poets describe scenery in their poems.
Their purpose is to refine the feelings, stimulate the mind, and
create a mood so that when the reader or onlooker emerges from
the mood, he becomes a nobler soul, a loftier spirit, a friendlier
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neighbor, a more pious son, in short, a better human being. There
is no subordination of man to Nature in Chinese landscape paint-
ing. Neither is there escape from the human world.
Man is central, not only in Chinese government and the arts,
but even in religion, which is supposed to be otherworldly and
transcendental. This is not to deny that most Chinese Buddhists
aspire to go to paradise, the "Pure Land." But, significantly, one
of the most important transformations of Buddhism in China has
been the change from the doctrine of salvation in nirviiT)a after
death to the doctrine of salvation on earth and "in this very body,"
as we have pointed out. In spite of its acceptance of Buddhist
concepts of heavens and hells, the Taoist religion has always held
to the goal of everlasting life on earth. Immortals are believed to
inhabit the high mountains. They may ascend to heaven, but, more
often than not, they roam this earth and move among men, guiding
them and helping them. The center of religion is the human world,
where even man's own body becomes important.
These observations are quite general, but they are based on
such broad facts as to convince us that man in fact occupies a
central place in the various aspects of Chinese culture.
As to the importance of man as such, it is often asked why, if
man is so important, has the idea of the individual not been de-
veloped in Chinese thought? In answer to this it must be stressed
that the Western impression that the individual is undermined in
traditional Chinese society comes partly from limited observation
of Chinese social and political life and partly from an inadequate
understanding of Chinese thought. Since marriage has traditionally
been arranged by parents, property held in the name of the family,
and for a long time in Chinese history the family, rather than the
individual, was treated as a unit, it would seem that China has
had no respect for the individual. Furthermore, since both Taoism
and Buddhism deny the self and Confucianism teaches obedience,
it seems that Chinese thought attaches little importance to the
individual as such.
Such observations are superficial. While in traditional China
the Chinese has had no personal choice in marriage, he has en-
joyed absolute freedom in the choice of religion. There is a general
regard for privacy, in religion as in other spheres of life. While
property has been held in common, each son has had his inalien-
able right to inheritance. There was no individual vote guaranteed
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by a constitution, and yet in village meetings every male adult was
a voting member by natural right. In the thirteen-century-long
tradition of civil service examinations, the basis for the selection
of government officials was Individual merit rather than race,
creed, economic status, sex, or age.
Whether Buddhism denies the individual is a moot point.
However, in the Mahayana concept of nirviitJa, it is described in
terms of permanence, joy, the ego, and purity. The self is not really
denied. Certainly most Chinese Buddhists aspire to individual,
eternal existence in paradise. Taoism does advocate "having no
self," and teaches that one must lose one's life in order to find it.
Yet, the Taoist is the most rugged individualist among the Chinese.
He would have as little government as possible. He would not be
swayed by fear of other people's opinions. He meditates on Nature,
not to overcome himself by it but to enjoy himself therein. Under
Taoist influence Nature does seem to dominate in Chinese land-
scape painting where the human figure is dwarfed in the shadow
of majestic mountains and rivers. But it is wrong to say that in
Chinese landscape painting man is subjugated by Nature; the per-
spective is not intended to put man into oblivion, but to purify and
harmonize his emotions and make him a better man. As to Con-
fucianism, suffice it to quote from Confucius, who said, "Although
the leader of three armies can be captured, the will of a common
man cannot be destroyed," 47 and from Mencius, who declared, "All
things are complete in the self." 48 Some years ago a group of
Oxford scholars, being disturbed by the popular but mistaken be-
lief that the individual was respected in the West but suppressed
in the East, examined the idea in all cultures. This is what the
editor of the symposium had to say: "It was stated that the individ-
ual had been discovered by Christianity. Now, apart from the
question of what the Christian religion has done for the individual
-admittedly a very great deal-there can be no doubt that the
statement is not true to historical facts. The India that produced
Buddhism, not to speak of the greater part of the Bhagavadgita,
in the centuries before the Christian era, had plainly been awake
to the individual and his soul. In China, from the fifth century
[B.C.] on, there were remarkable discoveries made by all sorts of
thinkers as to the nature of personality and its value to society." 49
Actually, one of China's chief troubles in recent decades has
been an excess of individualism. Everyone has his own opinion.
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There have been far too many individualists who think they are
above society. Teamwork and co-operative enterprise have been
conspicuously lacking. This is the type of thing the communists
have set out to destroy. The problem is whether they will destroy
the individual himself in the process.
However, while the individual is fully considered as impor-
tant, his importance is not to overshadow that of society. A balance
of the two has to be maintained. In fact, the goal of moral discipline
is exactly this balance. The highest ethical goal is humanity (jen).
As Confucius taught, "The man of jen, wishing to establish his own
character, also tries to help others to succeed." 50 This is an ex-
ceedingly important saying, one that is well known to any student
of Confucianism. It is important, not only because it is a positive
statement of the Golden Rule, but also because it expresses the
central Chinese idea that a good man must also be a good member
of society. Significantly, the Chinese character for jen consists of two
parts, one meaning man himself and the other meaning many, that
is, society. The interest of the individual and that of society are
fully recognized, and so is the necessity of their adjustment. A
basic institution has existed for centuries for this purpose, namely,
the family. Among the functions of the family, surely one of the
most important is its position as the intermediate point between
the individual and the larger society. It is here that one is trained
in the adjustments he will have to make throughout life as between
himself and other men. This is the reason harmony has been
stressed as a cardinal virtue for the family. How well the Chinese
have succeeded in maintaining the balance between the individual
and society and whether the family should continue to be the
training ground for this adjustment in a modern democracy are
important and interesting questions for discussions.
So far as our immediate question is concerned, the above ob-
servations cannot fail to lead to the conclusion that Chinese philos-
ophy and practical affairs have been close both in theory and in
fact.
In summary, from the Chinese concepts that truth can be
discovered and tested only in events, that eternal truths are essen-
tially moral, and that action and words are virtually identified,
and from the fact that these concepts have resulted in humanism
as the dominant system of Chinese thought, we are forced to the
conclusion that Chinese philosophy and practical affairs have been
close both in theory and in fact.
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QUESTION: In your paper you have discussed Buddhism and
Taoism at some length, and their place in Chinese life and thought
is recognized. Nevertheless, it is hard to avoid the feeling that you
have considered Confucianism the dominant system in Chinese
history. Does this agree with the usual saying that the three sys-
tems of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism have prevailed in
parallel throughout much of Chinese history?
ANSWER: It is difficult to measure the influence of philosophical
systems. Surely Taoism has exercised tremendous influence on
Chinese art, religion, government, and philosophy of life, and Bud-
dhism has contributed substantially to Chinese religion, philosophy,
and art, especially sculpture. But there is no question that Con-
fucianism, or, rather, Neo-Confucianism, has been the dominant
system in China during the last 800 years. It has been the con-
trolling system so far as government, education, literature, society,
ethics, and non-institutional religion are concerned. It went through
many phases and has various aspects, but its fundamental tenets
have remained throughout the centuries. In all these, both Bud-
dhism and Taoism have played a secondary role. Furthermore,
the metaphysics, espistemoJogy, and psychology of medieval Bud-
dhism and Taoism were assimilated into Confucianism to constitute
Neo-Confucianism in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Finally,
there has been no significant Buddhist or Taoist development in
the last 800 years in institutions or in thought.
QUESTION: You have emphasized the Confucian teaching of
correspondence between theory and practice, and yet it seems that
Confucius taught occasional departure from theory. In Analects
XIII. 18, for example, Confucius taught that it is not upright for a
Son to bear witness against his father's stealing a sheep but upright
for him to conceal the misconduct of his father. How do you ex-
plain that?
ANSWER: This and other teachings have given rise to the im-
pression that Confucian ethics is relative or determined by circum-
stances, especially family relatives. This is not true. Actually,
Confucians and Neo-Confucians have always strongly stressed
eternal moral prinCiples. At the same time, they have been practical
enough to take care of special situations. They have done this with
the twofold doctrine of standard and expedient. Eternal principles
are standard, while special situations require expedient measures.
It is standard to be forthright and honest. but in this case it is
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expedient to conceal the father's misconduct. The reason for this
is not to sacrifice moral principles in order to be filial or to submit
to the father's will. Rather, it is to sacrifice honesty to preserve the
greater value of family harmony. This is permissible as an expedient
when small issues are involved, so long as the total human values
are preserved. However, when fundamental issues are involved,
even family relations must be sacrificed. This is illustrated by the
classical example of Confucius' hero, the Duke of Chou (d. 1094
B.C. ). He executed his own older and younger brothers who were
plotting for the overthrow of the Chou Dynasty. The principle
"to annihilate relatives for the sake of great moral principles" (ta-i
mieh-ch'in) has been a fundamental one in Confucianism.51
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WING-TSIT CHAN The Story
of Chinese Philosophy
CHINESE PHILOSOPHY is an intellectual symphony in three move-
ments. The first movement, from the sixth to the second century
B.C., was essentially a period of development of the three major
themes of Confucianism, Taoism, and Moism, and the four minor
ones of the Logicians, Neo-Moism, the Legalists, and Yin-Yang
Interactionism, all with their contrasts and harmonies, to the ac-
companiment of the others of the "Hundred Schools." The second
movement was characterized by the intermingling of the different
motives which resolved into the dominant chord of medieval Chi-
nese philosophy, while the note of Buddhism was introduced from
India, giving it the effect of counterpoint. In the third movement,
the longest of all, from the eleventh century to the present day,
the characteristic notes of Chinese philosophy have been synthe-
sized to transform the persistent chord of Confucianism into the
long and unique melody which is Neo-Confucianism.
This analogy immediately suggests that there is consonance as
well as dissonance among the main systems of Chinese thought,
a significant fact to note particularly in the case of the ancient
schools. The opposition between humanistic Confucianism and
naturalistic Taoism is, at first sight, almost irreconcilable. But any
complete distinction inevitably distorts the picture. Early Taoism
is nearer to Confucianism than is generally understood, especially
in its philosophy of life. Contrary to the popular belief that Lao
Tzu taught the renunciation of life and society, his ethical doctrine
Was more akin to that of the world-wise Confucius than to Hin-
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duism or Buddhism. This opinion is neither new nor personal, but
a general one among native historians of Chinese philosophy. Both
Dr. Hu Shih in his The Development of the Logical Method in
Ancient China 1 and Professor Fung Yu-Ian in his A History of
Chinese Philosophy 2 interpreted Lao Tzu in a way quite different
from that to which the West is accustomed. The main interest of
Taoism and Confucianism is life, the chief difference being that
in Taoism the preservation of life comes with following Nature,
whereas in Confucianism the fulfillment of life comes with the full
development of man.
Early Confucianism: Confucius, Mencius,
Hsiin Tzu, and the Chung yung
The movement of humanism began with Confucius (551-
479 B.C.). It gained momentum in Mencius (327-289? B.C.) and
Hsiin Tzu (313-238? B.c.), and finally reached its climax in Neo-
Confucianism. It is a story of more than two thousand years. It is
the story of Chinese life and thought. From the time of Confucius
to the present day, the chief spiritual and moral inspiration of the
Chinese has been the Confucian saying: "It is man that can make
t!Ie Way great, and not the Way. that can make man great." 3
To say that Confucius was humanistic is not to deny that the
Sage showed a reasonable interest in religion. Confucius was, on
the one hand, a reformer, apioneer in universal education for all
those who cared to come 4 and for people of all classes,5 a man who
traveled for fourteen years over many states in search of an oppor-
tunity to serve the rulers in order that the Moral Law (Tao, the
Way)6 might prevail. He was, on the other hand, a conformist,
a man who "believed in and loved the ancients," 7 a man who
attempted to uphold the culture of Chou 8 of which the worship
of Heaven and ancestors was an integral part. Consequently, he
said: "The superior man stands in awe of ... the Mandate of
Heaven." 9 He believed that, "if the Way is to prevail, it is the
Mandate of Heaven." 10 He himself offered sacrifices to his ancestors
and "felt as if his ancestral spirits were actually present," saying,
"If I do not participate in the sacrifice, it is as if I did not sacrifice
at all." 11 Nevertheless, he frankly put the welfare of men before
religion. His reluctance to discuss Heaven caused his pupils to say
that his view of the Way of Heaven "cannot be heard." 12 He "never
discussed strange phenomena, physical exploit, disorder, or spirit-
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ual beings." 13 When a pupil asked about serving spiritual beings
, and about death, he replied, "If we are not yet able to serve men,
how can we serve spiritual beings? ... If we do not yet know
about life, how can we know about death?" 14
From these it is evident that Confucius was a humanist even
in religious matters; he was not a priest, much less the founder of
the religion bearing his name. Man, and man alone, engaged his
primary attention. This can be seen from the following passage:
,--- The ancients who wished to manifest their clear character to the
world would first bring order to their states. Those who wished to bring
order to their states would first regulate their families. Those who wished
to regulate their families would first cultivate their personal lives. Those
who wished to cultivate their personal lives would first rectify their
minds. Those who wished to rectify their minds would first make their
wills sincere. Those who wished to make their wills sincere would first
extend their knowledge. The extension of knowledge consists in the inves-
tigation of things. When things are investigated, knowledge is extended;
when knowledge is extended, the will becomes sincere; when the will is
sincere, the mind is rectified; when the mind is rectified, the personal life
is cultivated; when the personal life is cultivated, the family will be reg-
ulated; when the family is regulated, the state will be in order; and when
the state is in order, there will be peace throughout the world.15
This is a comprehensive program, but may be summed up in
one word, namely, "jen," humanity. This is the central idea in the
Confucian system, around which the whole Confucian movement
developed. Confucius neither defined nor analyzed .jen. It is even
recorded in The Analects (Lun yii) that he "seldom" talked about
it,16 Although 55 out of the 498 chapters of The Analects are de-
voted to a discussion of humanity, the Master viewed the matter
with such high seriousness that he gave the impression of having
seldom discussed the subject.
The statement nearest to a definition of jen is that it "consists
in mastering oneself and returning to propriety (li)." 17 This prac-
tically amounts to the entire Confucian philosophy, since jen, so
defined, involves the realization of the self and the creation of a
social order. Specifically, 'bumanity" consists in "being respectful
in private life, being serious in handling affairs, and being loyal in
dealing with others." 18 A man "who is strong, resolute, simple, and
slow to speak" is "near" to humanity.19 Again, "One who can prac-
tice five things wherever he may be, is humane . . . namely,
earnestness, broadness, truthfulness, diligence, and generosity." 20
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"The man of humanity," Confucius said, "wishing to establish his
own character, also seeks to establish the character of others. Wish-
ing to succeed, he also seeks to help others succeed." 21 In a word,
to be a man of humanity is to "love all men." 22
Such a man of humanity is what Confucius called the "supe-
rior man," who is the combination of "the man of humanity who
has no worry, the man of wisdom who has no perplexities, and the
man of courage who has no fear." 23 He regards "righteousness as
the substance of everything. He practices it according to the prin-
ciple of propriety. He brings it forth in modesty. And he carries it
to its conclusion with faithfulness." 24 He "restrains himself in mat-
ters of sex when his blood and vital force are strong. When he
reaches maturity and his blood and vital force are full of vigor, he
restrains himself in matters of strife. When he reaches old age and
his blood and vital force have already weakened, he restrains him-
self in matters of acquisition." 25 He aims at nine things. "In the use
of his eyes, his object is to see clearly. In the use of his ears, his
object is to listen distinctly. In expression, his object is to be warm.
In appearance, his object is to be respectful. In speech, his object
is to be sincere. In handling affairs, his object is to be serious. In
doubt, he wishes to ask. In anger, he wishes to think of the resultant
difficulties. In the face of gain, he thinks of righteousness." 26 He
does not do anything contrary to the principle of propriety,27
wants to be slow in word but diligent in action,28 and thinks of
righteousn~ss instead of profit.29 He enjoys the pleasure derived
from the due ordering of rituals and music, from talking about the
good points of others, and from friendship with many virtuous
men.30 He would give up wealth and rank but endure poverty and
mean position for the sake of moral principles.31 He does not do to
others what he does not want others to do to him,32 "repays hatred
with uprightness and repays virtue with virtue." 33 He exercises
filial loyalty to his parents, to the point of never disobeying but
adhering strictly to the principle of propriety in serving them
when they are alive and sacrificing to them when they are dead.34
He is respectful to his superiors.35 In short, he is a perfect man.
This emphasis on humanism in Confucius is supreme. It un-
derlies all his political, educational, aesthetic, and even his logical
doctrines. People are to be ruled by the good examples of the
rulers, guided by virtue, and regulated by the principles of pro-
priety,S6 and the object of government is to bring wealth and
education to the people and security to the state.S7 Knowledge is
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"to know men." 38 The superior man "studies to reach the utmost
of the Way." 39 Poems are "to stimulate your emotions, to broaden
your observation, to enlarge your fellowship, and to express your
grievances." "They help you in your immediate service to your
parents and in your more remote service to your ruler. They widen
your acquaintance with the names of birds, animals, and plants." 40
Even the "rectification of names," the nearest Confucian approach
to logic, is to be carried out along humanistic lines. For example,
music does not mean merely bells and drums,41 for names, when
rectified, have a practical flavor. So, to rectify names in a state
means: "Let the ruler be a ruler, the minister be a minister, the
father be a father, and the son be a son." 42
This humanism is complete. But what is its logical foundation?
Confucius said that "there is one thread that runs through my
doctrines." 43 This one thread is generally accepted to mean "none
other than conscientiousness and altruism." 44 If this interpretation
is correct, then we are forced to conclude that the foundation of
the Confucian system lies in the moral realm, that is, in human
experience itself. The thread is also generally taken to be identical
with the Confucian doctrine of central harmony (chung yung,
Golden Mean). Indeed, this doctrine is of supreme importance in
Chinese philosophy; it is not only the backbone of Confucianism,
both ancient and modem, but also of Chinese philosophy as a
whole. Confucius said that "to be central (chung) [in our mOl"al
being] and to be harmonious (yung) [with all]" is the supreme
attainment in our moral life.45 This seems to suggest that Con-
fucius had as the basis of his ethics something psychological or
metaphysical. This was not developed, however, until two cen-
turies later. For Confucius, chung yung definitely meant the
Golden Mean, as indicated by the saying, "To go too far is the same
as not to go far enough." 46 The psychological foundation is to be
provided by Mencius and Hsiin Tzu, and the metaphysical by the
book known as the Chung yung (The Doctrine of the Mean).
Confucius was interested mainly in a practical world, and
therefore taught us how to do good without going into the problem
of why we should do good. To Mencius, however, we do good, not
only because we should, but because we must, for "man's nature is
naturally good just as water naturally flows downward." 47 "If men
do evil, that is not the fault of their natural endowment." 4~ All
men originally have the feeling of commiseration, the feeling of
shame and dislike, the feeling of respect and reverence and dis-
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like, and the feeling of right and wrong, and these are what we
call the "four beginnings" of humanity, righteousness, propriety,
and wisdom.49 This moral consciousness is rooted in the heart of
all men,50 which can be demonstrated by the facts that children
all know how to love their parents,51 and that, when men suddenly
see a child about to fall into a well, a sense of mercy and alarm
is inevitably aroused in their hearts.52
This native feeling for the good is "innate ability," which we
possess without the necessity of learning, and is also "innate
knowledge," which we possess without the necessity of delibera-
tion.53 Thus, "all things are already complete in oneself. There is
no greater joy than to examine oneself and be sincere." 54 For
"sincerity is the way of Heaven, whereas to think how to be sin-
cere is the way of man." 55 The guiding principle of human conduct
is therefore "the full exercise of one's mind." "To exercise our
minds fully is to know our nature, and to know our nature is to
know Heaven. To preserve our minds and to nourish our nature is
the way to serve Heaven. To maintain singleness of mind whether
we suffer premature death or enjoy long life, and to cultivate our
personal character and wait for [Heaven's Mandate to take its
own course] is the way to fulfill our destiny." 56 Thus the prerequi-
sites of a harmonious moral order are all complete in us. Instead
of looking to Nature in order to know ourselves, we look within
ourselves in order to know Nature. We do not even have to look
to the sage, because we "and the sage are the same in kind." 57
The clue to the centrality and harmony of the universe as well as
ourselves is therefore not far to seek. It lies within our nature. To
develop out nature is to realize the virtues intrinsic in it, which
Mencius first reduced to the "four beginnings," and further to
humanity, which is "man's mind," and righteousness, which is
"man's path." 58 The former is the ethical basis of society, while
the latter is the foundation of politics. The term "humanity" (fen)
must be understood in its more fundamental meaning of true
manhood, for "fen is [the distinguishing character] of man. When
embodied in man's conduct, it is the Way." 59 The man of humanity
does nothing which is not according to humanity.60 In fact, he
loves all men.61 The most natural demonstration of humanity is
loyalty to parents, which to Mencius was the greatest of all vir-
tues.62 "Of all which a filial son can attain to, there is nothing greater
than honoring his parents." 63 Filial piety, then, is the foundation
of the five human relationships. "Between father and son there
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should be affection; between ruler and minister, righteousness;
between husband and wife, attention to their separate functions;
between old and young, a proper order; and between friends,
good faith." 64 When these are demonstrated, a harmonious social
order will prevail.
This attempt to provide a psychological foundation for hu-
manism is a significant development in the Confucian school, not
only because it marks a great advance, but also because it exerted
tremendous influence upon the whole school of Neo-Confucianism,
especially from the fourteenth century to the present day.
The psychological development in Hsiin Tzu, however, took
almost the opposite direction. Not that the humanistic spirit is any
weaker in him; on the contrary, it is much stronger. The Way
(Tao) is "not the Way of Heaven, nor the way of Earth, but the
way followed by man, the way followed by the superior man," 65
and, more specifically, "Tao is the way to rule a state," or, in other
words, "to organize the people." 66 Consequently, he vigorously ad-
vocated the control of Nature:
You glorify Nature and meditate on her:
Why not domesticate her and regulate her?
You obey Nature and sing her praise:
Why not control her course and use it?
You look on the seasons with reverence and await them:
Why not respond to them by seasonal activities?
You depend on things and marvel at them:
Why not unfold your own ability and transform them?
You meditate on what makes a thing a thing: .
Why not so order things that you may not waste them?
You vainly seek the cause of things:
Why not appropriate and en;oy what they produce?
Therefore, I say, "To neglect man and speculate about Nature
Is to misunderstand the facts of the universe." 67
Hsiin Tzu believed the control of Nature to be necessary be-
cause he found that human nature is sharply different from what
Mencius pictured it to be. To Hsiin Tzu, "The nature of man is
evil; his goodness is the result of activity." 68 The motive here is
obviously to emphasize education, an emphasis that made him the
outstanding philosopher of education in ancient China. As the
original nature of man is evil, he needs "the civilizing influence
of teachers and laws." 69 Thus, virtue is not inborn, but is to be
"accumulated," just as mountains are formed by accumulation of
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earth.70 The guiding principle of accumulation for the individual
is li, propriety; 71 that for society is the "rectification of names"; 72
and that for the government is "modeling after the latter-day Sage-
Kings." 73 When virtue is "accumulated" to a sufficient degree, man
then can "form a triad" with Heaven and Earth.74
By the end of the fourth century B.C., Confucianism took an-
other step forward. There was an attempt to provide a metaphys-
ical foundation for its humanism, as we can see from The Doctrine
of the Mean (Chung yung).75 According to this book, chung
(equilibrium, or moral being) is conceived to be "the great foun-
dation of the world" and yung (harmony, or moral order) is "the
universal path." "When equilibrium and harmony are realized to
the highest degree, Heaven and Earth will attain their proper order
and all things will flourish." 76 Thus, "the superior man [exempli-
fies] the chung yung." 77
The Doctrine of the Mean further states that sincerity (ch'eng)
is "the Way of Heaven," and "to think how to be sincere" is "the
way of man." 78 Absolute sincerity is "eternal," "self-existent," "in-
finite," "vast and deep," "transcendental and intelligent." 79 It con-
tains and embraces all existence; it fulfills and perfects all existence.
"Such being its nature, it becomes prominent without any display,
produces changes without motion, and accomplishes its end with-
out action." 80 Only those who are "absolutely sincere can fully
develop their nature. If they can fully develop their nature, they
can thep fully develop the nature of others. If they can fully de-
velop the nature of others, they can then fully develop the nature
of things . . . they can then assist in the transforming and nour-
ishing process of Heaven and Earth ... and can thus form a
trinity with Heaven and Earth." 81 How original this metaphysical
tendency was in Confucius is uncertain, but it became an extremely
significant factor in later Confucianism, particularly in the Neo-
Confucianism of the eleventh and fifteenth centuries.
Early Taoism: Yang Chu and Lao Tzu
While this movement of Confucian humanism was progressing,
naturalistic Taoism developed in parallel, with different ways but
similar aims of life. As the goal of Confucianism is the fully de-
veloped life, that.s>f T~o!~m is simple and harmonioll~1if~.Although
the term "Taoism" was not used until the first century B.C., in the
Shih chi (Records of the Historian) by Ssu-ma Ch'ien (14S-86?
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B.C. ), the Taoist movement must have been going on for some
centuries. But whether Yang Chu or Lao Tzu was the first leader
of the movement is a controversial matter.82 In the case of Yang
Chu (ca. 44o-ca. 366 B.C.), the spirit is certainly that of simplicity
and harmony. He was not a hedonist who urged all men to "enjoy
life" and to be satisfied with "a comfortable house, fine clothes, good
food, and pretty women," as the spurious Lieh Tzu of the third
century A.D. represents him,83 or an egotist "who would not have
plucked out one single hair though he might have benefited the
whole world by doing so," as Mencius purposely made him appear
to be.84 He was, rather, a follower of Nature who was mainly
interested in "preserving life and keeping the essence of our being
intact, and not injuring our material existence with things," 85 "a
man who would not enter an endangered city, join the army, or
even exchange a single hair for the profits of the entire world." 86
Even in the chapter entitled "Yang Chu" in the Lieh Tzu, the main
emphasis is to "let life run its course freely," 87 and to ignore, not
only riches and fame, but also life and death. It was this naturalistic
emphasis that made him the representative Taoist of his time.
In the case of Lao Tzu, the keynote of his Tao-te ching (Clas-
sic of the Way and Its Virtue) is "simplicity," a central idea by
which other apparently strange concepts must be understood. A
"simple" life is a life of plainness, in which profit is discarded,
cleverness abandoned, selfishness minimized, and desires reduced.88
It is the life of "perfection which seems to be incomplete" of "full-
ness which seems to be empty," of "absolute straightness which
seems to be crooked," of "skill which seems to be clumsy," and of
"eloquence which seems to stutter." It is the life of "producing
and rearing things without taking possession of them," and of
"leading things but not dominating them." 89 It is the life which
is "as pointed as a square but does not pierce, as acute as a knife
but does not cut, as straight as an unbent line but does not extend,
and as bright as light but does not dazzle." 90
Other fantastic ideas of Taoism have developed and died, but
this is the living factor that has made Taoism a strong fiber of
Chinese ethics even today. It is the point of agreement with the
most powerful intellectual system of China, namely, Confucianism.
It is true that Lao Tzu was extremely critical of the existing
order, even to the point of crying that "when the Great Way (Tao)
declined, the doctrine of humanity and righteousness arose. When
knowledge and wisdom appeared, there emerged great hypoc-
40 WING-TSIT CHAN
risy." 91 But he denounced civilization in the same spirit as he
attacked war, taxation, and punishment,92 essentially because of
their excessive and destructive character. Lao Tzu was no deserter
of civilization. According to authentic historical records, he was. a
minor governmental official. Hu Shih suggests that he and Con-
fucius were both ju, literati of the priest-teacher type, who bore
the torch of civilization; that Lao Tzu was an orthodox ju, a "ju of
the meek," who clung to the culture of the conquered people of
Yin, which was characterized by non-resistance, contentment, etc.,
whereas Confucius, in spite of the fact that he was a descendant
of Yin, was a ju of a new type, a "ju of the strong," who advocated
the replacement of the degenerating Yin culture by the growing
culture of the ruling people of Chou.93 Thus, we must look at Lao
Tzu as a teacher of Simple liVing rather than as a forsaker of life.
It is also true that Lao Tzu taught the strange doctrine of
wu-wei, generally interpreted as "inaction." But it is a mistake to
think of wu-wei as anything suggesting complete inactivity, re-
nunciation, or the cult of unconsciousness. It is, rather, a peculiar
way, or, more exactly, the natural way, of behavior. "The sage man-
ages affairs without action, and spreads doctrines without words." 94
The natural way is to "support all things in their natural state" and
thus allow them to "transform spontaneously." 95 In this manner,
"The Way invariably takes no action, and yet there is nothing left
undone." 96 "The sage-ruler acts without action, and thus all things
will be in order." 91 From this it is quite clear that the way of
wu-wei is the way of spontaneity, to be contrasted with the arti-
ficial way, the way of cleverness and superficial morality. It was
the life of artificiality that drew Lao Tzu's vigorous attack and led
him to glorify the reality of the non-existent, the utility of the
useless, and the strength of the weak.98
This represents no effort to replace being with non-being, or
the strong with the weak. It is, rather, an affirmation of the im-
portance of both. "Eternal non-being" and "eternal being" are "the
same" but "have different names." 99 The truly weak is identical
with the truly strong. As Lao Tzu said, "What is most perfect seems
to be incomplete," and "What is most full seems to be empty." 100
In these utterances, Lao Tzu was even a step nearer to the Golden
Mean. On the surface, he seems to be the champion of the female
as the fundamental principle of life, and of infancy as the ideal
state of being.101 He also seems to advocate emptiness and quie-
tude.102 At bottom, however, his ethical position comes much nearer
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to the center than to the extreme. Since "much talk will, of course,
come to a dead end, it is better to keep to the center." 103
The main difference between Lao Tzu and Confucius lies in
the fact that, while with Confucius the measure of all things is
man, with Lao Tzu it is Nature. Simplicity, wu-wei, and other
ethical ideas are all moral lessons drawn from Nature, which is
the standard for Heaven and Earth as well as for man.104 It is the
Way, Tao, the universal principle of existence. It is "the origin of
Heaven and Earth" and "the mother of all things." .105 It is eternal,
one, all-pervasive, and absolute.106 Above all, it is naturaJ.1°7
As reality is natural, so must our life be. To be natural is to
live like water, which is "similar to the highest good" and so "near
to Tao." 108 Water "dwells in places which people detest," but "it
benefits all things and does not compete with them." 109 "There is
nothing softer and weaker than water, and yet there is nothing
better for attacking hard and strong things." 110 The idealization of
infancy is nothing more than the idealization of the natural state.
It is not the state of ignorance and incapability. It is, rather, a state
of quietude, harmony, and insight. Above all, it is the state of life.
"Tao produced the One. The One produced the two. The two
produced the three. And the three produced the ten thousand
things. The ten thousand things carry yin [the passive or female
principle] and embrace yang [the active or male principle], and
through the blending of the vital force (ch'i) produces har-
mony." 111 To know this harmony is called "the Eternal," and to
know the Eternal is called "enlightenment." 112 Lao. Tzu said:
Attain complete vacuity.
Maintain steadfast quietude.
All things come into being, and I see thereby their return.
All things fiourish, but each one returns to its root.
This return to its root means tranquillity;
It is called returning to its destiny.
To return to destiny is called the Eternal.
To know the Eternal is called enlightenment.
Not to know the Eternal is to act blindly, to result in disaster.
He who knows the Eternal is all-embracing
Being all-embracing, he is impartial.
Being impartial, he is kingly (universal).
Being kingly, he is one with Nature.
Being one with Nature, he is in accord with Tao.
Being in accord with Tao, he is everlasting,
And is free from danger throughout his lifetime.113
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This is perhaps the most comprehensive passage in the Tao-
te ching. We must note that the climax of the whole procedure is
to be "free from danger throughout one's lifetime." Here we have
the humanistic flavor of naturalism. Life is not to be abandoned
but to be made secure and valuable. The greatness of Tao is perfect
primarily because it never considers itself great.114 "He who is con-
tented suffers no disgrace. He who knows when to stop is free
from danger. Therefore he can long endure." 115 It is "only those
who are not seeking after life that excel in making life valuable." 116
In short, the philosophy of Lao Tzu can be summed up by his
phrase "the way of long life and everlasting vision." 117
When this emphasis on a simple and harmonious life in Taoism
is understood, we are in a position to see why this naturalistic and
atheistic philosophy should have been made the foundation of a
superstitious religion in medieval China, which was notorious for its
practice of alchemy and belief in immortals. The simple reason is
that the primary motive of the corrupt Taoist religion was to
search for longevity. The effect of the movement was that man took
more and more to a negative philosophy, losing confidence in him-
self as well as in a progressive social order. Such an attitude was
diametrically opposed not only by Confucianism but by Moism as
well.
Moism, The. Logicians, and Neo-Moism
As in Confucianism, the main interest of Moism is man. In-
stead of the general and vague "humanity," however, Mo Tzu
(468-376? B.C.) advocated the welfare of men. "Promote general
welfare and remove evil" became the motto of the whole Moist
movement.us Mo Tzu was so much opposed to the Confucian
empty talk of "rituals and music" that he entirely rejected them in
favor of "benefits" in terms of population and wealth. "Ancient
kings, dukes and great officials," he said, "in the administration of
their states all aimed at wealth for the country and a great popula-
tion." 119 Consequently, he insisted that "men should marry at
twenty and women at fifteen," 120 and it was on the ground of
population that he denounced war. Military expeditions, he said,
break up family life and result in the decrease of population.121 He
strongly advocated economy of expenditure.122 He attacked elab-
orate funerals and music, not on the basis of morality or decorum,
as Confucius would, but on a strictly utilitarian basis. "The practice
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of elaborate funerals and extended mourning inevitably results in
poverty for the nation, in reduction of population, and in disorder
of government." 123 By the same token, music enjoyed by the rulers
leads to heavy taxes, interferes with farming and other productive
enterprises by taking musicians away from their occupations, and
wastes the time of government officials.124
Our practical philosopher arrived at this utilitarian humanism,
not merely as a reaction against the formalistic tendency of Confu-
cius, but also as a result of his scientific method. "For any doctrine,"
he said, "some standard must be established. . .. Therefore,
for any doctrine there must be three standards.... There
must be a basis or foundation; there must be an examination; and
there must be practical application. How find the basis? Find it
in the experiences of the ancient Sage-Kings above. How is it to
be examined? By inquiring into the actual experience of the eyes
and ears of the people below. How apply it? Put it into law and
governmental measures and see if they bring about benefits to the
state and the people." 125
Instead of attempting to direct and regulate experience by a
central principle such as the "central harmony" of Confucius or
the Tao of Lao Tzu, this utilitarian philosopher chose to arrive
at a general principle through a comprehensive survey of actual
experience. Whether there is fate or not, for example, must be
determined by the actual experience of the eyes and ears of the
people. "If people have seen or heard it, I shall say that there is
fate. If none has seen or heard it, I shall say th~t there is no
fate." 126 Although this positivism sounds crude, the practical and
objective character of Mo Tzu's philosophy is unmistakable.
This practical character carries with it a pragmatic flavor, be-
cause utility and choice are held to be the guiding principles for
value and conduct and even for truth. "The reason why Mo Tzu
censures music is not because the sound of bells, drums, harps,
and flutes is unpleasant . . . but because it does not contribute
to the promotion of general welfare and the removal of evil." 127
By the same token, "All activities that are beneficial to Heaven,
the spirits, and men" are to be fostered as ''heavenly virtues,"
whereas "all words and deeds that are harmful to them" are to be
looked upon as an "enemy." 128 There can be nothing that is good
but not useful.129 The value of such virtues as loyalty and filial
piety is their "great benefit" to all people.130
Thus, value in Moism is limited to "benefits," and every value
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is to be appraised in terms of its ability to "promote welfare and
remove evil." A good life and a well-ordered society depend pri~
marily on a right choice of such values. "A blind man cannot
distinguish black and white, not because he is ignorant of their
definitions, but because he cannot choose between them." Simi-
larly, "the superior men of the world do not know what humanity
really is, not because they do not know its definition, but because
of their failure to choose." 131
To test the utility of a value, it must be put to application to
see whether it actually contributes to the "promotion of welfare
and removal of evil." The fundamental principle of this application
is the famous Moist doctrine of universal love, which aims at the
gr'eatest amount of happiness for the gr~atest number of people
through people's "loving one another and benefiting one an-
other:' 132 "This is," Mo Tzu declared, "the principle of the ancient
Sage-Kings and of the general welfare of men." 133 Lack of it is the
cause of social disorder.134 So, let everyone "treat other countries
as his own, treat other families as his own, and treat other people
as he treats himself:' 135 It is interesting to note that even this
principle is not free from utilitarian flavor, for at least one of the
reasons for this benevolent doctrine is a utilitarian one, namely,
"Those who love others will be loved." 136
It is obvious that the foundation of such a utilitarian philos-
ophy cannot be sought in any internal sanction. Instead, it is to be
sought in "the experience of the wisest men of the past." This
reverence for the past in no way undermines the practical spirit
of the Moist philosophy. Rather, it enhances it, for, according to
Mo Tzu, "The governmental measures of the ancient Sage-Kings
were designed to revere Heaven, to serve the spirits, and to love
men." 137
Another sanction, the religious one, also sounds the note of
practical interests. "If everybody believes in the power of the spirits
to bless the good and condemn evil, there will be no disorder." 138
This belief, when applied to the state and the people, "becomes a
principle of restoring order to the state and promoting the welfare
of the people." 139 It was because of this practical efficacy of religion
that Mo Tzu became its chief defender in ancient China, more so
even than Confucius. One may not accept the theory that Mo Tzu
founded a religion, and that his followers organized a religious
order of some sort. One cannot deny, however, that Mo Tzu went
further than Confucius in the attempt to preserve a religious sys-
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tem. While Lao Tzu definitely tended toward the left and
Confucius adhered to the "Golden Mean" in the belief in the super-
natural, Mo Tzu unmistakably represented the right. We may
safely say, however, that the criterion of the Moist religious belief
was again human interest, for Mo Tzu said, "I do whatever Heaven
wishes me to do; and Heaven does whatever I wish Him to do." 140
Just how the Moist school developed after Mo Tzu is still a
matter of controversy. There is some evidence that it became a
religious order. But another aspect 'of its development, its logical
tendency, known as Neo-Moism, is of more interest to us. The
Neo-Moists, who flourished in the fourth and third centuries B.C.,
sought to establish their practical philosophy on a logical founda-
tion, and, in doing so, they found it necessary to refute the sophistry
of Hui Shih (38O-30S? B.C.), Kung-sun Lung (b. 380? B.C.), and
other Logicians. The former expressed his ideas in such paradoxes
as: "The greatest has nothing beyond itself: it is called the Great
Unit. The smallest has nothing within itself: it is called the Little
Unit." "The sun begins to set at noon; a thing begins to die at
birth." "I go to Yiieh today and arrived there yesterday." 141 Hui
Shih and his group were even more sophistical, and claimed: "The
egg has feathers." "A fowl has three legs." 'Wheels never touch
the ground." "The shadow of a flying bird never moves." "A swiftly
fleeting arrow sometimes does not move and sometimes does not
rest." "A brown horse and a dark ox make three." "If a rod one
foot in length is cut short every day by one half of its length, it
can never be exhausted even after ten thousand generations." 142
Kung-sun Lung further asserted: "A white horse is' not a horse,"
because "the word 'horse' denotes the term and the word 'white'
denotes the color." "A horse is not conditioned by any color, and
therefore both a yellow horse and a black one may answer. A white
horse, however, is conditioned by color... ." 143 He propounded
the theory that all things are "marks," designations or predicates,l44
and that the qualities of solidity and whiteness are independent of
the substance of the stone.l45 The main interest of the Logicians
lay in such concepts as space and time, potentiality and actuality,
motion and rest, the general and the particular, and substance and
quality. In short, the whole movement of the Logicians represented
an interest in knowledge for its own sake, an interest not at all in
harmony with the keen interest in life of Taoism, Confucianism,
and Moism alike. It is no wonder that the Logicians became the
target of attack by all of them.146
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But the Neo-Moists, in order to maintain their practical inter-
est in the face of the intellectualism of the Logicians, had to make
their own logical system strong enough to defend their utilitarian
philosophy. Consequently, they wrote the Neo-Moist Canon in the
form of definitions, propositions, notes, and proofs, now incorpo-
rated in the Mo Tzu,147 They developed seven methods of argu-
mentation: "possibility," "hypothesis," "imitation," "comparison,"
"parallel," "analogy," and "induction." 148 They classified names into
three classes, "general, generic, and private." 149 They discovered
the "method of agreement," which includes "identity, generic re-
lationship, co-existence, and partial resemblance"; the "method of
difference," which includes "duality, absence of generic relation-
ship, separateness, and dissimilarity"; and the "joint method of
differences and similarities." 150 "Identity means that two substances
have one name, while generic relationship means inclusion in the
same whole. Both being in the same room is a case of co-existence,
whereas partial resemblance means having some points of resem-
blance. . .. Duality means that two things necessarily differ. Ab-
sence of generic relationship means to have no connection.
Separateness means that things do not occupy the same space.
Dissimilarity means having nothing in common." 151 They defined
a model as "That according to which something becomes," 152 and
explained that "the concept of a circle, the compass, and the actual
circle ... all may be used as a model." 153 They rejected the theory
of the Logicians that solidity and whiteness and stone are three. On
the contrary, they maintained that solidity and whiteness are in the
stone,154 and that the two qualities are not mutually exclusive.155
While it is significant that the Neo-Moists refused to tolerate
distinctions such as that of quality and substance, an equally impor-
tant point is that knowledge is power. To the Neo-Moists, knowing
means "to meet." 156 Whether it takes the form of "understand-
ing," 157 "learning," "inference," or "searching," 158 its end is con-
duct.159 The function of knowledge is to guide man in his behavior,
especially in the intelligent "choice" between pleasure and pain.
"1£ a man wants to cut off his finger, and his knowing faculty is
not aware of its harmful consequences, it is the fault of his knowing
faculty. 1£ he knows the harmful consequences and is careful about
it, he will not be injured. But, if he still wants to cut off his finger,
then he will suffer." 160 But, "when one cuts off a finger to preserve
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lesser harm." 161 By such intelligent "choice," the Moist "promotion
of general welfare and removal of evil" may be carried out.
It is unfortunate that this logical movement died almost in its
infancy, and thus deprived China of a disinterested, analytical,
and scientific system of logic on which metaphysics and episte-
mology might have been built. However, the overwhelming inter-
est in human affairs was not the only factor that prevented the
growth of intellectualism. There was a strong anti-intellectual
movement in China in the fourth century B.C., the best representa~
tive of which was Chuang Tzu.
Chuang Tzu and the Yin-Yang School
In both the moralistic humanism of the Confucian school and
the utilitarian humanism of the Moists, the intellect enjoyed a
rightful place. It is true that Lao Tzu condemned knowledge in no
uncertain terms, but "enlightenment" in the Tao-te ching is con-
trasted with cleverness and deceit. By the time of Chuang Tzu
(b. 369? B.c.) it was developed to the point of almost complete
unconsciousness. In Chuang Tzu's own language, true knowledge
is "great knowledge," and great knowledge is "all-embracing and
extensive." 162 By this he meant that the intelligent "knows how to
identify all things as one. Therefore he does not use [his own
judgment] but abides in the common [principle]." 163
The underlying principle for this doctrine of pure unity is that
Tao produced all things,164 is the ground for all things,165 and is in
all things, even in such lowly things as the ant, the 'tare, the pots-
herd, and ordure.166 From the point of view of Tao, therefore, "all
things are equal," a theme to which the entire second chapter of the
Chuang Tzu is devoted. "Take the large beam and the small pillar,
or take an ugly woman and Hsi-shih (a famous beauty), or take
generosity, strangeness, deceit, and abnormality. Tao identifies
them all as one. What is division [to others] and what is produc-
tion [to others] is destruction [to some].167 Generally speaking,
"the 'this' is also the 'that,' and the 'that' is also the 'this:" 168 From
the standpoint of "mutual production," the "'that' is produced by
the 'this', and the 'this' is caused by the 'that:" 169 This is to say that
"when there is life, there is death, and when there is death, there is
life. When there is possibility, there is impossibility, and when
there is impossibility, there is possibility. Because of the right, there
48 WING-TSIT CHAN
is the wrong, and because of the wrong, there is the right." 170 By
the standard of Tao, too, "There is nothing in the world greater
than the tip of a hair that grows in the autumn, while Mount
T'ai is small." 171
This doctrine of "equality of things" cannot be pushed any
further. Its glorification of unity, identity, and synthesis may be
regarded as a virtue, but its condemnation of the particular, the
concrete, and the specific must be viewed as a defect. If absolutely
no distinction could be made, not only logic, but morality also,
would be impossible. Indeed, in the eyes of Chuang Tzu, civiliza-
tion is not a blessing, but a curse. "The sage, therefore, con-
siders knowledge as a curse.... He needs no virtue he is
nourished by Nature. To be nourished by Nature is to be fed by
Nature. Since he is fed by Nature, what is the use of man's ef-
fort?" 172 All benevolence and righteousness, rites and music, must
be "forgotten." 173
This is primitivism to the last degree. Nowhere else in Chinese
philosophy do we find such extreme primitivism. Chuang Tzu's
naturalistic philosophy of life exerted tremendous influence on the
fatalistic libertines of the fourth and fifth centuries, while his
naturalistic metaphysical doctrines became points of contact be-
tween Taoism and Buddhism. His emphasis on incessant, spon-
taneous transformation and the "equality of things" has affected
almost all Chinese philosophers in the last fifteen centuries. As a
glorifier of Nature, he still is today, as he has been for the last
fifteen centuries, the main fountain of inspiration and imagination
to Chinese artists, particularly landscape painters.
The greatness and importance of Chuang Tzu lie primarily in
his exaltation of Nature. Humanism to him lost all meaning, be-
cause man in the world is nothing more than "the tip of a hair
upon a horse's skin." 174 This being the case, "those inwardly up-
right" want to be "companions of Nature" 175 and "followers of Na-
ture." 176 They do not want to "assist Heaven with man." 177 That
is to say, as long as "horses and oxen have four feet," do not "put a
halter on a horse's head or a string through a bullock's nose." 178
Not to assist Heaven with man is Chuang Tzu's version of wu-wei,
in which alone can happiness be found. "Perfect happiness and
preservation of life are to be achieved through taking no unnatural
action." 179 "Do not be the possesser of fame. Do not be the store-
house of schemes. Do not take over the function of things. Do not
be the master of knowledge [to manipulate things]. Personally
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realize the infinite to the highest degree and travel in the realm
of which there is no sign. Exercise fully what you have received
from Nature without any subjective viewpoint. In a word, be
absolutely vacuous." 180
When one reaches this state, one becomes a "true man,"
"one who knew neither to love life nor to hate death. He did not
rejoice in birth, nor did he resist death. Without any concern he
came, and without any concern he went, that was all. He did not
forget his beginning nor seek his end. He accepted [his body] with
pleasure, and, forgetting [life and death], he returned to [the
natural state]. He did not violate Tao with his mind, and he did
not assist Nature with man.... Such being the true man, his
mind is perfectly at ease. . . . He is in accord with all things,
and no one knows the limit thereof." 181
To achieve this end, we must "have no self," "have no achieve-
ment," and "have no fame." 182 We must "let our mind be at ease
in abiding with the nature of things. Cultivate our spirit by follow-
ing what is necessary and inevitable." "For our external life, there
is nothing better than adaptation and conformation. For our in-
ternal life, there is nothing better than peace and harmony." 183
Here we have primitivism, mysticism, quietism, fatalism, and pes-
simism in a nutshell.
The tone of fatalism and pessimism was made intense by the
fact that both reality and the life of men are ever changing. "The
life of a thing passes by like a galloping horse. With no activity is
it not changing, and at no time is it not moving? What shall we
do? What shall we not do? The thing to do is to leave it to self-
transformation." 184 Existence is transitory, the life of man being just
as momentary as that of things. "Things are born and die, and their
completion cannot be taken for granted. They are now empty and
now full, and their physical form is not fixed in one place. The
years cannot be retained. Time cannot be arrested. The succession
of decline, growth, fullness, and emptiness go in a cycle, each end
becoming a new beginning." 185 In this fleeting universe, the only
way for man to have peace is to let Nature take its own course. He
should not question whether there is "some mechanical arrange-
ment so that heavenly bodies cannot help moving" or if "they keep
revolving and cannot stop themselves." 186 Perhaps there is an
Overlord of all, but, if "it seems there is a True Lord, there is no
indication of his existence." 187 The only thing we are sure of is
that "all things spring from germs and become germs again." "All
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species come from germs. Certain germs, falling upon water, be-
come duckweed . . . become lichen ... become the dog-tooth
violet ... produce the horse, which produces man. When man
gets old, he becomes germs again." 188 In passages like these we
cannot help being attracted by Chuang Tzu's poetic imagination
and his evolutionary thought. But we are also impressed with the
inevitable "spontaneous transformation" and transitory existence. In
the face of these irreducible facts, the true man "harmonizes all
things in the functioning of Nature and leaves them in the process
of infinite evolution. This is the way to complete our lifetime....
We forget the passage of time [life and death] and the distinction
of right and wrong. We relax in the realm of the infinite and thus
abide there." 189
We should not forget, of course, that, in spite of the idea of
escape in Chuang Tzu, his main interest was still the "preservation
of life." He devoted an entire chapter to "the fundamentals for the
cultivation of life." 190 In this he joined the chorus of the "Hundred
Schools" that flourished in the fourth and third centuries B.C. in
China. They were all seekers after a good life, each having a
unique doctrine of its own. In no other period in Chinese history,
or in the history of any country, was there more freedom of
thought and more profuse intellectual development.
Running through this multiple development was one strong
intellectual current the origin of which can be traced to the remote
past, when divination was the only form of intellectual activity.
This is the theory of yin and yang, the passive or female and
active or male universal forces, respectively, which, according to
the Tao-te ching, made the harmony of the world possible. In the
Confucian classic, The Book of Changes 191 (I ching); we read:
"In the systems of change, there is the Great Ultimate (rai-chi),
which generates the Two Modes [yin and yang]. The Two Modes
generate the Four Forms [major and minor yin and yang.] The
Four Forms generate the Eight Elements. The Eight Trigrams
determine good and evil fortunes. And good and evil fortunes
produce the great business of life." The date of The Book of
Changes is still surrounded by an atmosphere of uncertainty, but
the fundamental ideas, that the universe is a dynamic system of
incessant change from the simple to the complex and that the
Two Modes are the agents of the change must have antedated
the compilation of the book by centuries.
No student of Chinese history should underestimate this idea
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of yin and yang, not only because it largely conditioned the Chi-
nese outlook toward reality, but also because it provided the com-
mon ground for the intermingling of the divergent philosophical
schools. The movement was so strong that by the fourth century
B.C. it became an independent school. Eventually, it identified
itself in the second century B.C. with the common and powerful
movement under the name of Huang-ti as well as the prevailing
philosophy of Lao Tzu, and assumed the name "Huang-Lao." At
the same time, the yin-yang idea of The Book of Changes became
the most important aspect of Confucianism. Indeed, the note of
yin-yang is the dominant note in the second movement of China's
intellectual symphony, namely, medieval Chinese philosophy.
Earlier Medieval Philosophy
It was around the doctrine of yin-yang that earlier medieval
Chinese philosophy developed, in various directions. In both Huai-
nan Tzu the Taoist and Tung Chung-shu the Confucianist, it led to
a microcosm-macrocosm philosophy, while in Wang Ch'ung it led
to naturalism in direct opposition to the correspondence theory.
Huai-nan Tzu (d. 122 B.C.) attempted to develop a more rational
cosmology than his predecessors. He suggested that "there was a
beginning," a "beginning of an anteriority to this beginning," and a
"beginning of an anteriority even before the beginning of this
anteriority," 192 and that the great beginning produced in succes-
sion space, the universe, the material forces, the yin and yang,
and, finally, the material form.193 But these are merely the unfold-
ing of Tao. 194 Furthermore, although insects, fish, birds, and animals
"differ in their nature and destiny," "they all come from the same
great beginning," "with reference to which the pure man makes
no distinction." 195 So far, Huai-nan Tzu does not depart from
ancient Chinese philosophy. But the yin-yang idea in him adds a
new note to Taoism. "Heaven has the four seasons and the Five
Agents or Elements These find correspondence in man's four
limbs and five viscera " 196 for they are merely different mani-
festations of the same principles of yin and yang.
The spirit of correspondence assumes an even more important
aspect in Tung Chung-shu (176-104 B.C.), who was instrumental
in making Confucianism a state ideology. To him, "All things
have their complements of yin and yang. . . . The underlying
principles of prince and minister, father and son, husband and
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wife, are all derived from the way of yin and yang. The prince is
yang, and the minister is yin. The father is yang and the son is
yin. The husband is yang, and the wife is yin." 197 In short, every-
thing conceivable can be reduced to these two universal principles.
These two principles express themselves through the medium of
the Five Agents, with which all things in the world correspond. The
Five Agents have their correspondence in the five tones, five tastes,
five colors, the various directions, the seasons, and the moral
virtues.198
This scheme of correspondence must have had unusual fasci-
nation for the medieval Chinese, for it dominated Chinese thought
for no less than five centuries. Both Taoists and Confucianists found
it congenial because it was a systematized expression of the idea
of harmony, an idea close to their hearts. But the real spirit of
harmony, whether the central harmony of Confucianism or the
inner harmony of the Taoists, or the harmony between man and
Nature as taught by both schools, was lost. The movement of cor-
respondence became a matter of intellectual sport, a game of puz-
zles, and, finally, a superstition. Volume after volume of "apocryphal
treatises" were written to aid the interpretation of The Book of
Changes. This body of literature became so huge and so influ-
ential that many important state policies were decided upon by
strange confirmations from these superstition-infested books. Chi-
nese philosophy had entered upon a dark age, an age in which
Confucianism developed into a state ideology rather than a rational
philosophy, and Taoism degenerated and identified itself with the
lowest forms of religious worship. It was natural that there should
arise strong reaction against such a state of affairs. Gradually the
critical spirit made itself felt, until it Teached such a high pitch
from the third to the fifth century that it gave rise to a strong
movement of textual criticism and an equally strong movement of
free political thought.
The outstanding representative of this critical spirit was Wang
Ch'ung (z7-ca. 100?). Perhaps no other Chinese philosopher could
rival him in rational thinking and critical spirit. He attacked all
kinds of erroneous beliefs, beliefs in ghosts,199 in thunder as the
sound of Heaven's growling,200 in calamities as visitations of Heav-
en,201 in the past as superior to the present,202 and many other
false beliefs. He held that "all things are produced spontaneously
by the fusion of the vital forces of Heaven and Earth [yin and
yang]." 203 These spontaneous creations are not for the sake of man,
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because the opinion that Heaven produces grain for the purpose
of feeding mankind is tantamount to making Heaven the farmer
of man.204 Furthermore, "If Heaven had produced its creatures on
purpose, it ought to have taught them to love each other and not
to prey upon and destroy one another." 205 We have here the most
thoroughgoing naturalism in Chinese philosophy.
Later Medieval Philosophy
Wang Ch'ung was nghting to reinstate naturalism on a rational
ground by appealing to reason and experience. Had Chinese phi-
losophy developed along this line, its story would have been differ-
ent. Unfortunately, Taoism as a philosophy hardly developed,
except in the case of the book called the Lieh Tzu (ca. 300), in
which the idea of Tao is carried to the point of fatalistic mecha-
nism,206 and in the philosopher Ko Hung (Pao-p'u Tzu, 284-363)
alone was the true spirit of Taoism revived. He restored and
developed the Taoist doctrines of naturalism and spontaneous
transformation to a position of dignity.
In Confucianism, the only notable development was in Han
Yii (768-824), the success of whose theory of three grades of hu-
man nature and whose defense of Confucianism were due more
to his beautiful literary style than to his reasoning. The really
constructive phase of Chinese philosophy in the period was the
introduction and development of Buddhist philosophy.
Buddhism
All the Buddhist schools were introduced, preserved, and
developed in China, but only those consonant with the Chinese
temper lasted. Neither the Theravada school of being, the realistic
Abhidharmakosa school (Chii-she, ca. 60o-ca. 800), which held
that "all exists," nor the Theravada school of non-being, the nihil-
istic Satyasiddhi school (Ch'eng-shih, 412-ca. 700), which insisted
that "neither the self nor the dharmas (elements of existence) are
real," had a long history in China. Also, neither the Mahayana
school of being, the idealistic Vijfiaptimatrata school (Yogacara,
Fa-hsiang, '\lei-shih, ca. 60o-noo), which asserted that "all is mere
ideation," nor the Mahayana school of non-being, the negativistic
or, rather, absolutistic Madhyamika school (San-Iun, ca. soo-noo),
which regarded reality as "void," flourished in China for long.
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Clinging to either the being or the non-being position, they existed
in China as essentially Indian systems, without being assimilated
into Chinese thought. Those Buddhist schools that combined
tendencies of both being and non-being, however, continue to live
up to this day.
The tendency to combine different and even opposing ele-
ments into a synthetic whole is characteristic of Chinese thought.
We will recall that, with Lao Tzu, Tao is conceived as both "is"
and "is not," a point further developed by Chuang Tzu, to become
his famous theory of the equality of things. We will also recall
that Confucius held the Mean to be the highest ideal, to the re-
jection of anything one-sided or extreme. We will recall, too, that
in Neo-Moism the distinction of substance and predicates, of the
universal and the particular, etc., was severely criticized. The Yin-
Yang tradition was, through and through, a tradition of synthesis
of opposites. The whole movement of medieval Chinese philosophy
was not only a continuation of the central emphasis on synthesis
of the ancient schools, but was itself a synthesis of the opposing
philosophies of Confucianism and Taoism. This synthetic tendency,
which affected practically all indigenous Chinese philosophies, also
affected Buddhism in China.
Roughly speaking, just as the Abhidharmakosa, Satyasiddhi,
Vijnaptimiitratii, and Miidhyamika were hardly more than Indian
Buddhism on Chinese soil, the five Buddhist schools which are the
most prominent in China today, whether in amount of influence or
in length of time, are typically Chinese. They are typically
Chinese, not only because they still exist in China, but also be-
cause of their synthetic character. They all discarded their
original extreme position of being or non-being in favor of a
synthetic position of the "Middle Doctrine." The Hua-yen school
(Avatamsaka, ca. 600) started with the theory of causation by
mere ideation, developed the theory of "universal causation of
Dharma-dhiitu," or universal causation of Elements of the Prin-
ciple, and culminated in what Professor Takakusu calls "Totalism."
It originated the "Ten Metaphysical Propositions" to the effect that
all elements are perfect and real, that the elements reflect one
another, and that all of them are at the same time simple and
complex, one and many, exoteric and esoteric, pure and varied,
etc., so that the universe is a ·"grand harmony without any obstacle."
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veloped in China, represents a culmination of the "both-and" spirit
of Buddhism.
The other school which shifted from the position of being to
the position of both-being-and-non-being is the Mystical school
(True Word, Mantra, Chen-yen, ca. 300), which is a mystical
religion rather than a philosophical system. Yet, even here, the
synthetic mode of thought is evident. It is an Indian religion bap-
tized and transformed by Chinese ethical ideals. This school treats
the universe as the spiritual body, or the Body of Law, of the
Buddha, which manifests itself as the "Realm of Diamond Ele-
ment," that is, the static world, and the "Realm of Matrix Reposi-
tory," that is, the dynamic world. These two phases, however, are
but different manifestations of the same Buddha: "They are two
and yet not two."
The same shift from an extreme position to the "Middle Doc-
trine" is even more evident in the other three schools which were
formed in China and are therefore typically Chinese. While both
the Avatamsaka and the Mystical schools started from the position
of being, the T'ien-t'ai (ca. 580) started from the position of non-
being. Beginning with the negativistic doctrine of the Void, this
school finally arrived at the "Perfectly Harmonious Triple Truth"
of the Void (things have no reality), Temporariness (but they have
temporary existence), and the Mean (they are at the same time the
True State). These three are identical, and Suchness, or the True
State, involves both phenomenon and noumenon. Consequently,
it calls itself the "Round Doctrine." This synthetic spirit must
strongly appeal to the imagination of the Chinese, 'for T'ien-t'ai is
still the strong Buddhist sect in China today.
As to the Meditation (Ch'an, ca. 450) and the Pure Land
(Ching-t'u, ca. 300) schools, they are essentially Chinese creations,
although certain sources can be traced to India. The Pure Land
sect is a creed of faith, the least philosophical of all the schools we
have mentioned. Its fundamental beliefs, however, such as salva-
tion for all and the salvation by faith, are based on the idea of "one
in all and all in one." It accepts the idea that Nirviina has neither
space nor time, neither life nor death. But it intreprets this as
nothing other than the land of the Buddha of Infinite Light and
Infinite Life, that is, the Pure Land.
The most significant of all the Buddhist schools, so far as Chi-
nese thought is concerned, is Ch'an (Zen, in Japanese). Ch'an is
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basically a method, not a method of writing or words, which the
school rejects, but a method of "direct intuition into the heart to
find buddha-nature." Nevertheless, this method is based, on the
one hand, on the assumption of the eightfold negation of produc-
tion and extinction, annihilation and permanence, unity and diver-
sity, and coming and departing, and, on the other hand, on the
affirmation of the reality of buddha-nature in all things. The
Ch'an method of "direct intuition," together with its "sudden en-
lightenment," gave the Chinese mind a way of ready and complete
release, and for this reason had a peculiar charm. Above all, its
sole reliance on meditation imposed on the Chinese mind a severe
mental and spiritual discipline which was invigorating and quick-
ened the Chinese imagination which the glorious poetry and land-
scape painting of the T'ang Dynasty (618--g07) had already
awakened.
But such quietism was fundamentally out of harmony with
the practical and humanistic Chinese. The zenith of Ch'an was
soon reached, and its decline began. With this, Chinese medieval
philosophy came to a close. Thus the second movement of the
intellectual symphony of China concluded with a song without
words. There was harmony, but harmony in silence.
Neo-Confucianism
Ever since the advent of Buddhism in China, Chinese philoso-
phers had been very critical of it. The fatal attack was delivered
by the Neo-Confucianists. They felt that there was nothing "sub-
stantial" in Buddhism, and that the Buddhists' fear of birth and
death was motivated by selfish interest.207 They considered the
Buddhist theory of renunciation untenable because they insisted
that, even though a man might desert his family, he could never
escape from society so long as he scts his feet on earth.208 They
believed that things were always in the process of transformation,
and, consequently, the Buddhist doctrine of formation, duration,
deterioration, and extinction was unsound.209 They criticized the
Buddhists for mistaking concrete reality for emptiness, because the
Buddhists regarded all things, including clothing and food, as void,
and yet they lived on those things every day.210 They found that
the Buddhist Void was really founded on the failure to understand
the principle of things.2l1 They showed that even the Buddhists
could not get away from human relationships, because, while they
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severed their kinship with their parents, they organized themselves
in a society of masters and pupils.212 They condemned the Bud-
dhists as unjust and cowardly, because they worked for their own
interest and avoided social responsibility.213
From these criticisms we can see the spirit of Neo-Confucian-
ism. The story of Neo-Confucianism is virtually the story of modern
Chinese philosophy. It has not only dominated Chinese thought
for the last eight hundred years but has also dominated Japanese
thought for many centuries. In China, it developed in three phases,
namely, the School of Principle in the Sung period (960-1279), the
School of Mind in the Ming period (1368-1644), and the Empirical
school in the Ch'ing period (1644-1911). In Japan, it was repre-
sented by the Shushi school (Chu Hsi) and the Oyomei school
(Wang Yang-ming).214
THE SCHOO L OF PRINCIPLE:
THE CH'ENG BROTHERS AND CHU HSI
The central idea of the movement is focused on the Great
Ultimate (T'ai-chi). "The Great Ultimate through movement gen-
erates yang. When its activity reaches its limit, it becomes tranquil.
Through tranquillity the Great Ultimate generates yin. When tran-
quillity reaches its limit, activity begins again. So, movement and
tranquillity alternate and become the root of each other, giving
rise to the distinction of yin and yang, and the two modes are thus
established. By the transformation of yang and its .union with yin,
the Five Agents of water, fire, wood, metal, and earth arise. When
these five material forces (ch'i) are distributed in harmonious
order, the four seasons run their course." 215 "These Five Agents are
the basis of their differentiation, while the two material forces
constitute their actuality. The two forces are fundamentally one.
Consequently, the many are [ultimately] one, and the one is dif-
ferentiated in the many. The one and the many each has its own
correct state of being. The great and the small each has its definite
function." 216 A vivid example of the one-in-many and many-in-one
relationship is that of the moon. "Fundamentally there is only one
Great Ultimate, yet each of the myriad things have been endowed
with it and each in itself possesses the Great Ultimate in its en-
tirety. This is similar to the fact that there is only one moon in the
sky, but when its light is scattered upon rivers and lakes, it can be
seen everywhere. It cannot be said that the moon has been split." 217
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Thus, reality is a progressively evolved and a well-co-ordinated
system. But it is not the only coherent order. Everything is a unified
system, a Great Ultimate in itself. "With respect to Heaven and
Earth, there is the Great Ultimate in them. With respect to the
myriad things, there is the Great Ultimate in each and every one
of them." 218 For instance, "Heaven and Earth are one great system
of yin and yang. The year, the month, and the day, all have their
own systems of yin and yang." 219
This philosophy of one-in-all and all-in-one was a direct prod-
uct of the Confucian metaphysics of change. But it is quite prob-
able that its development was inspired by the totalistic philosophy
of Buddhism. If that is so, we have here a fundamental distinction
between the two systems. While Buddhist philosophy was based on
the Void, which is the denial of the particular, the Neo-Confucian
philosophy was based on principle, which is an affirmation of it.
Principle (li, order) is the keynote of the Neo-Confucian system.
In the words of the Ch'eng brothers (Ch'eng I, 1033-1107, and
Ch'eng Hao, 1032-1085), "We say that all things form one body
because all things have the same principle in them." 220 They all
have principle because things "must have their principles of be-
ing." 221 As principle is the universal law, "The principle of a thing
is one with the principle of all things." 222
This principle needs an agency through which to operate and
also needs to be embodied. It must be supplemented, therefore, by
a substantiating and particularizing principle. This is ch'i, or mate-
rial force, which, working through its own avenues of the Five
Agents and in the forms of yin and yang, differentiates the one
into the many so that each of the many has its own "definite
function." "When yin and yang are equal, form and substance are
present. When these two original principles are not equal, the
dormant nature and manifest nature of things are differenti-
ated."223 Material force is indispensable to reality, because "without
material force, principle would have nothing to attach itself to," 224
and would degenerate into the state of the Buddhist Void. To the
Neo-Confucianists, the Buddhist Void, to be valid at all, must be
substantiated with material force. "The Great Vacuity has no phys-
ical form. It is the original substance of material force. Its integra-
tion and disintegration are but objectification caused by change.
. . . Vacuity, the Void, is nothing but the material force." 225
While principle and material force function differently, it was
never the intention of the Neo-Confucianists to contrast them
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sharply. Basically, there is no distinction between them, because
"there is no principle outside of material force, and there is no
material force outside of principle." 226 "The Great Ultimate is prin-
ciple, whereas activity and tranquillity are the material force. As
the material force operates, principle also operates. The two are
mutually dependent and are never separated. The Great Ultimate
may be compared to a man, and activity and tranquillity may be
compared to a horse. The horse carries the man, and the man rides
the horse. As the horse comes and goes, so does the man." 227 The
main difference between them is that "principle is above form."
From the point of view of its formlessness, therefore, we may say
that principle is prior to material force.228 This distinction is made,
however, merely from "a certain point of view." They are really
two phases of the same thing, each working for the realization of
the other.
It is this co-operative functioning of principle and material
force that makes the universe a cosmos and the fullest realization
of "central harmony." "The universal principles of yin and yang
and the Five Agents manifest themselves in all directions and in all
degrees, but there is perfect order in them." 229 This order is demon-
strated in the production and co-existence of things. "The sequence
of creation is the sequence of being. The co-existence of the great
and small, and the high and low, is the order of being. There is a
sequence in the production of things, and there is an order in their
existence." 230 Thus, the universe, with all its myriad things, is a
harmonious system. "Centrality is the order of th~ universe, and
harmony is its unalterable law." 231 Consequently, the cosmos is a
moral order. This is the main reason why the greatest of the Neo-
Confucianists, Chu Hsi, said that "the Great Ultimate is nothing
but the principle of ultimate goodness." 232*A moral order means a social order. Therefore, just as man is
a social being, so is a thing a social entity. The Neo-Confucianists
stressed emphatically the fact that no thing can be isolated from
others. "According to principle, nothing exists alone. Unless there
are similarity and difference, contraction and expansion, and begin-
ning and end among things to make the thing stand out, it is not
really a thing although it seems to be." 233 That is to say, unless there
is community, there cannot be individuality. I
This leads to a new and interesting emphasis in Neo-Confucian-
ism, namely, that everything has its opposite. "According to the
Principle of Heaven and Earth and all things, nothing exists in
60 WING-TSIT CHAN
isolation, but everything necessarily has its opposite." 234 "As there
are forms, there are their opposites." 235 This is true because the
underlying principles of being cannot stand by themselves. "Yang
cannot exist by itself; it can exist only when it is allied with yin.
Similarly, yin cannot alone manifest itself; it can manifest itself
only when accompanied by yang.236 Consequently, "No two of the
productions of creation are alike." 237
This being the case, Chuang Tzu's doctrine of the "equality of
things" and the Buddhist denial of birth and extinction must be
totally rejected. "It is the nature of things to be unequal," 238 the
Neo-Confucianists reiterated. "Although there is nothing in the
world which is purely yin or purely yang, and yin and yang always
interact, yet the distinction between rising and falling, and be-
tween birth and extinction, should not be ignored." 239 "In the opera-
tion of yin and yang, and Heaven and Earth, there is not a single
moment of rest in their rise and fall, and in their zenith and nadir.
. . . These two tendencies cause the differences of things and an
infinite number of transformations take place. This is why it is said
that it is the nature of things to be unequal." 240
The constant succession of zenith and nadir may suggest that
"appearance and disappearance follow a cycle." 241 But this cycle
does not mean a cycle in the Buddhist sense. Things do not return
to their origin, as the Buddhists and Taoists claim, because, "when
a thing disintegrates, its material force is forthwith exhausted.
There is no such thing as material force returning to its source. The
universe is like a vast furnace. Even living things will be burned
to the last and no more. How can material force that is already
disintegrated still exist? Furthermore, what is the need of such a
disintegrated material force in the creative process of the uni-
verse? It goes without saying that the force used in creation is
vital and fresh." 242 Every creation is therefore a new creation, and
the universe is perpetually new.
All these characteristics of the universe are but its principle.
It is the duty of man to comprehend this principle in order to ap-
preciate fully the meaning of his existence. We must "investigate
things to the utmost." As the Ch'eng brothers said, "A thing is an
event. A perfect understanding of an event can be obtained by
investigating to the utmost the principle underlying it." 243 This does
not mean "to investigate the principle of all things to the utmost
or to investigate the principle of only one thing to the utmost. As
one investigates more and more, one will come to understand
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principle." 244 We do not even have to go far for such investigation,
for principle. . . lies before our very eyes." 245 It makes no differ-
ence whether the investigation is directed to the nature of fire and
water or the relationship between father and son, nor does it make
any difference whether it is done by reading about and discussing
truth and principles or by handling affairs and dealing with people
in the proper way.246 When sufficient effort is made, understanding
naturally comes. When this takes place, our nature will be realized
and our destiny will be fulfilled, because "the complete realization
of the principle of things, the full development of one's nature,
and the establishment of destiny are simultaneous." 247
This is inevitable because, if we investigate things thoroughly
and understand their principle, we will find that "all people are
my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions," 248
since all men have the same principle in them. Consequently, we
should not entertain any distinction between things and oneself.249
We must love universally. It is only in fully developing the nature
of other people and things that one's own nature can be devel-
oped.250 This is the foundation of Neo-Confucian ethics, the ethics
of jen, humanity, true manhood, or love. Thus ethics has a firm
basis in metaphysics, because love is "the source of all laws," and
"the foundation of all phenomena." 251 The fact of universal produc-
tion is a concrete evidence of jen.252
To achieve the end of full understanding of principle and a
life of jen, the human mind must go through severe discipline. The
mind must be sincere (ch'eng) and serious (ching). As Chu Hsi
defined them, "Seriousness is apprehension, as if there were some-
thing feared. Sincerity is truth and the utter absence of anything
false." 253 They are the "Way of Heaven" and the "essence of human
affairs." 254 Specifically, sincerity means "to have no depraved
thought," and seriousness means "to maintain unity of mind, that
is, absolute equanimity and absolute steadfastness." 255
The emphasis on seriousness, especially in the Ch'eng brothers
and Chu Hsi, soon assumed almost religious significance. Some of
their followers frankly explained it in terms of Buddhist meditation.
As a matter of fact, the dual formula of the Neo-Confucianists of
the School of Principle, that is, extension of knowledge and the
practice of seriousness, might have some correspondence with the
dhyiina and prajnii, or meditation and insight, of Meditation Bud-
dhism.256 The Neo-Confucianist movement became an inward
movement, the mind gradually assuming importance. \Vith the
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ascendancy of the role of the mind, Neo-Confucianism passed on
from its first phase to its second, from the School of Principle to
the School of Mind.
THE SCHOOL OF MIND:
LU HSIANG-SHAN AND WANG YANG-~nNG
The philosophy of the School of Mind already had definite
form in Lu Hsiang-shan (1139-1193), who said that "the universe
is my mind, and my mind is the universe." 257 This is because both
the mind and the universe are conceived as expressions of the Way.
"There is no Way beyond events, and there are no events beyond
the Way." 258 But "the affairs in the universe are my own affairs,
and my own affairs are affairs of the universe." 259 There is no
suggestion of solipsism in these utterances, for "my mind, my
friend's mind, the mind of the sages generations ago, and the mind
of the sages of generations to come are all one." 260
This idealistic tendency developed until it reached its climax
in Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529), to whom the mind and prin-
ciple are one and the same thing. "The mind is principle. Is there
any affair in the world," he asked, "outside of the mind?" 261 Take,
for example, the matter of filial piety. The principle of filial piety
lies, not in one's parents, but in one's own mind. "If the principle
of filial piety is to be sought in parents, then is it acutally in my
own mind or is it in the person of my parents? If it is actually in
the person of my parents, is it true that as soon as the parents pass
away the mind will lack the principle of filial piety? . . . What is
true here is true of all things and events." 262 "The master of the
body is the mind. What emanates from the mind is the will. The
original substance of the will is knowledge, and wherever the will
is directed is a thing. For example, when the will is directed toward
serving one's parents, then serving one's parents is a 'thing.'
. . . Therefore I say that there are neither principle nor things
outside the mind." 263 If we say that Heaven and Earth and things
exist, it is due to our consciousness of them. "Separated from my
clear intelligence, there will be no Heaven, Earth, spiritual beings,
or myriad things, and, separated from these, there will not be my
clear intelligence." 204 As to the relationship between the mind and
external objects, Wang Yang-ming argued that these objects are
really not external to the mind. We see flowers blossom and drop
on the high mountains seemingly without connection with the
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mind. But, as our philosopher observed, "Before you look at these
Bowers, they and your mind are in the state of silent vacancy. As
you come to look at them, their colors at once show up clearly.
From this you can know that these Bowers are not external to
your mind." 265
Since the mind is the embodiment of principle, it follows that,
if one would truly comprehend principle, he must discover it from
his own mind. He must "fully exercise his mind." "Man's nature is,
of course, good. . . . It becomes evil only because of deviation
from the mean." 266 The emergence of evil is, therefore, to be ex-
plained by a disturbed condition of the mind which is originally
good. "The mind is like a mirror. The mind of the sage is like a
clear mirror, whereas the mind of the ordinary person is like a dull
mirror. . . . The effort is to be directed toward the [active] role
of polishing. When the mirror is clear, it does not cease to re-
Bect." 267 In short, evil is due to the loss of the "original substance"
of the mind.268
To return to the original nature of the mind, any disturbance
must be avoided. The mind must be left in a state of "tranquil
repose," in which alone is the highest good attained.269 When the
mind is clear as the result of tranquil repose, it will naturally know
what is true and what is good. In other words, knowledge of the
good is innate in us. "The mind is naturally able to know. When it
perceives the parents, it naturally knows that one should be filial.
. . . And when it perceives a child fall into a well, it naturally
knows that one should be commiserative. This is in~ate knowledge
of the good and need not be sought outside." 270
Not only is knowledge of the good inborn, but practicing the
good is also native, because knowledge and conduct are identical.
This theory of the unity of knowledge and conduct is character-
istic of Wang Yang-ming, although Neo-Confucianists of the School
of Principle had suggested it. If man fails to treat his parents with
filial piety or his elder brother with respect, it is due to obstruction
by "selfish desires and is no longer knowledge and action in their
original substance. There have never been people 'who know but
do not act. . . . Seeing beautiful colors appertains to knowledge,
while loving beautiful colors appertains to action. However, as soon
as one sees that beautiful color, he has already loved it." 271
Since man is born with the capacity to know and practice the
good, the chief duty of man is to "manifest the clear character."
"Manifesting the clear character consists in loving the people. . . .
64 WING-TSIT CHAN
The nature endowed in us by Heaven is pure and perfect. The
fact that it is intelligent, clear, and not beclouded is evidence of
the emanation and revelation of the highest good. It is the original
substance of the clear character which is called innate knowledge
of the good. . .. As the highest good emanates and reveals itself,
we will consider right as right and wrong as wrong." 272
Manifesting the clear character consists in humanity (fen)
because the mind of man and the mind of things have a common
structure.273 This is to say that "Heaven and Earth and I form one
body." 274 An ideal man "considers Heaven, Earth, and the myriad
things as one body." Consequently, he "views the world as one
family and his country as one man." 275 His love is extended even
to plants and animals, because, when he hears the pitiful cry and
sees the frightened appearance of a bird or an animal that is about
to be slaughtered, a sense of commiseration instinctively arises in
his mind.
In a metaphysical and ethical system such as this, the impor-
tance of the mind is supreme. Although Wang Yang-ming based his
idealistic philosophy on the doctrine of the "rectification of the
mind" of The Great Learning and the doctrine of the "preservation
of the mind" of Mencius, one can easily detect the influence of
Ch'an. The emphasis on tranquil repose definitely proves such
influence. At any rate, no Confucianist, whether in medieval or
modern times, had ever gone to such an extreme position and
thereby departed from the Golden Mean of Confucius.
THE EMPIRICAL SCHOOL: TAl CHEN
Reaction against such extreme idealism, even in the camp of
Neo-Confucianism itself, was inevitable. The third phase of Neo-
Confucianism, that of the Ch'ing period (1644-1911), may be said
to be such a reaction. In rejecting the philosophy of the School of
Mind in favor of an empirical philosophy, however, the last stage
of Neo-Confucianism was more than merely a reaction. It repre-
sented an effort to retain all that is good in ancient, medieval, and
modern Confucianism, and to return to the central harmony of
Confucius and Mencius.
Thus, to say that the Neo-Confucianism of the Empirical school
was really an anticlimax of the Neo-Confucianism of the schools of
Principle and Mind will do the Neo-Confucianists of the Ch'ing
Dynasty great injustice. There were no names in this period so
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great as those in the Sung (960-1279) and Ming (1368-1644)
dynasties, to be sure. Neither were there so many novel theories.
But if Tai Chen (1723-1777), the greatest philosopher of the
Empirical school, can be taken as representative, there was an
earnest attempt to re-establish Confucianism on a more balanced
basis. The Neo-Confucianists of the School of Principle had con-
trasted principle and material force, considering the former above
corporeity, pure, refined, and universal, and the latter corporeal,
mixed, crude, and particular. Tai Chen vigorously criticized this
bifurcation of reality. To him, "The distinction of what is corporeal
and what is above corporeity refers to the operation of material
force. . . . What is corporeal is that which has taken a definite
form, and what is above corporeity is that which has not taken a
definite form. . . . Thus corporeity means the transfiguration of
things and not the material force." 276 Material force, together with
its Five Agents and the two universal forces of activity and pas-
sivity, is not inferior to principle. To Chu Hsi and his circle, prin-
ciple is the Way which is above material force. To Tai Chen, on
the other hand, the Way means nothing but the operation of mate-
rial force. There is no distinction, then, between principle and the
Way, on the one hand, and material force, on the other. Both
principle and material force are the Way.
The Way refers to the incessant transfonnation whereas prin-
ciple refers to the complete fullness of the Way That which
produces and reproduces is the source of transfonnation, and that which
produces and reproduces in a systematic order is the' flow of trans-
fonnation. . . . As there is growth, there is repose, and, as there is
repose, there is growth. This is how the universe keeps on fonning and
transforming. That which produces and reproduces is called jen, and that
which is responsible for the orderliness of life is called propriety (li) and
righteousness (i) ." 277
Thus the Way finds expression in constant and orderly trans-
formation, the realization of which is principle. This name can ap-
ply to all that is in harmony with the characteristics of the universe.
"With reference to its naturalness, it is called harmony. With refer-
ence to its necessity, it is called constancy." 278 Consequently, only
"those who can comprehend the harmony of the universe are
qualified to discuss the Way." 279
With harmony as the keynote, the philosophers of the Empiri-
cal school advocated the harmony of human nature, which they,
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following most of the Confucianists before them, held to be good.
In the discussion of principle from the eleventh to the sixteenth
century, the general opinion had been that good action proceeds
from principle, whereas evil action proceeds from desire, thus
sharply contrasting principle and desire. To later Neo-Confucian-
ists such as Tai Chen, however, this opinion was erroneous, because
"men and creatures all have desires, and desires are the functions
of their nature. Men and creatures all have feelings, and feelings
are the operations of their nature." 280 Since they are inborn, they
"should not be violated." 281 The problem is, therefore, not how to
suppress desires and feeling, but how to harmonize them with
principle. If their functionings "do not err," they are in harmony
with Heaven and Earth.282 The general formula seems to be that
"we should not be without desires, but that we should have few
desires." 283
Modem Neo-Confucianists came to the defense of desires and
feelings, not only because they are inborn, but also because desire
and principle are inseparable. "Desire is a fact, whereas principle
is its specific law of beings." 284 "A thing is an event. In speaking
of an event, we cannot go beyond daily matters such as drinking
and eating. To neglect these daily matters and talk about principle
is not what the ancient sages recognized principle to be." 285 Fur-
thermore, feeling, which engenders desires, does not violate prin-
ciple. On the contrary, "Principle never obtains where feeling does
not. . . . When feeling is expressed neither too much nor too
little, it is called principle." 286 When we harmonize feeling and
desires with principle, we then come into harmony with the
universe. When all men and things are in harmony with the uni-
verse, there will be the fulfillment of the Way.
In emphasizing the harmony of principle and "daily events,"
the Neo-Confucianists of the last three hundred years have been
demanding a return from the speculative to the empirical, from
the universal to the particular, from the abstract metaphysics of
Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming to the socio-political interest of Con-
fucius and Mencius. In short, they insisted on "practical applica-
tion." This practical emphasis ultimately culminated in K'ang
Yu-wei (1858-1927) and T'an Ssu-t'ung (1865-1898), who made
fen the basis of their doctrine of "practical application" and politi-
cal reform. For the guidance of social and political reform,
however, modem China found her traditional philosophies inade-
quate. She looked to the West for the solution of her problems.
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Stimulated by the Renaissance led by Hu Shih (1891-1962), West-
ern philosophies became dominant in twentieth-century China.
Western pragmatism, materialism, neo-realism, vitalism, and new
idealism almost dealt indigenous philosophies a fatal blow. Never-
theless, Chinese philosophies have survived, because their ideals
are still the ideals of China.287
These ideals have been examined throughout Chinese history
and have been found valuable, and no philosophical system that
hopes to enjoy a permanent place in China is likely to reject them.
We refer particularly to the ideals of central harmony, or cordial
relationship between Nature and man, of the "both-and" attitude,
of the Golden Mean, of humanism, of the preservation of one's life
and the full realization of one's nature, of mental tranquillity, of
incessant transformation and spontaneous creation, of the interac-
tion of the active and passive universal principles, of the harmony
of the one and the many, and of the goodness of human nature.
Because of the impact of Western philosophies, a change of tone
is already noticeable in Chinese philosophy.288 There can be no
doubt that Chinese philosophy will be baptized by Western sci-
ence, logic, and epistemology. In the next movement of the
philosophical symphony of China, therefore, there will be new
notes and new chords, combining those of traditional China into
a new harmony.
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NO ONE WHO has read ,Mr. Suzuki's paper could have failed
to be impressed by the scrupulous accuracy and integrity with
which he defined his position. From the point of view of an out-
sider, Suzuki's train of thought was comparable to the feat of
tight-rope walking. He preserved an assured balance, although
every new paradox that he enunciated seemed bound to bring
him crashing to the ground. To some, it might seem that there was
no rope at all for him to walk on. Yet, the fact remained that he
went on walking, preserving his precision of balance. Speaking for
myself, Suzuki brought home to me with new force what is to me a
plain fact of history, that man cannot dispense wjth philosophy,
and philosophy's first concern is criticism, criticism of appearance,
criticism of thought, criticism of language; and, that being so, the
philosopher from first to last is dealing with paradoxes, some of
which may be humanly irresolvable. But the final paradox is that
the philosopher is also a man, a man amongst men. He goes on
living, eating and drinking, wearing his clothes, performing his
daily duties. There, if I may venture a criticism which is not a
criticism since that side of Zen Buddhism was outside the subject of
his paper, Suzuki did not make the situation quite clear. Zen Bud-
dhists from the very beginning of Zen Buddhism have always been
paradoxically engaged in ordinary living, the less deliberatively
the better. That, for them, was a necessary concomitant to enlight-
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enment. They have maintained that there is no other way of
arriving at enlightenment.
I make this preface to my paper on Chinese epistemology
because Ch'anism and Zenism are, I submit, highly significant
Chinese and Japanese reactions to Indian and Western Asian Bud-
dhism. The Chinese Ch'an movement started with a simple un-
learned monk who revolted against all the deliberate refinements
and elaborations of thought, ritual, yoga, and the like which he saw
in his fellow monks. He discovered that enlightenment was the
one thing he needed, and that it was the one thing he could not
get for himself: the more he tried to achieve it, the more sophisti-
cated he became, and the less possible it was for him to be en-
lightened. Therefore, he went on living as a man on the simplest
possible basis of living. There the Taoist and to a certain extent
the Confucianist spoke in him.
If knowing in the fullest sense be considered dependent on
living in the simplest sense, the natural inference is that a man
with that kind of outlook will not be likely to evolve a very elabo-
rate system of epistemology. TrueI I doubt whether the Chinese
indigenous tradition, along its own line of conscious reasoning,
achieved anything so intrinsically subtle and elaborate as the In-
dian tradition achieved. Thus, the material presented here may be
disappointing because of its simplicity. On the other hand, it should
be borne in mind that of all paradoxical writing in Chinese litera-
ture-and there is a good deal-the most paradoxical is that of the
Ch'an Buddhist; and, when I say "paradoxical," I mean consciously
and deliberately paradoxical, even with the intention of causing
laughter, to make evident the incongruities in the human situation.
In this respect a Chinese critic is never so philosophically Chinese
as when he appears "dumb." So, in regard to epistemological
theorizing, the facts may appear simple, but they are by no means
as simple as they seem.
For instance, examine the writings of Chinese thinkers from
the late fourth century B.C. (the first date of really consecutive
dialectical composition) down to the eleventh century A.D.
(the time when the Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucianist epistemology
emerged): one constant recurrent characteristic is an appeal to
history. In other words, one indispensable method of achieving
reliable knowledge was the historical method. It was as if a man's
contemporaries said to him, "Speculate, theorize, as much as you
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like, but check up on your speculations by finding out what has
happened in the past." Now, such an attitude may easily reveal
intellectual naIvete. As we know so well today, anybody can quote
history to suit any theory he wants to put across. True, but, al-
though in the earlier days the appeal to history was made in very
simple unreflecting fashion, as time went on the citation of history
became one of the severe tests of a scholar's integrity of mind and
breadth of learning. He was expected to cite groups of relevant
facts which shed light on each other. In other words, there came to
be an empirical critique of history, one built on a fine sense of
historical perspective: a division of the past into shang ku, chung
ku, hsia ku (high antiquity, middle antiquity, low, i.e., later, an-
tiquity), chin shih (recent times), this last being split up into
Western Han (206 B.C.-A.D. 8), Eastern Han (A.D. 25-220), Three
Kingdoms period, and so on. Each epoch stood in its own right
on its own ground, had its high spots and low spots. Woe betide the
scholar who had a confused perspective. According to this ap-
proach, the object of knowledge was not abstract and changeless,
not a logical entity. It was shot through and through with a sense
of the particular.
On the other hand, it would be disastrously erroneous to as-
sume, for those same centuries in which the "Great Tradition" of
the Chinese people was being slowly smelted and forged, that
those thinkers were not interested in metaphysical problems and
were incapable of realizing the questions which emerge in relation
to categorical knowledge. As I shall show, they went on from crude
experiments in reasoning to more and more refined and systematic
inquiries. But the point I have to emphasize at the outset is that,
as they refined their sense of reason in these abstract fields, they
become more and more conscious that thought is conditioned by
language and that language as communication fails unless it be
disciplined and controlled. They were intrigued by the nature of
thought and its relation to emotion. They were highly conscious of
that mysterious monitor of the mind, reason (Ii); but to them the
chief factor in the two-way traffic between thought, language, and
logic was language.! So simple as that, and yet so curiously pro-
found! R. G. Collingwood described philosophy as "thought of the
second degree, thought about thought." 2 The distinctively Chinese
epistemological reply to that would be to say, "Yes, more or less,
but we do not know what your thinking is until it is expressed in
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language." From this angle, philosophy becomes (a) a critique of
language, of communicated meaning, and (b) a checking of this
critique by a critique of history.
This is the basic approach to Chinese epistemology. For this
reason, I would urge that in our study of these matters we should
learn to walk before we try to run. If we do not, as we run from
Confucianism to Taoism, from Taoism to the Chin (Tsin) (265-
420) transcendentalists, and from them to Chu Hsi and Wang
Yang-ming, and try to appraise this system as against that, we are
ignoring the prime factor in the situation, the thinking man and
the language in which he got his thought, the language which
was for him the molder of his thoughts, the language which ob-
jectified that essentially subjective thing, thinking.
The Distinction Between 500 B.C. and A.D. 500
The first of these dates stands for Confucius' lifetime, the sec-
ond for the first collection of literary masterpieces, poetry, prose,
state papers, dialectical essays, letters, inscriptions, etc., all put
together under the one all-embracing title of wen, ordered artistic
composition, writings which conveyed meaning in ordered fashion,
in clear-cut patterned sentences and clear-cut patterned para-
graphs. We have no term in English which covers the meaning
of wen. It is significant that in this collection 98 per cent of the
selected compositions are taken from writers not earlier than the
second century B.C. The man who made the collection was Hsiao
Tung (d. A.D. 531), son of Emperor Wu of the Liang Dynasty
(502-557 ). From this foreword we learn that the invention of
writing was to him the most momentous invention of all history,
and that in the development of literary composition he found evi-
dence of both evolution and revolution. To give as nearly a first-
hand impression as is possible of a very typical double approach to
knowledge, I have translated the first two paragraphs of the fore-
word, marking by a special use of colons the coupling of the
sentences, and so elucidating the actual movement of the author's
mind.
PARAGRAPH 1
Let us make observation of primordial beginnings, strain our eyes to
penetrate the cloud of [primitive] custom.
In the days when men lived in caves in the winter and [slept] perched
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on trees in the summer, when they ate their meat uncooked and drank
the blood:
that era was one of raw material (ch'i); its people were simple-minded;
and this literature (wen) of ours had not been invented.
Coming down to the time of Fu Hsi's ruling over our world of men, he
was the first to trace out the Eight Trigrams and invent the written
language:
this he did with a view to their being a substitute for government by
string knots.
From this came the birth of books.
In The Book of Changes it is written:
"We make observation of the patterns (wen) in the heavens with a view
to understanding the seasonal changes:
We.make observation of man's patterns (wen) with a view to transform-
ing and completing the society of man." 3
How far back the historical significance of pattern (wen? literature?
pattern) goes!
PARAGRAPH 2
With regard to the [primitive] hammered-out wheel being the beginning
of the imperial carriage, the imperial carriage actually has the raw
material (ch'i) of the primitive wheel:
With regard to a block of ice being the product of a quantity of water:
the water does not have the iciness of the ice.
How about this? (How do I make this out?)
It would appear [in the one case] that with the toe-and-heel succession
of events there comes the accretion of ornamentation:
[in the other case] with the subversal of the original condition there
comes the addition of whet-stone hardness.
Since ordinary material objects have this [double te~dency], it is
[logically] right that literature also should have it.
[And since] the movement of time ever brings revolution and evolution,
it is practically impossible to identify changes in full detail.
PARAGRAPH 3
I make the experiment of discussing this as follows . . .
In Paragraph. 1 the appeal to history appears-an appeal, I
might add, couched in conventional language, assuming the factual
truth that the first Sage-Emperor was the inventor of the trigrams
and the script. In Paragraph 2 the following points should be
noted: (1) Hsiao T'ung selects two relevant data from his field of
empirical observation. (2) Although the imperial carriage is a man-
made thing and ice is what we call the result of natural process,
the two phenomena are treated as on the same level. That, to the
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Chinese, is logical. The idea of natural process for them applies
equally to man-made products. (3) Process led to two directly
opposite results; thus the author draws two separate conclusions.
(4) From those he goes on to urge that what applies to carriages
and blocks of ice applies to that infinitely multiform and ever-
changing product of the human mind, wen. (5) His final reflection,
in a vein common since the Taoist fathers, is that our knowledge
cannot but be limited, since every process in Nature consists of an
infinite number of steps, so minute that no one can discern them.
All we can do is to mark such effects as are discernible to our
limited powers of observation.
To these five points should be added the following three in
relation to the presentation, the manner, and the style of the argu-
ment. (1) Discursive thought is packed into pairs of sentences re-
lated to each other, sentences of equal length so that contrasted
meaning may stand out clearly. (2) The two trains of thought are
presented in paragraphs of equal length. (3) The author does not
dogmatize. He uses the form of words which we find in thinker
after thinker in that and later ages: "Let us make observation,"
"It would appear that," "How about that?" and "I make the experi-
ment of discussing this."
It would be interesting to know what your several reactions
are to this kind of reasoning. I suggest that it is epistemologically
simple in certain respects, e.g., accepting sense-data at their face
value, and arguing from analogy; and yet as a continuous piece of
ratiocination it is highly impressive, pointing to premeditation, a
drastic discipline of the mind, involving also a language structure
of considerable syntactical refinement. This leads me to make a
comparison with the Confucius whom we find in The Analects, not
the Confucius of Han State Confucianism four hundred years after
his death-a very different person, or, rather, set of persons, pro-
duced by the hagiographical instinct. The real Confucius, as far as
we can envisage him, had a much simpler and ruder language
as the tool for cutting out his thoughts. Also, in his day no one had
ever thought of taking a stylus and a set of bamboo slips and
scratching down a consecutive account of his personal ideas. Nor
did it occur to Confucius. The written documents he read could
have been little more than various collections of folk songs, elegiac
laments, and congratulatory and sacrificial odes; and, in addition
to these, at most, the annals of his home state and those of one or
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two others, some notes on ritual procedure by liturgists, and maybe
some records in the archives at the Chou capital and some lists of
divining oracles. I am not trying to "debunk" Confucius or sow any
suspicion as to his essential greatness. On the contrary, the more
historical criticism deals with his story, the more truly great he
appears. But he was not a philosopher, except in the most rudi-
mentary sense, namely, asking probing but disconnected questions
about accepted ideas and accepted institutions, and then discover-
ing the individual in society and making his great affirmation that
a man is a man in the full sense only if he treats his fellow man as
equally a man. From that affirmation sprang the Confucian logic of
human relationship and the categorical imperative. Confucius him-
self clearly was no metaphysician, no logician. It is not until
Mencius' time, 150 years later, that we get clear evidence of the
language of hypothesis and conclusion, and get also such basic
revelation of a philosophic consciousness as "yu-tz'u kuan-chih"
(looking at the matter from this angle) and "wu t'a" (for no other
reason than).
It is well known what Plato and Aristotle did to the Greek
language, carrying it, for example, from the simple eniai (to be)
to that exquisite abstraction to on (being), and from that to to ri
en einai (that which makes being what it is, the nature of being). In
this connection I would draw your serious attention to Dr. Richard
Robinson in his Plato's Earlier Dialectic: "It often takes more than
a lifetime for humanity to advance from the more concrete 'A rose
cannot be both red and not red' to the more abstract 'X cannot be
both Y and not Y,' and it may take as many years again to get from
the latter to some established label such as the phrase 'The Law
of Contradiction.''' 4 I think Robinson is a little on the short side
when he says "one lifetime" and "as many years again." It may take
several lifetimes. Thus, it would appear that Confucius first made
the suggestion that names should correspond to facts in the moral
realm, but it was not until some four lifetimes later that a new
group of "name specialists" began to ask searching questions on
that and kindred matters. These men, Teng Hsi, Hui Shih, and
Kung-sun Lung, threw out the logician's challenge on accepted
notions about classification, about the relation of sense impressions,
about similarity and dissimilarity, and about universals; but they
strained current language to the breaking point to convey their
meaning. Chuang Tzu (Chuang Chou), the Neo-Moists, and Hsiin
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Tzu (Hsiin Ch'ing) took up the challenge from various angles.
But then the impulse went dead for four hundred years," until
Wang Pi and his fellow transcendentalists set the logical ball rolling
again. This they could do more effectively, for the language was
by then refined to the pitch of expressing these recondite notions.
Further, there was no real consciousness of empirical reason-
ing as sucb until there was a canon of sacred writings, a bible to
which the ordinary man could appeal for an authoritative statement
on what was true and what was false. When did that time come in
China? Not in Confucius' time: there was no ching then. The
character ching meant in that age the warp set up on a loom. But
after Confucius' time there came the practice of recording a teach-
er's noteworthy dicta, and these records came to be called ching,
i.e., warp teaching on which diSciples could weave the woof of
their amplifications. Finally, in mid-Han times (second century
B.C.), came the establishment of State Confucianism and with it the
colleges for expounding the Five Classics (wu ching). Unless we
understand this movement in history and its effect on thought and
language, we cannot understand the emergence of higher levels of
consciousness in regard to knowledge. In the beginning, when
Confucius urged his disciples to study and get knowledge, he
meant knowledge of the ancestral Tao, the ways of their fathers.
When a good Eastern Han conservative, in the first and second
centuries A.D., urged the duty of study, he meant knowledge as
found in the sacred canon; and there is no lack of evidence of that
dogmatic attitude toward the objects of knowledge. But that is not
the whole of the matter. The Han mind was by no means all of one
pattern. There were the po shih, on the one hand, the exegetes;
authoritarians, bibliolaters. There were the wen shih, on the other
hand, the literateurs, critics of popular beliefs, satirists, men with
an eye for paradox: the men whom Hsiao Tung commemorated in
his ever-famous collection, and whose language and empirical atti-
tude toward knowledge his foreword so admirably exemplifies. A
wen shih could be as much of a sycophant of the court as a po shih,
but when the Han Confucianist ( so-called) State collapsed in
shame and confusion and long years of civil disorder ensued, it
was the wen shih empirical mind which alone was sufficiently
resilient to face facts. It was their influence which enabled think-
ing men to look beyond the accepted Confucianist and Taoist
ideas of knowledge, and search afresh for a system of abstract
categories.
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Chinese Thinking in Terms of Abstract Categories
I want here to ask a very simple, even seemingly stupid,
historical question. As I have said, let us learn to walk before we
try to run. Is there any known case of a culture which entered on
the self-conscious philosophizing stage and yet failed to proceed,
on the ruins of its old animistic myth-abstractions, to erect new
and more essentially abstract categories for the mind? If it is true
that there is no such case, we can move confidently on to a general-
ization, namely, that the envisaging of such categories is more than
a strait-jacketing of the mind. To men playing with the newly
discovered tool of individual self-conscious reasoning these appar-
ently restrictive concepts actually have a liberating effect, at any
rate temporarily. They constitute acts of imagination, an envisage-
ment of order, of pattern, in the universe.
In regard to China it is advisable to make this cautious ap-
proach, for it looks as if the development of systematic categorical
thinking came a little slowly and was hampered by the Con-
fucianists' tendency toward authoritarianism and by the Taoists'
tendency toward a denial that any categorical statement can be
more than relatively true. Nonetheless, the search for abstract cate-
gories began, and continued, and even in Confucius, the first of the
individual thinkers, instinctive as the temper of his mind was, we
can find evidence of this. In its beginnings the movement was
along simple enough lines, one of reason coping with a three-
dimensional universe and using the idea of exact measurement for
things of the mind. Also, men followed Mo Ti's (Mo Tzu's) lead
in tracing the nexus of cause and effect. Also, they developed a
sense of the relativity of the large and the small, and so arrived
at the abstractions, infinity at one end of the scale and nothingness
at the other end. There was much daring exploration, particularly
as the fourth century B.C. went over into the third century: the
discovery of metaphysical abstractions as well as cosmological.
Then, in the second century B.C., with the coming of the syncretism,
which we speak of as "State Confucianism," the attempt was made
to be inclusive with results that were not coherently systematic.7
Thus, we do not find in Han philosophy anything comparable to
Aristotle's analysis of the Greek language and its underlying cate-
gorical abstractions, nor do we find a parallel to the syllogistic logic
which he built on his categories.
On the other hand, if we compare the categories within the
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four walls of which the third- and fourth-century transcendental
logicians (Hsiian hsiieh chia) carried out their speculations, we
find that they go further. For example, compare Kant's categories
of quantity, categories of quality, categories of relation, and cate-
gories of modality. \Ve find clear evidence of a consciousness
of all these categories in the Chinese mind at that time. That,
however, is not all that has to be said on this score. There was, in
addition, from mid-Han times on, the category of the yin and yang,
and alongside it, more or less dovetailed into it, the five hsing, i.e.,
the five physical forces operating in the universe. As if that were not
enough, a school of so-called Confucianist thought took the diviners'
cabalistic figures of divided and undivided lines and linked them
by a sort of science of symbolism to the yin and the yang and the
five hsing. For many minds this symbolism was the key to the
march of history. For others it was an epistemological method, a
sure guide to all possible forms of knowledge. The correlation of
these abstract categories with the other more universally recognized
abstractions was never, as far as I have been able to discover,
successfully made. Today they are, rightly or wrongly, despised
by the intelligentsia as having had a crippling influence on Chi-
nese philosophy.s
Nevertheless, when all is said on this point and all due weight
given to certain Sung (960-1279) philosophers and their mathe-
matical schematizations of the hexagrams and the five hsing and
the yin and the yang, I have still to be convinced that this line of
abstraction had only a crippling influence on Chinese powers of
ratiocination. The significant thing is that these symbols, i.e., the
lines in the hexagrams and the trigrams, were regarded as centers
of energy continually acting and reacting on each other according
to their relative positions. We find, also, the correlative notions of
t'i (substance) and yung (function) used in connection with them;
but the impression I get is that greater importance was attached
to the functional side. The center of interest lay there, so that the
logic at work in these thinkers' minds led them to concentrate
more on categories of relationship than on categories of substance.
That fact is worthy of serious consideration. So also, although to a
lesser degree, is the fact that the idea of a macrocosm's being
paralleled by a microcosm in the human body 9 was worked out
in a kind of precise scientific spirit. Clearly, however, the main
attraction of this line of systematic thinking lay for the Chinese
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in the direct clue it gave to the dualistic nature of the universe with
its correlation. of phenomena in the heavens and phenomena on
earth, e.g., in connection with the farmer's year, cycles of prosperity
and disaster, etc. In this way, also, a satisfactory explanation was
found for the fact of male and female, and of life and death; and
this explanation was on the basis that no entity in the universe
could be static or self-contained. One triumph of the system was
what can only be called its ecological good sense. The plumage of
birds and the pigmentation of animals' skins were guessed at as
deriving from the nature of the terrain in which the birds and
animals lived.10
In the light of the above, it would appear that the cogency of
late classical and early medieval philosophy did not in the final
upshot suffer from a failure to appreciate the necessity for abstract
categories, but from the promulgation of too many such categories.
No amount of fitting them together could produce a coherent sys-
tem. Here, however, we have to beware of assuming that every
thinker accepted these categories equally at their face value. That
would manifestly be an unwarranted assumption, although a tend-
ency in that direction is traceable in foreign circles through the
inHutllce of Alfred Forke's excellently informative but highly gen-
eralized work, The World Conception of the Chinese,u In this
connection it must always be borne in mind that the Chinese way,
apart from a few exceptions such as the iconoclast Wang Ch'ung
(A.D. 27-ca. 100), was for writers just to leave out of their philo-
sophic pictures those categories about which they had their doubts.
Thcy would not denounce unless there were some very compelling
reason. We have, therefore, to use the argument from silence more
often than we are naturally predisposed to do. Thus, in the notable
case of Yang Hsiung (53 B.C.-A.D. 18), we find a thinker much
given to speculation on the nature of knowledge but having a pro-
found sense of the inscrutability of the natural order. It is to be
taken as significant that he produced two books, one the T'ai
Hsiian (The Supreme Mystery), the other the Fa Yen (Regulatory
Measures), two books which bear very little, indeed no obvious,
relation to each other. Since the author was silent on this, we can
only assume that he was content that the two sides of his mind
should so appear, each for what it was worth, no more and no less.
I submit that the above is evidence of an empirical mind at
wark in these writers, an empirical mind applied in the field of
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abstract categories as well as in the field of historical attestation.
From that we must go on to envisage a continual process of pro-
motion and de-motion in thinkers' attitudes toward generalizations,
on the one hand, and abstract categories, on the other: a process
which can be found in other cultures as well as the Chinese. Thus,
thinkers in the third and fourth centuries A.D., men like Kuo Hsiang
and Ko Hung, subjected the generally accepted absolutes to fresh
scrutiny and by no means accepted them all as being as certain as
the stars in their courses. The point is that they did not discard
these absolutes outright but relegated them to the lower position
of being tentative generalizations.
The empirical mind, once it has discovered itself and has been
enshrined in cogent literary form, can never be denied its right of
way. Yet, that same mind cannot work without categories, and
therefore makes choice of such as it finds best suited to its purposes.
This may be a dangerous philosophical path to tread, but even
philosophers have to think, perhaps not perfectly, but as best they
can. That this kind of thing happened in China may be taken as
part of the abiding influence of the greatest of the Taoist thinkers,
Chuang Chou. He sowed in Chinese thinkers' minds the unceasing
suspicion that all categorical thinking, by very reason of its being
categorical, was in the very nature of a tentative experiment into
the mysterious hinterland of knowledge. What is true today may
easily be untrue tomorrow.
The Evidence for Controlled Experiment in Language
in Eastern Han Times and Thereafter
I have given in the quotation from Hsiao T'ung's foreword a
typical instance of what is sometimes called parallelistic prose, but
to which the Ch'ing (1644-1912) scholars gave the title "double-
harness writing." This designation seems to me more illuminating.
The word "p'ien," which they used, meant originally driving horses
in double harness. The importance of this style of writing lies in
the fact that it came into existence when the language was first
pulled together after the unification (ca. 220 B.C.), and that it
remained in one form and another as a continual influence right
down to the twentieth century. Epistemologically, it is significant
because it presupposes that all clear thinking moves forward in
pairs of complementary propositions, one pair releasing the mind
for the next pair. Further, it was definitely laid down by the ex-
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positors of this style that the only sound approach to inward
experience, or alternatively to any object of outward attention, was
from a double angle of vision, and that these two angles must be
strictly correlated in the syntactical structure of the sentences. We
are reminded of Aristotle's sweating over the problem of getting
the bare bones of syl-Iogizing clear, and in consequence setting up
two propositions, relating them, and getting a third: in other words,
making a constructional language experiment, and doing so with
a strong sense of the importance of grammar; not worrying over
concepts so much, but getting down to the living molecule of
thought, the sentence. It is commonly supposed that the Chinese
failed to do anything commensurate along this line. That idea is
not true. Not only was there the great experiment of double-
harness writing; there was also in Eastern Han times (first and
second centuries A.D.) and for some centuries afterward the prac-
tice among scholars of making what they called "linked pearls." 12
Since these are the nearest Chinese approach to the Aristotelian
syl-Iogism, I will deal with them before treating the major experi-
ment in detail.
A "linked pearl" consisted, first, of two general propositions
introduced by the words, "Your servant has heard." These proposi-
tions expressed matters of common knowledge or common,
accepted principles. A third and final proposition was then enunci-
ated, introduced by the logical connective "therefore" (shih i),
in the logical sense, not the factual. That, plainly, is a conclusion,
so that here we have an alternative method of syl-logizing. The
interesting thing is that conclusions in many cases were statements
which did not correspond to hard facts. One is driven to suspect
that the author's intention was to indicate the wide difference there
is between theory and fact. The conclusion, therefore, was not in
the nature of a new item of assured knowledge, but a point d'appui
from which the auditors of the "linked pearl" were expected to be
driven on to reconsider the nexus of the two initial propositions
and the conclusions from them. In a word, here in these "linked
pearls" is a methodological device for stirring criticism of accepted
knowledge. In that respect their objective is fundamentally differ-
ent from that of the Aristotelian syllogism, or at any rate the objec-
tive as discerned in the European traditional use of it,13 Thus, by
comparing the two ways of syl-logizing, it is arguable that the
Westerner gets new light on his ancestral mode of formal reasoning.
To me it becomes clear that the conclusion of a syl-logism is not
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final in any sound epistemological sense but is merely a concrete
hypothesis, clear-cut and evidential in its own way but requiring
examination in the light of all the other available evidence. In
other words, the proper use of the syllogism is in connection with
empirical reasoning, and there its value lies in its being an experi-
ment in which the language is under strict control.
I go on to the problems connected with empirical reasoning.
We speak a great deal about empiricism, empiricism here, empiri-
cism there, empiricism everywhere; but, in the last analysis, em-
pirical reasoning does not produce results unless the mind is driven
to make some form or other of controlled experiment. This is quite
clear from the history of the natural sciences down to the present
day. This seems to me the gist of what the logical positivists have
been trying to emphasize, namely, that a reliable philosophical
method of empirical reason requires controlled experiments in lan-
guage. Now, the particular ways in which some of these neo-
logicians deal with their theses may be obnoxious to some, but the
main contention as I have ventured to describe it is surely in-
contestable. It is in that connection that the Chinese attempts at
controlled language experiment are worth consideration, the more
so because they have been couched in a language which at first
sight is so alien to the Indo-European languages.14
The nature of double-harness rational discourse is especially
exemplified in Hsiao T'ung's two empirical observations as expressed
in the opening words of paragraph 2 of his foreword. What we have
to realize is that the correlation of the imperial-chariot-cum-primi-
tive-wheel observation with the block-of-ice-cum-quantity-of-wa-
ter observation is effected by an exact parallelism in the syntactical
structure of the sentences. Thus, "with regard to the [primitive]
hammered-out wheel's being the beginning of the imperial car-
riage," in the Chinese the clause consists of seven words. So, also,
does the phrase "with regard to a block of ice's being the product of
a quantity of water." The same principle operates in regard to the
other two clauses: "the imperial carriage has the raw material of
the primitive wheel" and "the water has not got the iciness of the
ice"-each clause is eight words long. What you will certainly have
noticed is that these two statements are in contrast, the one being
positively affirmative, the other negatively affirmative. What you
should also have noticed is that in the two introductory clauses you
have two complementary approaches to the two subjects of dis-
course: the one approach from the angle of the beginning, the other
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approach from the angle of the final product. Thus the two sets of
observations are brought into exactly comparable form so that the
mind can deal with them. The result is immediately apparent.
First, the two contrasted data provoke the question, "How about
this?" Second, the mind is impelled to comparative analysis of the
two situations (or should I call them "events"?). "It would appear"
(kai) introduces these two analyses, and after "kai" we find two
six-word sentences of exactly parallel syntactical structure, which
the translation faithfully reproduces. The final stage in the argu-
ment consists of two couplets of four-word sentences. Here the
syntactical structure is not precisely parallel, but the relation of
the two sets of meanings is sufficiently obvious.
I have chosen this passage by Hsiao Tung partly for the reason
that, although the insistence on parallelism in grammatical structure
was a strong insistence, it was not carried to insane lengths. The
exact comparison of meaning was the object, and, so long as that
was obtained, variations in syntax were permissible. These varia-
tions were more common in the simple four-word sentences, less
common in the more complicated, longer sentences.
In regard to paragraph 1, it is more a piece of historical descrip-
tion than a piece of dialectical reasoning, so that the parallelism
is not quite so close at all points. Yet, the first parts of the de-
scription are conducted in three consecutive couplets, respectively,
4+4,6+6,4+4. In the second half of the description there appear to
be two complementary final statements separated from each other:
(a) "From this came the birth of patterned books," ~nd (b) "How
far back the historical significance of wen goes."
The final emphasis with regard to this double-harness thinking
and writing is to be laid on the consciousness which lies behind it,
of wandering, discursive thinking being necessarily disciplined by
language into clearly comparable meanings. From the impact of one
meaning on its fellow meaning, the mind is impelled along a
straight course of comparable meanings until the author arrives at
what he regards as a conclusion, or a complementary pair of conclu-
sions. This is ratiocination, disciplined, directed, formalized, yet
embodying the basic freedom of empirical investigation.
The question for the Indian and Western minds is whether this
is reasoning in the strict sense of the term. As I see it, it is; but,
then, I must confess my heretical predilection for regarding poets
as conducting controlled experiments in language through the
medium of prosodic form. I would also maintain that a painter,
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particularly a landscape painter, conducts an experiment controlled
by the size of the canvas or piece of silk within the compass of which
he tries out an idea. Moreover, I suspect that a physicist, a biologist,
or a behavioristic psychologist, does something which is basically of
the same sort. Imagination comes into every one of these experi-
ments, but imagination which is subjected to control. So, also, with
regard to philosophy and the latest experiments in logic: I venture
to suggest that such a book as Professor Ayer's The Foundations of
Empirical Knowledge 15 is distinguished above all by the acuteness
of his imaginative powers and the pertinacity with which he works
to control language.
Desiderata
Finally, I offer a brief survey of desiderata, outlining work
needing to be done before Chinese epistemology can be in a fit
state to make its contribution to the new science of comparative
epistemology.
1. That the various critically historical studies of Chinese key
philosophical terms should be evaluated in the light of modern
semantic techniques, and that, after that evaluation, further studies
should be undertaken with a view to clarifying the blurred mean-
ings which now so hamper the advancement of scientific knowledge
in the field of epistemology. (The wor~ must be done by a group
of scholars, Chinese and Western, and, if at the same time the
Hellenists and Latinists would put their learning into better and
more systematic semantic shape, we should really be able to com-
pare. )
2. That the epistemological significance of "double-harness"
writing generally and "double-harness" dialectic in particular should
be made the subject of intensive study.
3. That the influence of "double-harness" thinking and writing
on Chu Hsi's mind should be carefully explored; e.g., li (organic
principle) and ch'i (constitutive ethers) are obviously complemen-
tary abstractions.
4- That the interplay of the scholar-mind and the artist-mind
should be made the subject of exhaustive study, particularly for
the Six Dynasties when the idea of graded perspective in landscape
painting began to emerge, and that this should be followed by
similar studies in the minds of men like Su Shih in the Sung era
(960-1279) .
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5. That the texts of the Kung-sun Lung dialogues and the Neo-
Moist chapters in the Mo Tzu should be subjected to severe critical
examination.
6. That much more intensive study of the Chinese particles
should be made, especially the logical connectives, and this by
scholars with good philosophical training.
II
Strategic Reasons for the Above Specialized Approach to
the Study of Chinese Epistemology and Methodology
The foregoing approach to Chinese epistemology and method-
ology may cause surprise since it refers only incidentally to the
great age of Sung "and centers attention on what has been generally
regarded as an off-time in Chinese philosophical history. Since the
Sung era produced among its various methodologies one clear and,
along its own line, cogent methodology, namely, that of the Ch'eng-
Chu school,16 and, since this became dominant and remained so for
some seven centuries, why this one-sided treatment? There are a
number of reasons, three of them of strategic force in relation to
this Conference in which distinguished Western and Indian philos-
ophers are anxious to take Chinese philosophy into due account, no
more and no less. That being so, in the first place, the Ch'eng-Chu
synthesis, for all the signs of Buddhist influence on the minds of its
makers, was nonetheless a great token of revulsion against the Bud-
dhist thesis of a higher knowledge, which stood in" complete con-
trast to the knowledge of this world. Chu Hsi went back to the
ancient Confucian tradition, as did most of the Sung philosophers;
and there they found this element and that which expressed for
them the truth about the universe and man and about the way to
achieve knowledge which is truth. It is arguable, therefore, that the
Ch'eng-Chu synthesis was only a rehash of the old dogmas, and,
since the doctrines of the school became the pattern of orthodoxy,
the inference stares the foreign student in the face that we have
here the final culminating evidence of a damning Chinese proclivity
for bibliolatry and its attendant epistemological authoritarianism.
The question is whether such an inference can stand, and the an-
swer in my considered opinion is that it is only very partially true;
and, when I say that, I am keenly aware that Chu Hsi's emphasis on
ko wu (examination of things, i.e., objects of attention) became
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sidetracked, as the modern scientist would allege, first by Chu Hsi
himself to the examination of the li (something akin to the Platonic
ideal pattern) of things, and afterward by the Ming (1368-1644)
and Ch'ing (1644-1912) devotees of the school to what they could
find in the authoritative books about things and their li. The evi-
dence against the truth of the accusation of authoritarianism lies,
first of all, in the kind of empirical and categorical thinking the
growth of which has been pictured in Part I, and, last of all, in the
fact that, when modern Western mathematics and science came to
the attention of the sons of the li doctrine devotees, some of them
took to the new learning like ducks to water. Moreover, in the writ-
ings of Han Yii and Li Ao (T'ang Dynasty, 618-g07), whom Dr.
Fung calls the forerunners of the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi, the
studied language and ideation are double-harness throughout, and
this in spite of the fact that these two writers revolted against the
euphuistic excesses of the double-harness art in their day.
In the second place, it is as well that foreign students of Chi-
nese cultural history should understand a recent trend in historical
research in China, namely, the realization of the intrinsic impor-
tance of the Six Dynasties (third to sixth century A.D.). 17 Thus, now
that the fury of the revulsion against the past and all its works,
which characterized the period following the 1911 Revolution, has
had time to subside, the new driving force in critical historical stud-
ies is showing itself in (a) a more impartial appreciation of Chi-
nese Buddhism, and (b) in discovering that "ex nihilo nihil fit"
applies to the great flowering ages of T'ang and Sung. Had it not
been for the "smelting and forging" of the language done by the
later Han and Six Dynasties scholars, had it not been for the close
scrutiny of abstract thinking conducted by the transcendental logi-
cians, how could T'ang poetry and Sung philosophy have come into
being?
In the third place, we cannot but take into serious considera-
tion the main thesis of F. S. C. Northrop's The Meeting of East and
West. It is undoubtedly the main contribution which has come from
the East-West movement in comparative philosophy, and we are all
indebted to Northrop for his trenchant defining of problems in this
particularly blurred field. His distinctions of "concepts by intuition"
and "concepts by postulation" will be with us for some time to come.
Yet-to confine myself to the Chinese side-there has been an unfa-
vorable reaction amongst some Chinese scholars and most Sinolo-
gists to the lumping of China and India and Japan all in the same
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philosophical boat. Speaking personally, the more I have examined
this matter from Northrop's angle of approach, the more I have
appreciated his challenge to certain well-intrenched ways of think-
ing, and the more I have come to doubt whether his over-all classi-
fication of the "Oriental" traditions and their methodologies is in
line with the historical facts. For that reason, therefore, as well as
the other two, it became my business to draw attention to those,
methodologically speaking, highly formative centuries between the
collapse of Chou (third century B,C.) and the rise of T'ang and
Sung, the centuries in which empirical thinking became associated
with controlled language experimentation, the centuries in which
the categories necessary to deductive reasoning were explored con-
sciously and deliberately.
With Regard to Concepts by
Intuition and Concepts by Postulation
"The clarification of the distinction between <mathematicals'
and <ideas' must await the further development, in the sequel, of our
technical terminology of comparative philosophy, and in particular
the clarification of the different possible types of concepts by postu-
lation." 18 The crux lies there: what kinds of concepts by postulation
are we to allow as valid? Are only those which are expressed in
mathematical and physical terms valid for "deductively formulated
theories," and, if so, are cosmogonical as well as cosmological hy-
potheses of the same logical genus or not? Further, if-as seems
legitimate and necessary-we are to allow valid postulation in re-
lation to the fields of biology and physiology, of psychology and
social science, is there not also a case to be made for valid postulates
concerning ethical values?
I do not want to whittle at Northrop's distinctions. Obviously
his emphasis on Plato the mathematician is extremely important,
and the Greek consciousness of "incommensurable magnitude" did
put mathematics on a very different footing from that on which it is
for the man who is conscious of it only as the rule of thumb 2+2 and
2 X 2. So, then, I do not minimize the fact that the ancient Greeks
got as far as that and that the Chinese of classical China did not get
so far. On the other hand, as I note that "concepts by postulation"
were first introduced into Western philosophy because of the need
for them in Greek physics and mathematics, so I note also that Ar-
istotle, for two reasons, one of them his concern for biology, was
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forced to reject all postulated scientific objects, such as the physical
atoms of Democritus. The interesting thing is that Epicurtls a few
years later went back to the Democritean atom but changed the
postulate to one in which the deductive movement of his mind
seems to have been that men are of the same basic stuff as the atoms
in Nature, that some freedom of movement is characteristic of
men, that therefore some freedom of movement is characteristic of
atoms (d., Leibniz on his monads). Now, it is not required of a
concept by postulation that it should be true but that it should give
birth to a deductively formulated theory and should not spring from
one or more direct sense-apprehensions. But does the use of analogy
come into the postulatory picture, for Epicurus plainly intuited (or
postulated) an intrinsic affinity between the basic stuff of man and
the basic stuff of Nature?
The significance of these questions is, of course, in relation to
China, where there came to be a vivid and even subtle conscious-
ness of the biological-cum-physiological side of Nature, and where
a basic affinity was assumed between men and things. 19 The level
of mathematical interest seems to have remained low, although in
the Neo-Moist books (third century B.C.?) a number of geometrical
definitions are given. A sort of Pythagorean playing with numbers
is found in the Hsi tz'u (sometime between the third century B.C.
and the first century A.D.) and elsewhere, but it is not until early
Sung times that we can find such high-level calculations as produce
an abstract theory of numbers. 20 At first sight, therefore, the whole
range of scientific thinking seems to be at the natural-history stage,
sometimes a little childishly so, but also often enough maturely so.
E.g., as early as the third century B.C. we find one Ho Kuan Tzu, a
Taoist-minded philosophizer, noting that between an object and its
shadow there is no interstice of space, but between a sound and its
echo there is an interval of time. What is more, he noted that the
direct unbroken connection is necessary if the shadow is to be
there at all, and assumes, infers, postulates (?) that the interval of
time is necessary if the echo is to come. There, however, he stopped.
He was not driven, as were William Derham and the French Acad-
emy in the eighteenth century, to image the existence of sound
waves and to experiment accordingly.
Thus, in China there was controlled experimentation all the
time, but, apart from alchemy, it was in the direction of control
of the language of discourse, of the language of poetry, as of the
language of prose. The line of demarcation which the West has
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come to draw between the two ways of thinking and writing does
not work out the same way in China. Most of China's philo-
sophical history is to be found in essays and not in ponderous
treatises, and in those essays there is generally attention to form as
well as to matter. This at first sight would seem to give Northrop
all that he claims, namely, a highly developed sense of art and a
poorly developed sense of logic, the employment of the artistic
genius militating against the employment of the scientific: minds
working by intuitive imagination and not by the cold light of rea-
son. To a certain extent I agree. I am the first person to acknowl-
edge that he has some justification for his theories in relation to
China. Nonetheless, I do not agree when he rules out concepts by
postulation and deductively formed theories. It is not a case of
"either-or" in the China field but of "both-and." And this "both-and"
state of affairs surely applies to Western philosophy as well as to
Chinese. The only thing is that in the Chinese philosophizing tradi-
tion there is probably rather more of the artistic power of discourse
than there is in the Western philosophizing tradition.
If Northrop can grant me, as certain utterances of his lead me
to suppose he can, that not all valid postulations are directly con-
nected with physics and mathematics, then I think we can start
getting a little further in our common explorations. In order to
define the comparative situation, I submit, by way of example,
that the two concepts ;en and yin-yang, concepts which have exer-
cised so profound an influence on Chinese ways of thinking, are
concepts by postulation, not concepts by intuition in Northrop's
sense. In the one case, in very early days, when, as Hsiao T'ung
might have said, philosophical thinking was in the stage of primi-
tive simplicity, one Confucius made a practical syl-logism: man
can live well only in society: we men of Lu State and its neighbors
are men: therefore, we must be socially minded, i.e., man-to-man-ly
(;en). In this way, by postulation, he revolutionized the current
meaning of ;en and gave the Chinese a deductively formulated
theory which the disciples of Confucius have been trying to prove
experimentally ever since. In the second case, at a time when
philosophical thinking as such was beginning to take shape in
Chinese minds, by direct apprehension some thinkers saw the
heavens and the earth, two different entities sharply distinguish-
able yet self-evidently related, since life on the earth depended
on the regular day-and-night, spring-summer-autumn-winter, rain-
and-sunshine cycle of movement in the skies. They analyzed this
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cosmic situation in their minds, and-I would say-arrived at a
hypothesis that there were two theoretic forces behind this range
of phenomena viewed as a whole: a constructive force and a
destructive force working in conjunction, the one the logical antith-
esis of the other, but the hvo working as one indivisible existential
process. They then proceeded to try out this hypothesis in relation
to the various departments of life in Nature and life in man. In the
light of this yin-yang postulation (as I would call it) they dis-
covered all sorts of relationships, some of them ludicrous from
Wang Ch'ung's point of view in the second century A.D., others
unsound from Chu Hsi's point of view in the twelfth century, and
still others merely naively common-sensical and not true to fact
from our scientific point of view today.
Yet, its main presuppositions, that the positive must entail the
negative, that movement must entail stillness, that what we see as
life must entail death (although, as Chuang Tzu maintained, we
do not know what death is), stand today. Along with these, yet
sanely enough not differentiated as yin, on the one hand, and
yang, on the other, went the two presuppositions that the idea of
limited space carries with it its complement, unlimited space, as
also the idea of time carries with it the idea of eternity. These,
surely, were not intuitions or hunches but inferences. And now we
come to Chu Hsi again, with his concepts by postulation (as I
would say), liand ch'i, the one metaphysical, the other physical,
or perhaps paraphysical, together constituting the current coin of
later methodological theorizing, and in their basic complementality
furnishing an incontrovertible instance of the double-harness mind
at work, since by their means Chu Hsi made observation of all
phenomena. We have to bear in mind: (a) that the Sung scholars
had inherited a strong sense of the importance of history, and to
them we owe those massive tomes, the Tzu-chih tung-chien and
the T'ai-p'ing yii-lan,21 both of them monuments of historical dis-
crimination, and the latter documenting every citation it makes
under its fifty-five main headings, while Chu Hsi himself set his
disciples to work on making a shortened version of the former;
and (b) that, although later ages read and revised these vast
works with painstaking care, yet the actual tendency inherent in
Chu Hsi's line of reasoning was to view things sub specie aeterni-
tatis rather than sub specie temporis. That being so, the practical
moral for both Northrop and me is that the historian's sense of
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impartiality demands that we should do justice, no more and no
less, to China's epistemological devil and saint, "Chu Wen Kung"
(prince of wen, patterned thinking), China's arch-deductive
theorist, Chu Hsi.
Conclusion
Since our main desideratum here must be a more denotative
examination of epistemological method, may I plead for the exer-
cise not only of more studied care but also of a more imaginative
mind in comparing East and \Vest on a historical basis. For instance,
no illumination of the comparative field can be gained by treating
The Analects of Confucius and the Metaphysics of Aristotle pari
passu as typical examples of the methodological approach to
knowledge in the respective cultures. The one book came into
existence before there was any conscious, much less consecutive,
philosophical thinking, and was not written by Confucius, while
Aristotle was stimulated by a Plato and had the philosophical re-
flections of two centuries on which to draw. The more legitimate
comparison is with the ordered and more competent literary mind
of Hsiin Ch'ing, two centuries after Confucius. And even then the
comparison cannot have much weight unless we are able to preface
it with a comparison of the relative philosophical maturity of the
Greek and Chinese languages at those two particular times. This
procedure would come nearer to the basic principle of comparison,
namely, comparing like with like.
A second instance may be cited in relation to the era of the Six
Dynasties. Because the collapse of Rome and the overrunning of
the Mediterranean world by barbarians brought a period commonly
known as the "Dark Ages," it is rather generally taken for granted
that the collapse of the Han order in the third century, followed by
the barbarian rule of North China in the fourth to sixth centuries,
produced a very similar dark age. The history of civilization is by
no means as tidy as that. A comparison of Lu Chi, the literary
critic, who died in A.D. 303, with Longinus, who died in A.D. 273,
and a comparison of the respective achievements in the writing of
history and the creation of new art motifs would show how different
the two eras were. Not that they should not be compared, for they
should. The rise of the Holy Roman Empire and the rise of the
Tang Dynasty are essentially comparable historical phenomena,
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and our task of comparing philosophies goes haltingly until compe-
tent work has been done in this matter. This reflection is closely
linked with another reflection, namely, one in connection with the
growing practice of using the European historians' terminology,
such as "Early Medieval" and "Late Medieval." I do not see how
this is to be avoided in Western learned circles, but it is obviously
attended by great dangers. The crux of the problem lies in the
unconscious assumption by \Vestern students that the uneven levels
of intellectual acumen to be found in the Western Middle Ages
are roughly a criterion as to what Chinese learning and philosophy
could have achieved, i.e., presumably did actually achieve, in their
Middle Ages. That does not follow in the least. The attainments of
new levels of rational consciousness do not come pari passu in the
different cultures, just as the Mediterranean time-schedule of ad-
vance and pause is not necessarily that of other cultures. Thus, for
example, the Chinese had their major attack of religious utilitar-
ianism followed (may we say, inevitably?) by non-religious
utilitarianism twenty-one to twenty-three centuries back, while
Europe got its major attack and aftermath one to three centuries
ago. On the other hand, Greek mathematics was what it was-and
later was forgotten for several hundred years-while even
eleventh-century Chinese mathematics did not produce a Euclid
or a Democritus. Here are pitfalls for the unwary philosopher in
the new field of culture comparison.
In this connection note should also be taken of Fung Yu-lan's
pithy statement that all post-classical Chinese philosophy is in the
medieval stage. ~Te know what he means by that and we need
not quarrel with it, until we come to consider what is called "The
Renaissance" in textbooks of European culture. It is then apt to be
assumed that not only did "The Renaissance" take place in Europe,
but that no renaissance could have taken place in China in the
twelfth century. No true historian, of course, would soil his his-
torian's tongue with so gross a non sequitur. That stands. On the
other hand, there have been these four last centuries of the ad-
vance of natural science in the West and not in China. What are
we to assume? That the Chinese intelligentsia are incurably artistic
and unscientific? We cannot do that when before our eyes stands
the evidence of the nineteenth-century mathematicians, Li Shan-
Ian and Hua Heng-fang, of the brilliant geodecist of this genera-
tion, Li Ssu-kuang, and many others, including the younger men
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working in the Princeton Institute of Advanced Studies after gain-
ing mathematical doctorates at Oxford. Can we assume a time lag
of a few negligible centuries which the Chinese will quickly over-
take? No one can know for a generation or two.
Meanwhile, there is the little matter of the historical imagina-
tion, that indispensable tool of the historian's science and art, which
is even more needed in intercultural comparison. There would be
great virtue in learned experiments in the imaginative depicting
by Chinese scholars of various key periods transplanted by a magic
carpet into some American or European mise en scene: Yang
Hsiung dining with Seneca or Marcus Aurelius, Han Yti in the
Rome of Gregory the Great, and Chu Hsi coming into the England
of James I and Donne and Milton. What would these critics of the
thought of their times have made of the philosophic foundations of
the culture they saw in process of evolving? My impression is that
the Sung visitor to England would have felt that the Protestant
reform in England had produced but a rehash of the old classics
and that both the new Protestant and the Trentine Catholic were
sunk in authoritarianism. But then he could have met Francis
Bacon or read his Novum Organum and said, "Ah, yes, that is what
I was thinking of when I said ke wu (investigating things), but
he does not realize the necessity of having a kang chi (over-all
binding principle)." But, then, if Chu Hsi had seen Shakespeare
played and had mastered Shakespeare's Hamlet with its immortal
picture of filial piety tom two ways, if he had gone over to Holland
and studied the Dutch painters, being a little too early to talk with
Benedict Spinoza, he might, yes, he might have said to himself,
"How muddled and inconclusive the philosophy of this people is,
and how great their poetry and art." And then he would have
gone back to China muttering something about the aesthetic, intui-
tive approach to the problems of the universe and man and would
have thanked Heaven that his China knew how to combine the
scientific 22 and the artistic approach and make sense of it all. How
wrong he would have been, and yet how excusably wrong, how
even illuminatingly wrongl
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I
The Scientific Spirit and Method
in Chinese Philosophy
IN THE COURSE of the past work in East-West philosophy, the
question has been raised as to whether there was science in the
East, and why the East developed little or no science.
To the first question, some of the answers seem definitely in
the negative. "So the West generated the natural sciences, as the
East did not," said Professor Wilmon Henry Sheldon.1 And Professor
Filmer S. C. Northrop said, "There is very little science [in the
East] beyond the most obvious and elementary information of the
natural history type." 2
To the second question as to why there was very little or no
science in the East, the answers vary. But the most challenging
and provocative answer has come from Northrop, who declares,
- "A culture which admits only concepts by intuition is automat-
ically prevented from developing science of the Western type
beyond the most elementary, inductive, natural history stage." 3 As
defined by Northrop, concepts by intuition are those "which denote,
and the complete meaning of which is given by, something which
is immediately apprehended." 4 This is Northrop's theory:
Formal reasoning and deductive science are not necessary if only
concepts by intuition are used in a given culture. If what science and
philosophy attempt to designate is immediately apprehended, then
obviously all that one has to do in order to know it is to observe and
contemplate it. The methods of intuition and contemplation become the
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sole trustworthy modes of inquiry. It is precisely this which the East
affirms and precisely why its science has never progressed for long
beyond the initial natural history stage of development to which concepts
by intuition restrict one.5
This theory is concisely expressed in these words "... the
East used doctrine built out of concepts by intuition, whereas
Western doctrine has tended to be constructed out of concepts by
postulation." 6
I have no intention to go into the details of this Northropean
theory, which must have been familiar to us who have followed
our philosopher-friend all these 20 years.
I only wish to point out that this theory of bifurcation of East
and West is unhistorical and untrue as far as the intellectual history
of the East is concerned.
In the first place, there is no race or culture "which admits
only concepts by intuition." Indeed, there is no man who "admits
only concepts by intuition." Man is by nature a thinking animal,
whose daily practical needs compel him to make inferences for
better or for worse, and he often learns to make better and surer
inferences. It has been truly said that inference is the business man
never ceases to engage in. And, in making inferences, man must
make use of all his powers of perception, observation, imagination,
generalization and postulation, induction, and deduction. In that
way, man develops his common sense, his stock of empirical knowl-
edge, his wisdom, his civilization and culture. And, in the few
centers of continuous intellectual and cultural tradition, man, of
the East and of the West, in the course of time, has developed his
science, religion, and philosophy. I repeat, there is no culture
"which admits only (the so-called) concepts by intuition," and
which "is automatically prevented from developing science of the
Western type."
In the second place, I wish to point out that, in attempting to
understand the East and the West, what is needed is a historical
approach, a historical attitude of mind, rather than a "technical
terminology for comparative philosophy." Northrop includes among
his examples of "concepts by postulation" these items: Centaurs,7
the opening sentence of the Fourth Gospel, the concept of God
the Father, the Christianity of St. Paul, of St. Augustine, and St.
Thomas Aquinas,8 as well as the atoms of Democritus, the atomic
models of Bohr's and Rutherford's classical atomic physics,9 and
the space-time continuum of Einstein's physics.10 Surely, one can
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find a thousand imaginary concepts in the mythological and re-
ligious literature of India and China that can compare with the
Greek concept of "Centaurs." And, surely, one can point to many
scores of religious ideas in India and China that can compare with
the concept of God contained in the first sentence of the Fourth
GospeI.ll Are we not justified in calling a halt to such 'bifurcating"
terminology that tends to emphasize a difference between East
and West which historically does not exist?
I would like very much, therefore, to present here what I
mean by the historical approach to the comparative study of phi-
losophy. Briefly, the historical approach means that all past dif-
ferences in the intellectual, philosophical, and religious activities
of man, East and West, have been historical differences, produced,
conditioned, shaped, grooved, and often seemingly perpetuated
by geographical, climatic, economic, social and political, and even
individual or biographical factors, all of which are capable of being
studied and understood historically, rationally, and intelligently.
Through this historical approach, patient and fruitful studies and
researches can then be conducted, always seeking to be under-
stood, never merely to laugh, or to cry, or to despair. It may be
that, through this historical approach, we may find that, after all,
there are more similarities than differences in the philosophies and
religions of East and West; and that whatever striking differences
have existed are no more than differences in the degree of emphasis
brought about by a peculiar combination of historical factors. It
may be that, through this historical approach, we may better
understand the rise and rapid development of what has been
called "science of the Western type"-not as an isolated or exclusive
creation of any chosen people, but only as the natural product of
an unusually happy combination of many historical forces. It may
be that, as a result of patient historical researches, we may better
understand that none of those historical forces, nor a combination
of them, will ever "automatically prevent" or permanently inca-
pacitate any race or culture from learning, adopting, developing
-and even excelling in-the intellectual activities historically
initiated and developed by any other race.
To say that any culture "is automatically prevented from de-
veloping science of the Western type" is to despair prematurely.
But to seek to understand what historical forces have conspired to
give the nations of Europe the glory of leading the entire world
by at least fully four hundred years in the development of modern
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science, and, on the other hand, what other historical forces or
what combinations of such forces have been largely responsible for
retarding or even crushing such scientific development by any
race or culture throughout historic times, not excepting the Graeco-
Roman-Christian culture throughout the Middle Ages-that would
be a legitimate ambition not unworthy of such a learned assembly
of philosophers and historians of philosophy.
II
It is in the direction of suggesting some such historical ap-
proach to comparative philosophy that I have prepared this paper
with the rather immodest title: "The Scientific Spirit and Method
in Chinese Philosophy."
I have deliberately left out the scientific content of Chinese
philosophy, not merely for the obvious reason that that content
seems so insignificant compared with the achievement of Western
science in the last four centuries, but also because I am of the
opinion that, in the historical development of science, the scientific
spirit or attitude of mind and the scientific method are of far more
importance than any practical or empirical results of the astron-
omer, the calendar-reformer, the alchemist, the physician, or the
horticulturist.
This point of view has been eloquently presented by Dr. James
B. Conant, former President of Harvard University, and a first-rank
scientist in his own right, in his Lectures, On Understanding Sci-
ence. Let me, therefore, quote him: .
Who were the precursors of those early investigators who in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries set the standards for exact and
impartial inquiries? Who were the spiritual ancestors of Copernicus,
Galileo and Vesalius? Not the casual experimenter or the artful contrivers
of new mechanical devices who gradually increased our empirical
knowledge of physics and chemistry during the Middle Ages. These men
passed on to subsequent generations many facts and valuable methods of
attaining practical ends but not the spirit of scientific inquiry.
For the burst of new ardor in disciplined intellectual injuiry we must
turn to a few minds steeped in the Socratic tradition, and to those early
scholars who first recaptured the culture of Greece and Rome by
primitive methods of archaeology. In the first period of the Renaissance,
the love of dispassionate search for the truth was carried forward by
those who were concerned with man and his works rather than with
inanimate or animate nature. During the Middle Ages, interest in
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attempts to use the human reason critically and without prejudice, to
probe deeply without fear and favor, was kept alive by those who wrote
about human problems. In the early days of the Revival of Learning, it
was the humanist's exploration of antiquity that came nearest to
exemplifying our modern ideas of impartial inquiry. . . .
Petrarch, Boccaccio, Machiavelli, and Erasmus, far more than the
alchemists, must be considered the precursors of the modern scientific
investigator. Likewise, Rabelais and Montaigne who carried forward the
critical philosophic spirit must be counted, it seems to me, among the
forerunners of the modern scientists,12
I believe that the position taken by President Conant is es-
sentially correct. It is interesting to note that he gave his lectures
a subtitle: "An Historical Approach."
From this historical standpoint, "the love of dispassionate
search for the truth," the "interest in attempts to use the human
reason critically and without prejudice, to probe deeply without
fear and favor," "the ardor in disciplined intellectual inquiry," "the
setting of standards for exact and impartial inquiry"-these are
characteristics of the spirit and method of scientific inquiry. It is
these aspects of the scientific spirit and method, as they are found
in the intellectual and philosophical history of China, that will
form the main body of my paper.
III
To begin with, there was undoubtedly a "Socratic tradition"
in the intellectual heritage of classical China. The tradition of free
question and answer, of free discussion, independent thinking, and
doubting, and of eager and dispassionate search for knowledge
was maintained in the school of Confucius (551-479 B.C.). Con-
fucius often described himself as one who "learns without satiety
and teaches without being wearied," and as one who '1oves antiq-
uity and is earnest in seeking to know it." 0 On one occasion, he
spoke of himself as one "who is so eager to know that he forgets
to eat, whose cares are lost in moments of rapturous triumph,
unmindful of the coming of old age."
That was the man who founded and molded the orthodoxy of
the Chinese intellectual life of the past twenty-five centuries. There
" Editor's note: Because of serious illness and death of Dr. Hu it has been
impossible to provide complete references for some of his quotations from
classical texts.
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was much in Confucius that reminds us of Socrates. Like Socrates,
Confucius always professed that he was not a "wise man" but a
man who loved knowledge. He said: "He who knows does not rank
with him who loves knowledge; and he who loves knowledge does
not rank with him who really delights in it."
An interesting feature in the Confucian tradition is a deliberate
encouragement of independent thinking and doubt. Thus Con-
fucius spoke of his most gifted student, Yen Hui, "Hui is no help
to me: he is always satisfied with what I say." But he also said, "I
often talk to Hui for a whole day, and he, like a dullard, never
raises an objection. But when he is gone and I examine his private
life, I find him fully capable of developing [my ideas]. Hui is no
dullard." Confucius apparently wanted no docile disciples who
would feel pleased with everything he said. He wanted to en-
courage them to doubt and raise objections. This spirit of doubt
and questioning was best shown in Mencius, who openly declared
that to accept the whole Book of History as trustworthy is worse
than to have no Book of History at all, and that, of the essay
"Wu-ch'eng" (a section of The Book of History), he would accept
no more than two or three (bamboo) pages. Mencius also sug-
gested a free and independent attitude of mind as a necessary pre-
requisite to the understanding of The Book of Odes (Shih ching).
The best-known Confucian dictum is: "Learning without
thinking is labor lost; thinking without learning is perilous." He
himself, however, seemed to be always inclined to the side of
learning. He said of himself: "I have often spent a whole day with-
out food and a whole night without sleep-to think.' But it was of
no use. It is better to study." "Study as if life were too short and you
were on the point of missing it." "He who learns the truth in the
morning may die in the evening without regret." That was China's
Socratic tradition.
Intellectual honesty was an important part of this tradition.
"Yu," said Confucius to one of his students, "shall I tell you what
knowledge is? To hold that you know a thing when you know it,
and to hold that you do not know when you really do not know:
that is knowledge." When on another occasion the same student
asked Confucius how to serve the spirits and the gods, Confucius
said, 'We have not yet learned to serve men, how can we serve
the spirits?" The questioner then asked about death, and the Master
said, 'We do not yet know life, how do we know death?" This was
not evading the questions; it was an injunction to be intellectually
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honest about things one does not really know. Such an agnostic
position about death and the gods and spirits has had lasting in-
fluence on Chinese thought in subsequent ages. That, too, was
China's Socratic tradition.
In recent decades, doubt has been raised about the historicity
of the man Lao Tzu (or Lao Tan) and about the authenticity and
the dating of the ancient book known as The Book of Lao Tzu.
But I, for one, still believe that Confucius was at one time a
student of and an apprentice to the older philosopher, Lao Tzu,
whose influence in the direction of a naturalistic conception of the
universe and of a laissez-faire (wu-wei) philosophy of government
can be observed in the thinking of Confucius himself.
To have postulated a naturalistic view of the universe at so
early a date (the sixth century B.C.) was truly revolutionary. The
ancient Chinese notion of T'ien (Heaven) or Ti (Supreme God),
as represented in the songs and hymns of The Book of Odes, was
that of a knowing, feeling, loving, and hating supreme ruler of
men and the universe. And the fate of men was also supposed to
be in the hands of all kinds of gods and spirits. In place of such
an anthropomorphic deity or deities, an entirely new philosophic
concept was proposed.
There is something of indeterminate origin,
And born before Heaven and Earth.
Without voice and without body,
It stands alone and does not change;
It moves everywhere but is never exhausted.
It may be regarded as the mother of the universe.
I do not know its name:
I call it "the Way" (Tao),
And perforce designate it "the Great" (ta).
So, the new principle was postulated as the Way (Tao), that is,
a process, an all-pervading and everlasting process. The Way be-
comes so of itself (tzu jan), and all things become so of themselves.
"The Way (Tao) does nothing, yet it leaves nothing undone."
That is the central idea of this naturalistic conception of the uni-
verse. It became the cornerstone of a political theory of non-activity,
non-interference, laissez faire (wu-wei). "The best ruler is one
whose existence is scarcely noticed by the people." And the same
idea was developed into a moral philosophy of humility, of non-
resistance to evil and violence. "The supreme good is likened to
THE SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT AND METHOD IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 111
water which benefits all things and resists none." "The weak and
yielding always wins over the hard and strong." "There is always
the Great Executioner that executes. [That is the great Way, which
does nothing but leaves nothing undone.] To do the executing for
the Great Executioner is like doing the chopping for the master
carpenter. He who does the chopping for the master carpenter
rarely escapes injuring his own hand."
Such was the naturalistic tradition formed by Lao Tzu, the
teacher of Confucius. But there was a fundamental difference be-
tween the teacher and his student. Confucius was a historically
minded scholar and a great teacher and educator, whereas Lao
Tzu was a nihilist in his conception of knowledge and civilization.
The ideal utopia of Lao Tzu was a small state with a small popu-
lation, where all the inventions of civilization, such as ships and
carriages "which multiplied human power by ten times and a
hundred times are not to be put in use; and where the people
would restore the use of knotted cords instead of writing!" "Always
let the people have no knowledge, and therefore no desires." How
different is this intellectual nihilism from Confucius' democratic
philosophy of education, which says, "With education there will
be no classesI"
But the naturalistic conception of the universe, as it was germi-
nated in The Book of Lao Tzu and more fully developed in
subsequent centuries, has been a most important philosophical
heritage from the Classical Age. Naturalism itself best exemplifies
the spirit of courageous doubt and constructive postulation. Its
historical importance fully equals that of the humanist heritage
left by Confucius. Whenever China has sunk deep into irrationality,
superstition, and otherworldliness, as she has done several times
in her long history, it was always the naturalism of Lao Tzu and
the philosophical Taoists, or the humanism of Confucius, or a com-
bination of the two, that would arise and try to rescue her from
her sluggish slumbers.
The first great movement "to use the human reason critically
and to probe deeply without fear and favor" in the face of the
State Religion of the Han empire was such a combination of the
naturalistic philosophy of Taoism and the spirit of doubt and intel-
lectual honesty that was the most valuable heritage handed down
from Confucius and Mencius. The greatest representative of that
movement of criticism was Wang Ch'ung (A.D. 27-ca. 100), author
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of a book of 85 essays called the Lun heng (Essays in Criticism).
Wang Ch'ung spoke of his own essays in these words, "One
sentence sums up my essays: I hate falsehood." "Right is made to
appear wrong, and falsehood is regarded as truth. How can I re-
main silent! ... When I read current books of this kind, when I
see truth overshadowed by falsehood, my heart beats violently, and
my brush trembles in my hand. How can I be silent! When I
criticize them, I examine them in my reasoning power, check them
against facts, and show up their falsehood by setting up proofs." 13
He was criticizing the superstitions and falsehoods of his age,
of which the greatest and most powerful were the central doc-
trines of catastrophes (tsai) and anomalies (i), which the state
religion of the Han empire, under the name of Confucianism,
interpreted as warnings sent by a benevolent and all-seeing God
(or Heaven) (T'ien) to terrify the rulers and governments so that
they might repent and reform their acts of misrule. This religion
of Han Confucianism had been formulated by a number of philoso-
pher-statesmen of the second and first centuries B.C. who were
justifiably worried by the real problem of how to deal with the
unlimited power of the absolute monarchy in a vast unified empire,
and who, consciously or semiconsciously, had hit upon the religious
weapon and had worked out an elaborate theology of "reciprocal
relationship between Heaven (T'ien) and the rulers of men" which
seemed to have been able to hold the absolute sovereigns in awe
throughout the several centuries of the Han dynasties.
This theology of the state religion of catastrophes and anom-
alies was best expressed by Tung Chung-shu (ca. 179-ca. 104
B.C.), who spoke like a prophet and with authority: "The action of
man, when it reaches the highest level of good and evil [that is,
when it becomes government action affecting vast numbers], will
flow into the course of Heaven and Earth and cause reciprocal
reverberations in their manifestations." "When a state is on the
verge of ruin, Heaven will cause catastrophes [such as floods,
famines, great fires] to befall earth as warnings to the ruler. When
these are not hearkened to, Heaven will cause strange anomalies
[such as sun eclipses, comets, unusual movements of planets] to
appear to terrify the ruler into repentance. But, when even these
anomalies fail to check his misrule, then ruin will come. All this
shows that Heaven is always kind to the ruler and anxious to pro-
tect him from destruction." This theology of intimate reciprocal
reverberations between Heaven and the rulers of men was sup-
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posedly based on an elaborate interpretation of the pre-Confucian
Book of History and the Confucian Ch'un ch'iu Annals (Spring
and Autumn Annals, which recorded numerous unusual events on
earth and in the heavens, including thirty-six eclipses of the sun
and five earthquakes between 722 and 481 B.C.). But the canonical
Classics of established Confucianism were not enough for the sup-
port of this fanatic and fantastic theology, which had to be rein-
forced by an ever-increasing crop of apocryphal works known as
the wei (woofs or interweaving aids to the Canon) and the ch'an
(prophecies), which are collections of bits of empirical knowledge
intermixed with hundreds of astrological fantasies.
It is a historical fact that this state religion of pseudo-Confu-
cianism, at the height of its glory, was taken so seriously that many
a prime minister was dismissed, and one was forced by the Emperor
to commit suicide, all because of the belief in Heaven's warning
in the form of catastrophes and abnormalities. One of the three
great medieval religions was in full sway over the empire.
It was against the basic idea of a reciprocal responsive rela-
tionship between a teleological God and the rulers of men that
Wang Ch'ung was directing his main criticism. He was criticizing
the theology of the established religion of the empire. The world
view with which he set out to attack the current theology was the
naturalistic philosophy of Lao Tzu and the Taoists. He said:
The Way (Tao) of Heaven is that it does nothing and all things become
so by themselves. If Heaven were to give warnings to men or mete out
punishments, that would be "doing" things and not things "becoming so
of themselves." . . . Those who hold that catastrophic and abnormal
occurrences were purposeful warnings from Heaven are in reality
degrading the dignity of the great Heaven by interpreting natural
phenomena in terms of human action. They are therefore not convincing
at all.14
For, he pointed out,
Heaven is most exalted, and man is tiny. Man's place between Heaven
and Earth is like that of a flea inside one's clothes, or that of an ant in an
anthill. . . . Surely it is absolutely impossible for man with his tiny body
of seven feet to hope to bring about any response from the vast
atmosphere of the great firmament.l 5
That is why Wang Ch'ung said that the doctrine of reciprocal
response between Heaven and man was in reality "degrading the
dignity of the great Heaven."
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And he offered to prove that man and all things in the uni-
verse were never purposefully (ku) produced by Heaven and
Earth, but were accidentally (yu) so, of themselves:
It is wrong to hold that man is born of Heaven and Earth purposely.
Certain fluids are combined, and man is born accidentally. . . . All
things are formed of fluid (ch'i), and each species reproduces itself....
If it were true that Heaven purposely produced all living things in the
world, then Heaven should make them all love each other and not allow
them to injure or prey on each other. . . . But there are tigers and
wolves, poisonous snakes and insects, which prey on man. Can we say
that it is the purpose of Heaven to create man for the use of those
ferocious and poisonous animals? 16
The first century of the Christian era was a period of calendar
reform under the Han empire. And Wang Ch'ung made full use of
the astronomical knowledge of his age to expose the folly of the
current theological doctrine of catastrophes and anomalies as warn-
ings from Heaven against the evil acts or policies of the rulers of
the empire. He said:
There is one eclipse of the sun in about forty-one or forty-two months,
and there is one eclipse of the moon in about six months. Solar and lunar
eclipses are regular occurrences which have nothing to do with
government policies. And this is true of the hundreds of anomalies
and thousands of calamities, none of which is necessarily caused by the
action of the rulers of men.17
But Wang Ch'ung more frequently cited facts of everyday
experience as proofs or evidences in his numerous criticisms of the
superstitions or falsehoods of his age. He offered five "tests" (nien)
to prove that thunder was not the wrath of Heaven but only a kind
of fire generated by the friction of the yin and yang fluids in the
air. And he produced many a proof to support his thesis that there
were no ghosts or spirits. One of those proofs is most ingenious and
so far irrefutable: "If a ghost is the spirit of the dead man, then the
ghost should be seen only in naked form and could not be seen
with clothes on his body. For surely the cloth or silk can have no
soul or spirit to survive destruction. How can it be explained that
ghosts have never been seen in naked form, but always with
clothes on?" 18
So much for my favorite philosopher, Wang Ch'ung. I have
told his story to show how the spirit of courageous doubt and intel-
lectual honesty of the Classical Age of Chinese philosophy could
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survive centuries of oblivion and would arise to carryon the fight
of human reason against ignorance and falsehood, of creative doubt
and constructive criticism against superstition and blind authority.
To dare to doubt and question without fear and favor is the spirit
of science. "To check falsehoods against facts and to expose them
by setting up proofs" constitute the procedure of science.
IV
The rest of my paper will be devoted to a brief interpretative
report on a great movement in the history of Chinese thought
which started out with the ambitious slogan of "investigation of the
reason of all things and extension of human knowledge to the ut-
most" but which ended in improving and perfecting a critical
method of historical research and thereby opening up a new age
of revival of classical learning.
That great movement has been called the Neo-Confucian
movement, because it was a conscious movement to revive the
thought and culture of pre-Buddhist China, to go back directly to
the humanist teaching of Confucius and his school, in order to over-
throw and replace the much Indianized, and therefore un-Chinese,
thought and culture of medieval China. It was essentially a Confu-
cian movement, but it must be noted that the Neo-Confucian
philosophers frankly accepted a naturalistic cosmology which was
at least partially of Taoist origin and which was preferred probably
because it was considered to be more acceptable. than the theo-
logical and teleological cosmology of the "Confucian" religion since
the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220). Here was another case of a
combination of the naturalism of Lao Tzu and the philosophical
Taoists and the humanism of Confucius once more rising in protest
and rebellion against what were considered as the un-Chinese
otherworldly religions of medieval China.
This new Confucian movement needed a new logical method,
a "novum organum:' which it found in a little essay of post-Confu-
cian origin entitled The Great Learning, an essay of about 1,700
Chinese characters. From that little essay, the founders of Neo-
Confucianism picked out one statement which they understood to
mean that "the extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of
things." That soon became one of the central doctrines in the
philosophy of the school of the Ch'eng brothers (Ch'eng Hao, also
called Ch'eng Ming-tao, 1032-1085, and Ch'eng I, also called
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Ch'eng I-ch'uan, 1033-1107), especially as that philosophy was
interpreted and reorganized by the great Chu Hsi (113(}-1200).
The investigation of things was further interpreted to mean "seek-
ing exhaustively to investigate the reason (Ii) in all things."
What are "things"? According to the Ch'eng-Chu school, the
scope of "things" was as extensive as Nature itself, including "every
grass and every shrub" as well as "the height of the heavens and the
thickness of the earth." But such a conception of the "things" to
be investigated was beyond the capability of the philosophers, who
were men of affairs and politicians as well as thinkers and teachers
of men. They were more vitally interested in the moral and political
problems of men than in the investigation of the reason or law
in every grass or shrub. So Ch'eng I himself began to narrow down
the scope of "things" to three categories: the study of books, the
study of men of the past and the present, and the study of what is
right in dealing with practical affairs. "Always begin with what is
nearest to you," he said. And Chu Hsi, the greatest of the Sung
(960-1279) philosophers and the most eloquent and untiring ex-
ponent of the philosophy of the investigation of the reason in all
things, devoted his whole life to the study and exposition of the
Classics of Confucianism. His Commentary on The Four Books
(the "New Testament" of Neo-Confucianism) and his Commen-
taries on The Book of Odes and The Book of Changes were
accepted as the standard texts for seven centuries. The philosophy
of the investigation of the reason in all things was now definitely
applied to the limited field of classical studies.
Truly inspired by the "Socratic tradition" of Confucius, Chu
Hsi worked out a set of principles on the spirit, the method, and
the procedure of investigation and research. He said, "Investigate
with an open mind. Try to see the reason (Ii) with an open mind.
And with an open mind follow reason wherever it leads you." What
is an open mind? Chu Hsi said, "Retreat one step back, and think
it over: that is the open mind." "Do not press your own opinion too
much forward. Suppose you put your own opinion aside for a
while, and try to see what the other side has to say. Just as in hear-
ing a case of litigation, the mind is sometimes prejudiced in favor
of A, and you are inclined to seek evidences against his opponent
B, or vice versa. It is better to step aside and calmly and slowly
study what both sides have to say. Only when you can step aside
can you see things more clearly. The Master Chang Tsai (also
called Chang Heng-ch'ii, 102(}-1O77) said, 'Wash away your old
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ideas to let new ideas come in.' If you do not put aside your pre-
conceived notions, where and how can you get new ideas?"
The Neo-Confucians of the eleventh century often stressed the
importance of doubt in thinking. Chang Tsai had said, "The student
must first learn to be able to doubt. If he can find doubt where
no doubt was found before, then he is making progress." As an
experienced worker in textual and semantic researches, Chu Hsi
was able to develop a more practical and constructive methodology
out of the idea of doubt. He realized that doubt did not arise of
itself, but would come only when a situation of perplexity or diffi-
culty was present. He said: "I used to tell students to think and to
seek points of doubt. But I have come to understand that it is not
fruitful to start out with the intention of finding things to doubt.
Just study with an open mind. After working hard at a text,
there will be places which block your path and cause you per-
plexity. That's where doubts naturally come up for you to compare,
to weigh, to ponder over." "The student [as it has been said]
should learn to find doubt where no doubt had previously existed,
but he should also learn to resolve the doubt after it has arisen.
Then he is making real progress."
Doubt would arise in a situation in which conflicting theories
simultaneously claimed credulity and acceptance. Chu Hsi told of
his early doubts when he found that "the same passage in The
Analects had been given widely different explanations by various
commentators." "That," said he, "led me to doubt." How is doubt
to be resolved? "By keeping one's mind open," he ~aid. "You may
have your own view, but it may not be the correct view. Do not
hold it dogmatically. Put it aside for a while, and search for more
and more instances to be placed side by side, so that they may be
compared. Then you may see through and understand." In one of
his letters to his friend and philosophical opponent, Lu Chiu-yuan
(also called Lu Hsiang-shan, 1139-1193), he again used the
example of the judge trying a case of litigation: "Just like the judge
trying a difficult case, one should keep his mind open and impartial,
and must not let his own inclination or disinclination influence his
thinking. He can then carefully listen to the pleading of both sides,
seek evidences for cross-checking, and arrive at a correct judgment
of right and wrong."
What Chu Hsi was saying amounts to a method of resolving
doubt by first suggesting a hypothetical view and then searching
for more instances or evidences for comparison and for checking
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the hypothesis "which may not be correct" and which Chu Hsi
sometimes described as "a temporarily formed doubting thesis"
(ch'iian-li i-i). In short, the method of doubt and resolution of doubt
was the method of hypothesis and veriBcation by evidence.
Chu Hsi told his students: "The trouble with you is that you
are not capable of doubting; that's why you do not make progress.
As for myself, I have my doubt even in the least signiBcant matters.
As soon as one begins to doubt, one has to go on [thinking] until
the doubt is completely resolved."
It was because of this inner urge to resolve doubts that Chu
Hsi often confessed that, from his younger years on, he was fond of
making investigations based on evidences (k'ao-cheng ). He was
one of the most brilliant minds in human history, yet he was never
tired of hard work and patient research.
His great achievement lies in two directions. In the Brst place,
he was never tired of preaching the importance of doubt in think-
ing and investigation-doubt in the sense of a "tentatively formed
doubting thesis," doubt, not as an end in itself, but as a perplexity
to be overcome, as a puzzling problem to be solved, as a challenge
to be satisfactorily met. In the second place, he had the courage to
apply this technique of doubt and resolution of doubt to the
major Classics of the Confucian Canon, thereby opening up a new
era of classical scholarship which did not attain its full develop-
ment until many centuries after his death.
He did not produce a commentary on The Book of History,
but he made epoch-making contributions to the study of that classic
by his great courage to doubt the authenticity of its so-called
"ancient-script" portion consisting of 25 books which were appar-
ently unknown to the classical scholars of the Han Dynasty, but
which seemed Brst to appear in the fourth century A.D., and came
to be accepted as an integral part of The Book of History after the
seventh century. The 28 (actually 29) books that were officially
recognized in the Doctors' College of the Han empire had been
transmitted orally through an old scholar, Fu (who survived the
book-burning of 213 B.C.), and had been transcribed in the "mod-
em script" of the second century B.C.
Chu Hsi started out with a great doubt: 'There are two distinct
languages in these books-some of them are difficult to read and
understand, others can be read and understood quite easily. It is
very strange that the books which were transmitted from memory
by the old scholar Fu are all hard to read, whereas the other books,
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which made their appearance much later, should all tum out to be
quite easy to understand. How can we explain the strange fact
that the old scholar Fu could memorize only those most difficult
texts but could not transmit those that are so easy to read?"
In his Chu Tzu yii-lei (Classified Sayings), he kept repeating
this great doubt to every student who asked him about The Book
of History.19 "All the books easy to understand are the 'ancient-
script' texts; all those most difficult to read are the 'modem-script'
texts:' Chu Hsi did not openly say that the former group of texts
were later forgeries. He merely wanted to impress upon his stu-
dents this most puzzling linguistic distinction. Sometimes he sug-
gested a very mild explanation to the effect that those books most
difficult to read probably represented the language actually spoken
to the people in those public proclamations, whereas the books easy
to read were the work of official historians who probably did some
revising or even rewriting.
Naturally such a mild theory did not explain away the doubt
which, once raised, has persisted for many centuries to plague
classical scholars.
A century later, under the Mongol (Yuan) Dynasty (1279-
1368), Wu Ch'eng (1247-1331) took up Chu Hsi's challenge and
drew the logical conclusion that the so-called "ancient-script" books
were not genuine parts of The Book of History, but were forgeries
of a much later age. So, Wu Ch'eng, in writing a Commentary on
that classic, accepted only 28 "modem-script" books, and excluded
the 25 "ancient-script" books. .
In the sixteenth century, another scholar, Mei Tsu, also took
up the question, and published in 1543 a book to prove that the
"ancient-script" portion of The Book of History was a forgery by a
fourth-century writer who apparently based his forgeries on the
numerous passages found in ancient works wherein specific titles
of "lost" books were mentioned as sources of the quotations. And
Mei Tsu took the trouble to check the sources of those quotations
which formed the kernel of the forged books.
But it took another and greater scholar of the seventeenth
century, Yen Jo-ch'u (1636-1704), to put a finishing touch to the
task of resolving the doubt raised by Chu Hsi in the twelfth cen-
tury about the "ancient-script" portion of The Book of History. Yen
devoted thirty years to the writing of a great book entitled "Inquiry
into the Authenticity of the Ancient-Script Portion of The Book of
History:' With his wonderful memory and great learning, Yen
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proved these books to be deliberate forgeries by tracing almost
every sentence in them to its source and by showing how the
forger had misquoted or misunderstood the meaning of the original
passages. Altogether, Yen offered over a hundred proofs to expose
the forgery. Although his views were vehemently attacked by
conservative scholars of his day, it is now considered that Yen
Jo-ch'ii's book has convincingly rendered a final verdict, and that
nearly one-half of a major book of the Confucian Canon, which
had been accepted as sacred scripture for a thousand years, must
be recognized as a proven forgery.
And for this intellectual revolution of no small magnitude
credit must be given to our philosopher Chu Hsi, who in the twelfth
century expressed a courageous doubt and proposed a meaningful
question which he himself was not yet fully prepared to answer.
Chu Hsi's treatment of the I ching (The Book of Changes),
another of the "sacred scriptures," was even more daring, so daring
indeed that it was never accepted and developed during the last
seven centuries.
He published a Commentary on the I ching and a little book
entitled "A Primer on the Study of the I ching." And he left a num-
ber of letters and discussions on that classic.2Q
His most daring thesis about the I ching was that that book,
which had always been regarded as a sacred book of profound
philosophical truth, was originally devised as a text of divination
and fortune-telling, and could be understood only if it were studied
as a book of divination and no more than a book of divination.
"The sentences or judgments for every kua (hexagram), of which
there were 64, and every line (of which there were 384) were
meant to be used as answers to people who wanted to know
whether it was propitious to do such-and-such a thing or not. Some
answers were for sacrifices, others for hunting, others for traveling,
or for war, or emigration. If the sages had intended to talk about
philosophy, why should they not simply write a philosophy book;
why should they talk always in terms of fortune-telling?" "If the
book is studied merely as a text for the diviner, then so many
passages which had been wrongly explained as mysterious and pro-
found wisdom immediately become quite plain, simple, and
intelligible."
This common-sense theory was the most courageous doubt
ever uttered about that strange book. But it was rejected by his
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friends as an "oversimplification." But Chu Hsi replied: "It is just
like this big lantern. Every strip of bamboo added to the lantern
frame simply takes away that much of the light. If we could only
get rid of all those light-covering devices, how much more light
there would be, and how much better it would be for all of usl"
That was a truly revolutionary theory which illustrates one of
his great remarks, that "the simplest theory is usually the true
theory." But Chu Hsi realized that his view of the I ching as noth-
ing more than a text for divination was too radical for his time.
He sadly said, "It is difficult to talk to people about this theory.
They would not believe it. Many distinguished people have argued
so vehemently against me, and I have spent so much energy to
explain and analyze my view to them. As I now look back, it is
better to say nothing more. I shall leave it here, regardless of
whether people believe it or not. I shall waste no more strength
arguing for it."
Chu Hsi was justly proud of his Commentary on The Book of
Odes (1177), which was to remain a standard text for many cen-
turies after him. Two features of this work have been fruitful in
leading to future developments in research. One was his courageous
discarding of the traditional interpretation as represented in the
so-called "Prefaces to the Poems" and his insistence that the songs
and poems should be read with an open mind and independent
judgment. The other feature was his recognition of the "ancient
pronunciation" of the end-rhymes, a recognition th\lt was at least
indirectly responsible for the future development of a more exact
study of the entire field of ancient pronunciation, leading to the
beginnings of a science of Chinese phonology.
When The Book of Odes became a major Classic of the Confu-
cian Canon under the Han empire, there were four different schools
of textual reading and interpretation. After the first two centuries
of the Christian era, only one school, the Mao school, was in the
ascendency, overshadowing all the other schools. This Mao school
claimed to have based its interpretation of the poems on the
authority of the "Prefaces," which were supposedly handed down
from Tzu-hsia, a great disciple of Confucius, but which were prob-
ably the work of some Han scholar who had taken the trouble to
assign each poem to some historical occasion or event, or even to
some historic personage as its author. Some of the historical as-
signments were taken from the Tso chuan, one of the three
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commentaries of the Confucian Ch'un ch'iu Annals, in which the
origin of a few "Poems" was specifically mentioned. This display of
historical erudition was quite impressive and probably accounted
for the success of the Mao school in gradually winning general
acceptance and official recognition. The "Prefaces to the Poems,"
therefore, were regarded as having sacrosanct authority through-
out more than a millennium before the time of Chu Hsi.
Chu Hsi's senior contemporary, Cheng Ch'iao (1104-1162),
the learned author of the encyclopedic T'ung chih, published a
little book with the title, "An Examination of the Absurdities about
The Book of Odes," in which he strongly attacked the "Prefaces"
as absurd interpr'etations by vulgar and ignorant persons with no
sense of literary and poetic appreciation. Cheng Ch'iao's vehe-
mence of language at first shocked our philosopher Chu Hsi, but,
he confessed, "Mter reading several of his criticisms and checking
them with historical works, I soon came to the conclusion that the
'Prefaces' of those poems were really not reliable. When I went
on to compare some other poems with their Prefaces, I found the
content and meaning of the poems did not tally at all with their
Prefaces. I was finally convinced that most of the 'Prefaces' were
not trustworthy."
Here was a good illustration of conflicting ideas leading to
doubt, and also of an open mind being receptive to new ideas and
successful in resolving the doubt by evidence. Chu Hsi told how
he had tried unsuccessfully to persuade his life-long friend and
philosophical comrade, Lii Tsu-ch'ien (1137-1181), to reject the
Prefaces. He pointed out to Lii that only a few Prefaces were con-
firmed by clear references in the Tso chuan, but most of them were
grounded on no evidences. "But my friend said: 'How can one
expect to find so many documentary evidences!' I said: 'In that
case, we shall have to leave out all those Prefaces not based on
evidences. We cannot use the Prefaces as evidences for the inter-
pretation of the poems.' 'But,' said my friend Lii, 'the Prefaces
themselves are evidences!' From our discussion, I realized that
many people prefer to explain each poem by its Preface, and re-
fuse to seek understanding by reading the poem itself."
In his courageous fight to overthrow the authority of the
Prefaces and seek to understand the meaning of the poems by
reading each poem with an open mind, Chu Hsi was only partially
successful, both in his own new commentary and in leading future
workers to go farther in the same direction. The weight of tradition
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was still too great for Chu Hsi himself and for future generations.
But the great and creative doubt of Cheng Ch'iao and Chu Hsi
will always be remembered whenever modern and unprejudiced
scholarship undertakes to work on The Book of Odes with new
tools and in an entirely free spirit.
For the second new feature of Chu Hsi's work on The Book
of Odes, namely, the aspect of the ancient pronunciation of the
rhymes, he was inspired and aided by the work of another learned
contemporary of his, Wu Yii, who died in 1153 or 1154. Wu Yii
was the real pioneer in the study of Chinese phonology in working
out an inductive method of comparing rhymed lines in that ancient
Classic among themselves and with other ancient and medieval
rhymed poetry. He wrote quite a few books, including "A Supple-
ment on the Rhymes of The Book of Odes," "Explaining the
Rhymes in the Ch'u t'zu," and "A Supplement to the Standard
Rhyme-Book" (Yiin pu). Only the last-named has survived to this
day, through reprints.
There is no doubt that Wu Yii had discovered that those many
end-rhymes in The Book of Odes which did not seem to rhyme
according to "modern" pronunciation were natural rhymes in an-
cient times and were to be read according to their "ancient
pronunciation." He therefore carefully listed all the end-rhymes in
the 30o-odd poems of The Book of Odes and worked out their
ancient pronunciation with the aid of ancient and medieval dic-
tionaries and rhyme-books. A preface written by Hsii Ch'an, a
friend and distant relative of his, clearly described his patient
method of collecting and comparing the vast number of instances.
"The word now pronounced 'fu' appears 16 times in The Book of
Odes, all, without exception, pronounced 'bek' [or 'b'iuk,' accord-
ing to Bernard Karlgren]. The word now pronounced 'yu' appears
11 times in The Book of Odes, all, without exception, rhymed with
words ending -i."
This strict methodology impressed Chu Hsi so much that he
decided to accept Wu Yii's system of "ancient pronunciation"
throughout his own Commentary. Probably with a view to the
avoidance of unnecessary controversy, Chu Hsi did not call it
"ancient pronunciation" but "rhyming pronunciation"-that is to say,
a certain word should be pronounced in such a way as to rhyme
with the other ~'1d-rhymes the pronunciation of which had appar-
ently remained unchanged.
But, in his conversation with his students, he frankly said that
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he had followed Wu Yii in most cases, making additions or modifi-
cations in only a few instances; and that the rhyming pronuncia-
tions were the natural pronunciations of the ancient poets, who,
"like us in modern times, composed their songs in natural rhymes."
That is to say, the rhyming pronunciations were ancient pronuncia-
tions.
When asked whether there was any ground for the rhyming
pronunciation, Chu Hsi answered: "Mr. Wu produced proofs for
all his pronunciations. His books can be found in Ch'iian-chou. For
one word he sometimes quoted as many as over ten proofs, but at
least two or three proofs. He said that he originally had even more
evidences, but had to leave out many [in order to reduce the cost
of copying and printing]." And in those cases in which Chu Hsi
found it necessary to differ with Wu, he also cited examples for
comparison in his "Classified Sayings" and in the Ch'u-t'zu chi-chu
(An Annotated Edition of the Ch'u t'zu).
But because Chu Hsi used the expression "rhyming pronuncia-
tion" throughout his Commentary on The Book of Odes without
ever referring to the expression "ancient pronunciation," and be-
cause Wu Yii's books were long lost or inaccessible, a discussion
was started early in the sixteenth century in the form of a severe
criticism of Chu Hsi's improper use of the expression "rhyming
pronunciation." In 1580, Chiao Hung (1541-1620), a great scholar
and philosopher, published in his "Notes" (Pi-ch'eng) a brief
statement of a theory (probably his friend Ch'en Ti's [1541-1617]
theory) that those end-rhymes in ancient songs and poems that
did not fit into modern schemes of rhyming were all natural rhymes
whose pronunciations happened to have changed in the course of
time. He cited a number of instances to show that the words would
rhyme perfectly if pronounced as the ancients sang them.
It was Chiao Hung's friend Ch'en Ti who undertook many
years of patient research and published a series of books on the
ancient pronunciation of hundreds of rhyming words in many an-
cient books of rhymed poetry. The first of these works was
published in 1616 under the title: Mao-shih ku-yin k'ao (An Inquiry
into the Ancient Pronunciation of The Book of Odes), with a
preface by Chiao Hung.
In his own preface, Ch'en Ti proclaimed his main thesis that
the end-rhymes in The Book of Odes were naturally rhymed in
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their original pronunciation, and that it was only the natural change
of pronunciation which made some of them appear not to rhyme
at all. What had been suggested by Chu Hsi as "rhyming pronun-
ciations," said Ch'en Ti, were in most cases the ancient or original
pronunciations.
"I have done some evidential investigation (k'ao-chii) ," he
said, "and have grouped the evidences into two classes: internal
evidences (pen-cheng) and collateral evidences (p'ang-cheng).
Internal evidences are taken from The Book of Odes itself. Col-
lateral evidences are taken from other ancient rhymed works of
approximately the same age."
To show how the word "fu" was invariably rhymed in its
original archaic pronunciation (bek, or b'iuk), he listed 14 internal
evidences and 10 collateral evidences, a total of 24. The same
inductive method was applied to the study of ancient pronuncia-
tion in other rhymed literature of ancient China. To prove the
ancient pronunciation of the word "hsing," he cited 44 instances
from the rhymed sections of The Book of Changes, all rhyming
with words ending in -ang. For the word "ming," he cited 17
evidences from the same book.
Nearly half a century later, the patriot-scholar Ku Yen-wu
(1614-1682) completed his Yin-hsiieh wu-shu (Five Books of Pho-
nology). One of them was on "The Original Pronunciation of The
Book of Odes"; another on "The Pronunciation of The Book of
Changes"; and another on "The Rhyming Groups of the T'ang
Period," which is an attempt to compare the ancien~ pronunciation
with that of the Middle Ages. Ku acknowledged his indebtedness
to Ch'en Ti and adopted his method in classifying his proofs into
internal and collateral evidences.
Let us again use the word "fu" as an example. In his "Original
Pronunciations of The Book of Odes," Ku Yen-wu cited 17 internal
evidences and 15 collateral evidences, a total of 32. In his larger
work on the rhyming groups of the T'ang Dynasty (61~o7), he
listed a total of 162 evidences from available ancient rhymed
literature to show how that word was rhymed and pronounced in
ancient times.
Such patient collecting and counting of instances was intended
to serve a twofold purpose. In the first place, that was the only way
to ascertain the ancient pronunciation of the words and also to
find possible exceptions which may challenge the rule and demand
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explanation. Ku Yen-wu acknowledged that some exceptions could
be explained by the possibility of local and dialectal deviations in
pronunciation.
But the most valuable use of this vast statistical material was
to form a basis for systematic reconstruction of the actual group-
ings of ancient sounds. On the basis of his study of the rhymed
literature of ancient China, Ku Yen-wu concluded that ancient
pronunciations could be analyzed into ten general rhyming groups
(yiin p'u).
Thus was begun the deductive and constructive part of Chinese
phonetics, namely, the continuous attempts, first, to understand the
ancient "finals" (rhyming groups), and, in a later period, to under-
stand the nature of the ancient initial consonants.
Ku Yen-wu proposed ten general rhyming groups in 1667. In
the following century, a number of scholars continued to work
on the same problem and by the same inductive and deductive
methods of evidential research. Chiang Yung (1681-1762) sug-
gested 13 rhyming groups. Tuan Yii-ts'ai (1735-1815) increased
the number to 17. His teacher and friend, Tai Chen (1724-1777),
further increased it to 19. Wang Nien-sun (1744-1832) and Chiang
Yu-kao (died in 1851), working independently, arrived at a more
or less similar system of 21 rhyming groups.
Ch'ien Ta-hsin (1728-1804), one of the most scientifically
minded men of the eighteenth century, published in 1799 his
"Notes," which includes two papers on the results of his studies of
ancient initial labials and dentals. These two papers are outstand-
ing examples of the method of evidential investigation at its best.
He collected over 60 groups of instances for the labials, and about
the same number for the dentals. In the identifying of the ancient
sound of the words in each group, each step was a skillful combi-
nation of induction and deduction, of generalization from partic-
ulars and application of general rules to particular instances. The
final outcome was the formulation of two general laws of phono-
logical change regarding labials and dentals.
It is important for us to remind ourselves that those Chinese
scholars working in the field of Chinese phonetics were so greatly
handicapped that they seemed almost from the outset to be
doomed to failure. They were without the minimum aid of an
alphabet for the Chinese language. They had no benefit of the
comparative study of the various dialects, especially of the older
dialects in southern, southeastern, and southwestern China. Nor
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had they any knowledge of such neighboring languages as Korean,
Vietnamese, and Japanese. Without any of these useful tools, those
Chinese scholars, seeking to understand the phonetic changes of
their language, were actually faced with an almost impossible task.
Their successes or failures, therefore, must be evaluated in the
light of their numerous and important disadvantages.
The only dependable tool of those great men was their strict
method of patiently collecting, comparing, and classifying what
they recognized as facts or evidences, and an equally strict method
of applying formulated generalizations to test the particular in-
stances within the classified groups. It was indeed very largely
this meticulous application of a rigorous method that enabled Wu
Yii and Chu Hsi in the twelfth century, Ch'en Ti and Ku Yen-wu
in the seventeenth century, and their successors in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries to carryon their systematic study of
Chinese phonetic problems and to develop it into something of a
science-into a body of knowledge answering to the rigorous canons
of evidence, exactitude, and logical systematization.
I have sketched here what I have conceived as the story of
the development of the scientific spirit and method in the Chinese
thought of the past eight centuries. It began in the eleventh cen-
tury with the ambitious ideal of extending human knowledge to
the utmost by investigating the reason or law in all things of the
universe. That grandiose ideal was by necessity narrowed down to
the investigation of books-to the patient and courageous study of
the few great books which formed the "sacred scripture" of the
Chinese classical tradition. History saw the gradual development
of a new spirit and a new method based on doubt and the resolu-
tion of doubt. The spirit was the moral courage to doubt even on
questions touching sacred matters, and the insistence on the im-
portance of an open mind and impartial and dispassionate search
for truth. The method was the method of evidential thinking and
evidential investigation (k'ao-chii and k'ao-cheng).
I have cited some examples of this spirit and method at work,
notably in the development of a "Higher Criticism" in the form of
investigations of the authenticity and dating of a part of the clas-
sical texts and in the development of a scientific study of the
problems of Chinese phonology. But, as a matter of history, this
method was fruitfully and effectually applied to many other fields
of historical and humanistic research, such as textual criticism,
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semantics (i.e., the study of the historical changes of the meaning
of words), history, historical geography, and archeology.
The method of evidential investigation was made fully con-
scious by such men as Ch'en Ti and Ku Yen-wu in the seventeenth
century, who first used the expressions "internal evidences" and
"collateral evidences." The efficacy of the method was so clearly
demonstrated in the scientific works of the two great masters of
the seventeenth century, Ku Yen-wu and Yen Jo-ch'ii, that by the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries practically all first-class minds
in intellectual China were attracted to it and were devoting their
lives to its application to all fields of classical and humanistic study.
The result was a new age of Revival of Learning which has also
been called the Age of Evidential Investigation.
Even the most violent critics of this new learning had to admit
the scientific nature of its rigorous and effective method. One such
violent critic was Fang Tung-shu (1772-1851), who in 1826 pub-
lished a book which was a vehement criticism and condemnation
of the whole movement. Even Fang had to pay high tribute to the
rigorous method as it was used by two of his contemporaries, Wang
Nien-sun and his son, Wang Yin-chih (1766-1834). Fang said, "As
a linguistic approach to the classics, there is nothing that surpasses
the Ching-i shu-wen (Notes on the Classics As I Have Heard
from My Father) of the Wangs of Kao-yu. That work could ac-
tually make the great Cheng Hsiian (d. 200) and Chu Hsi bow
their heads (in humble acknowledgment of their errors). Ever
since the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220), there has never been
anything that could compare with it." Such a tribute from a violent
critic of the whole movement is the best proof that the meticulous·
application of a scientific method of research is the most effective
means to disarm opposition, to undermine authority and conserva-
tism, and to win recognition and credence for the new scholarship.
What was the historical significance of this spirit and method
of "exact and impartial inquiry"?
A brief but factual answer must be: It succeeded in replacing
an age of subjective, idealistic, and moralizing philosophy (from
the eleventh to the sixteenth century) by making it seem out-
moded, "empty," unfruitful, and no longer attractive to the best
minds of the age. It succeeded in creating a new age of Revival
of Learning (1600-1900) based on disciplined and dispassionate
research. But it did not produce an age of natural science. The
spirit of exact and impartial inquiry, as exemplified in Ku Yen-wu,
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Tai Chen, Ch'ien Ta-hsin, and Wang Nien-sun, did not lead to an
age of Galileo, Vesalius, and Newton in China.
Why? Why did this scientific spirit and method not result in
producing natural science?
Some time ago, I tried to offer a historical explanation by
making a comparative chronology of the works of the intellectual
leaders of China and of Europe in the seventeenth century. I said:
If we make a comparative chronology of the leaders of Chinese and
European learning during the seventeenth century-the formative period
both for the new science in modern Europe and the new learning in
China-we shall see that four years before Ku Yen-wu was born (1613),
Calileo had invented his telescope and was using it to revolutionize the
science of astronomy, and Kepler was publishing his revolutionary studies
of Mars and his new laws of the movements of the planets. When Ku
Yen-wu worked on his philological studies and reconstructed the archaic
pronunciations, Harvey had published his great work on the circulation
of blood [1628], and Calileo his two great works on astronomy and the
new science [1630]. Eleven years before Yen Jo-ch'ij began his critical
study of the Book of History, Torricelli had completed his great
experiment on the pressure of air [1644]. Shortly after, Boyle announced
the results of his experiments in Chemistry, and formulated the law that
bears his name [1660-1661]. The year before Ku Yen-wu completed his
epoch-making Five Books on philological studies [1667] Newton had
worked out his calculus and his analysis of white light. In 1680, Ku wrote
his preface to the final texts of his philological works; in 1687, Newton
published his Principia.
The striking similarity in the scientific spirit and method of these
great leaders of the age of new learning in their respective countries
makes the fundamental difference between their fields of work all the
more conspicuous. Calileo, Kepler, Boyle, Harvey, and Newton worked
with the objects of nature, with stars, balls, inclining planes, telescopes,
microscopes, prisms, chemicals, and numbers and astronomical tables.
And their Chinese contemporaries worked with books, words, and
documentary evidences. The latter created three hundred years of
scientific book learning; the former created a new science and a new
world.22
,
That was a historical explanation, but was a little unfair to
those great Chinese scholars of the seventeenth century. It was not
enough to say, as I did, that "the purely literary training of the in-
tellectual class in China has tended to limit its activities to the field
of books and documents." It should be pointed out that the books
they worked on were books of tremendous importance to the
moral, religious, and philosophical life of the entire nation. Those
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great men considered it their sacred duty to find out what each
and every one of those ancient books actually meant. As Robert
Browning sang of the Grammarian:
"What's in the scroll," quoth he, "thou keepest furled?
"Show me their shaping,
''Theirs who most studied man, the bard and sage,-
"Give!"-So, he gowned him,
Straight got by heart that book to its last page. . . .
"Let me know all! . . .
"Even to the crumbs 1'd fain eat up the feast." . . .
"... What's time? Leave Now for dogs and apes!
"Man has Forever." ...23
Browning's tribute to the spirit of the humanist age was: "This man
decided not to Live but Know."
The same spirit was expressed by Confucius: "Study as if life
were too short and you were on the point of missing it." "He who
learns the truth in the morning may die in the evening without
regret." The same spirit was expressed by Chu Hsi in his age.
There is no end to knowledge. I can only devote my whole energy
to study: death alone will end my toil."
But Chu Hsi went further: "My friends, you are not making
progress, because you have not learned to doubt. As soon as you
begin to doubt, you will never stop until your doubt is resolved at
last." And his true successors, the founders and workers of the new
age of Revival of Learning, were men who had learned to doubt-
to doubt with an open mind and to seek ways and means to re-
solve the doubt, to dare to doubt even when they were dealing
with the great books of the Sacred Canon. And, precisely because
they were all their lives dealing with the great books of the Sacred
Canon, they were forced always to stand on solid ground: they
had to learn to doubt with evidence and to resolve doubt with
evidence. That, I think, is the historical explanation of the remark-
able fact that those great men working with only "books, words,
and documents" have actually succeeded in leaving to posterity a
scientific tradition of dispassionate and disciplined inquiry, of
rigorous evidential thinking and investigation, of boldness in doubt
and hypotheses coupled with meticulous care in seeking verification
-a great heritage of scientific spirit and method which makes us,
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sons and daughters of present-day China, feel not entirely at sea,
but rather at home, in the new age of modem science.
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WING-TSIT CHAN Syntheses in
Chinese Metaphysics
CHINESE PHILOSOPHERS, both ancient and modern, have been in-
terested primarily in ethical, social, and political problems. Meta-
physics developed only after Buddhism from India had presented
a strong challenge to Confucianism. Even then, basic metaphysical
problems, such as God, universals, space and time, matter and
spirit, were either not discussed, except in Buddhism, or discussed
only occasionally, and then always for the sake of ethics. Discus-
sions have been unsystematic, seldom based on hypothesis and
logical analysis, for Chinese philosophers have always shunned
abstraction and generalities and have always been interested more
in a good life -and a good society than in organized knowledge. If
in our search for a world perspective in philosophy we rely chiefly
on theoretical foundations and logical subtlety, Chinese philosophy
has little to offer.
But if we are interested in a synthesis of philosophies, it will
be worth while to look into what has taken place in Chinese phi-
losophy, for one of the outstanding facts in the history of Chinese
philosophy has bt:len its tendency and ability to synthesize. The
history of Chinese philosophy is usually divided into four periods,
and each period ended in some sort of synthesis.
In the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220), even before Confu-
cianism was made a State cult and became supreme, the meta-
physical doctrines of Taoism, of the Yin-Yang school, and of the
Chung yung (The Doctrine of the Mean) were in the process of
merger. The result was the philosophy of change, accepted by
SYNTHESES IN CHINESE METAPHYSICS 133
Confucianism, Taoism, and all other schools. The Taoist ideal of
the Great Unit, the Yin-Yang theory of the interaction of the posi-
tive and negative cosmic principles, and the Confucian philosophy
of ch'eng, or truth, in The Doctrine of the Mean were synthesized
into one philosophy that was to dominate Chinese thought for
centuries and form a Rrm basis for Neo-Confucianism.
The second synthesis took place within the sphere of Bud-
dhism. The signiRcant thing is that in metaphysics the various Bud-
dhist schools of nihilism, realism, idealism, and negativism were
synthesized into the philosophy of Rua-yen totalism (Avatamsaka,
Kegon), which was distinctly Chinese in spirit. In this philosophy,
the "Realm of Principles" and the "Realm of Facts" are so harmo-
nized that the theoretical and the practical, the one and the many,
and noumenon and phenomenon are interwoven, so that all things
"arise simultaneously," co-exist, are complementary, mutually pene-
trating, mutually identifying, and involve and reflect one another.
The third synthesis took place in Neo-Confucianism, in which
Buddhism and Taoism were assimilated into traditional Confucian-
ism, as we shall see.
The fourth synthesis is going on in our own day. Modern Chi-
nese philosophy is still in its infancy. The few philosophers who
are building up systems of their own are all attempting to combine
Western philosophy with traditional Chinese thought.
I shall not go into the various historical factors in these four
stages of synthesis. What interests us more is the synthesis of ideas.
This will be discussed briefly under six topics which represent the
most important problems in Chinese metaphysics..
Being and Non-Being
The Rrst is the problem of being and non-being, on which Con-
fucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism radically disagreed. Being and
non-being were both denied in Buddhism; they were reduced to
non-being in Taoism; and were synthesized in Neo-Confucianism.
According to Buddhism, to be is impossible, because, in order
to be, a thing has to be produced. But, in order to be produced,
a thing has to come either from itself or from another, both of
which are absurd. Furthermore, to be means to have self-nature.
But a thing is nothing but an aggregate and as such has no self-
nature. Consequently, being is an illusion. By the same token, non-
being is also an illusion. Both may be granted "dependent reality"
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and "secondary truth," but the Void transcends them all. It is true
that Buddhist philosophers such as Seng-chao (384-414) inter-
preted the Void as "not true Void," since everything involves the
entire universe. In the middle of the first millennium, Buddhist
schools north of the Yangtze, such as Hua-yen, exhibited realistic
tendencies and were called "Schools of Being." But those south of
the river, especially the Meditation school (Ch'an, Zen), were la-
beled "Schools of Non-being." They were so called because they
insisted on the "highest truth," that "all matter and form are iden-
tical with the Void, and the Void is identical with all matter and
form." 1 In the end, both being and non-being are negated in the
Void.
Instead of denying both being and non-being, Taoism reduced
all to non-being, wu: "Heaven and Earth and all things come from
being," says the Tao-te ching, "and being comes from non-being." 2
Early Taoists understood wu to mean "having no name," that is,
that Tao cannot be described. Later Taoists, especially Kuo Hsiang
(d. ca. 312), went a step further and definitely identified wu with
nothingness. They argued that Tao is nowhere and has no activity.
To say that a thing comes from Tao is merely to say that it comes
from nowhere or from nothing. In truth, it comes from itself.
It should be noted that Taoists were not arguing for nihilism.
Rather, they were arguing for the doctr~ne of "self-transformation,"
that a thing comes from itself. This is Tao. Nevertheless, the nega-
tivistic character is unmistakable. After all, the emphasis is on
non-being, and Taoism, whether in ethics or government, has been
the champion of the negative spirit.
Neo-Confucianists did not deny being or non-being, but af-
firmed both. To them the nature of a thing or man consists in
production. It is interesting to note that the Chinese word for the
nature of things or man, "hsing," has the word "sheng," birth, life,
or production, as its chief component. And production is the very
essence of change.
It has been pointed out that the philosophy of change laid the
foundation for Neo-Confucianism. In a nutshell, its metaphysics is
stated in these words:
In the system of change there is the Great Ultimate (T'ai-chi). It
generates the Two Modes (yin and yang). The Two Modes generate the
Four Forms [major and minor yin and yang]. The Four Forms generate
the Eight Trigrams. The Eight Trigrams determine good and evil
fortunes. And good and evil fortunes produce the great business [of life].3
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Thus, reality is a continuous process of production and repro-
duction. This is possible only because there is the interplay of in-
activity, decrease, etc., which constitute yin, and activity, increase,
etc., which constitute yang. Now, yang is being, and yin is non-
being: Reality, then, is possible only because of the interaction of
being and non-being. In other words, in the fact of change, being
and non-being are synthesized.
Several consequences follow this synthesis. In the first place,
of the three systems, Confucianism alone accepts change, not only
as natural but also as desirable. Not that Buddhism and Taoism
are blind to the fact. The Buddhists look upon the universe as a
"sea of waves"; the Taoists, as "a grea~ transformation"; and Con-
fucianists, as "a great current." On the fact of change they agree.
Their attitudes toward the changing universe, however, differ
vastly. Buddhists devote all their effort to crossing the sea of waves
to arrive at the "Other Shore" where the perpetual becoming will
cease. Taoists, comparing the universe to a "galloping horse," view
the drama fatalistically, often with a sense of humor, always in the
spirit of indifference. Confucianists, on the contrary, intend to take
a leading role in the drama and to like it. This is the meaning of
the little incident, much cited by Neo-Confucianists-when a
Confucian pupil, Tseng Tien, declared that it was his ambition to
go with a group of grown-ups and children, bathe in the river,
enjoy the breeze, and come home singing, Confucius said, "You are
after my own heart." 4 For, to Confucianists, change is good. Sig-
nificantly, all the Confucian terms for reality have the meanings of
both process and good. In The Doctrine of the Mean, reality is
ch'eng, or truth, meaning, on the one hand, sincerity, and, on the
other, "the end and the beginning of things," which "leads to activ-
ity . . . change . . . and transformation." 5 In the philosophy of
the Great Ultimate, "The successive movement of yin and yang
constitutes the Way. What issues from the Way is good." 6 In Neo-
Confucianism, the Great Ultimate is equated with Ii (principle),
which means both a principle and what is proper.
Another consequence of the Neo-Confucian synthesis of being--!
and non-being is that Confucianism alone looks upon time as travel-
ing forward. Absolute time was hardly touched upon in Chinese
philosophy. With Chinese philosophers, time has always been as-
sociated with events. In Buddhism, since events are illusory, time
is illusory. As such it moves on but will come to an end in NirvalJa.
In Taoism, time travels in a circle, since a thing comes from non-
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being and returns to non-being. In the Confucian process of pro-
duction and reproduction, however, time never comes to an end or
repeats itself. Every production has an element of novelty, since
it requires a new relationship of yin and yang. When Confucius
urged people to "renovate oneself every day," 7 he meant a daily
development of personality. Neo-Confucianists, however, gave the
phrase a metaphysical flavor, that everything is new.
There is another consequence which is quite serious. The syn-
thesis of being and non-being, in making change possible, also
makes it natural. The Great Ultimate, reality (ch'eng), change,
and principle (li) are not caused. In this respect, Taoism fully
agrees, for the very concept of Tao as the Way of self-transformation
precludes any possibility of a creator or a supernatural director. It
is true that Lao Tzu spoke of Ti the Lord, and Chuang Tzu men-
tioned the "maker of things" (tsao-wu-che). But, if there is any
idea of God, it is completely overshadowed by the cardinal Taoist
doctrine of "self-transformation." Heaven in ancient Confucianism
did have an anthropomorphic character, but Hsiin Tzu (313-238?
B.C.) clearly equated it with Nature, and Neo-Confucianists
identified it with li. The kuei-shen in Neo-Confucianism are no
longer the heavenly and earthly spirits of popular religion that
interfere with human events, but are "traces of the operation of
yin and yang," and Shang-ti, instead of being the personal God that
Bruce supposed it to be,S is but the "greatest mystery in the process
of production and reproduction."
The great difference between Confucianism and Taoism is that
the latter allows no room for teleology, unless it is the ultimate
realization of Tao. Although Taoism is not mechanistic, it is difficult
to conceive the Taoist universe as a moral one. "Heaven and Earth
are not humane [not man-like]," declares the Tao-te ching.9
To Confucianists, what proceeds from production is good. This
conviction runs through the entire Confucian tradition. In a more
rational frame of mind, Neo-Confucianists argued that the universe
is good because it is a process of production and reproduction, and
production and reproduction are the greatest acts of love. Further-
more, in the oscillation of yin and yang there is harmony, and
harmony is good. Thirdly, the universe embraces all, and what
moral act can be greater than identification with all? Finally, in the
production and reproduction of things, Mother Nature is impartial
to all. God is just, as we say.
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Li and Ch'i
We now pass on to the second problem, that of li and ch'i. In
synthesizing being and non-being, early Neo-Confucianists created
a dichotomy of their own, namely, the bifurcation of li and ch'i. The
concept of li was borrowed from Hua-yen Buddhism. In borrowing
it, Neo-Confucianists also borrowed the Hua-yen bifurcation of the
realm of principles (li) and the realm of facts.
Briefly stated, li is the universal principle underlying all things,
the universal law governing all things, the reason behind all things.
It is at once the cause, the form, the essence, the sufficient reason
for being, the highest standard of all things, that is, their Great
Ultimate, or T'ai-chi. It is self-caused, indestructible, eternal. There
is nothing without it. It combines all things as one. It is manifest
everywhere. It is fully embodied in the mind. Ch'i, on the other
hand, is the material, particularizing principle, the concretion, ex-
pression, and operation of li. It provides the conditions for the
production, evolution, and destruction of things. It gives them sub-
stantiality and individuality. It differentiates them.
Such being the characteristics of ch'i, obviously it is inadequate
to translate it as matter. The concept of ch'i goes back to ancient
times and was shared by practically all schools, but was promoted
by Taoists, who inspired the Neo-Confucianists in this regard. It
has always meant force, energy, breath, power. When Chu Hsi
(1130-1200) considered it as matter and described it as corporeal,
he was unorthodox indeed.
Neo-Confucianists differed greatly in their inte.rpretation of li
and ch'i. The two Ch'eng brothers (Ch'eng Hao, 1032-1086; Ch'eng
I, 1033-1107), for example, did not see eye to eye with respect to
li. The former looked upon it as merely the natural tendency in
things, whereas the latter considered it as transcendental. For con-
venience, we may summarize the three main Neo-Confucian move-
ments in propositions. As the representatives of the philosophy of
the Sung period (960-1279), philosophers Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi
postulated that:
( 1) All things have li.
(2) Li, in contrast to ch'i, is a priori, incorporeal, and tran-
scendental.
(3) Existence is not necessary to li but is necessary to ch'i.
(4) Actually there is no li without ch'i, "for, without ch'i, li
would have nothing to adhere to."
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(5) The mind embraces allli.
(6) Li can be, but need not be, known.
(7) Knowledge consists in "extending" the mind to all things.
Hence all things must be "investigated." (Here Ch'eng
and Chu differed, the former emphasizing intensive study
of one thing, Chu advocating the extensive study of all
things.)
'"The Ch'eng-Chu philosophy aroused opposition in the Sung
Dynasty itself, especially by Lu Hsiang-shan (1139-1193). But the
opposition did not reach its height until the Ming Dynasty (1368-
1644), in the person of Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529). The Lu-
Wang philosophy may be summed up in these propositions:
( 1) Mind is li.
(2) The universe is my mind, and my mind is the universe.
(3) Every person has this mind, and every mind has li.
(4) To understand the mind is to understand li.
The main effort of this school was to remove the bifurcation of
li and ch'i in the Ch'eng-Chu philosophy by identifying li and mind.
But, in doing so, the Ming philosophers went to the extreme of
idealism. To this, philosophers of the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911)
were vigorously opposed. Roughly, the metaphysical views of the
outstanding Ch'ing philosophers, notably Yen Yuan (1635-1704)
and Tai Chen (1723-1777), are:
(1) Li is the principle of a thing, and ch'i its substance.
(2) Wherever there is li, there is ch'i; wherever there is no
ch'i, there can be no li.
(3) Li is immanent in things.
(4) To know li, it is necessary to observe and analyze things.
. It is important to note that, while the three schools held differ-
ent views on li and ch'i, none held that only one of them was real.
Ming, philosophers seldom talked about ch'i. But to them ch'i was
the operation or function of li and as such it was fully real. While
Chu Hsi claimed that li was prior to and independent of ch'i, he
quickly added that in fact no li exists apart from ch'i. Ch'ing philos-
ophers denied that li was a priori or transcendental, but they did not
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go so far as to say that Ii was only an abstraction. One is justified in
saying that the general Chinese position is that li and ch'i exist in
each other. Once more, the Chinese tendency to synthesize asserts
itself.
The One and the Many
Such a mutual relationship between Ii and ch'i rules out the
contrast between the one and the many. Historically, the problem
of the one and the many was first and most thoroughly discussed in
Buddhism. The most famous treatise on this question is the essay
"The Golden Lion," by Fa-tsang (643-712). According to him, in
the golden lion the gold and the lion are inseparable. The gold
penetrates every part of the lion, and the lion penetrates every part
of the gold. Furthermore, since every part of the lion penetrates the
gold and since the gold penetrates the whole lion, every part of the
lion penetrates the whole lion. In short, the one is the many, and
the many are the one.
On the surface, the one and the many are synthesized. But
Buddhists still insisted that the one was the True Norm or the True
Mind. If everything is a manifestation of the entire universe, it is
the entirety that is important. In Taoism, too, there has always been
emphasis on the Great One, or Great Unit. These emphases have
resulted in the Buddhist doctrine of non-discrimination and the
Taoist doctrine of the equality of things. In ethics, these doctrines
have promoted such virtues as tolerance, love, unselfishness. But in
metaphysics they raise the serious question as to whether a thing
has any specific character, determinate nature, independence, or
individuality at all.
Neo-Confucianists would have no quarrel with Buddhists and
Taoists on the view that reality is one. Incidentally, it is interesting
to note that no Chinese philosopher has rejected the one in favor
of the many. Pluralism has been conspicuously absent in Chinese
metaphysics. Even dualism has been weak. The dualism of Chu
Hsi is not complete, since the T'ai-chi includes both Ii and ch'i.
This does not mean, however, that Chinese metaphysics has
tended toward monism. Here the Neo-Confucian synthesis is that
both the one and the many are real. "The many and the one are
each rectified," said philosopher Chou Tun-i (1017-1073). "The
one and the many each has its own correct state of being. The great
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and the small each has its definite function." 10 As Chang Tsai
(1021-1077) put it, the pervasiveness of ch'i makes the universe an
infinite harmony. At the same time, since the effect of ch'i on every-
thing is different, no two things are alike,u In fact, since ch'i
operates through concentration and dissipation and through in-
crease and decrease, and since increase in one thing means decrease
in another, everything necessarily has its opposite. This does not
mean, however, that a thing can stand in isolation, for all things
are combined as one in the infinite harmony. Or, as other Neo-
Confucianists would say, all things are combined as one by li. Thus,
the one and the many co-exist. As has been suggested, this idea was
borrowed from Hua-yen Buddhism. The important difference is
that in Buddhism the harmony is achieved by the non-discrimina-
tion or even the denial of the one and the many, whereas in Neo-
Confucianism the harmony is achieved by affirming both.
Furthermore, in Buddhism the harmony is to be achieved in a
transcendental world, whereas in Neo-Confucianism the harmony
is to be achieved here and now.
Man and the Universe
From the foregoing, the position of man as an individual in
relation to the universe is clear. While every man, as an individual,
has his place, he can also be identified with the universe. This idea
of the unity of man and the universe runs through virtually the
entire history of Chinese philosophy. In Taoism, identification with
Nature has always been held as an ideal. Both Taoist and Confu-
cian philosophers of the Han period (202 B.C.-A.D. 220) saw man
and the universe in a microcosm-macrocosm-relationship. In both
The Book of Mencius and The Doctrine of the Mean, the theory
is propounded that, since the nature of man and that of the universe
are the same, one who fully develops his nature will develop the
nature of others, that one who develops the nature of others will
develop the nature of things, and that one who develops the nature
of things will develop the nature of the whole universe.12 This is
the basis of the Neo-Confucian theory. To this central point of the
common nature of man and the universe they added that, since
the mind is the full embodiment of li, a fully developed mind will
embrace all li, which amounts to saying that it will embrace the
whole universe. Also, one who is jen (humanity, true manhood,
love) "will form one body with Heaven and Earth."
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Good and Evil
It follows that, since man is one with the universe, and, since
the universe is good, man by nature must be good. This has been an
unflinching conviction among the Chinese ever since Mencius. But
opinions have not been unanimous on this question. Before the Han
Dynasty, theories fell into five groups: (1) that human nature is
good; (2) that human nature is evil; (3) that human nature is both
good and evil; (4) that human nature is neither good nor evil; and
(5) that some people are born good and others evil.
This problem has been the most important one in Chinese
metaphysics. It was the earliest metaphysical question to be de-
bated, and it has been most extensively discussed. It has engaged
the attention of practically every Chinese philosopher worthy of
the name. Taoists discussed it because they were keenly interested
in nourishing, preserving, and restoring the original nature of man.
Confucianists discussed it because it formed the logical basis for
their entire social and ethical philosophy. In Buddhism, it even
created a crisis, which eventually led to a radical transformation
of Buddhism from Hinayana to Mahayana.
In the first part of the Mahii-parinirviir:ta-siitra, there is the
idea that a class of people called icchantikas were so depraved as
to be beyond the hope of salvation. Such a concept was repulsive
to the monk Tao-sheng (d. 434). Evidently influenced by the
traditional doctrine that human nature was originally good, he
argued that, since buddha-nature is all-pervasive, even the most
depraved has buddha-nature in him and therefore. can be saved.
He was first excommunicated by conservative Buddhists, but later
reinstated when the entire Mahii-parinirviir:ta-siitra, which con-
.firmed his theory, was introduced from India. The result was the
doctrine of universal salvation, which turned Buddhism into Maha-
yana, or the great vehicle for the salvation of all.
As has been indicated, the main argument for the original
goodness of human nature is that man is part of the universe, which
is morally good. If so, how is evil, at least moral evil, to be
explained? Opinions differ as to its emergence. Buddhism ascribes
it to ignorance. Taoism ascribes it to desire. Among Neo-Confu-
cianists such as Chu Hsi, there was a strong tendency to hold desire
responsible. Chu Hsi even contrasted li as the source of good and
ch'i as the source of evil, although he by no means implied that
ch'i is by nature evil. In him the climax of the controversy over the
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contrast between the li of Heaven and the desire of man was
reached. This question had been debated for centuries and contin-
ued for a long time after Chu Hsi. As time went on, more and more
Neo-Confucianists held that desires are good simply because they
are a part of nature. In the end, whatever the theory of the origin
of evil, evil means deviation from the Golden Mean. This is not just
moderation or compromise. It means the harmony of li and ch'i, or
the harmony of reason and desire. The fall of man is due to selfish
desires, external influence, lack of education, lack of self-control,
failure to develop one's moral capacity, wrong judgment, etc. Thus,
evil is unnatural, incidental, and temporary, due primarily to one's
own defects. Salvation obviously lies' in fully developing one's orig-
inally good nature. In so doing, one "fulfills" and "establishes" one's
own fate. This being the case, one must work out his own salvation.
Since his nature is originally good, this is not only possible but im-
perative. Furthermore, since everyone shares to the fullest extent
the goodness of the universe, everyone can become a sage.
Knowledge and Conduct
Developing one's nature requires education, and education
involves both conduct and knowledge. These topics, as such, lie
beyond the province of our discussion. However, we must not by-
pass the important fact that knowledge and conduct were identified
by most Chinese philosophers. Actually, in this respect, there has
been a series of syntheses.
First of all, there is the identification of the knower and the
known. Influenced by the Buddhist distinction between the "higher
truth" and the "lower truth," and by the Taoist distinction between
"great knowledge" and "small knowledge," Neo-Confucianists dis-
tinguished between "knowledge through information" and "knowl-
edge through one's moral nature." The difference between
Buddhism and Taoism, on the one hand, and Neo-Confucianism,
on the other, is that, whereas in Buddhism and Taoism the "lower
truth" and "small knowledge" are considered untrustworthy, in Neo-
Confucianism "knowledge through information" is acceptable. It
is, however, "knowledge through moral nature" that leads to the
true understanding of li and to the fulfillment of one's nature. The
emphasis throughout the last eight hundred years has been on this
type of knowledge. Philosophers refused to direct the effort of
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knowledge to a transcendental Absolute or to a self which dissolves
itself into nothingness, as in Taoism and Buddhism, respectively.
The only worth-while knowledge is that of Ii. Now, the Ii of a thing
is the same as the li of the universe. Therefore, to know a thing, the
mind must first of all be its true self, that is, realize its own li, and
then extend it to the li of things. This "extension" is possible because
li is one. By virtue of this common nature of the knower and the
known, the two can establish rapport. In other words, to know a
thing truly, the knower must approach it with "sympathetic intelli-
gence" and a feeling of unity. To make this possible, not only must
the mind be clear, calm, concentrated, and unselfish, but the entire
personality must be morally sound.
Similarly, knowledge requires both intellectual activity and
actual practice, as is indicated by the term "ko-chih." The term
really defies definition. One writer listed sixty-two different inter-
pretations, ranging from "the extending of the mind to things,"
through "investigating things to the limit," "finding out the form of
things," etc., to "studying the causes of peace and chaos in history"
and "handling human affairs." The Lu-Wang school advocated "the
extension of inborn (or intuitive) knowledge" by manifesting the
good nature of one's own mind. Rebelling against this doctrine,
Yen Yuan and other Ch'ing philosophers demanded actual practice,
declaring that the only way to learn to playa musical instrument,
for instance, is to play it and not just to read the musical score. The
most generally accepted interpretation of ko-chih, however, is that
of the Ch'eng-Chu school, which combines the intuitive, rational,
and empirical methods. Chu Hsi said: .
The meaning of the expression, "The perfecting of knowledge
depends on the investigation of things," is this: If we wish to extend our
knowledge to the utmost, we must investigate the li of all things we come
in contact with, for the intelligent mind of man is certainly formed to
know, and there is not a single thing in which li does not inhere. It is
only because all li are not investigated that man's knowledge is
incomplete. For this reason ... [man should], in regard to all things in
the world, proceed from what knowledge he has of their li, and pursue
his investigation of them until he reaches the limit. After exerting himself
in this way for a long time, he will suddenly find himself possessed of
wide and far-reaching penetration. Then the qualities of things, whether
external or internal, subtle or coarse, will all be apprehended, and the
mind in its entire substance and its great functioning will be perfectly
intelligent.13
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This "wide and far-reaching penetration" has often been inter-
preted as intuition. If so, it is different from the Buddhist variety,
for here intuition is rationally arrived at, and there is no leap and
no necessity for meditation. In fact, Chu Hsi condemned medita-
tion as based upon the fallacious assumption that reality reveals
itself only when thought is cut off. He even condemned introspec-
tion, for, according to him, that would mean splitting the mind in
two, one to observe and one to be observed. The "extension of
inborn or intuitive knowledge" in the Lu-Wang school is not self-
introspection or meditation, but, rather, the extension of one's mind
to embrace the whole universe. This is the true meaning of Lu
Hsiang-shan's dictum, "The universe is my mind and my mind is
the universe." 14 It is true that many Neo-Confucianists of the
Sung and Ming dynasties practiced quiet sitting, but they adopted
meditation only as an aid to mental hygiene, not as a way of
knowledge.
Two important things are to be stressed in this method of dis-
covering li. First, both the deductive and the inductive methods are
employed. One may study a thing intensively or study many things
extensively, one by one and day by day, or one may do both. The
result will be the same. This is not to suggest that Neo-Confucianists
knew the scientific method. Although most of them were learned in
astronomy, phonetics, mineralogy, etc., they never dreamed of the
spirit or the technique of experiment. One must remember, how-
ever, that the nature of li is rational, and there is no reason why the
scientific method cannot be fully applied to it.
The second point to stress is that knowledge must be obtained
by oneself. The extension of the mind cannot be accomplished
through an agent. Incidentally, I have not found a single case in
which a philosopher asserted that reading the classics is the only
or chief way of obtaining knowledge or that a thing is true simply
because the classics say so. Knowledge is always one's own adven-
ture. This is not to deny the heavy weight of authoritarianism in the
Chinese tradition. But authority is found in other quarters, not in
knowledge. Yen Yuan said that knowledge consisted in practice,
and by practice he meant the Six Arts, that is, the arts of govern-
ment, social intercourse, etc., as laid down in the classics. Still he
insisted that one must make his own discovery of truth. This is why
revelation has had no place in Chinese philosophy, including Bud-
dhism and Taoism. This is also why dreams have been regarded by
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Buddhists as illusory and by Confucianists as obstructions to clear
thinking, although Taoists see in them a large measure of truth.
From the foregoing, the relationship between knowledge and
conduct can be appreciated. Next to the question of human nature,
the question of the relationship between knowledge and conduct
has been most persistent in Chinese philosophy. Philosophers have
differed greatly as to whether knowledge or action comes first, and
as to which is more difficult. But most of them have agreed that,
in essence, knowledge and conduct form a unity. Some philosophers,
such as Wang Yang-ming, confined their discussions to certain types
of knowledge, such as tasting, perception of color, the practice of
filial piety, etc. Others included all types of knowledge. The general
argument is that, unless coupled with action, the full value of
knowledge cannot be realized, and, unless coupled with true knowl-
edge, no action can be really intelligent or correct.
The whole matter of the understanding of li is summed up in
the Chinese term "t'i-yen," which, roughly, means personally testing,
or "t'i-fen," that is, personally understanding. The word "t'i" also
means the body, thus emphasizing active personal experience. This
experience involves, first of all, one's identification with the object
of knowledge, secondly, moral preparation and social action, and,
thirdly, both the rational and the intuitive methods. In a word, it
combines metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics into one harmon-
ious whole. Many contemporary Chinese philosophers believe that
this t'i-yen or t'i-fen may be an important contribution China can
make to the world. Even if the claim is exaggerated, there can be
no mistake as to where the Chinese emphasis lies.
I have stressed the tendency in Chinese philosophy to sny-
thesize. Not all syntheses have been successful. For example, the
macrocosm-microcosm relationship is not supported by the evidence
of science. The concept of the identity of knowledge and conduct
needs to be more critically analyzed. The moral for us, however,
is that apparently contrary concepts may not be incompatible after
all. Of course, there can be no compromise between good and evil.
To define clearly what is good and what is evil has occupied much
attention of Chinese philosophers throughout the ages. But, signifi-
cantly enough, in Chinese metaphysics even the relationship be-
tween good and evil in man has not been placed in such an
impossible position as to require either the denial of evil or the
grace of God for its removal.
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Observations
As a footnote to this paper, let me make a few observations.
1. Chinese metaphysics is simple, unsystematic, and in some
instances superficial. Chinese philosophers have debated metaphys-
ical questions in conversations, letters, and commentaries on the
classics, and have debated them primarily as theoretical foundations
for ethics.
2. Western philosophy developed from metaphysics to social
and moral philosophy, whereas Chinese philosophy developed the
other way.
3. Since Chinese philosophy has been devoted chiefly to the
good life, those metaphysical questions which have been discussed
were those closest to the moral life, and the conclusions have made
Chinese metaphysics very earthly and practical.
4- There has been a curious absence of any deduction of
categories.
5. There has also been a conspicuous absence of materialism.
It is definitely wrong to label Hsiin Tzu a materialist. All he did
was to describe Heaven in naturalistic terms, but nowhere did he
ever reduce the mind to matter or to a quantity. Even Wang Ch'ung
(A.D. 27-ca. 100), often called a materialist in the West, did not go
that far. He merely elaborated the Taoist doctrine that all things
are "self-transformations," and denied the existence of spirits. This
shows that Western terms need to be applied to Chinese philosophy
with great care. For example, Chu Hsi has been called both a
rationalist and an empiricist. Some say he was an empiricist because
he insisted on moral preparation for knowledge and on rapport with
the object, and because he demanded not only self-evident prem-
ises but also a finer degree of receptivity to the realities operating
in the given world. Others say he was a rationalist because he in-
sisted that observation must be attended by thought, and that, since
the nature of li is rational, the only correct method of knowing li
was the rational one. What was Chu Hsi, then, a rationalist or an
empiricist? The answer is a typically Chinese one: he was both.
6. The word "mysticism" has not been mentioned in this paper.
One can detect a mystical element in Mencius, Chu Hsi, and Wang
Yang-mingo But after the decline of Buddhism and Taoism in the
eleventh century, mysticism ceased to have any appreCiable place in
.. Chinese philosophy. In this paper, less space has been given to
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Taoism and Buddhism than to Neo-Confucianism, partly because
they have been assimilated into Neo-Confucianism and partly be-
cause Neo-Confucianism has been the Chinese philosophy for the
last eight hundred years.
7. If the history of Chinese philosophy proves anything, it
shows that materialism and extreme forms of mysticism, or indeed
any extreme philosophy, will not find China fertile soil. In the last
two decades there has been a revival of Buddhist idealism and
Buddhist mysticism. But, very significantly, they soon reached their
climax and rapidly declined. No one should be so dogmatic as to
say that Buddhism and Taoism will remain dormant in the next
eight hundred years as they have in the last eight centuries. Besides,
Buddhism has tremendous possibilities. But the fact remains that
the most influential philosophers today are those who are trying to
reconstruct Neo-Confucianism in the light of Western philosophy
or combine it with Western objectivism.
8. Any future Chinese metaphysics will have to be fortified by
science and logic. Fortunately there is nothing in the nature of
Chinese metaphysics to prevent the introduction of these two.
g. The synthesis that is going on today and will likely continue
for years to come will be easier than the task of the early Neo-Con-
fucianists, for in the eleventh century the three systems that were
finally synthesized had incompatible features, whereas today the
currents that meet reinforce each other.
10. Finally, most contemporary Chinese philosophers I have
talked to feel that, while in ethics China will probably have some-
thing to offer the world, in metaphysics she is on the receiving end.
Personally, I feel that when different streams come together, all of
them, no matter how large or small, will affect the river. Ideas
travel in strange ways. If Buddhism influenced Schopenhauer, as
indeed it did, and if Chu Hsi impressed Leibniz, as certainly he
did,15 who can foretell with certainty that Mencius or Tai Chen will
not influence a future Spinoza who may be in our midst?
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Y. P. MEl The Basis of Social, Ethical, and
Spiritual Values in Chinese Philosophy
THE FIELD OF SOCIAL, ethical, and spiritual values in Chinese
philosophy is so wide and the content so rich that the paper here
presented will have to be highly selective in scope. It is proposed
to limit the treatment to the following sub-topics:
I. Some general characters and the problem of Chinese phi-
losophy
II. Values in Confucianism-as expounded by Confucius
III. Values in Confucianism-as developed by Mencius
IV. Values in alternative systems: (a) Moism, and (b) Taoism
of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu
V. Values restated in Neo-Confucianism
The discussion of values in the several systems will be concentrated
on their respective search after the highest good, as the other virtues
and standards are usually found subsumed thereunder. It is hoped
that such a plan of treatment will afford the best perspective for a
general view of the basis of values in Chinese philosophy, without
permitting ourselves to get involved in the many features that
might sidetrack us from the central issue.
I
Insofar as one may speak of Chinese philosophy and not of
Chinese philosophies, he may suggest that Chinese philosophy is
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predominantly a system of ethical realism. The major tenets of this
philosophy may be outlined as follows:
METAPHYSICS
(1) Both the universe and man's life are real.
(2) The nature of reality is dynamic and not static, relational
and not absolute.
(3) All forms of change may be regarded as expressions of the
interaction of two forces, the yin and the yang, between
which there can be equilibrium and harmony, as well as
conflict and opposition.
(4) Change takes place in the form of supplementation and
alternation and usually in the form of cycles or spirals, but
never extremes.
(5) The universe is a macrocosm and man is a microcosm.
ETHICS
(1) Running through life and the universe is one all-pervading
principle, rational and ethical in nature.
(2) Man's duty is to follow this principle, which brings him
into harmony with society and in tune with the universe.
(3) Evil results when there is deviation from this path.
(4) Every mortal has in him the capacity to become a sage.
(5) The sage is one who "assists the transforming and nourish-
ing powers of Heaven and Earth, and so with Heaven and
Earth forms a ternion." 1
These tenets are most fundamental in Chinese thought. In
fact, they are as much the contents of a credo of the Chinese race
as the doctrines of Chinese philosophy. Such a faith about man and
his universe antedates all philosophical systems, on the one hand,
and is still the basis of Chinese life and conduct, on the other.
Philosophy only performed the useful service, a very useful service
to be sure, of midwifery to the embryonic ideas in the ancient
culture and of outlining more clearly defined precepts for later ages.
The feeling of kinship between man and the universe is so strong
that it is sometimes difficult to know where ethics ends and where
metaphysics begins.
Assuming a common root for man and the universe, Chinese
philosophy is grounded in man and his life. Man is the center of all
---
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things, and it is his nature, his relations, and the development of his
personality that are of absorbing interest. And how, in the end, is
man able to achieve perfection and to identify himself with the
universe-a synthesis of this world, which man affirms and does not
relinquish, and a world beyond-this is the final problem of Chinese
philosophy and particularly of Chinese ethics.
If man gives rise to the problem, life itself is considered ade-
quate to provide the basis and standard for all values. Transcen-
dental and supernatural considerations have as little place here as do
methods of abstraction and objectification. The world beyond is
beyond in the ontological and moral, but not the temporal, sense.
Of course, agricultural people are children of Nature living among
vegetation and growth and moving in the intimate circle of the
family. Everything goes on in the experience of the immediate, and
understanding depends upon appreciation rather than analysis and
calculation. Plato's problem of abstract justice, for instance, has
hardly ever been discussed in China. Knowledge means wisdom, as
it did in Greek before Aristotle distinguished between sophia (phil-
osophic wisdom) and phr6nesis (practical wisdom), and wisdom
is virtue. It is something direct and personal, something like what
is called a "realizing sense." Philosophy is therefore decidedly a way
of life, just as the Orphic communities in ancient Greece claimed
they were. And ethical inquiry is always conducted in the same
spirit as that of Aristotle when he said, 'We are inquiring not in
order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, since
otherwise an inquiry would have been of no use." 2 Thus, there is a
large aesthetic element in morality, whereas an ethics based on
abstraction leaves life in want of the saving grace of art that is
developed independently and provided as an addition. It might be
significant to realize that the component Chinese character for
ethics, lun, comes under the ;en (meaning "man") radical, and that
an ancient form of the character for morality is te, which comes
under the hsin (meaning "heart") radical, whereas the Western
terms "ethics" and "morality" have their origins either in the nature
of gods or in social customs.
II
Confucius (551-479 B.C.) mayor may not have been the
keenest thinker among the Chinese, but for two and a half millen-
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niums he surely has been the chief molder of China. The Confucian
way of life remains the key to a study of values in Chinese phi-
losophy.
Confucius repeatedly spoke of his "one unifying principle,"
which is also rendered as "an all-pervading unity." 3 This unifying
principle is generally assumed to be shu, reciprocity, which Con-
fucius once said was the one word that might gUide one's conduct
throughout life.4 Reciprocity was stated to be "what you would not
have others do unto you, do not unto them," 5 and this formula has
usually been referred to as the Chinese Golden Rule. But, when
Confucius tried to make clear to a disciple what jen meant, the
explanation consisted of exactly the same Golden Rule.6 Jen is, of
course, the cornerstone of Confucianism, and it may be assumed
that reciprocity, or the Golden Rule, is an expression of jen, and
that it is just as proper to regard jen as the one unifying principle
of all of Confucius' teachings. Historically, jen is a distinct Confu-
cian concept, a concept that was little used before his time.7
Now, jen has been variously translated as "magnanimity,"
"benevolence," "perfect virtue" (James Legge), "moral life," "moral
character" (Ku Hung-ming), "true manhood," "compassion" (Lin
Yutang), "human-heartedness" (Derk Bodde), "man-to-manness"
(E. R. Hughes), etc. Evidently there is no term in the English lan-
guage that corresponds exactly to this fundamental Confucian con-
cept. It is probably just as profitable if we do not try to adopt some
one translation but use the transliteration "jen" in these paragraphs..
While not one of the list of translated terms seems entirely sat-
isfactory, the whole list together should afford some notion as to
what jen means. Confucius' own brief answer, when a disciple
asked about jen, was, "Love men." 8 Han Fei Tzu (d. 233 B.C.)
elaborated this idea and said, "Jen is to love men joyously and from
the inmost of one's heart." 9 In The Doctrine of the Mean (Chung
yung) there is the pun, "jen is jen" or "jen is manhood." 10 One of
the earliest and most influential commentaries 11 on the Confucian
Analects (Lun yu) pointed out that "jen denotes what is common
in two men," which is right in line with the etymological origin of
the character. (An older form of the character is made up of the
two components which separately mean "thousand" and "hearts.") 12
'When Mencius inquired what it was that distinguished man from
the birds and beasts, the answer was also jen. 13 Thus, jen is the
common denominator of humanity on the one hand, and the mark
which distinguishes man from animal on the other. It is both the
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innermost nature and the highest ideal of true manhood, the begin-
ning and the end of the way of life. The man of fen has no anx-
ieties 14 and is free from evil,15 and it is only he who knows how to
love men or to hate men.16 All virtues, like love, reciprocity, loyalty,
courage, trustworthiness, etc., may be regarded as expressions Qf
fen, and jen is thus, like Socratic justice, the super-virtue of virtues.
A superior man is said not to act contrary to fen, but to hold himself
true to it under all circumstances,17 The Master's highest praise for
his favorite disciple was that his heart did not deviate from fen for
as long as three months.1s And, when necessary, the virtuous man
would rather give up life than permit the fen in him to be injured,19
One arrives at fen not so much by way of intellect or emotion
as by intuition. len is inborn in us all, and we all have the "feel"
for it. He whose intuition is more sensitive than others' has a better
apprehension of fen and attains it to a higher degree. Even today,
Chinese medical language speaks of paralysis as "absence or lack of
jen." Confucius said, "Is fen something remote? If I want fen, behold,
jen has arrived." 20 And, "The attainment of fen depends upon one-
self. What does it have to do with others?" 21 Borrowing Professor
F. S. C. Northrop's immensely suggestive term, without subscribing
to all the uses he has put it to, however, one might say that fen was
to Confucius "an immediately apprehended aesthetic continuum
or manifold." 22
In spite of several frequently employed quotations from The
Analects which seem to point to the contrary, Confucius was truly
a religious man. Confucius had a deep sense of affirmation of life
and was ever ready to offer his praise. He had something of the
feeling that "God's in his heaven: all's right with the world." He
prayed,23 he fasted,24 ~e attended sacrifices,25 and once he even
swore by Heaven.26 In his disappointments, he trusted that Heaven
knew him.27 His sense of a heavenly mission grew upon him only
with the years. He observed, "Does Heaven speak? The four sea-
sons run their course and all things grow. Does Heaven speak?" 28
This observation might partly account for his own reticence in such
matters. Confucius was not a preacher of an institutional religion,
but he was a God-filled man.
One of the marks of the superior man that Confucius empha-
sized was that he was always composed and contented, whereas
the inferior man was always worried and full of distress.29 A record
in The Analects says Confucius' manners were easy and his looks
very cheerfuPo There was an occasion when four disciples were in
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attendance. Of the four, Tseng Hsi was the last to speak his mind
and said:
We will suppose now that we are in the latter days of spring, when
the new, light garments are ready. I would then take with me five or six
grown-ups and six or seven boys. We will go and bathe in the I River,
after which we will air and cool ourselves on top of that ancient terrace;
and then we will loiter back home, singing on our way.
Confucius, who had kept his silence as he listened to the others
speaking their minds, which invariably consisted of some political
ambition or plan, thereupon spoke up and said, "Ah, you are a man
after my own heart!" 31 In describing his own spiritual development,
Confucius said that at fifty he knew the will of Heaven, at sixty he
was obedient to it, and at seventy he could follow his heart's desire
without transgressing the moral law.32 Confucius thus achieved an
ease and serenity within himself and attained a harmony and iden-
tity with the universe. He was at once a perfect citizen of society
and of the universe, and in him was a synthesis of this world and
the world beyond. Confucius knew that such a state of mind was
neither reducible to conceptual analysis nor subject to systematic
teaching. But his personal example has stood like a beacon light to
all seekers after truth. Worthily indeed has Confucius been revered
during these long centuries by the Chinese as their Supreme Sage
and Foremost Teacher.
Although fen is inborn in us all, Confucius understood very well
that it was only the few who would reach the final stage in the
pilgrim's progress of the soul. For the benefit of the many, and to
pave the way leading to their attainment, he discoursed constantly
on the various virtues and the proper relations of men in their
several stations in life. Subsequently Confucian followers developed
out of these the code of the five social relations and the codes of
filial piety and ancestor worship, which have had an important
influence on Chinese life. Confucius' reiteration of the Golden
Mean, an idea dating from antiquity, gave rise to The Doctrine of
the Mean, and it has since in turn become a central doctrine in all
philosophical thinking. Confucius made much of the rites of pro-
priety and music. The manner in which an act is performed is of as
much importance as the motive that prompts it. If fen is the spirit
of conduct, propriety and music are to be its form and to give it
the finishing touch. When the natural qualities and good manners
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are well blended in a person we have a superior man.33 In politics,
Confucius was the champion of the idea of government by virtue,
a novel idea at a time when absolute powers were vested in a
heJ;editary aristocracy. Elevation of the citizen's character becomes
the purpose and procedure of such a government, and moral life
and education are one with political activity and process. The
liberating and democratic tendencies of such a political ideal are
evident, but it was left to Mencius to give these tendencies a
clear and definite formulation.
III
Mencius (372-289 B.C.) had the greatest admiration for Con-
fucius. He accepted all the tenets of Confucius and devoted himself
to their clarification and to giving them a more intelligible formu-
lation. In the process, he made his own very significant contribu-
tions. The Confucian idea of government by virtue was at the hands
of Mencius directly turned into government by ;en.:J4 Government
by jen is actually the easiest thing in the world. All that a ruler has
to do is to let his innate jen impulse have its natural play and give
it a wide extension toward all people.35 Of course, special attention
should be given to the needs of the people, material and spiritual.
Mencius went into great detail about what may be called his eco-
nomic planning. He was very insistent about it, and in The Book of
Mencius reiterated this plan several times.36 When, finally, there is
plenty in the country, the rulers are to share all the good things of
life with the people and then provide them with proper education.
Government by ;en is the political norm. In case of disharmony
between the ruler and the people, usually due to the degeneracy
of the ruler, he should be emphatically reminded that the people
rank the highest, the spirits of the land and grain next, and the
sovereign the lowest.37 And Mencius quoted with emphasis from the
Shu ching (The Book of History), "Heaven sees as my people see;
Heaven hears as my people hear." 38 If a wayward ruler should turn
a deaf ear to such warnings and admonitions, then, not only would
his forceful removal be permitted, but he by whose hands this act
is done would be regarded as a vessel of God as well as a savior of
men.39
Here we have the most articulate expression of the democratic
ideal in Chinese political thought. The right of the sovereign rests
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on a trust, a divine trust if you wish, but God exercises his vigilant
powers through the people. In such a system revolution becomes
part and parcel of the scheme and poses no problem for political
theory. The exaltation of the individual resolves itself in providing
for his needs as much as in calling attention to his worth. Mencius'
maxim is to "live and let live," and thus the formalism of Confucius'
political thought is here given a realistic content. At the bottom of
it all, we shall find that Mencius' enthusiasm for political democracy
comes from his deep-seated faith in moral democracy. Such enthu-
siasm and such faith are indeed remarkable when we realize that
at that time the individual common man was just emerging out of
the tenant slavery of feudalistic society and had hardly shaken off
all its vestiges.
Confucius simply posited the concept of ;en. Mencius explicitly
maintained that ;en, with its accompanying virtues of righteousness,
propriety, and wisdom, arose from the inner springs of the human
heart. His doctrine of the goodness of human nature 40 is well
known, and his illustration of the poor "child about to fall into the
well" 41 has been used until it is in tatters. What it says, in a nutshell,
is that the expressions of the four cardinal virtues are universal and
come naturally, just as taste for food and hearing for music and
sight for beauty come naturally.42 Therefore, if it is gUided by its
innate feelings, our nature will be good. Evil and misbehavior are
due to pressure and influence, the source of which is external. vVe
all have the seeds of the four virtues in US,43 sparks of divinity in
terms of some theology, and our business is to give them the op-
portunity of full extension and development. Self-cultivation is a
task that requires constant attention, but one must not overexert
oneself trying to be good. That would be like the foolish man of the
State of Sung who tried to help his crop grow by pulling up the
young sprouts just a little.44
Mencius has thus given a theory of the origin of the all-impor-
tant Confucian concept of ;en and outlined a procedure for its de-
velopment. Both are important supplements to the Confucian
doctrine. The theory of the goodness of human nature has since
stimulated much discussion and is one of the major problems in
Chinese philosophy.
Mencius' ideal of personal cultivation stops at nothing short of
the true sage. When he was asked wherein did he excel, he replied
that he knew well how to feed his boundless spirit. As to the mean-
ing of this boundless spirit, Mencius said:
--
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It is rather difficult to describe. The spirit is infinitely vast and
powerful. When properly cultivated and carefully preserved, it will fill up
all between Heaven and Earth. It is in accord with both virtue and
reason. Without the spirit, man is but an empty shell. It is the sum total
of all righteous deeds, and not the result of incidental acts of righteous-
ness.45
There is a strong element of mysticism in Mencius. And his sage-
hood constitutes a power permeating man and the universe and
Heaven and Earth,46 again "an immediately apprehepded aesthetic
continuum or manifold." It would be futile to try to describe this
feeling on his part except in his own words. But we have to limit
ourselves to the briefest of his remarks:
All the ten thousand living things are found within us. There is no
greater joy than to look into our life and find this true. To have strong
feelings for others and follow them is the nearest road to jen.47
He that goes to the bottom of his heart knows his own .nature; and
knowing his own nature he knows Heaven. By keeping his heart and
feeding his nature he serves Heaven. Long life and early death are as one
to him. By mending his life whilst he waits, he carries out the bidding.48
And yet, the truly great man is he who is able to preserve his
heart like that of a new-born babe.49
Although such a state may appear too lofty and unattainable
for the ordinary man, Mencius exhorted him to take heart. When
Mencius was asked if it was true that every man could become like
Yao and Shun (the great ancient Sage-Kings), he exclaimed, "Cer-
tainlyl" 50 And he put into the mouth of Yen Yuan, the favorite
disciple of Confucius, the following expression of confidence: 'Who
was Shun? Who am I? To do our all is to be like him." 51 If Mencius
departed from the traditional anthropomorphic God, he laid his
faith in a new realization of the true worth of man. For traditional
religion he substituted a vital ethical mysticism. Mencius was con-
fident that not only he himself but everyone else as well could at-
tain the identity of man with the universe. Everyone has potential
sagehood in him. It all depends on how well he can extend and
develop those inborn beginnings of the virtues. To a more profound
moral democracy than this no man can profess.
IV
(A) Mo Tzu (470-391 B.C.) had a vivid sense of a personal
God and was an outspoken champion of orthodox religion. He con-
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sidered Confucius' reticence about religious matters indicative of a
lack of faith and his skepticism a danger to morals. Religion is to be
revitalized and new content put in, to be sure, but it must be God
and not man who is to be the center of things. Confucius' spontan-
eous quality of jen suffers from the lack of a solid foundation, and in
practice it works for gradation and partiality, the root evil of all the
chaotic conditions of the day. Universal love (chien-ai) becomes,
therefore, the well-known ethical doctrine of Mo Tzu, with em-
phasis placed on the quality of universality.52 Mo Tzu's political
teachings consist of establishing a hierarchy of rulers chosen on the
basis of virtue and talent, and then carrying through a process of
identification with the superior.53 This process reaches its climax
through the emperor, the "Son of Heaven," in Heaven itself, just
as the concept of universal love finds its origin in the content of
the Will of Heaven.54 Both ethics and politics thus receive their
sanction from religion. At the same time, Mo Tzu was an out-
spoken utilitarian. The phrase "universal love and mutual profit,"
which he used repeatedly,55 did not seem to embarrass him in the
least, and, in fact, seemed to him to be the only possible expression
that would make the idea meaningful and intelligible. For the same
reason, Mo Tzu found Confucius' idea that jen was derived from
the direct intuitive sense unintelligible. For instance, he was greatly
annoyed when a Confucianist announced, "We make music for
music's sake." To Mo Tzu this was sheer nonsense, the same as
telling people we build houses for houses' sake. What one ought
to have said is that a house is built so as to keep off the cold in.
winter and the heat in summer, and to separate the men from the
women properly.56 His own doctrine of universal love was proposed
because it would result in mutual benefit and eventually the great-
est good to the greatest number.
Mencius' doctrine of the goodness of human nature may be
regarded as an ansWer to Mo Tzu's criticism regarding the origin
of Confucius' concept of jen. Confucianism insists on grounding
morality and value in man himself. No external standard, though
it be from God, will be acceptable. Self-conscious, self-critical, and
self-realizing manhood is the center of all goodness and the origin
of all virtues. Therefrom Mencius went on to condemn Mo Tzu's
principle of universal love. Universal love, contrasted to love as
jen in action-call it graded love if you must-is not at all a higher
level of moral sentiment but simply an arbitrary and artificial notion
about human relationships. What could be more ideal than to let
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the well-spring of the human heart issue forth freely in its natural
course and to its natural degree? To say that one loves or should
love the man on the street as much as one's parents violates every
sense of rationality. As to proposing love for profit, well, the Sage
Mencius could do without any such sacrilege. When Mencius com-
pared Mo Tzu to birds and beasts,57 he meant that Mo Tzu alto-
gether overlooked the all-important fen in himself and in others,
which was to Mencius the line of demarcation between man and
animal.
His twofold religious and utilitarian motive enabled Mo Tzu
to develop a way of life characterized by asceticism, obedience,
and self-denial. Mo Tzu had a considerable following for several
generations after his death, and these followers organized them-
selves into a community that can very properly be called a church
under the undisputed authority of a grand master. Members were
men of strict discipline, and the community had a stem sort of
order.58 But the strength of this discipline and of this order was of
the brittle kind, and the movement lasted for about two centuries
and then dwindled into oblivion. The teachings of Mo Tzu left
their marks on Chinese life, and it would be difficult to find a more
self-sacrificing person than Mo Tzu himself. But to lead a man to
inner peace with himself and happy relationship with his fellow
men, as well as harmony with the universe, Mo Tzu's way would
hardly suffice.59
(B) Lao Tzu (fifth century B.C.) and Chuang Tzu (369-286
B.C.) had no use for the anthropomorphic God that Mo Tzu tried
so desperately to salvage for the orthodox tradition. To Mo Tzu,
God was the absolute standard and the final reality. To the Taoists,
God was neither. Heaven was said to be unkind and to treat the
creation like the straw-dogs we use at sacrifices.60 And Lao Tzu
spoke of the Tao as "an image of that which existed before God." 61
On the other hand, the Taoists could not see anything in the fen
of Confucius or the i (righteousness) of Mencius. len and i are, at
best, of secondary significance: after Tao is lost then arises the
doctrine of fen; after fen is lost then arises the doctrine of i.62 And
people are told to abandon their saintliness and put away their
wisdom, to abandon their fen and put away their i.63
The highest good and at the same time the most fundamental
reality is Tao. It is difficult to talk about Tao because it is nameless
and unnamable,64 elusive, and evasive.65 If one must call it some-
thing, one may call it great.66 Out of Tao the created universe is
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born; 67 Tao is the mother of all things. 68 Yet Tao does nothing.69
In fact, the things of this world come from being, and being comes
from non-being.70 Tao transcends time and space and causality and
knowledge, and is beyond good and evil, truth and falsehood, life
and death. Tao is the prime mover, and underlies man, God, and
the universe.
While in Lao Tzu there is still room for a life of humility and
quietude in society, in Chuang Tzu the one aim in life for man
comes to consist in apprehending the Tao. He who attains the Tao
becomes the true man, the ultimate man (chih-jen), the spiritual
man (shen-jen). The stages in the pilgrim's progress of the mind
are marked by forgetfulness of the world, of the manifold, and of
life itself,71 Positively, there is enlightenment, then a sense of the
wholeness of things, then the merging of the present and the past,
and, Rnally, the oneness of death and life.72 What may be called
the Taoist beatiRc vision may be described as an equilibrium in
which all differences and distinctions-those between the ego and
the non-ego, between man and the universe, as well as between life
and death-disappear and are melted into a sea of identity. The
true man is therefore conditioned by nothing and is free in the
absolute sense.73 Taoist religion later readily turned him into a
fairy spirit, practicing alchemy and teaching the secrets of longev-
ity. Worst blasphemy and irony can hardly be imagined. Actually,
what we have here is again an "immediately apprehended aesthetic
continuum," and the term is used in Northrop's sense, this time
with less reservation. Chuang Tzu, of course, employed to the full
his power of literary imagery in inducing an appreciation of the
Tao, and at times he achieved poetic heights of fantasy.
In relation to the all-important attainment of the Tao, all else
becomes secondary. A naturalistic pantheism is all, if there is any-
thing, that is left of religion; ethical values become relative or
insigniRcant; and the political ideal is found in the primitivity of
small rural communities where the voices of cocks and dogs would
be within hearing and yet the people might grow old and die before
they visited one another.74 Both the ethical realism of Confucianism
" and the naturalistic mystEsm of Taoism are interested in the Rnal
perfection of man of' his identiRcation with the universe, but there
is a difference. Whereas to Confucius this attainment is the crown-
ing glory of a process of cultivation in which each step is a positive
good contributing to the upbuilding of the personality of the in-
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dividual and the welfare of his society, to the Taoists the towering
height of the one all-engrossing goal dwarfs all other values to the
level of insignificance. This contrast between Taoism and Confu-
Cianism may be grasped in another way. Lao Tzu and Mencius
were equally fond of speaking of the new-born babe. But Lao
Tzu was attracted by its lreedom from the fetters and burdens of
life, whereas Mencius was impressed by its vitality and promise
and potentialities. Maybe here is a key to the proper approach to,
and understanding of, the two systems.
v
For nearly a millennium, roughly speaking from the time of
Christ, Confucianism was overshadowed by Taoism and, more
fundamentally, by Buddhism. The teachings of Buddhism brought
from India proved to be refreshingly interesting to the Chinese
mind. It is no exaggeration to say that for the greater part of the
millennium the best thinkers in China were all Buddhist thinkers.
The Ch'an school, or Zen, with its charm of simplicity and yet its
depth of profundity, for instance, is one of the fruits of Buddhism
flowering in the Chinese mind. The story of Buddhism's arriving in
China as a foreign doctrine both geographically and intellectually,
coming there to its fruition, and, finally, ingraining itself in the
very fiber of the Chinese mentality, is an intellectual epic to which
a conference devoted to a synthesis of the philosophies of the East
and the West would do well to pay some attention.
Stimulating as the Buddha's teachings may be, they go against
the grain of the Chinese outlook on life and have always been
regarded by the orthodox Confucianists with suspicion. Voices have
recurrently been raised against this foreign system, and large-scale
persecution has occurred more than once in history. But the Neo-
Confucianism of the Sung and Ming dynasties was the first revival
movement that succeeded in directing the Chinese mind from
Buddhism to the indigenous Chinese heritage. The Neo-Confucian-
ists had to state their philosophy with the challenge of Buddhism
very much in mind. In their formulation, they leaned heavily on
such sources of Confucianism as The Book of Changes (I ching),
The Doctrine of the Mean, The Great Learning (Ta hsileh) and
the mystical phase in Mencius. Although they claimed to be stating
their views from the purely Confucian position, they were actually
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influenced by Buddhism and occasionally they even made use of
certain Taoist ideas. Synthesis does seem to come easily to the
Chinese temper of mind.
By the time of the Neo-Confucianists, the time-honored feel-
ing of kinship between man and the universe had grown even
stronger.75 Chang Tsai (A.D. 1020-1077) bluntly announced,
"Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother. . .. What fills the
universe is my body, and what commands the universe is my
nature. All men are my brothers; all things are my relatives." And
the essay known as "The \Vestem Inscription," from which the
preceding quotation is taken, is a classic in Confucian ethics.76
This twofold aspect must be borne in mind in following the dis-
cussion of this period of either the cosmos or of man's being.
According to Ch'eng Hao (1032-1085), the older of the two Ch'eng
brothers, the man who has fen in him identifies himself with all
things without discrimination,77 and the superior man is in a posi-
tion "to extend his affection to all and to respond spontaneously to
any occurrence." 78
Chu Hsi (A.D. 1130-1200) was, of course, the most compre-
hensive scholar of the period. His metaphysics is built on the basic
notions of li (rational principle) and ch'i (material principle).
Every object is an embodiment of these two components. Human
beings in common derive their essential nature from the li, whereas
individual characteristics are accounted for by the ch'i. Evil is due
to the coarse grade of ch'i that a person embodies in his make-up.
Chu Hsi used this explanantion to buttress Mencius' doctrine of
the goodness of human nature and at the same time to account
for the phenomenon of original evil. The Supreme Ultimate, which
is like a super Ii embracing all the individual Ii, is, at the same
time, the supreme good, and there is a sharp contrast of human
passion over against heavenly reason (Ii). Final unity can be
achieved only by way of fen, which to Chu Hsi is the life-giving
vitality in the universe as much as it is the heart-warming senti-
ment of love in man.79
Chu Hsi's keenest critic was his contemporary Lu Chiu-yiian
(Lu Hsiang-shan, 1139-1193). Lu found the dualism of li and
ch'i in Chu untenable and unnecessary, and he discovered the true
being completely in the rationality of his own mind. Against the
authoritarian background of Chinese thought, he was prompted
to declare that there was no use in writing commentaries on the
j
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Six Classics, as the Six Classics were but commentaries on his
mind. And his saying, "The cosmos is in my mind; my mind is in
the cosmos," has since become celebrated. Man's attainment comes,
therefore, entirely through an inner process. In this way Lu repre-
sented a synthesis of Confucianism and the teachings of Ch'an
Buddhism, although he was very wary of being called a Bud-
dhist.8o And Lu's great contribution lies in his having been the
source of inspiration to Wang Shou-jen (1472-1529), more popu-
larly and respectfully known by his appellation Yang-mingo The
first mention of the idea of intuitive knowledge (liang-chih) oc-
curred in The Book of Menciu8. 81 Wang Shou-jen expounded the
doctrines of the extension of intuitive knowledge and the unity of
knowledge and conduct. Thus knowledge contains in itself the
factor of action, and action has an intelligible reference. Wang's
Dialogue on the Great Learning is an elaboration of his doctrine
of intuition as it bears on the concept of jen. len is an all-inclusive
whole, and in the ordinary life of man this natural feeling of jen
becomes the categorical imperative of conduct.82
These teachers of the Sung and Ming dynasties reaffirmed
Confucius' way of jen. To them, the views on life of both the
Taoists and the Buddhists of their time were unacceptable. The
Taoists suffered from too much attachment to life and hence their
cultivation of magic and alchemy in the hope of discovering the
elixir of longevity. The Buddhist suffered from too much negation
of life and hence their search for release and freedom from the
perpetual wheel. In common, they suffered from a mistaken view.
Life is here: it is to be lived. Man is to be of this world and, at
the same time, of the world beyond. To achieve this ideal is pos-
sible only when the individual has apprehended the jen that is the
final unity or continuum.
It is remarkable that out of an intervening intellectual hetero-
geneity and richness that lasted for centuries the eventual sanction
of the Chinese mind went back to Confucianism. And to this day
the way of jen is the accepted way among the Chinese masses,
and in it some few Chinese seers have, with the sages and teachers
across the ages, found joy and satisfaction and a peace that passes
understanding. The catholicity of jen breeds tolerance. May I con-
clude this paper with the suggestion that the system of jen will be
found, by those who will try, to synthesize easily and well with any
system of values the world over that has an element of true worth?
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HSIEH YU-WEI Filial Piety and Chinese Society
I
---
THIS PAPER WILL discuss the practicality of Chinese ethics and
explain the doctrine of filial piety (hsiao) and its place in the
Chinese ethical realm. We shall then discuss the far-reaching in-
fluence of this doctrine in Chinese society, including family life,
religious worship, social activities, and political affairs generally.
Finally, this paper will shed some light upon what the doctrine of
filial piety may contribute to the peace and welfare of the world.
Since the Confucian teaching of filial piety has held for four
thousand years the most important place in Chinese ethics, I have
selected it as the leading Chinese moral principle. In terms of
this teaching, I shall explain the characteristics of ~hinese society
in the light of the relationship between these principles and the
realistic life of the Chinese people.
I
The Great Learning, as the words of Confucius (551-479 B.C.)
taken down by his disciple Tseng Tzu, has this leading passage:
"What The Great Learning teaches is: to demonstrate illustrious
virtue; to renovate the people; and to rest in the highest excellence
attainable." 1 This sentence forms the central thought of Chinese
philosophy. What most ancient Chinese philosophers strived for
generally was put under these three items: "demonstrating illustri-
ous virtue," "renovating the people," and "resting in the highest
excellence." These three objectives form the focus of most classical
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Chinese philosophers. It starts with the cultivating of one's personal
virtues, progresses in stabilizing the social order, and culminates
in the perfection of one's personality. Hence, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao
(1873-1929), a renowned Chinese scholar, remarked that:
... most Chinese learning has been the study of human behavior rather
than theoretical knowledge. The pursuit of theoretical knowledge is
neither the starting point nor the final goal. The literal translation of
Chinese academic thought as philosophy is rather misleading. If we
borrow the term it should be qualified as "philosophy of life." Chinese
philosophy took for its starting point the study of human beings, in which
the most important subject was how to behave as a man, how one can
truly be called a man, and what kind of relationships exist among men.2
Even though I cannot agree with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in treating
Chinese philosophy merely as a philosophy of life or ethics, it is
still correct to say that the main theme of Chinese philosophy has
centered around ethics, which also formed its starting point. The
Chinese philosophical domain includes metaphysics and episte-
mology, but these were shaped on the basis of ethics. They derived
their source from ethical principles, and were systematized through
ethical interpretation. Starting from the standpoint of "demonstrat-
ing illustrious virtue," the philosopher advances to the study of
human nature, in which the virtue of benevolence (fen) is in-
herent; by this the philosopher tries to reveal the "Mind of Heaven"
and the "natural laws" by deduction in order to "assist the trans-
forming 'and nourishing powers of Heaven and Earth." As The
Doctrine of the Mean has said:
It is only he who possesses the most complete sincerity that can exist
under Heaven and who can give full development to his nature. Able to
give full development to his own nature, one can do the same to the
nature of other men. Able to give full development to the nature of other
men, he can give full development to the natures of animals and things.
Able to give full development to the natures of creatures and things, he
can assist in the transforming and nourishing powers of Heaven and
Earth. Able to perform this latest feat, he may with Heaven and Earth
form a trinity.3
If man can thoroughly understand physical laws and heav-
enly matters and even join himself with Heaven and Earth as in a
trinity only by developing his own nature to the utmost, does this
metaphysical theory not proceed from Chinese ethics?
Classical Chinese philosophers had also discussed ways and
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means for the "perfecting of knowledge through the investigation
of things," which in turn was conducive to "making one's thoughts
sincere" and "rectifying the mind" in everyday living conditions.
As the aim of investigating the nature of things was primarily
"making thoughts sincere" and "rectifying the mind," this theory
dwells upon the necessity for action after the acquiring of knowl-
edge. Any and all knowledge is worth while only when it is appli-
cable in action in daily life with goodness as its result. The ancient
savants then pursued epistemological discussion of the relationship
of knowledge and practice. Hence, Wang Yang-ming (Wang Shou-
jen, 1474-1529) urged the "unity of knowledge and action,"
whereas Dr. Sun Yat-sen advocated the theory that "knowledge-
acquiring is hard, but practice may be easy." These two views were
set forth in epistemological studies on an ethical basis.
Hence, in the eyes of Chinese philosophers, the establishment
of ethics rested, not in its theoretical system, nor in mere language
or words, but in energetic striving for practice. That is one distinc-
tive point by which Oriental ethics is to be differentiated from
the Western pattern. The latter more or less concentrates its dis-
cussion especially on the question as to what constitutes "right"
or "good." Most Western philosophers treat ethics in a sense as a
science or a line of thought rather than a way of life or as a kind of
conduct; they separate ethical thinking from the actual practice of
the thinker. Hence, some authors of ethical works who may be
highly learned in the scientific expounding of what is good in
morality may actually be ignorant as to how to bring about good-
ness in daily life, and their own behavior may also have gone
astray, because they treat ethics merely as one aspect of thought
and possibly as having nothing to do with conduct. Such a concept
or attitude is not acceptable to the orthodox Chinese philosopher.
Mencius (371-28g? B.C.) said, "Why should I be fond of dis-
puting? I am compelled to do itl" 4 Such an attitude of speaking
with reluctance and only when it is absolutely necessary has been
a tradition handed down by Confucius to the Sung-Ming (960-
1644) Neo-Confucian scholars.
II
As Chinese ethics stresses the practic~lity of moral teachings,
its central idea is benevolence, on the one hand, and filial piety,
on the other. They are correlated, the latter serving as the basic
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requirement of the former. As Confucius' disciple Yu Tzu said, in
the Confucian Analects, "Filial piety and fraternal submissionl-
are they not the root of all benevolent actions?" 5
Why should benevolence and filial piety be joined? And why
should the latter serve as the foundation of all benevolent actions?
This point may be generally overlooked or misunderstood, not only
by Western Sinologists, but also by many Chinese students. Some
intellectuals in the New Cultural Movement in the early years of
the Chinese Republic went so far as to vow against filial piety. Such
a radical campaign demonstrated that in modern China there are
many literati who are ignorant of the meaning of this traditional
virtue. In fact, the tenet of filial piety has always held the most
important place in Chinese ethics and also in the Chinese cultural
tradition as a whole.
The Confucian scholar often linked filial piety with benevo-
lence, and did not regard it as an incidental expediency. There
are two weighty reasons for this. First, benevolence as a paramount
and comprehensive Chinese virtue must have its roots. And, second,
benevolence must have its application in human society.
Where may we find any root of benevolence? As Mencius put
it, "Every human being is endowed with the sense of commisera-
tion." 6 And he added, "The feeling of commiseration is the starting
point of benevolence." 7 As everyone possesses an inherent feeling
of commiseration, this is the evidence that everyone is endowed
with the virtue of benevolence. Mencius also said, "The ability
possessed by men without having been acquired by learning is
their 'intuitive ability,' and the knowledge possessed by them with-
out the exercise of thought is their 'intuitive knowledge.' Children
carried in arms all know to love their parents, and, when they are
grown up, they all know to respect their elder brothers." 8 This is
to emphasize that human love toward one's own parents is innate,
as in the case of little children, without any need of being acquired
through study. This inherent love-and-respect toward parents is the
feeling of filial piety. And this is the fountainhead of benevolence.
It is the germination or starting point of the gradually expanding
virtue, the universal love of mankind.
However, the seed of benevolence as sown in filial piety still
needs timely cultivation, without which it tends to wither away
or completely disappear, and then the great virtue of benevolence,
even though it may have been developing in other directions, will
be rootless, whereas it should have been a foundation. Or, the
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drifting virtue of benevolence may soon dry up like a tree without
a root or a stream without a source. In order to keep benevolence
durable and expanding, cultivation of the feeling of filial piety as
its fountainhead is indispensable. This is one essential reason ex-
plaining why Confucians had all along championed the correlation
between benevolence and filial piety.
Another reason lies in the fact that benevolence needs realiza-
tion through actual practice. But then how should men practice
benevolence? The Confucian Analects related, "Fan Ch'ih asked
about benevolence. The Master said, 'It is to love all human
beings.' "9 And Mencius also asserted, "The benevolent man loves
others." 10 Then, whom should everyone love? Theoretically, he
should love all others throughout the world as a matter of course.
In such a great love, how should one start and whom should he
love first of all? Is it not correct to say that he should love his
parents to start with? As everyone has an inherent love toward his
parents, is it not right that this filial piety should be observed as
the starting point of one's practice of benevolence?
To all such questions, the answers of Confucian scholars were
in the affirmative. They agreed unanimously that the realization of
benevolence must begin with the love of children toward their
parents. This means that, in the complicated relations among men,
filial piety forms the primary and most fundamental unit of mutual
connection between two or more persons, in which the practice of
benevolence must first be fulfilled. By inference, all other relations
among human beings should emanate from this basic virtue as
their source; otherwise, they may not stay on the right course of
benevolence for the attainment of peace and prosperity.
Meanwhile, it is possible that, if one ignores his duty of show-
ing love to his own parents, he will also be apt to neglect the
practice of benevolence toward other people. Hence, the Confu-
cian tenet "The benevolent man loves others" must be interpreted
in the light of filial piety to the effect that "The benevolent man
loves others, with his own parents as the starting point." This is a
sound postulate because of its factual basis and indisputable rea-
soning.
It is a universal fact that every human being loves his parents
from the beginning. If one should love others instead of his own
parents, this would be a treacherous act. The Classic of Filial
Piety thus set the warning: "Therefore to be without love of par-
ents and to love other men [in their place] means to be a 'rebel
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against virtue'; to be without reverence for parents and to rever-
ence other men means to be a 'rebel against sacred custom.''' 11
Actually, such moral rebels are rare in any civilized country. And
eventually those who do not love their own parents will also have
no love toward others; those who do not respect their own parents
will not respect others in the proper way. Therefore, even though
fraternal love may be prevalent, any biased practice of benevolence
is vacillating and void if it is not rooted in the prime sense of
filial piety. As Mencius pointed out, "The substantiation of benevo-
lence begins with service to one's parents." 12 This, again, means
that the observance of filial piety is one phase of the practice of
benevolence, if not its starting point. This is another reason why
the Confucian so closely related these two virtues.
Accordingly, the doctrine of filial piety was recognized as
primary among Chinese ethical principles, with the virtue thus
shaped also taking the paramount position in Chinese morality.
After the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220), from the early part of
third century B.C., in which The Classic of Filial Piety was sup-
posed to have been "drastically revised by some Han filial pietist,"
this human virtue firmly established itself as the foundation of
Chinese ethics. One can hardly understand Chinese ethics, and to
some extent even Chinese political activities, if he cannot grasp
the true import of this filial doctrine with is practical application
in Chinese society.
Western philosophers generally appeal to reason, to con-
science, to sympathy, or to the idealism of universal love of man-
kind in order to discover or expound the source of morality. All
these are important, of course, in the exploration of the ethical
domain. And yet, without filial piety as their mainstay, all go
adrift in confusion or are limited in their development and appli-
cation. In other words, if one's love toward his parents withers
away due to negligence of cultivation, where can he find better
soil for developing reason, conscience, sympathy, and fraternal
Jove? In this case, his conscience or sympathy may go astray or
even die. His moral sense, then, is liable to become twisted into
an abnormal state.
It is plain that the ideal development of good morality must
derive from its true source, that is, filial piety in its enlightened
and broad interpretation. This explains why classical Chinese phi-
losophers emphasized the doctrine of filial piety as the fountain
of all good conduct.
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Nevertheless, the foregoing observations do not mean that
filial piety is all-embracing as the exclusive virtue. It is merely the
starting point, not the final goal, of moral practice. Most Confucian
scholars well understood this basic principle. As The Classic of
Filial Piety put it: "Filial piety at the outset consists in service to
one's parents; in the middle of one's path, in service to his sover-
eign; and, in the end, in establishing himself as a mature man." 13
Mencius further extended this virtue, saying, "The superior man
should love his parents and be lovingly disposed to people in
general; and so he should also be kind to all living creatures." 14
He had previously pointed out, "Treat with reverence the elders
in your own family, so that the elders in other families shall be
similarly treated; treat with kindness the young in your own family,
so that the young in other families shall be similarly treated." 15 All
such passages show that filial duties toward one's parents must be
expanded to the whole society. With the broad view in mind,
the developing process may be pushed on, step by step. The
Doctrine of the Mean points out: "The ways of the superior man
may be compared to what takes place in traveling, when to go to
a distance we must first traverse the space that is near; and, in
ascending a height, we must begin from the lower ground." 16 This
way marks out the general process which is to start with one's
loving and serving his own parents. Otherwise, by following the
roundabout and difficult way, there may be "too much putting of
things in confusion, fear, and sorrow, which may result in a stand-
still." 17 For this reason, it is plain why Mo Tzu's (fifth century
B,C.) "principle of all-embracing love" and Jesus' doCtrine of uni-
versaI love have not been readily acceptable to the Chinese masses.
The Chinese ethical principle is not opposed to the doctrine
of universal love, however. In embracing the latter, the former
insists on starting with the observance of filial piety. That is the
easiest approach. And then, step by step, its expanding process
might readily be directed toward the goal of universal love. The
Confucian advocacy of this tenet definitely indicates the easy and_
practical way from filial service to moral practice in general.
All of the human virtues, therefore, should be born through
observance of filial piety, which serves as the dynamic force of all
other virtues. With genuine and comprehensive love toward one's
own parents, in its developing process, one may naturally learn to
be benevolent to all living creatures, affectionate toward mankind
as a whole, loyal to his country and to the duties of a free citizen,
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faithful in keeping obligations, righteous in action, peaceful in
behavior, and just in all dealings. All these eight virtues, together
with many others, emanante from filial piety through its expansion.
The Classic of Filial Piety says, "It is filial piety which forms the
root of all virtues, and with it all enlightening studies come into
existence." 18
As the Confucian scholars always taught, in the learning of
filial piety there should be concurrently the cultivation of other
virtues for its supplementation. The main virtue must be endowed
with benevolence and righteousness as well as loyalty to country
and courage in justifiable actions. Hence, Tseng Tzu, the chief
exponent of the Confucian doctrine of filial piety and one of the
most learned disciples of the Sage, once said, "Those who lack
propriety in private life, loyalty in serving the sovereign, serious-
ness in discharging official duties, faithfulness in treating friends,
or bravery in waging war are all found wanting in filial piety." 19
Therefore, for the fulfillment of the paramount virtue of filial piety
many more moral aptitudes are required as its necessary supple-
mentation. And, in this sense, filial piety has been extended to
embrace all virtues. Since all virtues derive from filial piety, they all
are also contained within the full development of filial piety.
There was no independent treatise on benevolence among
Chinese classical works, but there was the distinguished filial-piety
Classic. By inference, it is unmistakable how important the feeling
as well as the practice of filial piety was considered in Chinese
ethics. It serves as both the fountainhead and the accomplished
state of Chinese morality as a whole.
III
We are now in a position to appreciate the paramount virtue
of filial piety in its relation to Chinese society as a whole.
What influence has the doctrine of filial piety had on Chinese
society? During the past several thousand years, how has the Chi-
nese world been affected by this moral concept as its basic virtue?
And how was Chinese society built upon the doctrine of filial piety
as the cornerstone of Chinese ethics?
Chinese society has always been thoroughly under the sway
of the ethical concept of filial piety. In other words, it was built
up on the basis of filial piety, which has penetrated into every
comer of Chinese life and society, permeating all the activities of
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the Chinese people. Its influence has been all-prevailing. All tra-
ditional habits and customs of the people, collectively as well as
individually, show the influence of the practice of this ethical
principle. This observation may be verified through a careful survey
of the family life, religious life, social life, and political life of
the Chinese people.
First, with reference to family life, Chinese society, which has
laid special emphasis on the integrity of household !elations, treats
the family as the foundation and the unit of society. Mencius held
it to be true that "the root of the empire is in the state, and the root
of the state is in the family." 20 The Great Learning advocated that
"in order rightly to govern the state, it is necessary first to regulate
the family; in order to put the empire in peace and prosperity, it
is necessary first to regulate the state." 21
Prior to the setting up of a community or a state,. there must
be the social unit called the family. Therefore, to put one's house-
hold in good order is the primary stage to demonstrate one's ability
to hold a public office in such a way as to bring well-being to the
state and peace to the empire. The primary stage, according to the
Confucian view, was absolutely important as a prerequisite for
the attainment of the latter. The logical reasoning was based on
the premise: "What is meant by 'In order rightly to govern the state,
it is necessary first to regulate the family,' is this: It is not possible
for one to teach others if he cannot teach his own family." 22 As
everyone's parents, and by inference also his ancestors, are the
source of his life, this fundamental blood relationship legally as
well as morally dictates the imperative rule that one owes certain
unavoidable obligations to his parents. Taking for granted that he
is endowed with the virtue of love, he must first show it toward his
parents. Otherwise, how can he be expected to show kindness to
society at large or to the country in which he lives? He must first
be able to uphold his responsibility to his parents and
his family as a social unit before he can shoulder his heavier,
though more remote, responsibility toward society and the
state. The logical conclusion of this reasoning on the importance of
the family obviously revolves around the theme of filial piety.
Chinese society has therefore laid its emphasis upon the family
system, in which the relationship between parents and children
assumes the top priority, and filial respect and love toward one's
elders are held to be urgently required even after their death.
Mencius put it emphatically: "Of services, which is the greatest?
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Service toward parents is the greatest. ..." 23 Failing to perform
this service, the root of all other services, one cannot be expected
to do good to others.
But, how can one perform well the greatest service in one's
life-to teach and to cultivate? This was what Chinese ethics and
all other related learning, such as rituals and music, concentrated
their efforts upon. From the emperor and his ranking officials
down to the common people, such as peddlers and hirelings, all
without exception were taught and urged to practice filial piety.
The teaching of their tutors, the inspiration drawn from customs
and illustrations, and praise by the literati all emphasized filial
piety. As The Classic of Filial Piety has taught, "Filial piety is the
unchanging truth of Heaven, the unfailing equity of Earth,
the [universal] practice of man."24 Before the dawning of the
twentieth century, most Chinese had actually observed this text
and translated it into practice, though deviations may be found,
of course, in certain respects.
Later, during the past half-century, since Western culture
seeped into Chinese society with some ill effects, the former Chi-
nese large-family system was gradually dissolved and the virtue
of filial piety was also gradually relegated to obscurity. Neverthe-
less, most Chinese families still maintain reverential service to their
elders as the Heaven-ordained obligation of all children. In prac-
tically all Chinese households elderly parents are living with their
married son or daughter in harmony. Such a condition may be
found less often in the Western world. This characteristic of the
Chinese family system unmistakably demonstrates the practice of
filial piety, which prevails in Chinese society.
Next to the parent-son relationship is the marriage relation,
which in ancient China was held to be inviolable except in the
case of certain adequately prescribed conditions. Again, with
the doctrine of filial piety as the nucleus of the family system, the
Chinese nuptial relationship was evolved. For the purpose of con-
tinuing the blood line as one important phase of filial piety, one
must first of all keep oneself in sound physical condition. It was
taught by The Classic of Filial Piety that "the body with its limbs
and hair and skin comes to a person from father and mother, and
it is on no account to be spoiled or injured:' 25 This precept re-
affirmed the importance of one's life as handed down by his an-
cestors. Then, as a necessary tribute to his forefathers, it is one's
duty to perpetuate the blood line by producing offspring through
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wedlock. Marriage was not an affair forged through instinctive
desire alone but was based also on the higher concept of creating
new life or lives so as to prolong those of one's ancestors, including
one's parents. Therefore, the Chinese family system placed great
importance on marriage, not only because of the husband and
the wife themselves, but also because of their children.
It is plain that, on the premise of filial piety, there were at
least three essential points governing traditional Chinese marriage.
First, wedlock, once formed, was not to be dissolved without
adequate reasons strictly prescribed. Second, the parents should
see to it that their children were properly married, though not
necessarily in terms of mutual love prior to the nuptial ceremony.
And, third, the younger couple had the inherent obligation to
produce offspring, and again bore of themselves the responsibility
of getting their children married when they became of marriage-
able age. Consequently, many of the ancient Chinese families have
been propagated for thousands of years down to the present era
in innumerable descendants.
Love counts after the nuptial ceremony of a couple and seldom
before it. Such an ancient custom in China might seem absurd and
even ridiculous to Westerners. The principal mission of marriage,
then, lay in the perpetuation of the family line. If the couple failed
to produce a male descendant, it was permissible for the husband
to divorce his wife, or, as an alternative, for the husband to take
one or more concubines. Even though such a practice is, from the
modern viewpoint, unreasonable or unjust to womanhood, the an-
cient custom might be understood better in terms of practicing
filial piety in its historical sense.
Aside from the vertical line of lineage involved in the Chinese
family system, there is also the horizontal, as represented by the
brotherly relationship. Between father and son, filial piety was
highly emphasized, while between the elder and the younger
brothers mutual respect was the keynote. Chinese ethics urged
the younger to respect his elder brother with submission, whereas
the elder must love and take good care of the younger. Their
connection was like that of hands and feet, with close co-operation
as their reciprocal obligation.
Brotherly love in China may, nevertheless, be attributed to
esteem for the source of their lives, which in turn had recourse to
the filial-piety doctrine. As we highly esteem our parents, by
inference we must also esteem their creatures. Hence, the fra-
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ternal duty was correlated with filial piety. As Mencius emphasized,
"The great course in life of Yao and Shun [emperors of antiquity]
was simply that of filial piety and fraternal love." 26 Those who can
perform the former well would, of course, know how to perform
the latter. In many old Chinese families, brothers persistently
shared the same household, even though they had themselves
married and raised a host of children. And they retained the same
household as long as either one or both of their parents remained
alive. Some Chinese took pride in sharing the same household with
several generations of the same paternal line. The large-family
system thus brought about was gradually abandoned, for there were
various drawbacks. But, as the origin of this system is explained,
it is seen to be derived from the practice of filial piety.
Aside from the Chinese family system, which was built upon
the practice of filial piety, Chinese religious life also had much to
do with the doctrine of filial duties.
Apparently most Confucian scholars seldom touched upon re-
ligious subjects. They seemed to have behaved complacently
toward the issue of life and death. They also slighted such contro-
versial topics as the existence of God and the immortality of the
soul, which have been so extensively discussed by Western phi-
losophers. The Confucian Analects took the following stand: "Chi-
lu [a disciple of Confucius] asked about serving the spirits [of the
dead]. The Master said, While you are not able to serve men, how
can you serve their spirits?' Chi-Iu added, '1 venture to ask about
death?' He got the answer, While you do not know life, how can
you know about death?'" 27 This attitude of avoiding the issue of
the unknown world was later almost unanimously adopted by
Confucian followers. Some even openly disparaged the prevalent
Taoist and Buddhist religions. What is the reason for this? Was
there no need for a Confucian to have some sort of religious belief?
It is to be noted that most Confucian followers, though not
openly professing religious worship, actually had faith in some basic
principle in place of religion. This substitute was the observance
of filial piety. The Confucian religion was intrinsically involved
with the doctrine of filial piety.
How can this doctrine take the place of religion? Or, how can
the doctrine of filial piety be formulated as a doctrine of religious
worship? These two questions can be answered only by consider-
ing the essential elements of religion and the religious value of
filial piety. Definitions of religion are varied. The essentials of any
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religion should consist of at least the following three points: first,
faith in a supernatural being or a supernatural force; second, the
hope for salvation from extinction; and, third, consolation for senti-
mental cravings. Since no religion can lack these three elements,
any emotional or intellectual belief abounding with them may be
called a religion or a substitute for religion. The doctrine of filial
piety therefore transformed itself into a kind of religious worship,
with beliefs and practices, or at least a substitute for them, and with
all their essentials provided for.
Filial piety involves paying due respect, not only to one's
living parents, but also to the deceased and to remote ancestors.
Therefore, ancestor worship took place as a natural sequence of
paying tribute to one's parents. The Classic of Filial Piety states:
In filial piety there is nothing so great as honoring the father. In
doing this, there is no achievement so great as making him an "Associate
of Heaven": and the Duke of Chou [d. 1094 B.C.] was the man who
succeeded in this achievement. In ancient times Duke Chou offered
sacrifice to his high ancestor Hou-chi in the suburbs as an "Associate of
Heaven," and set up King Wen's [reigned, 1171-1122 B.C.] [his father's]
tablet in the Ming-t'ang [the Illustrious Hall] as an "Associate of Shang-
ti" [God-an-High]. The result was that from all the lands within the Four
Seas came princes each with tribute to join in the sacrificial ceremony.28
Though some contemporary scholars, such as E. R. Hughes,
doubt the interpretation given for these terms, "Associate of
Heaven" and "Associate of Shang-ti," as being tinted with exag-
geration, the quoted passage nevertheless portrays the sentiment
of identifying the deceased father with a sort of superhuman force
which deserved worship in the expanded expression of the feeling
of filial piety. Hence, the Confucians laid particular emphasis on
the solemnization of the rites in ancestral worship, including fu-
neral rites for deceased parents.
Before offering sacrifice to one's ancestors, the most rigorous
vigil was kept inwardly by the pious offspring, while outwardly he
fasted and bathed for at least one or more days.
On the day of the sacrifice when he enters the apartment [in the
ancestral temple], he gasps: Surely there is a vision by the spirit tablet!
After he has moved here and there [in making his sacrifice] and comes to
the threshold, he is struck with awe: Surely he hears the particular tones
of the deceased parents' voices! Then, as he hears and listens, he catches
his breath: Surely he hears the sound of the deceased parents' sighing! 29
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All such descriptions show Chinese ancestral worship to be
laden with so much care and awe that it might even have sur-
passed the similar attitudes and practices of Christians in their
church service. As ancestral worship had provided all the essentials
of a religion, though in certain respects it differed from most of
the regular religious sects, its essential meaning or significance may
still be identical with that of, say, Christianty.
The main sentiment of Chinese ancestor-worship lay in com-
memoration of one's origin-the fountain of his life-and in repay-
ing the debt that he owes to his ancestors, yet without much
praying for blessings. To a certain extent, however, the rituals of
worship may involve praying for blessings. As Confucius once put
it, "When I wage war I will win the victory, and when offering
sacrifice I will gain blessings, because I have practiced the right
way." 30 He also pointed out, "For offering sacrifice, there are many
purposes: one for praying for blessings, another for paying obliga-
tions, and still another for purification from sin." 31 Hence, Confucian
ancestral worship did not conceal the desire for blessings from some
supernatural force or forces, on the one hand, and the desire to
avoid calamity, on the other. When facing some critical moment-
for example, prior to waging war or making important decisions on
state affairs-ancient Chinese emperors or kings appealed to their
ancestors for oracular revelations and blessings.
Later, the Chinese geomancy practiced by the common people
in another form of ancestral worship laid even more emphasis upon
the seeking of blessings from the supernatural power through the
intermediary grace of ancestors, who, in certain respects, were
looked upon as identical to Buddhist or Taoist deities.
Next, the doctrine of filial piety played even a greater role in
the search for emotional consolation through ancestral worship.
Human beings cannot avoid death. Practically all religions have
been built upon the sentiment that even after passing into the un-
known world the human soul will be taken care of by some super-
natural force, with deserved reward or punishment awaiting it.
However, if there is another way to dispose of the soul without the
need of the help of such abstract faith, there is no need to seek
help from any religious sect.
The Confucians had their own particular way of disposing of
this problem. Their way hinged upon the doctrine of filial piety.
Mencius said, "There are three things which are unfilial, and having
no posterity is the greatest of them." 32 This utterance may seem
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enigmatic to many, especially Westerners. Why was it so important
for one to have posterity? To Confucians, one's offspring are the
continuation of his own and also of his ancestors' lives. With such
continuation, his and his ancestors' lives are looked upon as being
immortal. Therefore, anyone who has cut short the How of his
ancestors' lives would be condemned as having committed the
gravest sin of being unfilial.
On the other hand, anyone who has generations of offspring
to prolong his lineage-especially one who has "fa~her-like sons"
to continue and, better still, to develop his father's academic at-
tainment or industrial enterprise or other honorable pursuit-might
take great consolation and pride in that fact. He may also deem
it to be the immortality of his own life in succession to those of
his ancestors. In this respect, the filially pious son is always cau-
tioned to take good care of his own body and his own mental and
moral attainments. Thus, The Classic of Filial Piety says, "The body
with its limbs and hair and skin comes to a person from father and
mother, and it is on no account to be spoiled or injured." 33 The
Confucian Analects also teaches, "If the son for three years does
not alter from the way of his father, he may be called filial." 34
As the continuous How of one's life in his offspring, together
with his trade or mental achievement, was looked upon by Con-
fucians as the perpetuity of his own life, then the question con-
cerning the continued existence of the soul (and where his soul
will be) is unimportant. It was said, ''When one has a son or sons,
he will be satisfied with all in his life." 35 Professor T'ang Chiin-i
has said, "As the life of one's offspring comes from his, the survival
of one's life in future generations proves directly that his own life
will never . . . perish. . . . Hence, in the preponderant love of
one's offspring there will be only slight desire for immortality of
his own soul after death." 36 Such a view undoubtedly was derived
from the doctrine of filial piety. So, Chinese religious life virtually
consists in the practice of filial piety.
Regarding social life, the Chinese people essentially expanded
or extended family life into a larger area. This was an expansion of
the practice of filial piety. In the Chinese community, kinship was
formed through the marriage relationship, clans were established
through blood relationship, and villages were built up through the
regional relationship in which one was born and brought up. One's
ancestors, and, still further, tutors and friends, were linked to-
gether through academic pursuit or mutual attraction or other
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causes-all these revolved around the center of gravity of the prac-
tice of filial piety. In Confucian ethics, the position of the tutor was
particularly respected, ranking next to the father's position in
every household. In a series of worshipped, more or less personi-
fied, objects, as stated in a simple tablet in the family alcove, there
were "Heaven, Earth, Sovereign, Father, and Tutor." It was then
observed that, as the parents had given birth to the physical body
of the son, it was the teacher who had much to do in formulating
the pupil's spiritual and cultural life. By expanding the view that
one must honor his physical-life giver, he must also honor his
cultural-life giver. By the same reasoning, one treats his bosom
friends with high respect, too. Confucius' disciple Tseng Tzu there-
fore said, "The superior man on grounds of culture meets with his
friends, and by their friendship helps to establish his virtue." 37
\Vhile the Chinese respect for the tutor was an extension of
filial piety, the respect of friendship was, as an expansion of tutor-
ship, also an extension of filial piety. The closely knit patterns of
relatives, clansmen, fellow countrymen, and tutors, together with
friends, were all interwoven around the filial axis in the Chinese
community. Such a condition still prevails in some conservative
groups of overseas Chinese residents.
Finally, in regard to the Chinese people's political life in its
traditional form, it may be said that the Chinese seem to have
shown little interest in politics as viewed in the West. The tradi-
tional political life of the Chinese was different from that of West-
erners. It emphasized the principle of laissez faire, because in
every community or every village and in every trade organization
the local self-government, based on the social relationship as stated
above, usually functioned instead of higher administrative regula-
tion. From the filial viewpoint, everyone was exhorted to respect
the elder in the family in the management of family affairs and in
the settlement of intra-family disputes, if any serious dispute arose;
and then, in case of inter-family controversies, the village chief
was at hand to settle them as amicably as possible. The Book of
Rites emphasized, "As the people are taught filial piety and
brotherly love at home, with reverence toward the elder and
diligent care for the aged in the community, they constitute the
way of a great king; and it is along this line that states as well as
families will become peaceful." 38
In the traditional local government of China, the village elder
took the place of the administrator and the judge, and the observ-
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ance of the traditional rituals or ceremonies also considerably
eliminated the function of legal provisions. It was said, "The power
which the rituals have of transforming by instruction is not on the
surface. They put a stop to evil before it takes form. They cause
men day by day to travel toward the good and leave wrongdoing
far behind." 39 Thereupon, Confucius remarked that there is no
more excellent method than the rituals for making those in author-
ity secure and the people well-ordered. If every village is kept in
good order, the whole state will naturally be in good order. Confu-
cius said, "By reviewing the local rule in the villages, I comprehend
that the King's Way should be easy." 40 Even though the whole
empire might collapse, with the ruling house changing hands some-
times frequently, yet the people might still take advantage of the
local village rule which, as stated above, was an expansion of the
practice of filial piety in every good household.
For several thousand years, the Chinese people thus enjoyed
their family life, religious life, social life, and political life-all in-
volving, directly or indirectly, the practice of filial piety. Chinese
society is thus seen to have been under the sway of the doctrine of
filial piety and to have been built virtually upon the basis of filial
piety as its essential foundation.
IV
One of the outstanding characteristics which have marked
the difference of social and cultural patterns between China and
Western countries is, therefore, the Chinese emphgsis upon filial
piety.
Chinese society and its cultural How have been based on the
doctrine of filial piety, which was derived from the intrinsic love
of human beings in its natural course of development. The working
principle may be found in the theme of extending such virtue
beyond the household into society at large, with pure, true, and
durable love, devoid of any consideration of selfish profit. By the
practice of such a virtue as filial piety, although still far from being
perfect, Chinese society and its culture could therefore endure
throughout the past several thousand years up to the present. The
unity of every family, the solidarity of the community, and the
unification of the whole nation all depend upon the strengthening
of such love.
The problem which now demands careful consideration is
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whether the present Chinese nation may still resort to the appli-
cation of filial piety as one means to its rejuvenation and whether
the ethical sense and practical value of filial piety still may hold its
position in Chinese society. And, ultimately, from the synthetic or
comparative point of view, whether the doctrine of filial piety still
is worth being preserved and expanded in the cultural interflow
between the East and the West in the light of philosophical ex-
amination and scrutiny. Before the paper is concluded, it is fitting
that these questions should be answered, though only briefly.
Chinese society has been undergoing drastic change. The an-
cient large-family system is collapsing, while filial piety as a para-
mount virtue is also being ignored progressively and gradually by
the younger generation. In the face of such a critical period, will
the modern philosophers of China sail with the tide that seems
formidable enough to sweep people off their feet, or will they put
up a gallant stand against this trend?
As ethics must not bend itself to any evil force, what it should
emphasize is not what the fact unwarrantedly dictates, but what
the moral law discerns as the best for the world. There should be
no expediency, submitting what ought to be to what society blindly
prefers. Further, the Chinese ethics of today must take upon itself
the responsibility of correcting the wrong and championing the
right.
Therefore, the doctrine of filial piety must be propagated and
put into practice in Chinese society and in other communities-
though revision and modernization of certain phases of it are de-
sirable. The intrinsic love which is inherent in the filial doctrine
is most valuable to mankind.
Why should filial piety be preserved in the modern world?
The import of this virtue is the affirmation of affection for human
life and society, if not exactly love; and it is an essentially consoli-
dating factor of society. As its starting point is the children's love
of their parents, it is conceivable that the inherent nature of life
must be good and of intrinsic value. Hence, the filially pious son
should highly esteem the origin of his life, should carefully cherish
his own life and the name of his family, and then create the next
generation so as to maintain the flow of life without interruption.
This is the full affirmation of the value of life. And this is the most
fundamental attitude of the Chinese toward life, indicating that
life is worth living.
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By use of the filial doctrine to solidify human society, with the
correlated virtues of mankind, such as benevolence, righteousness,
justice, faithfulness, and the love of peace, together with bravery
in fighting against the aggression of brutes, all brought up to the
fullest possible extent, then and only then may the world achieve
the blessings of durable peace.
In this regard, the fundamental premise to be definitely and
universally recognized should be mutual love of all men in place
of jealousy and hatred. Only through mutual love may human
beings come together, with reciprocal co-ordination and co-
operation of efforts for the common good. This is only common
sense-for all mankind.
QUESTION: What is the relation of justice to filial piety? In case
there is a conflict, how can you reconcile them? What about the
story in Confucius' Analects in which the father stole the sheep
and the son refused to appear as a witness in the court against him.
ANSWER: Such conflicts between virtues, especially between
loyalty and filial piety, were frequently found in the history of
the Chinese ethical thought. There is no simple solution to such
conflicts, that is, no fixed general rule for settling them. The only
solution is that you have to consider the situation in which you are.
In other words, you have to consider what F. H. Bradley called
"My Station and its Duties." For example, if you are an official,
you will decide in favor of justice, but, if you are an ordinary
person, then you will decide in favor of filial piety. In the case of
the father who stole the sheep, the son should not appear as
witness against his father. In not appearing as witness, the son is
not violating justice. For, whether his father is guilty or not, the
son is not in the position to judge. If you judged your own father,
you would not feel right in your heart. Thus, the Confucian ethical
point of view is that, in case of such conflicts, though there is no
fixed rule, you should do what is proper in your heart, that is,
what you will feel right about when you have done it.
QUESTION: Why should we love and respect our ancestors?
The important thing for us to do is to educate the young.
ANSWER: If anyone docs not like his ancestors, how can he like
the man in the street? The doctrine of filial piety is aimed at the
cultivation of love toward your parents, your ancestors, and then
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extending your love toward others. If you don't like your ancestors,
there is the end of the matter. But my advice is that you should
like your ancestors. That is all.
COMMENT BY T'ANG CHUN-I
A parent's love of his child is strictly biological, whereas filial
piety, love and respect for one's parents, is not biological but is
moral, being based upon a sense of obligation or a debt of gratitude,
and is therefore spiritual.
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T' ANG CHUN-I The Development of Ideas
of Spiritual Value in Chinese Philosophy
I. A Tentative Definition of Spiritual Value
Before I Talk about the ideas of spiritual value in Chinese phi-
losophy, I will define what I call spiritual value.
By the word "spirit" I mean any self-conscious subject and its
activities which are initiated by self-conscious ideas. Any value
which has the following characteristics is called spiritual: (1 )
created or realized "by the spirit"; (2) presented or revealed to
the spirit, that is, "for the spirit"; (3) self-consciously recognized
as such in (1) and (2), and then the value can be predicated on
the spirit, that is, "of the spirit."
According to (1), we can differentiate spiritual values from
the values of outer natural objects and from the values of the
satisfaction of our natural instincts. Outer natural objects usually
have the value of utility, for they are instrumental in the realization
or attainment of spiritual aims or purposes. Sometimes, outer nat-
ural objects may have some aesthetic values which are presented
to our enjoying spirit, too. However, at least at the moment when
we say these values are created or originated or manifested by
outer Nature and belong to outer Nature they are not spiritual
values. It is generally agreed, too, that, when our instinctive de-
sires are satisfied in instinctive ways, there is the realization of
natural values which need not be taken as spiritual.
According to (2), we can differentiate spiritual values from
a certain kind of social values which come from the effects of a
certain action (or actions) or a person (or pcrsons) on other per-
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sons and the whole historical society. As the chain of effects of
human action may stretch and extend to an indefinite number of
persons, areas of society, and even ages in history, the social values
of a human action cannot all be presented and known by any
personal spiritual subject except God. These values are always
realized outside the self-consciousness of the person who pei-forms
the action. Therefore, the existential status of these values should
be said to be in the historical society as a whole and not within
any particular personal spirit.
According to (3), we may differentiate a genuine spiritual
value from a certain quasi-spiritual value, which is created by a
certain spirit and then presented to that same spirit but is not
self-consciously recognized as such. For example, the imagery of
a dream may be merely symbols of a spiritual idea we have had
before. Thus, it is created by our spirit and presented to our spirit.
However, when we are dreaming, the aesthetic value of the
imagery seems to belong to the imagery itself and is not self-
consciously recognized as created "by the spirit," "for the spirit,"
and "of the spirit." This is therefore not a genuine spiritual value.
So, any value of human activity, though originally created by the
spirit and presented to the spirit, if its origin is forgotten and
taken as belonging to the world outside the spirit, is only a quasi-
spiritual value, which is alienated from the originating spirit itself.
From the above, we may say that the first kind of spiritual
values consists of values of moral and religious activities. Generally,
in moral and religious activities, one is self-consciously command-
ing himself how to act, to meditate, or to pray. All'such activities
are initiated, at least to some degree, by one's spiritual subject in
the very beginning, and their values, such as goodness, peace of
mind, holiness, and so on, are more or less taken as created or
realized by the spiritual subject and presented for the spiritual
subject, and can be taken as inhering in, and then predicated of,
the same spiritual subject.
The second kind of spiritual values consists of those of the
artistic and intellectual activities of man. It is doubtless that there
are values of beauty and truth realized by, and presented to, the
spiritual subject through one's spiritual activities, such as specula-
tive thinking, experimental observation, and creative imagination.
Yet, the truth-value or beauty-value is not only capable of describ-
ing the spiritnal activities of man but also can be predicated of
aesthetic objects or the objective realities as outside of the spirit
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of men. It is much more difficult to say that moral goodness and
peace of mind exist in themselves outside the spirit or personality
of man, even when we believe in a Platonic metaphysics of value.
Thus, the spiritual values of artistic and intellectual activities are
differentiated from the moral and religious values, and they may
not have the same degree of spirituality.
The third kind of spiritual values consists of natural values
and social values, defined above as non-spiritual, which are trans-
formed into spiritual values. These transformations are achieved
usually by highly exalted spiritual activities. For example, the
utility or beauty of natural objects is generally taken as having
originated from the objects themselves. If we, as some poets, re-
ligiOUS men, and metaphysicians have done, take man and Nature
as created by some absolute spirit, such as God or Brahman, or
as the manifestation of some absolute spirit, then all the utilitarian
aesthetic values of natural objects may be taken as having origi-
nated from the same spiritual substance of man, in which case
the values of natural objects can be taken as transformed into
spiritual values.
On the question as to how social value also can be transformed
into spiritual value, the crucial point is that any social value of
one's action which is taken as outside the personal spirit can also
be taken as inside the spirit by the more fully developed moral
consciousness of the subject. For example, a discovery in the theo-
retical study of a scientist may benefit mankind in the indefinite
future and generate infinite social values which are beyond the
expectation of the theoretical consciousness of the scientist. Yet,
if the moral consciousness of the scientist is fully developed into
infinite love of mankind, such as the love of Jesus or the fen
(humanity, love, benevolence) of Confucius (551-479 B.C.), then
he understands that all the social values generated from his inven-
tive action are by principle such as can satisfy his love of mankind,
although all the details of all the effects of his action could never be
foretold by him. If the satisfaction of this love is purely spiritual
and has spiritual value, then the actual realization of any social
value of his present discovery any time in the future is at the
same time a realization of the spiritual value of his present love
of mankind. The realizations of these two kinds of values are
co-extensive and equivalent in domain, at least in his present lofty
moral consciousness. Therefore, for this consciousness, all social
values which are not taken as external values become internalized,
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immanently present to the spiritual subject, and thus transformed
into spiritual values. Needless to say, outside such a lofty moral
consciousness, the social value is just a social value, just as, outside
the consciousness of poets, religious men, and metaphysicians, as
mentioned above, natural value is merely a natural value.
II. Spiritual Values in Confucian Moral Teachings and
The Key Concept of "Searching in Oneself
The Confucian school and the Taoist school are the main cur-
rents of thought of native Chinese philosophy. They and Buddhism
have usually been mentioned together and called "san-chiao," three
teachings or three religions. Generally speaking, these three teach-
ings all intend to deepen spiritual experience and cultivate the
spiritual life of man, and have had much social-cultural influence
on Chinese historical society. Hence, if we wish to know the main
ideas of spiritual value in Chinese philosophy, we have to study
them in the Confucian and Taoist and Buddhist philosophies.
It is held by some writers that there are no really spiritual
values in Confucianism. It is said that in the body of Confucianism
dealing with the virtues of men in definite relations only social
values can be realized. Some contend that when Confucius talked
about the importance of the cultivation of these virtues he always
said this is a way for preserving the social solidarity of the nation
or the peace of the world or for training the people to be contented
with their circumstances and not to offend their superiors. These
values are therefore alleged to be only socio-political and not
spiritual values as defined above. Others contend that when Confu-
cius talked about the values of the virtues he was considering the
values as a means to the achieving of harmony and order in
human relations, which were taken as a part of the harmony and
order of the natural universe. But, the harmony and order of the
natural universe may have a natural value only and not necessarily
a spiritual value.!
The views which efface the ideas of spiritual value from the
Confucian ethical system are not without some justification. Ac-
tually, many Confucians in the course of Chinese history, such as
those of the Yung-k'ang school and Yung-chia school of the Sung
Dynasty (960-1279), and Yen Yuan (1635-1704) and Tai Chen
(1723-1777) of the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1912), emphasized the
social utilitarian value of ethical actions. Many Confucians in the
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Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) emphasized the natural value
of ethical action.
But the values of the virtues in Confucian ethics should be
considered essentially spiritual values. The central idea of virtue
peculiar to Confucius, Mencius (371-28g? B,C.), and the Neo-
Confucianism of the Sung-Ming period (g60-1644) is to consider
the virtues as the inner essence of one's personality, and their
values as intrinsic to one's moral consciousness and tinged with a
certain religious meaning, and thus as definitely spiritual values.
The key concept in this interpretation is the concept of "searching
in oneself," which is a teaching handed down from Confucius
himself and developed by all later Confucians. I shall explain its
meaning from three aspects.
( 1) In the first aspect, "searching in oneself" means that in all
ethical relations one has to do his duty to others, but not require
others to do their duties to him, reciprocally, though the others
should do their duties of their own accord. In order to explain
this we have to know that there are three ways to develop one's
spiritual life to the fullest extent, and all three may be called in
a certain sense "backward" ways.
The first way is to get real freedom from all the instinctive
and irrational desires in human life. The extreme of this is what
'\ Schopenhauer called the denial or mortification of the will. This
way is practiced, more or less, by all ascetics and mystics, as a
negative step in the very beginning of spiritual cultivation for
higher positive spiritual development.
The second way searches for some kind of higher or highest
Idea or Existence in the very beginning of spiritual cultivation
which is supernatural and transcendent, such as the Idea of the
Good in Plato and the self-existent God in the otherworldly re-
ligions. We may call this the way of leaving the mundane world
behind, in our process of spiritual ascent.
The third way is to live in definite ethical relations with others
in the actual world, practicing the morality of doing one's duty to
others but not asking them to do their duties, reciprocally, as
taught in Confucianism. This way of life may be called the way of
thinking or acting morally just for oneself, which is opposite to the
"forward way of asking others to do something morally for me,"
as in the common attitude of our daily life. It is a 'backward" way
of life and is as difficult to put into practice as the other two ways.
The difficulties of this third way arise from the fact that when
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one does his duty to others he naturally supposes that others are
moral beings like himself. According to the universal principle of
reason, man naturally expects others to do their duties in response
to his action. Thus, he naturally thinks he has the right to demand
that others do their duties. Actually, social justice and legislation
are based upon the reciprocity of rights and duties. One who does
his duty without asking others to do theirs is the same as one who
has only duty-consciousness without rights-consciousness and lives
beyond the idea of social justice. In duty-consciousness, one does
what his conscience commands him to do, and never goes beyond
his conscience to see what happens in other consciences, and so the
value realized is completely internal to his conscience and is
therefore a purely spiritual moral value. If I have this kind of
duty-consciousness in full degree, then, the less others do their
duty to me, the more I shall do my duty to others. That is to say,
the more my expectation from others is disappointed, the more
intensified is my self-expectation from myself. The value of social
justice, which is offended and lost because others do not do their
duty, is recompensed and satisfied by the moral values of my
fulfillment, which is purely spiritual and belongs to my inward
life. Yet, this kind of duty-consciousness is the most difficult for
human beings, because we have to do to others more than they
deserve. What we do to others is the same as the grace of deity
conferred on man, though man may not be aware of it or respond
to it with a sense of thanksgiving. It is significant that Christians
translate the word "grace" with the Chinese word "en" in the term
"en-i," which means that one does his duty without reciprocation,
and so confers something which is absolutely beyond what others
deserve. Therefore, we may say that in the first meaning of "search-
ing in oneself" in Confucianism a deification of human life is
implied and has religious and spiritual meanings.
(2) The second meaning of "searching in oneself' is that one
ought to cultivate his virtues and abilities without asking praise
from others. This is also very difficult to practice, due to the fact
that men, motivated by the universal principle of reason, naturally
want others to appreciate or approve what they themselves have
appreciated or approved. This desire may not be morally bad, if it
is accompanied by a moral feeling of respect when we request
it from others and accompanied by our gratitude when we receive
it from others. But, leaving the desire for praise itself alone and as
unconditionally right, then we may simply take the praise of others
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as personal gratification. When we are anxious to receive this kind
of gratification, many modes of moral evils, such as ambition, or the
will to power to control the will of others, or disloyalty to one's
original ideals in flattering others and then receiving praise in
return, can be generated in different circumstances. When I ask
the praise of others, I am taking my virtues and abilities, and their
expressions in actions and speech, as a means, and they then
have only instrumental or utilitarian value, which is non-spiritual
social value or quasi-spiritual value as defined in Section I, above.2
If our ordinary outward desire of gaining others' praise is
diminished, we may live a life which is directed by our moral
conscience itself. We can then eradicate the roots of our desire
to control the will of others; we will never be disloyal to the moral
ideal in order to please men, and, at the same time, never have
any complaint or grudge against others or Heaven. This is the
meaning of the Confucian saying: "There is no one that knows me.
. . . I do not murmur against Heaven. I do not grumble against
men. . . . But it is Heaven that knows me." 3 This is a kind of
deified human life.
(3) The third meaning of "searching in oneself' is that all
the moral principles, moral ideals, and moral values of our actions
and intentions can be discovered by self-reflection. This is strongly
implied in the teaching of Confucius, and is explicitly stated and
elaborated in the teaching of Mencius and many later Confucians,
as in the thesis that "human nature is good,"
The thesis that ''human nature is good" has had various inter-
pretations in the various schools of Confucianism. In the teaching
of Mencius, the first exponent of this thesis, the doctrine does not
say that all actions or intentions of men are actually good enough.
It says simply that there are good tendencies or good beginnings in
human nature and, most important, that, when we have good in-
tentions or do good actions, there is usually an accompanying feel-
ing of self-satisfaction or self-joy or self-peace.4 This may be said
to be deep self-praise when I find my intention or action is really
good. This deep self-praise is usually concealed when we are eager
to ask for praise from others or when we lack deep self-reflection.
Yet, when we withdraw the desire to ask others for praise and
have deep reflection, then everybody can find the deep self-praise
which accompanies all good intentions or good actions. However,
this deep self-praise is a result of my deepest self-evaluation, which
immediately follows my intention or action. This self-evaluation
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reveals to me what is good as good and what is not good as not
good, and from the former I feel self-satisfaction, self-joy, and self-
peace, but from the latter I feel disquieted, unjoyful, and dis-
satisfied. As my mind feels self-peace or self-joy or self-satisfaction
in the good only, so my human nature is disclosed as essentially
good. This is the orthodox doctrine of the thesis that "human
nature is good," which was morally expounded in Mencius' teach-
ing, was metaphysically explained by Chu Hsi's (1130-1200)
theory of Ii (principle, reason, or law), and culminated in the
teaching of liang-chih (almost the same as conscience) in Wang
Shou-jen's (Wang Yang-ming, 1472-1529) philosophy.
If we take human nature as essentially good, moral ideals and
moral principles are nothing other than the norms or standards
awakened within or originating in the nature of our mind and im-
manently presented to our moral self-consciousness for self-evalua-
tion. Consequently, our moral training and moral cultivation have
no other purpose than to preserve and extend what is judged or
evaluated as good, and all the achievements of moral life and the
formation of a moral personality express no more than the desire to
conform to these immanent norms or standards, to realize what
originates from the nature of the mind, and to know and to fulfill to
the maximum what is implicitly contained in the nature of the
mind.
However, in the development of our moral life, any phase of
our ordinary life which is taken by common sense as non-moral or
immoral can be evaluated as either good or evil. So, every phase of
our life has moral meaning, can be made moral by a certain cultiva-
tion, and then has moral value, which can be presented immedi-
ately to our self-reflection, as defined above, and become a purely
internal value. It is not difficult to see that if we resolve to have all
the phases of our life made moral then our self-evaluations and
self-reflections may arise successfully and co-extensively with the
extensions of all phases of life, including those phases of our life
which are considered by common sense as merely directing to, or
dealing with, the so-called external environment.
Hence, self-evaluation and self-reflection should not be taken
as subjective and self-closed, but should also be taken as objective
and self-open to all the other social and natural objects of the
universe as our whole environment. Here the "investigation of
things" as taught by Confucianism has not only intellectual value
but also moral value, and then we may have the wisdom that all
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the objects in the universe can be taken as the occasions for the
realization of spiritual moral values, and that all may be lighted
and permeated by spiritual and moral values as well. This is the
vision of the moral man, who realizes his good nature, develops
his moral life to the fullest extent, attains unity of the inner world
and the outer world, and achieves the grandeur and beauty of
personality as expounded in The Doctrine of the Mean 5 and The
Book of Mencius.
III. (1) Human Nature As Good, (2) Heaven, (3) Mind,
and (4) The Universal Attainability of Sagehood
If we compare the thesis that human nature is good with the
idea of original sin in Christianity or the karma theory and the
avidyii theory of Buddhism, there are many pros and cons worthy
of discussion. Yet, if we acknowledge the existence of original sin
or impure karma in the depth of our mind, we may still believe
that human nature is essentially good. We may hold that original
sin and impure karma are not derived from real human nature, but
that the feeling of unrest that arises when we are told we have
original sin or impure karma originates from our real human nature.
This nature, as revealed in unrest, is the same as the nature re-
vealed in our unpeacefulness in our evils, and is absolutely good.
In the feeling of unrest, of course, I may find at the same time that
I am so weak as to try to set myself free from the bondage of
original sin or impure karma, and I may pray to some transcendent
being, such as God, Brahman, or Amida Buddha, to save me. In
this type of religious consciousness, we think our nature is not good
enough. Yet, the very confession of our weakness and our praying
come from our nature, too. Our very confession may not be weak,
and our praying must be good in itself. If it is objected that the
very confession and words of prayer do not come from our human
nature, but are the result of human nature as affected by a tran-
scendent being or receiving grace from above, then we reply that
our capacity for being (and our unconscious willingness to be)
affected and receiving grace are additional evidences that human
nature is essentially good. If we deny this, then how is it possible
that men can be saved? The thesis that human nature is good does
not fundamentally oppose the ultimate teachings of Christianity or
Brahmar;l.ism or Buddhism, which believe either that man is the
image of God, or that man is Brahman, or that the Buddha is a
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sentient being awakened to the fullest extent. Therefore, the thesis
that human nature is good cannot be denied, even if we concede
the existence of original sin or impure karma, because we can
reassert our nature as good again in the very self-reflection of our
unrest or unpeacefulness in our evils and our very unwillingness to
be bound by them. However, the Confucian thesis that human
nature is good is still different from many religious points of view
which take the evil origin of human actions much more seriously
and believe that only a transcendent being can save man from evil.
Men who hold the latter point of view always look at human nature
as a mere potentiality and insist that the principle of its actuality
resides in some transcendent being. Yet, from the thesis that hu-
man nature is good the principle of actualization is seen to be
immanent in human nature.6
What we have said above does not imply that Confucian
thought lacks the idea of a transcendent reality, such as God, the
Mind of Heaven, or the Universal Mind. In fact, many Confucians
have these ideas. The real difference between the Confucian
point of view and the above religious point of view is that, in the
latter, the idea of a transcendent being, such as God, Brahman,
etc., is more easily brought to light by contrasting it with our sin or
impure karma or bondage; while, in the former, the idea of the
Mind of Heaven, the Universal Mind, God, or Heaven is usually
brought to light by the positive development of our moral life to
the fullest extent, with the knowledge that the transcendent being
is at the same time immanent in our moral life. How is it possible
to have these ideas brought to light by the positive development
of our moral lives? The answer was suggested in the teaching of
Mencius and culminated in the Neo-Confucians of the Sung-Ming
period, who had a deep understanding of the thesis that human
nature is good.
Briefly, the central theme of this trend of thought is that when
we develop our moral life to the fullest extent, as a sage does, the
essence of our good nature is wholly actualized in, presented to,
and known by, our self-consciousness. The essence of our good
nature may be said to be ;en, which is love, beginning with filial
piety, and flowing out as universal love to all the men with whom
we have definite ethical relations, to all the people under Heaven,
and to all natural things. So, the moral consciousness of ;en, in its
fullest extent, is all-embracing love, which pervades, permeates, and
fills Heaven and Earth as a whole. So, Mencius said, "The virtuous
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man transforms all experiences he passes through and abides in
holiness or deity-nature. His virtues are confluent with Heaven
above and with Earth below." 7 Chang Tsai (Chang Heng-ch'u,
1020-1077), Ch'eng Hao (Ch'eng Ming-tao, 1032-1085), Ch'eng I
(Ch'eng I-ch'uan, 1033-1107), and Chu Hsi had the same idea
namely, that the man who realizes fen considers Heaven, Earth,
and the ten thousand things as one body. Lu Chiu-yuan (Lu
Hsiang-shan, 1139-1193) said, "The universe is my mind and my
mind is the universe." Wang Shou-jen said, "Pervading Heaven and
Earth is just this spiritual light-my spiritual light-which is not
separated by, or separated from, Heaven, Earth, deities, and the
ten thousand things." 8 But is this mind only my own? In the mind
which identifies itself with the universe, where is the dividing
point between what is mine and what is not mine? When selfish
ideas and motives are transformed into universal and all-pervading
love, where is the borderline or the boundary between our mind
and the universe? Why can I not take this type of mind as belong-
ing to me and also to Heaven? Why can I not take this type of mind
both as created and presented by myself and as revealed and de-
scended to me from Heaven? Is its belonging-to-me incompatible
with its belonging-to-Heaven? If I take this kind of mind as mine
and not of Heaven, does this not simply contradict the very nature
of this kind of mind, which has no borderline to differentiate itself
from what is not itself and which is felt as a universal and all-per-
vading mind? Therefore, when I have this kind of mind and know
its nature truly, I shall never take this mind merely as my own; I
shall know that this kind of mind is conferred by Heaven as much
as it is mine, and I shall know Heaven (which was originally syn-
onymous with the word "God" in the Chinese Classics). As this
kind of mind is the mind of one who develops his moral life to the
fullest extent, and whose fen is wholly actualized as a sage, so the
sage is said to be the same as Heaven, and human nature is there-
fore sometimes called Heaven-nature, and the human mind is
called the mind of Heaven in some Confucian literature. So,
Mencius said, "To have our mind preserved and Nature nourished
is the way to serve Heaven" and "The man who has passed through
the stage of completing his virtues and sheds forth his spiritual
light brilliantly, and then can transform the world, is called a sage.
The sage, unfathomable by intellect, is called holy or divine." 9
Yet, the highest teaching of Confucianism is not merely the
realization that the sage is the same as Heaven, but the realization
---
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of the universal attainability of sagehood for all men and what is
implied by that. The universal attainability of sagehood is a logical
consequence of the belief that human nature is good. The sage is
the man who has fully realized his nature. If all men have the same
good human nature, surely all can realize their nature and attain
sagehood. Furthermore, the universal attainability of sagehood is
itself an immanent belief of the mind of the sage. Since the mind
of the sage is full of love and unselfishness to the fullest extent, he
could not have any idea that he is the only sage, because this is
selfish and contradictory to the very nature of his mind. He must
love to see, expect, and hope that everyone else will be a sage.
Therefore, the universal attainability of sagehood is a belief im-
manently involved in the mind of the sage. If 1 believe there is a
sage, or if 1 can be a sage, then 1 have to think of the idea of the
sage through the mind of the sage, and thus the universal attain-
ability of sagehood is also involved in my idea. Yet, according to the
thesis that human nature is good, 1 must believe there is a sage and
that 1 can be one, because sagehood is nothing more than my own
nature, fen, wholly realized. So, 1 must believe in the universal
attainability of sagehood.lO
According to the idea of the universal attainability of sagehood,
an actual sage can be born at any time and any place in the world,
and no one sage of any particular place or particular time has the
privilege of being the only sage. As all sages have the same funda-
mental virtue, fen, or universal love, so all sages go in the same
way, and are of the same spirit of mind, and live with the same
principle or the same TaoY This idea led the Chinese people to
believe that there can be sages in different religions of different
peoples.12 This is one reason there were no religious wars or large-
scale religious persecutions in Chinese history. So, this idea has its
religious value.
Furthermore, when we know there is a single spirit, or a single
mind, or a single principle, or a single Tao in the world of sages,
we have to know one thing more. This is: "I can know all this in
my here-and-now mind." This is to say that 1 can comprehend what
is universal and all-pervading in the world of sages in my here-and-
now mind. So, the world of sages is as much immanent in my here-
and-now spiritual world as it is transcendent to my here-and-now
actual existence. When 1 am awakened to this idea, then all that
is remote, such as the highest ideals or holy virtues of sages, is
nearest to my here-and-now mind, and all the values of the highest
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ideals and holy virtues belong to my mind as much as they do to
the minds of sages themselves. This is perhaps the highest idea of
human spiritual life expounded by the thinkers of the late Ming
( 1368-1644) after Wang Shou-jen. It is too subtle to explain all its
meanings here.13
IV. Spiritual Values in Taoism
Taoist ideas about spiritual life were usually expounded as in
contrast with the life of worldly man. Such names as "real man,"
"Heavenly man," "spirit-man" or "divine man," "perfect man," and
"sage-man" were used by Taoist philosophers to differentiate their
ideal man from the worldly man.
Taoist philosophers, who looked aloof at everything here, felt
some fatigue in worldly affairs and sought spiritual quiescence and
tranquillity, and then, withdrawing their minds from worldly things,
were men who had a transcendent mentality. Taoist philosophers
usually thought and spoke about their ideals of human life nega-
tively, unlike the Confucians, who usually thought and spoke
positively. Lao Tzu (sixth century B.C.) taught men to be weak, soft,
quiet, and foolish, instead of strong, hard, active, and wise. Chuang
Tzu (39g-Z9S? B.C.) taught man not to seek reputation, honor, or
social success, to forget himself and be indifferent to worldly gain
and loss, happiness and misery, and life and death. They taught
people to live a way of life which is neither driven by instinctive
desires nor motivated by calculation, forgetting worldly benefits.
So, the value of their ideal life is quite beyond the category of the
satisfaction of natural desires and utilitarian value as defined in
Section I, above. But what is the spiritual value of this kind of life,
which seems purely negative and from which we can derive
nothing?
The answer is twofold. First, the Taoist ideal of life has its
positive side. Second, this positive value of life can be realized by
living in a negative way. I shall begin with the latter point.
The reason the positive value of life can be realized by living
in a negative way is very simple. If our ordinary way of living is
considered of no value or of disvalue, then not living in this way is
a positive value. For example, if the toil of the whole day is con-
sidered to be disvalue, is not rest itself a positive value? The im-
portant thing is that the negating of disvalue should be presented
to the spiritual subject. If the negating of disvalue is presented to a
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spiritual subject, the value of the negating itself is positively pre-
sented to the spiritual subject, immanently exists in the subject,
and becomes positive spiritual value. So, when I am not seeking
worldly wealth, reputation, and honor, which are considered to be
of disvalue, the very quiescence and tranquillity in my non-seeking
can be presented to my spiritual self as full of positive value (just
as rest after a day of toil can be presented as of positive value).
If we understand this clearly, then we know there are as many
kinds of values experienced by the men who want to transcend
worldly things as by men who cling to worldly things. The sense of
tranquillity and quiescence of the men who transcend worldly
things successfully seems homogeneously extended. Yet, under this
homogeneous extension, the heterogeneous worldly things are tran-
scended co-extensively. So, the spiritual content of the life of the
man who transcends worldly things is as full as the life of the
worldly man, the difference being that all worldly things are tran-
scended and superseded in his mind. From this point we may
proceed to the reason many Eastern and Western mystics who see
the transcendent world as Divine Nothing estimate the value of
the Divine Nothing as higher than everything, full of everything
that has been superseded, and as a Divine All-Being.
The problem of all mystics, who want to transcend worldly
things, is that the deep quiescence or tranquillity of the spirit is not
easily preserved, and the Divine Nothing is not easily revealed. So,
it may be easily concluded that, without faith in a transcendent
savior who descends from above to help us ascend to the tran-
scendent world, we can never raise ourselves. However, in Oriental
religious and metaphysical thought there is an idea which is most
important: that it is not necessary for us to have faith in a tran-
scendent savior to help us transcend the mundane world. Instead,
we may have wisdom to see that worldly things are themselves sunk
down and have no power to disturb our tranquillity and quiescence
of mind and that the world is itself a place where something like
the Divine Nothing reveals itself. This is the wisdom of Nothing in
Taoist philosophy.
This wisdom is very simple in essence. It is the realization that
any worldly thing begins in or comes from "where it is not," or
"Nothing," through a process of transformation or change, and ends
at or goes back to "where it is not." Then, "beginning and ending in
Nothing" is the general nature of all things and the Great Way, or
Tao, where all things pass through. This idea is based primarily on
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our everyday experience. Everybody agrees, at least from the point
of view of phenomena, that the future is what has not "yet been"
and is now nothing, and that the present, which was the future
and becomes the past, may be said to come from Nothing and go to
Nothing. If we know deeply that everything comes from Noth-
ing and goes back to Nothing, then all things may be taken as
involved in a Great Nothing,H or as Boating out from the Great
Nothing, only to sink into it again. Then not anything can really
constitute bondage or disturb our spirit. When its very nature of
"shall-be-sinking" is really presented to me in the immediate pres-
ent, it is already nothing and has no effect as a disturbance or
bondage for me even now.
The two great founders of Taoist philosophy, Lao Tzu and
Chuang Tzu, both present the wisdom of Nothing in metaphysics
as the theoretical basis for the development of the spiritual life of
tranquillity and quiescence so as to achieve an actual transcendence
over worldly things. This is the negative side of their teachings.
On the positive side, there are differences in their teachings on the
spiritual life.
When Lao Tzu thought about the relation of worldly things to
the "Nothing," he usually thought that worldly things were involved
and contained in the Nothing. The ideal spiritual life, correspond-
ing to this metaphysical vision, is identified in our mind or spirit
with the Nothing and is free from all the limitations of finite partic-
ular worldly things. Thus we can comprehend and embrace all
things without partiality. When this kind of mind is used in political
philosophy, it is the mind of a sage-king, which has no special
reaction to any particular thing, but is glad to see all things and
actions of all people well done, and embraces all people as his
children. This kind of mind is mild, kind, soft, as broad as Heaven
or the Void, always wishing for all things to go their own way, and
tolerating them, following them, and never interfering with them.
This is the first aspect of Lao Tzu's teaching, which has cultivated
the virtue of tolerance and broad-mindedness in the Chinese people,
and has provided Chinese government with the political ideals of
non-interference with the people, concession to the will of the
people, and so on.
In the second aspect of Lao Tzu's teaching, the mind, which
is identified with Nothing and is as broad as Heaven or the Void,
may simply contemplate the "coming and going," "birth and death,"
and "prosperity and decay" of all things without affection or mercy.
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It is the mind of a spectator of the universe. It is neither morally
bad nor morally good, and maintains ethical neutrality. The meta-
physical truth is thus presented to this mind with a kind of intel-
lectual value.
In the third aspect of Lao Tzu's teaching, the mind, which
knows that what is prosperous shall decay, that what is strong
shall become weak, and that what is born shall die, can generalize
all these into a principle: Everything moves in a curve which rep-
resents the natural law of all things. According to this principle,
when a thing reaches the top of the curve it is destined to fall.
Therefore, if we do not want to be a victim of this natural law, the
only way is never to progress to the top of the curve, or, when we
approach the top, to go back to the beginning of the curve again,
for then the top of the curve will always be in our purview, but we
shall never arrive there, and so we shall never fall. So, Lao Tzu
taught us to go backward, to learn the way of the child or the fe-
male, and to be humble and modest, in order to preserve our vitality
and other powers to prevent falling down. This is the utilitarian
aspect of Lao Tzu's philosophy, which is neither morally good nor
morally bad and may not include any spiritual value to be realized
by this kind of mind.
In contrast with Lao Tzu, when Chuang Tzu thought about
the things of the world, he did not hold that all things are contained
in the Great Nothing, but paid more attention to the great process
of incessant change or transformation of all things in the Infinite
Heaven. In this process, all definite forms and colors of things come
into being and pass away. So, this process can also 'be taken as a
great change or transformation of a great ether or air, which is
itself formless and colorless, being combined with non-being. Since
Chuang Tzu paid more attention to the process of transformation
in the universe, his view of human life placed more emphasis on
the spiritual transformation of human life itself. If one wants to be a
real man or a man of Heaven, free from one's past habits or ordinary ./
self, one ought to live a life of spiritual flight, or spiritual wandering,
through the process of the infinite transformations in the universe.
He should also take all things as equals when they are presented
and enjoyed by one's spirit, yet without judging them as good or
bad from one's partial, personal point of view. In its flight or wan-
dering in the universe, one's spirit sees everything with empathy
and takes the myriad forms as the forms of things which it encoun-
ters, yet without attachment to anyone, and lets the forms success-
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fully be taken and then left. When the form of anything is left,
then nothing remains and nothing needs to be remembered. When
the form of anything is being taken, it is absolutely new, just as the
world which is present to the new-born child or new-born animal
is preceded by nothing, and, as we may not expect anything from it,
is followed by nothing. It is immediately presented and enjoyed,
as if it were floating in an infinite Void or Heaven as its background.
This is the way of life of the real man, the man of Heaven, or the
spirit-man of Chuang Tzu. Therefore, the word "spirit" (shen),
which originally meant an invisible spirit which existed objectively,
was used by Chuang Tzu as the name of the spiritual mood or
activity of the spirit-man which extends his spirit beyond the limi-
tation of the universe. He used "shen-yu" (literally, spirit-meeting)
as the term for the way of the ideal man when he encounters any-
thing immediately with empathy for the moment, without attach-
ment.15
From the above, we may conclude that the spirit of Chuang
Tzu's way of life is more aesthetic than Lao Tzu's way of life, and
therefore can appreciate with empathy the beauties of all things
or the "beauty of Heaven and Earth," as he called it.16 Yet, this kind
of beauty does not consist simply in the forms of things. As every
form exists in the process of "transformation of ether or air," so the
most beautiful forms should never be clear-cut and should be per-
meated by the flow of ether and become ethereal forms. As the
forms pass through the ether and return, they create rhythms.
Ethereal rhythm (ch'i-yiin) is a key term of Chinese aesthetics; it
has the Infinite Void or Heaven as its background. It permeates
the whole universe charged with life.17
V. Buddhist Ideas As a Supplement to Chinese Philosophy
From the Chinese point of view, the Buddhist theory of the
non-permanence of everything is very similar to the Taoist idea that
everything is in a process of change, as coming from Nothing and
returning to Nothing. Yet, impermanence in Buddhism is based on
the principle of yuan-sheng, sometimes translated as causal or de-
pendent origination, meaning that everything is a combination of
conditions. (It was never consciously posited by Lao Tzu or Chuang
Tzu.) The meaning of yuan-sheng is simple in itself. It leads our
thinking from the assertion that "a thing is generated by its con-
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ditions and has no 'self' concealed in it to sustain its existence" to
the assertion that "the self-nature or self-essence of a thing is
emptiness," that is, that there is no such self-nature.
To show that sunyata (emptiness) is the nature of everything,
according to the theory of yuan-sheng, the Buddhists argue that, if
we know a thing is generated by its conditions, then there is ab-
solutely nothing which exists as such, before or after all conditions
have met together. Since all the conditions which come together
can be separated, nothing has any permanence, and what is exist-
ing can also be non-existing. Therefore, the existing thing has no
self-nature or self-essence to sustain its existence, and the possibility
of its non-existence is the very nature of its existence. (This is
sunyata.) Yet, when we really know this starting point and other,
further theories of sunyata, we have to see directly and intuitively
the sunyata of all things. This requires strict training in spiritual
concentration, spiritual quiescence, and spiritual wisdom. When we
understand sunyata, then all things of the world become clear to us.
Then all is enlightened by non-being, and non-being is enlightened
by being. This is, of course, an awakening which is beyond the self-
consciousness of the layman and the speculation of philosophers.
The idea of yuan-sheng in Buddhism, especially in the
Madhyamika school, never requires us to know merely the con-
ditions of a thing. On the contrary, its main purpose is to direct
our consciousness to depart negatively from the false idea of self-
nature or self-essence, and to look to the conditions of a thing. As
every existing condition has its various conditions, too, so the idea
of yuan-sheng directs our consciousness to depart from the thing as
a center, to extend its light to the conditions, to the conditions of
conditions, and to go beyond the thing itself. Then the self-nature
or self-essence of anything can be cancelled and the sunyata of all
things may be revealed.
In the cultivation of spiritual life, the value of the teaching of
sunyata is tremendous. Since all the bonds of our spiritual life and
the infinite evils of human life come from clinging to the apparent
realities of worldly things, these teachings remove the roots of all
bonds and evils. Infinite merits can be achieved and infinite virtues
or spiritual values can then be realized by us. This is the ideal of
bllddhahood.
Buddhist demonstrations of the sunyata of all things are based
upon the conditional relations of things, which are acknowledged
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as actually existing in the intellect of common sense and science.
Therefore, all these demonstrations can logically be carried out as
in the Madhyamika school of Buddhism.
Another point is the idea of the iilaya (storehouse) conscious-
ness and its seeds as expounded by the Yogacara school of Bud-
dhism. These ideas come from our spiritual light reaching into the
unconscious nether world. From the teachings of the Yogacara
school, we can understand the world of iilaya and its seeds through
indirect and mediate reasoning only, though they can be consciously
known directly and immediately by deep contemplation of the
bodhi-sattva (one whose nature is perfect wisdom) or the Buddha.
In the teachings of this school, many layers and aspects of the world
of unconsciousness are elucidated and analyzed, and so are many
ways of yoga for the self-transformation of the whole personality in
order to attain the vision of the bodhi-sattva or the Buddha. These
were all new teachings. of spiritual cultivation for the Chinese
people.
The ultimate purpose of Buddhism is to teach man to attain
buddahood and to see the sunyatii of all things, which is super-
intellectual. This is different from Taoist philosophy, which usually
uses metaphorical symbolism or aesthetic imagination to attain the
super-intellectual. The combination of the spirit of the teaching of
Buddhism, mainly the Madhyamika school, and the spirit of Taoist
philosophers is the way of Ch'an (Zen), which may be taken as the
free use of intellectual ideas to cancel other ideas and let the vision
of sunyatii of Ch'an experience be expressed by symbolic language
and actions.
VI. New Orientation of Value-Consciousness in the
Neo-Confucianism of the Sung-Ming Period
It is generally agreed that the Neo-Confucians of the Sung
and Ming dynasties were men of an introvert type. They pro-
pounded the values of quiescence, serenity, reverence, self-reflec-
tion, and self-examination. They even adopted static sitting as a
way to spiritual cultivation. All this seems quite different from the
pre-Ch'in (220-206 B.C.) Confucians, who were more active in
social, political, and cultural activities. So, the Confucians of the
Ch'ing (1644-1912) criticized the Confucians of the Sung and
Ming dynasties as Buddhists or Taoists in disguise. This is an exag-
geration. Almost all the Confucians of the Sung and Ming dynasties
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most sincerely opposed many teachings of the Buddhists and Taoists.
Their ideas of ethical relations and of sacrificial ceremonies for
ancestors, sages, and worthies and their many other historical, cul-
tural, political, and economic ideas are all of Confucian origin. So,
we have to explain why they laid more emphasis on the self-reflec-
tive or quietistic way of spiritual cultivation through the influence
of Buddhism and Taoism, plus the development of Confucianism
itself.
Compared with the earlier Confucians, the Neo-Confucians
were more conscientious about the inner obstructions to the devel-
opment of spiritual life. These obstructions, such as the evil elements
of karma and iilaya, had not been taken seriously by earlier Con-
fucians. It is usually the case that the higher in spiritual life one
wants to ascend, the more inner obstructions one finds. The more
self-reflective one is, the more faults or potential inner motive of
faults one finds deep in his mind. The Neo-Confucians called these
inner obstructions insincere ideas, e.g., selfish desires, habitual
materialistic tendencies, obstinate opinions, variegated tempera-
ments, and the manipulative or calculating mind, which are all
deeply rooted and always concealed in our minds. Only deep inner
meditation or self-reflection can illuminate and reveal the way to
eradicate the roots of these obstructions. In order to eradicate these
ideas, which are all purely negative to the development of spiritual
life, we have to avoid absolutely doing certain things and let the
negative things be arrested, appeased, and transformed, and thus
our spiritual life may be purified. In these cases, all our ways of life
must be quiet and static, at least in appearance. .
Secondly, the Neo-Confucians were more metaphysical and
religious than the earlier Confucians, and consequently they usually
had a sense of life, both moral and super-moral. The ideas of
Heaven, God, the Reason of Heaven, and the Mind of Heaven, as
mentioned before, were always discussed by them. They always
talked of man from the point of view of Heaven and had a belief
in the eternal Tao. These were somewhat similar to Taoist thought.
Ch'eng Hao said that "the achievements of the Sage-Emperors, such
as Yao and Shun, may be like a floating cloud in an infinite void," 18
since the eternal Tao of the universe has no addition by "the
achievements of Yao or Shun, the Sage-Emperors," nor is there any
loss by all the evils done' by Chieh or Chou, the worst kings. When
a pupil of Lu Chiu-yuan regretted that Chu Hsi (an opponent of
his master) did not know the Tao rightly, Lu reproached his pupil
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and regretted that he had made no improvement, and said, "The
Tao shall neither be added nor subtracted whether there are Lu
Hsiang-shan (Lu Chiu-yuan) and Chu Yuan-hui (another name of
Chu Hsi)." 19 All these sayings took the standpoint of Heaven and
originated from a metaphysical and religious faith in the eternal
existence of Tao, or a spiritual mood which is, at least in a sense,
beyond the distinction of the good and evil of conduct and the right
and wrong ideas of man. In the philosophy of Wang Shou-jen,
liang-chih (conscience) is sometimes said to be beyond good and
evil. This is based upon the fact that, in the practice of liang-chih,
when evil is wholly undone, no evil is left, and, when good is done,
no good is left. So, in the practice of liang-chih we can pass beyond
good and evil, and the nature of liang-chih is neither good nor evil,
and this is called the chief good of liang-chih. Here we nnd Wang's
view to be moral thought combined with the super-moral idea, and
this may be said to be a combination of the moral ideas of earlier
Confucians and the super-moral ideas of the Buddhists and Taoists.
However, the Tao and the liang-chih of the Neo-Confucians
are still essentially moral concepts. "To see man from the point of
view of Heaven" is itself a phase of moral life, according to the
Neo-Confucians. When Wang Shou-jen said that "liang-chih is
neither good nor evil, and this is called the chief good," it is still
beyond mere evil and ordinary good, but never beyond the chief
good. So, the super-moral ideas of the Neo-Confucians should be
taken as the expressions of their highest moral experience, though,
in the profundity and depth of this moral experience, they may
exceed all the earlier Confucians in certain respects.
VII. Spiritual, Sooial, and Natural Values
During the Past Three Centuries
In the development of Chinese thought there has been a great
change since the end of the Ming Dynasty. During this period,
generally speaking, the trends of thought have moved from depth
of thought to extent of thought, from inward reflection to compre-
hensive understanding, from meditation on the spiritual and moral
life to a consideration of natural and social life, and from the gain-
ing of material for thought from personal experience to the gaining
of material for thought from historical documents and relics. At the
end of the Ming Dynasty, great scholars, such as Wang Fu-chih
(1619-16g2), Ku Yen-wu (1613-1682), and Huang Tsung-hsi
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(1610-1695), even though they were erudite and usually based
their ideas upon documentary evidence, all held a lofty idea of
culture and had high personal characters, to which their knowledge
was subordinated, and the spiritual and moral values of all social,
political, and cultural life was expounded by them. From the school
of Yen Yuan and Li Kung (1659-1733), a new current of thought
began to Hourish which laid more emphasis on the social utilitarian
values. Even the values of music and of the moral virtues were con-
sidered by them according to a utilitarian standard. From the
middle of the Ch'ing Dynasty, in the thought of Tai Chen and
Chiao Hsun (1768-1820), much attention was paid to the satis-
faction of men's natural feelings and desires. The moral values of
benevolence and social justice were interpreted to be the results of
men's mutual consideration of the satisfaction of natural feelings
and desires. So, the ideas of moral value, social utilitarian value,
and natural values were combined into one homogeneous system.
The most important current of thought late in the Ch'ing Dynasty
was the thought of the Kung-yang school, which gradually laid
more emphasis on the political and economic problems of the time
(and found its justification in the Commentaries on the Classics).
These currents of thought finally joined with the thoughts of social
construction from the West and resulted in the thought of K'ang
Yu-wei (1858-1927). In recent decades, the spirit of searching the
documentary evidence of the scholars of the Ch'ing Dynasty has
become gradually connected with the Western scientific spirit and
transformed into the popular high estimation of all things of
scientific value. The two watchwords of the so-called" new cultural
movement at the beginning of the Republic of China were democ-
racy and science, which were taken to have a very high social
utilitarian value and truth value. Other spiritual values were gen-
erally neglected. When Marxism attracted the minds of the young
generation, a communist party was organized and now has gained
political power on the mainland of China. The communists' sense
of value has further narrowed down to the political and social sphere.
Only the technical value of science has been emphasized by them.
From the above, it is clear that the direction of the develop-
ment of Chinese thought from the end of the Ming Dynasty to
recent years has gradually left the spirit of Neo-Confucianism,
which paid more attention to the spiritual values of human life,
and now pays more attention to the importance of the social,
utilitarian, technical, and natural values of human life. Since the
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nineteenth century, the value-consciousness of Westerners has
gradually concentrated on the social, utilitarian, and technical
sphere and on the values of satisfaction of natural desire. Here is a
meeting of the value-consciousnesses of East and West, which
represents a "Zeitgeist." On its good side, this "Zeitgeist" may be
taken as an extensive development of human value-consciousness
for the preparation of the spiritual ground of the coming age, which
should pay more intensive attention to the importance of spiritual
values. But when and how the various kinds of natural values, social
values, and spiritual values can be integrated into a great harmony
in the new age is a complicated problem which is quite beyond the
sphere of this essay.
QUESTION: You talk about spiritual life in Taoist philosophy,
and you identify the wisdom of Lao Tzu with the wisdom of
Nothing in metaphysics as the theoretical basis for the development
of spiritual life. It seems to me that the Tao of Lao Tzu is a meta-
physical being, the primordial mover of the universe or the God-
head. How can the wisdom of Lao Tzu be identified with the
wisdom of Nothing?
ANSWER: The wisdom of Lao Tzu is not identified simply with
the wisdom of Nothing. I did not use the word "identified." Surely,
the Tao of Lao Tzu may be interpreted as a metaphysical being or
primordial mover of the universe, perhaps something like the God-
head. However, in this paper, I had to stress the Nothingness side
of Lao Tzu's Tao. One reason for this is that the Tao of Lao Tzu as
a metaphysical being is said to be revealed to us through the
transiency of natural things. The transiency of things is explained
as their coming from Nothing and sinking into Nothing. The other
reason is that meditation on Tao as metaphysical must begin with
the thought of worldly things themselves as nothing. "Nothing" is a
mediation between the thought of worldly things and meditation
on Tao. When we want to ascend to Tao, we must transcend
worldly things and encounter Nothing first, and the very tran-
scending is itself a "nothing-ing" activity initiating from the Tao.
This is explicitly stated in Lao Tzu's thought also. When we talk
about Lao Tzu's idea of spiritual value as a higher value transcend-
ing worldly values, as my paper does, the wisdom of Nothing in
Lao Tzu must be stressed.
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Notes
1. Many writers, such as Ch'en Tu-hsiu (1879-1942) in the period of
the New Culture movement at the beginning of the Republic of
China, took the utilitarian point of view to interpret the ethical value
of Confucian teachings, and some missionaries and naturalism-biased
Chinese scholars usually interpret the ethical values of Confucian
teachings as merely natural values in contrast with supernatural or
spiritual values.
2. Cf. my essay, Tsai ching-shen sheng-huo fa-chan chung chih hui-yii
i-shih (A Phenomenological Study of the Consciousness of Praise
and Defamation in the Development of Spiritual Life), len-sheng, X,
NO.1 (1954).
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JOHN C. H. WU Chinese Legal
and Political Philosophy
IT IS IMPOSSIBLE to cover the whole field of Chinese legal
and political philosophy in a short discourse. I shall therefore con-
fine myself to three basic questions: (1) the foundations of political
authority, (2) the relations between law and ethics, and (3) the
ultimate ideal of human society and the historical process of its
realization.
I. Foundations of Political Authority
The sources of all political authority, according to the most
ancient of Chinese documents, The Book of History,! are three:
the Mandate of Heaven, the people's good will, and the ruler's
virtue.
It goes without saying that the Mandate of Heaven is the real
cornerstone. But it is worthy of note that the ancients did not think
of the Mandate as fate. It is something that one must gain and
maintain by constant virtue and effort. The ancients never tired of
teaching that the Mandate of Heaven is not fixed once and for all
in a single family and that it is subject to forfeiture should its in-
cumbent prove unfaithful to the solemn trust.
It is further to be remembered that Heaven manifests its will
in many ways. Natural calamities and other unusual phenomena
were considered grave warnings of God to the reigning monarch.
It is even more clearly revealed in the people's resentment against
the abuses of power, particularly greed and injustice on the part of
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their rulers, and their spontaneous flocking to a newly arisen leader
who knows their sufferings intimately. Besides possessing other
qualities of leadership, this new leader must be unselfish and cap-
able of judging justly the conflicts among his followers. He must
use the faults of the dying dynasty as a mirror in order to cultivate
the virtues that present a clear contrast to them.
In ancient China, revolution was not regarded as a right, but
as a solemn duty that the new leaders of the people owed to
Heaven to rectify the abuses or perversions of its Mandate, and to
relieve the people from intolerable oppressions of the tyrant. As
the great T'ang 2 declared, on starting a revolution, "The ruler of
Hsia [2183-1752 B.C.] has committed innumerable crimes, and it is
the will of Heaven to slay him. . . . As I fear God on high, I dare
not refrain from rectifying the perversion." 3 Even after T'ang had
succeeded in overthrowing the Hsia Dynasty, a spokesman of the
new dynasty, fearing lest T'ang's action might be misunderstood
by later generations and even cited as a justification for ordinary
rebellions, explained its underlying philosophy in clear and em-
phatic terms: "It is always necessary to remember the beginnings
in order to secure a happy end. By protecting the law-abiding
people and overthrowing the lawless oppressor, by carefully ob-
serving the dictates of the Natural Law, the Mandate of Heaven
will be perpetually kept intact. 4 The expeditionary forces of T'ang
are said to have been welcomed by the people of the whole country,
to such an extent that their only complaint was that he did not
arrive earlier. In the graphic words of Mencius (371-28g? B.C.),
"The people were hoping for his coming as they would hope to see
the cloud in a time of great drought." 5
The Shang Dynasty (1751-1112 B.C.) lasted six centuries. In the
twelfth century B.C., another revolution was necessary. In the Grand
Oath of King ~u 6 (reigned 1121-1116 B.C.), he pointed out to the
people that King Chou (reigned 1175-1121 B.C.) of Shang was even
worse than King Chieh (reigned 1801-1752 B.C.) of Hsia. Just as
the crimes of Chieh had moved Heaven to direct the great T'ang
to deprive the Hsia of its Mandate, so it now fell upon King Wu
to execute the sentence of Heaven upon Chou. In the same oath
he announced a great principle which has been quoted through
,~ the ages: "Heaven sees as our people see and hears as our people
hear." 7
The Chinese philosophy of political authority may be summed
up in a few words. Political authority is a trust conferred by the
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Mandate of Heaven upon the government for the welfare of the
people. The government is created for the people, not the people
for the government. The whole philosophy finds its best exposition
in the works of Mencius. I have dealt with it at some length else-
where, but here Ccan only introduce a dialogue between Mencius
and King Hsiian of Ch'i 8 (reigned 342-423 B.C.). "Suppose," he
asked the king, "that one of Your Majesty's servants were to entrust
his wife and children to the care of a friend, while he went to the
State of Ch'u for a trip, and that, on his return, he should find that
his friend had caused his wife and children to suffer cold and
hunger. How is such a one to be dealt with?" "He should be cast
off as a friend," the king replied. Mencius proceeded, "Suppose
that the minister of justice could not regulate his officers, how
should he be dealt with?" "Dismiss him," was the ready answer.
Mencius pursued further, "If within the four borders of the kingdom
there is no order and peace, what is to be done?" The king is re-
ported to have "looked to the right and to the left, speaking of
other matters."
The idea that the ruler is a steward of the common good, who
must forget his own interests, including his physical safety, is clearly
brought out by Lao Tzu (604-531 B.C.): "Only he who is willing to
give his body for the sake of the world is fit to be entrusted with
the world. Only he who can do it with love is worthy to be the
steward of the world." 9 He even says, "To receive all the dirt of a
country is to be the lord of its soil-shrines. To bear the calamities
of a country is to be the king of the world." 10
Thus, both Lao Tzu and the Confucians draw upon The Book
of History as a common source of political wisdom. In spite of their
differences on many points, they are in accord on some vital points.
Both are emphatic on the ruler's virtue of humility toward the
people. Take, for instance, the follOWing song recorded in The Book
of History:
The people should be cherished,
And should not be downtrodden.
The people are the root of a country,
And, if the root is firm, the country will be tranquil. ll
This should bring to mind what Lao Tzu says:
Truly, humility is the root from which greatness springs,
And the high must be built upon the low.
That is why the dukes and princes style themselves as
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"The Helpless One," "The Little One," and "The Worthless One."
Perhaps, they, too, realize their dependence upon the humble.12
Even the doctrine of wu-wei (non-assertiveness) seems to have
its seed in the famous song of Kao Yao: 13
When the head is enlightened,
The arms and legs will function smoothly
And the people's well-being ensured.
But if the head is fussy and meddlesome,
The arms and legs will become indolent,
And all affairs fall into decay.14
I need hardly point out that this is in entire consonance with
the spirit of Lao Tzu. But even Confucius (551-479 B.C.) has
praised the wu-wei of Emperor Shun of antiquity: "May not Shun
be said to have governed by non-assertiveness? For what assertion
was there? All that he did was to control himself with great care
and reign reverently with his face toward the south." 15 On another
occasion, he said, "Sublime were Shun and Yii [founders of the
Hsia DynastyJ! They possessed the whole world, but were not
possessed by it." 16 This is Confucius' notion of wu-wei, and it cannot
be very far from what Lao Tzu himself had in mind.
Confucius and Lao Tzu are in agreement in maintaining that
punishment must not be relied upon as a .policy of government, that
the ruler must guard against luxury, against the lust of power,
against giving rein to his arbitrary will, against violence and ex-
treme measures, especially against pride and self-complacency.
Both stress the necessity of self-denial, although there are some
differences in their ideas of self-denial,17
True enough, Confucius thinks of reality in terms of the Will
of Heaven, while Lao Tzu thinks of it in terms of the Way of Heaven
or the Way of Nature. But, for our present purposes, this makes
little or no difference, for in both cases the starting point is a Higher
Law, which should serve as the pattern for all human laws.18 Both
of them would be opposed to the absolutism of the legalists.
A very interesting and significant conversation between Con-
fucius and Duke Ting (reigned 509-495 B.C.) is recorded in The
Analects.19 The Duke asked if there is a single saying by the adop-
tion of which a country could be made to flourish. With his usual
candidness, Confucius replied, "No saying can really be of such
potency as that. However, there is the popular saying, 'It is hard to
be a prince, and not easy to be a minister: Now, if the prince
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realize~ how hard it is to be a prince, is it not a good beginning
toward the fulfillment of the saying?" The Duke again asked, "Is
there a single saying which would ruin a country?" Confucius again
pointed out that there really could not be a saying so potent as that.
"But," he continued, "there is the common saying, 'I see no pleasure
in being a prince except that no one would then dare to disobey
my words.' Well, if one's words are always wise, it would be well
for them to go uncontradicted. But, if they are foolish, and yet
carried out without opposition, would that not be almost an in-
stance of a saying that would ruin the country?"
This conversation, casual as it may appear, reveals some of the
basic tenets of Confucius' political philosophy. In the first place,
what makes it so hard to be a prince is that it is not merely a priv-
ilege but a grave responsibility. To realize the difficulty of the task
is the beginning of political wisdom. As Lao Tzu says, "He who
thinks everything easy will end by finding everything difficult. The
sage alone begins by considering everything difficult and ends by
having no difficulties." 20 Nothing is easier than to indulge one's
self-will, nothing harder than to sacrifice it in favor of justice and
the common good. How carefully the monarch should guard against
his self-will finds a good illustration in what King Ch'eng said to
Chlin-ch'en, whom he had appointed magistrate of Hsia-tu, a colony
for the people of the superseded Yin Dynasty (1384-1112 B.C.).
'When any of the Yin people are under trial for a crime," said the
King, "if I should tell you to convict, do not convict; and, if I should
tell you to release, do not release. Justice is all." 21
In the second place, the responsibility consists in taking care
of the people. All governmental measures and policies must there-
fore be judged in the light of their effects upon the people's well-
being. In answer to a disciple's inquiry as to how to achieve the
proper administration of government, Confucius enumerated five
good things to be pursued and four evils to be avoided.22 The five
good things are: "That the ruler be beneficent without expending
the public revenue, that in exacting service he should take care not
to arouse dissatisfaction, that his designs be free from personal
greed, that he maintain a dignified ease without being proud, and
that where it is necessary to assert his authority he should do it
without violence."
Concerning the four evils to be avoided, he said: "Putting men
to death without first teaching them their duty is cruelty. Expecting
the completion of tasks without giving due warning is called op-
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pression. To be remiss in issuing orders and at the same time de-
mand instant performance is called extreme unreasonableness.
Likewise, to show a grudging spirit in giving payor rewards due to
a man is called playing the petty functionary."
It is because Confucius and his followers had a clear view of
the true foundations of political authority that they never lost sight
of the well-being of the people. They never regarded political
authority as an end, but only as a means to an end. The end is the
development of the human personality and human civilization.
This is why the saying, "I see no pleasure in being a prince except
that no one would then dare to oppose my words," was picked out
by Confucius as indicating the beginning of all troubles in the state,
for this would imply that political authority was taken as an end in
itself, and that the arbitrary will of the ruler rather than reason was
considered as the essence of law. The fact is that it is the first duty
of the prince to mortify his self-will in order to minister to the
actual needs and legitimate desires of the people. In the words
of The Great Learning, "When a prince loves what the people
love, and loathes what the people loathe, then he truly deserves
to be called the parent of the people." 23 The Confucians cherish
profound respect for the people, who, with few exceptions, can
be assumed to be good, honest commoners. For, as The Book of
Odes has it:
Heaven gives birth to the teeming people,
Affixing a law to every relationship of man.
Being endowed with a constant norm,
They have a natural love for the beauty of virtue.24
Lao Tzu and Mo Tzu (H. 479-438 B.C.), each in his own way,
shared with the Confucians the same respect for the common peo-
ple and the Way of Heaven or the Law of Nature.25 Lao Tzu, for
instance, says that the sage has no preconceived intentions, for he
takes the heart of the common people for his own heart.26 Further,
he says, "The Way of Heaven is to diminish the superabundant and
to supply the needy, while the way of man is to take from the
needy to swell the superabundant."27 Thus, a Higher Law than the
positive laws of the state is recognized. The same is true of Mo Tzu,
who wrote: "The emperor may not make the standard at will.
There is Heaven to give him the standard. The gentlemen of the
world all understand that the emperor gives the standard to the
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world but do not understand that Heaven gives the standard to
the emperor." 28
On the whole, it may be said that Chinese legal and political
philosophy has the same starting point as that of Bracton, the
Father of the Common Law, who wrote that the king is "under
God and the law, for it is the law that makes the king," 29 and that
only the power to do good is derived from God, while the power
to do evil is from the devil and not from God. "So long, therefore,
as the king administers justice, he is the vicar of the Eternal King,
but he would be a servant of the devil if he turned aside to do
injustice." 30
II. Law and Ethics
The outstanding characteristic of the legal system of old China
is that it is a system of duties rather than rights. Logically speak-
ing, rights and duties are correlatives. If I have a duty, then the
one to whom lowe the duty necessarily has the right to demand
my performance of the duty. Similarly, if I have a right, then some-
body else must owe me a duty corresponding to my right. Thus,
rights and duties are inseparable. But here, as elsewhere in the
field of moral sciences, emphasis makes the song; and there can be
no question that in the Chinese legal system the emphasis is mark-
edly on duties, so much so that the notion of rights was not as fully
developed as in the Common Law and Roman Law. The emphasis
being on duties, the law has never been freed from its dependence
on morality. This forms a contrast to the legal systems of the West
in modern times, especially in the heyday of individualism, when
the emphasis was decidedly on rights rather than duties, with the
result that the science of law tended to be divorced from ethics,
and in a number of cases the decision became shocking to the
moral sense of man. For the past seventy or eighty years Western
jurisprudence has been moving steadily away from the amoral
philosophy of law toward a healthy recognition of the social and
ethical duties of man. During the same period, the legal thought
of China, influenced as it was by its contact with the West in the
nineteenth century, experienced at first a violent reaction against
the old emphasis on duties, and moved toward a new emphasis
on rights. This new vital tendency to vVesternization, however, has
been moderated by the ironic fact that the West is no longer so
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'Western" as when the tendency first started. The East wanted to
go the whole way in order to meet the West, but the West, without
intending it, has met the East halfway. So far as legal thought is
concerned, the East and the West have met in the zone of a happy
medium.
But it is of more than historical interest to inquire how the
relation between law and morality came to take the form it did in
the old legal system of China after the days of the Han (206 B.C.-
A.D. 220). In no other system has there been such a complete
identification of law and morality. Whatever is immoral is a penal
offense.3 ! The underlying philosophy is that morality and law con-
stitute the positive and negative phases of government.
This position was the end-product of a long evolution of ethical
and legal philosophy before the Han period. Confucius and his
followers advocated as principal methods of government the prac-
tice of virtue on the part of the ruler and the inculcation of good
manners among the people. For Confucius, to rule is to rectify, and
to rectify others presupposes rectitude in oneself.32 If a ruler does
not possess rectitude, he is not worthy of the name, nor can he ever
hope to rectify his people, for the simple reason that you cannot
impart something to others which you do not have in yourself. On
the other hand, if the ruler cultivates the virtues and perfects his
own person, the influence of his goodness will permeate the whole
population. Once a corrupt officer of Confucius' own state came to
ask him how to reduce the prevalence of thieves and robbers.
Confucius' answer was: "If you, sir, are not covetous, the people
would not steal, even if you should reward them for it." 33
To Confucians, ethics and government are practically one and
the same thing. If you cultivate your virtues so that harmony reigns
in your own person, your goodness will radiate its influence around
the fireside so that harmony will reign in the family. If one family
is perfectly harn;lOnious, it will gradually but surely influence other
families. If all families are perfected, the state will enjoy peace
and harmony. If all states are what they should be, they will be in
peaceful relations with one another, and all under Heaven will
enjoy universal peace and harmony.
No two schools of thought could be more completely anti-
thetical to each other than the Confucians and the Legalists. Con-
fucius says, "If you lead the people by political measures and
regulate them by penal laws, they will merely avoid transgressing
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them but will have no sense of honor. If you lead them by the
practice of virtue and regulate them by the inculcation of good
manners, they will not only keep their sense of honor but will also
be thoroughly transformed." 34 But Shang Yang (d. 338 B.C.) says,
"If you govern by penal laws, the people will fear; being fearful,
they will commit no villainies; there being no villainies, they will
find peace and happiness. If, on the other hand, you govern by
mere righteousness, they will be lax; and, if they are lax, there will
be disorder and the people will suffer great miseries." 35
Confucians maintain that good government depends upon the
employment of good and capable men. But Shang Yang says, "It is
the part of good government to set no store by the virtuous and
the wise." 36
Mencius says, "People tend to goodness as water tends down-
ward." 37 But Shang Yang says, "People tend to self-interest, as
water tends downward." 38
Confucius was opposed to the promulgation of penal laws
with a fixed and clear-cut tariff of penalties.39 But Han Fei Tzu
(d. 233 B.C.) says: "If a textbook is too summary, pupils will resort
to ingenious interpretations. If a law is too general, litigations will
multiply. Just as a wise man, when he writes a book, will set forth
his arguments fully and clearly, so an enlightened ruler, when he
makes his laws, will see to it that every contingency is provided
for in detail." 40
Confucians look to the ancient Sage-Emperors for models of
rulership. But Shang Yang says, "Former generations did not follow
the same doctrines, so which antiquity should we imitate? The
emperors and kings did not copy one another, so what moral sys-
tem can one follow?" 41
Confucians lay greatest emphasis on the study of the Odes
and the History and on the practice of moral virtues. These are all
found in Shang Yang's list of "Pests," which includes "ceremony
and music, Odes and History, care for old age, the cultivation of
goodness, filial piety and fraternal affection, sincerity and good
faith, purity and integrity, humanity and justice." 42
Confucians have unbounded faith in the persuasive power of
moral teachings and example. But Han Fei Tzu says:
Now take the case of a boy of bad character. His parents are angry
with him, but he never changes. The villagers in the neighborhood
reprove him, but he is not moved. His masters teach him, but he never
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reforms. . . . It is not until the district magistrate sends out police forces
to search for wicked men in accordance with the law of the state that he
becomes afraid and changes his ways and alters his deeds. So the love of
parents is not sufficient to educate children. It takes the severe penalties
of the district magistrate to accomplish what love cannot. This is because
people are naturally spoiled by love and are obedient to authority.43
In deciding cases, Confucians would apply the spirit of the
law, while the Legalists would adhere strictly to the letter. Han
Fei Tzu relates approvingly an anecdote which seems typical of
the Legalist position. "Marquis Chao of Han [reigned 509-495
B.C.] was drunk and fell into a nap. The crown-keeper, seeing the
ruler exposed to cold, put a coat over him. When the Marquis
awoke, he felt pleased. Afterward, however, he inquired of the
attendants, 'Who put the coat on me?' 'The crown-keeper,' they
answered. Thereupon the Marquis found both the coat-keeper
and the crown-keeper guilty; the coat-keeper, because he neglected
his duty, the crown-keeper, because he exceeded his office." Han
Fei Tzu's comment on the case is interesting: "This was not because
the Marquis did not mind catching cold, but because he con-
sidered trespassing upon the duties of another's, office a more seri-
ous evil than his catching cold." 44 Confucians would have
condemned this decision as repugnant to the natural dictates of
the human heart. In fact, Confucius had said, "If morals and music
are not promoted, penal laws will miss the just medium, and . . .
the people will not know where to put their hands and feet." 45
The Marquis' decision is a good illustration of this point.
Confucians consider the family as the foundation of society.
An unfilial son cannot be expected to become a loyal citizen. For
the state to destroy the family is, therefore, suicidal, for it would
be undermining its own foundations. That is why Confucius disap-
proved of the "straightforwardness" or uprightness of that son who
stood forth to bear testimony to his father's theft of a sheep.46 For
him, true justice demands that the father and the son should shield
each other's guilt. This philosophy is too much for the Legalists.
Han Fei Tzu says:
In the State of Ch'u there was a certain upright man who, when his
father had stolen a sheep, reported him to the law officer. The authorities
said, "The son should be put to death." The reason was that, although the
son was upright toward the prince. he was crooked toward the father,
and therefore he should be charged with the father's guilt. Thus a
dutiful subject of the prince becomes an unfilial son of his father.47
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Confucians place the virtues of humanity and justice above all
considerations of utility. Legalists base their whole system upon
the "calculating minds" of the average people,48 who would weigh
in a sensible manner the pains and pleasures involved in the choice
of a course of action and see the overwhelming advantage of
Goeying the laws. They would not expect even the ruler to be
above average in virtue and in intelligence. An average ruler who
is willing to let the law rule will accomplish more than a specially
gifted ruler trying to do without specinc rules of law.
All these antinomies may be reduced to a single issue, namely,
whether the business of government depends upon good men or
upon effective laws. The Confucian Hsiin Tzu (H. 298-238 B.C.)
goes to the extent of saying that only the right men, not the right
laws, can produce and maintain a good government.49 Mencius is
much more moderate. He says, "Goodness alone is not capable of
governing; laws alone do not enforce themselves." 50 For him, there-
fore, it takes both the right kind of men and the right kind of laws
to produce the right kind of government. His views are similar to
those of William Penn, who, in his preface to The Great Law,
writes, "Though good laws do well, good men do better; for good
laws may want good men and be abolished or evaded by ill men;
but good men will never want good laws nor suffer ill ones."
Legalists, on the other hand, maintain that any government that
depends ill any way upon the existence of good men cannot be a
good government, for the simple reason that it would be precarious,
seeing that the existence of good men is a contingency and not a
certainty. What they wished to produce was a system of laws built
solidly upon the psychology of average rulers and average people,
a system under which it would not pay anybody high or low to
set the laws at denance. They had such a narrow and mean con-
ception of human nature that they thought that in order to produce
an effective system of law only two motives needed to be reckoned
with, namely, fear and pront. They ignored the facts that even
terrorism and the inducement of reward have their limits, and that
when men are dehumanized nobody is safe and secure. It is no
accident that all the leading Legalists, Shang Yang, Han Fei, and
Li Ssu (d. 208 B.C.) ended their lives tragically. It is to their credit
that they saw the necessity of the Reign of Law; but they did a
great disservice to the Reign of Law by conceiving it too narrowly
and by attempting to build it upon force alone, and not upon
justice, good faith, and the natural dictates of humanity. It was
--
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from Hsiin Tzu that Han Fei and Li Ssu learned that human
nature is evil. But Hsiin Tzu's idea was that, since men are by
nature evil, they should be made good by moral discipline. His
Legalist pupils drew different conclusions from the same premise.
They held that, since men are by nature evil, they should be
taken for what they are and dealt with on that basis. They could
see only two sanctions for law, force and profit, force to deter and
profit to induce.
Hsiin Tzu is at least partIy responsible for the blunders of his
disciples. In advocating the evil of ·human nature, he actually dug
the grave for Confucian humanism and paved the way for the
Legalist uprooting of humanity. He tried to demolish the doctrines
of Mencius without understanding them. When Mencius said that
human nature is good, he meant the essential nature of man is
good, that nature which distinguishes man from the other animals.
Hsiin Tzu, on the other hand, was looking at men as they actually
are. But, even then, he should have noted certain good qualities
and tendencies along with the evil ones. In saying that men are
by nature evil, and that all the good comes only from the teachings
of the sages, he actually makes the sages rise above humanity, so
that they become superhuman beings. Of all the Confucians,
Hsiin Tzu is the most superficial, but his influence was great upon
the Legalists.
If the Legalists had been more moderate and less intolerant
of other schools of thought, they would have succeeded in estab-
lishing a stable Rule of Law, comparable to what the Common
Law countries have achieved. As it is, they ruined their cause by
wedding the Rule of Law to a radically positivistic and materialistic
point of view, and by identifying the concept of law exclusively
with the positive statutes of the State. Their exclusion of the Nat-
ural Law element from the conception of law led to the Han
scholars' exaggerated claims for Natural Law.51
Taking the tragic failure of the Legalists as a warning, the
Han rulers and scholars worked out a penal system in which
the polarity of law and morality is embodied, with morality as the
positive element and law as the negative element. The result was
a legalization of morality. They adopted from Confucianism the
substance of moral duties, and at the same time adopted from the
Legalists the procedure of enforcing them. The Emperor became
the Pope and the Monarch combined in one person. If we can
imagine a Church with police forces to enforce its precepts and to
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punish infractions, we can approximate the actual system under
which the Chinese people lived for almost two thousand years,
until it collapsed in the Revolution of 1911.52
But the Revolution was not entirely unprepared for by the
revival of the philosophy of Mencius and of some later Confucians
such as Huan:'\ Tsung-hsi (161O-16g5), whose political treatise,
Ming-i tai-fang'lu,52a seems to sum up all that is best in the tradi-
tional political thought of China. It contains, among other things,
essays on the Prince, on Ministership, and on Law. The essay on
law is particularly valuable as a contribution to Chinese legal phi-
losophy. It starts with a bold statement: "Until the end of the
Three Dynasties [Hsia, Shang, and Chou, 2183-256 B.C.] there was
law. Since the Three Dynasties there has been no law." The reason
for this astonishing statement is that the Sage-Emperors of old made
the laws entirely with the common good in mind; while the later
kings made their laws mainly for preserving the Throne. The whole
essay is worth serious study, but here I must content myself with
one passage:
The law of the Three Dynasties safeguarded the world for the
people. The prince did not monopolize all the wealth of the land nor did
he jealously keep the right to punish and reward out of the people's
hands. Position at court was not particularly considered an honor; to live
an obscure life in the country was not particularly a disgrace. Later, this
kind of law was criticized for its looseness, but at that time the people
were not envious of those in high place, nor did they despise humble
status. The looser the law was, the fewer the disturbances which arose. It
was what we might call "Law without laws." The laws· of later times
safeguard the world as if it were something in the [prince's] treasure
chest. It is not desired that anything beneficial should be left to the lowly,
but, rather, that all bleSSings be reserved for the one on high. If the
prince employs a man, he is immediately afraid that the man will act in
his own interest, and so another man is employed to keep a check on the
first one. If one measure is adopted, there are immediate fears of its
being abused or evaded, and so another measure must be adopted to
guard against abuses or evasions. All men know where the treasure chest
lies, and the prince is constantly fretting and fidgeting out of anxiety for
the security of the treasure. Consequently, the laws have to be made
more comprehensive and detailed, and, as they become more detailed,
they become the very source of disorder. These are what we might call
"unlawful laws." 53
I should like to point out that, although Huang Tsung-hsi was
a Confucian, his was a Confucianism which had been "baptized"
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by the spirit of Taoism, with its emphasis on the cultivation of
non-attachment and selflessness. If the Han scholars had wedded
their Confucianism to Taoism, instead of placing it in the frame-
work of the Yin-Yang philosophy and concentrating their efforts on
the institution of court ceremonies, if they had seen eye-to-eye
with Ssu-ma T'an (d. no B.C.) in his appraisal of the relative
merits of the schools, both ethics and jurisprudence would have
found a freer course of development in later generations.54 As it is,
law and morality have been identified with the yin and yang
phases of one and the same process of government, and neither
of them has been able to transcend the haH-mythical and haH-
human cosmogony. By moralizing the external universe, this cos-
mogony has irrationalized the interior world of the spirit. Instead
of achieving a true synthesis of the two by transcending both,
what the Han and later Confucians have left us is a promiscuous
blending of man and Nature. Nature is the macrocosm, while man
is the microcosm, and so is everything human. Running through
all is the polarity of yin and yang. This philosophy underlies the
typically Chinese view of the relation between law and morals,
as articulated in a commentary on the Code of T'ang (T'ang-lii
shu-i): "Virtue and morals are the foundation of government and
education, while laws and punishments are the operative agencies
of government and education. Both the former and the latter are
necessary complements to each other, just as it takes morning and
evening to form a whole day, and spring and autumn to form a
whole year." 55
III. Harmony As the Goal of Human Society
I do not believe, with the German jurists of the historical
school, that each nation has a soul of its own called the "Volks-
seele." But I do believe that every nation has a way of living and
thinking which is more or less peculiar to it, constituting, as it were,
its distinctive spirit. This spirit permeates all the main channels of
its activities, such as law, politics, social economy, literature, social
etiquette, and even athletics. For instance, the American way of
life is marked by the spirit of democracy and fair play. The spirit
may not be fully realized in actual practice, but that makes no
difference, so long as it is persistently there, ready to assert itseH
whenever it can and to the extent it can. The sense of fair play is
--
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the spirit of America. It says, "Every dog has his day, and every
man his say."
China, too, has her spirit, formed long before the days of
Confucius. The most deep-rooted desire of the Chinese people is
for harmony. Whether they are speaking of self-cultivation or deal-
ing with the affairs of the world, harmony is the keynote of all
their thinking. In the practice of virtue, they aim at the harmony
of body and soul. In the family, they aim at the harmony of
husband and wife and of the brothers and sisters. In the village,
they aim at the harmony of neighbors. Even the Golden Rule of
Confucius and his principle of reciprocity are little more than an
expression of the spirit of harmony. When Confucius says that in a
country what is really to be worried about is not the scarcity of
goods but the lack of proportion in their distribution, he is aiming
at socio-economic harmony. When he says that in hearing litigations
he is no better than other people, but that the important thing is
to cause litigations to cease, it is very plain that he prefers social
harmony, which would prevent any conflicts of interest from aris-
ing, to a just resolution of actual conflicts. The Book of Changes
contains a hexagram called "Sung," 56 meaning litigation, contention,
and controversy. The explanation is significant: "Sung intimates
that, although there is sincerity and justice in one's contention, he
will yet meet with opposition and frustration. If he cherish an
apprehensive caution, the outcome will be auspicious; but, if he
prosecutes the ligitation to the end, there will be evil." In sum-
marizing the comments of Confucian scholars on this hexagram,
Richard Wilhelm writes, "If a man is entangled in 'a conflict, his
only salvation lies in being so clear-headed and inwardly strong
that he is always ready to come to terms by meeting the opponent
halfway. To carry the conflict to the bitter end has evil effects .even
when one is in the right, because the enmity is then perpetuated." 57
This represents the typical Chinese attitude toward lawsuits. How
different in spirit from Rudolf von Jhering's fiery doctrine of the
struggle for law and his advice: "Bring suit, cost what it may!" 58
For better or for worse, the fact is that practically all the
Chinese sages are more or less of the mind of Lao Tzu, who says,
"The man of virtue attends to his duties; while a man of no virtue
attends to his rights." 59 Real strength of character reveals itself in
self-conquest, not in the conquering of another.
In the earliest extant literature of China, we note the Chinese
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predilection for peace and harmony. I need only to quote the
beginning paragraph of The Book of History, giving a characteriza-
tion of Emperor Yao of antiquity in these terms: "He was reverent,
enlightened, refined, and mild. He was most courteous and capable
of yielding. . . . By spreading the splendor of his noble virtues,
he made affectionate the nine branches of the family. When har-
mony reigned among the nine branches of the family, he adjusted
peacefully the relations of the hundred families. When the hundred
families were well regulated, the myriad states were harmonized,
and universal order and concord prevailed among all the people." 60
This may have been a myth, but a myth is a very real thing in
the life of a nation. It reveals basic evaluations.
It is indeed remarkable that in the very first cabinet recorded
in Chinese history there was included a Minister of Music, K'uei,
whom Emperor Shun charged with the duty of teaching music
to the eldest sons of the leading families so as to make them
"upright and yet mild, big-hearted and yet circumspect, strong
without being violent, simple and free in manners without being
arrogant." 61
In other words, the emperor wished the musical master to
infuse into the hearts of future leaders the spirit of harmony.
But, although the idea of harmony is richer than the idea of
justice, it nevertheless includes justice. At any rate, lack of justice
bespeaks lack of harmony. In fact, injustice was considered the
surest way of breaking the harmony of the universe and thereby
calling down calamities from Heaven. For instance, a poet com-
plained of the injustice of King Yu (reigned 781-771 B.C.) of Chou
(1111-256 B.C.) as follows:
Lands owned by your people
You have occupied by force.
Men that belong to the lords
You have robbed from their hands.
This one should be declared innocent,
Yet you have put him in fail.
That one should be found guilty,
Yet you have shown favors to him.62
This is one form of injustice that disturbs the harmony of the
universe. Another form consists in the lack of proportion in the
distribution of burdens and benefits among the people, as is graph-
ically described in the following verses:
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Some people live comfortably at home:
Others wear themselves out in public service.
Some lie supinely in bed:
Others are always on the move.
Some never hear a clamorous sound:
Others are never· relieved of toil and moil.
Some en;oy the pleasures of leisure:
Others chafe under the load of the king's business.
Some feast and drink in carefree ;oy:
Others live in constant dread of blame.
Some do nothing but talk and find fault:
Others are doomed to do all things.63
Occasionally, a poet would sing the praise of a just man:
Among the people goes the saying:
"Eat the soft, throw out the hard."
It is not so with the Venerable Chung-shan,
Who eats not the soft nor spares the hard.
For he had no fear of the powerful great;
Nor lorded it over the lonely and poor.64
The Chinese think of justice and harmony dynamically. The
empty is to be filled, and the full is to be diminished. The low
is to be exalted, while the high is to be leveled down. In the words
of Lao Tzu, "To be great is to go far, and to go far is to return." 65
Many modern thinkers of China are returning to the ancient ideal
of the Grand Harmony, as presented in The Book .of Rites:
When the Great Way prevailed in the world, all mankind worked
for the common good. Men of virtue and ability were elected to fill public
offices. Good faith was universally observed and friendly relations
cultivated. People's love was not confined to their own parents and their
Own children, so that all the aged ones were enabled to live out the
natural span of their lives, all the young ones were brought up in the
proper way, all the widows and widowers, the orphans and childless
persons, the crippled and the sick, were well taken care of. Each man had
a definite work to do, and each woman a home of her own. The people
were loath to let the natural resources lie undeveloped in the earth; but
they did not desire to hoard riches in their own houses. They were
ashamed to be idle; but they did not labor for their own profit. In this
way, the source of all greed was stopped up, and there was no occasion
for the rise of theft and banditry, nor was there any need to lock the
outer door of one's house. This is called the Age of Grand Harmony.66
---
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Neither Confucius nor Mencius was an impractical visionary.
They realized very well that, although cultural and spiritual life
is of infinitely greater value than physical life, yet the latter must
first be taken care of before the people could be expected to devote
time and energy to self-cultivation. Confucius once entered a popu-
lous city, and uttered a spontaneous exclamation, "Oh, what a
populationI" A disciple asked him, "Given a multitude of people,
what next?" He said, "Enrich them!" "After enriching them, what
next?" He said, "Teach them!" 67 This, roughly, represents his
program.
Mencius is even more explicit and emphatic on the impor-
tance of securing for all the people a regular livelihood. He pointed
out that only scholars will be able to adhere unswervingly to the
path of virtue even in the absence of economic security. As for
the rank and file of the people, their hearts cannot be fixed on
goodness as long as their livelihood is not secure. Therefore he
proceeds to say,
. . . an intelligent ruler will regulate the livelihood of the people, so as to
make sure that, above, they shall have sufficient wherewithal to serve
their parents, and, below, sufficient wherewithal to support their wives
and children; that in good years they shall always be abundantly
satisfied, and that in bad years they shall not be in danger of perishing.
After this, he may urge them, and they will proceed to what is good, for
in this case the people will follow after that with readiness.68
It is only upon this condition that the Confucians set forth
their truly thoroughgoing program of the moral reformation of the
world with one's own moral transformation as the starting point.
Let me quote the opening passage of The Great Learning, which
seems to me to belong to the perennial philosophy and to contain
a message for the modern world:
The goal of Great Learning consists in the elucidation of Bright
Virtue, in renewing the spirit of the people, and in resting in the
Supreme Goodness. When a man knows where to rest, his heart is fixed;
when the heart is fixed he can really be quiet; when he is quiet, he can
enjoy peace; when he enjoys peace he can think for himself; when he
thinks for himself he can attain true insights. Things have their root and
their branches. Affairs have their end and their beginning. To know what
is first and what follows after is to be near to the attainment of Truth.
The ancients who wished to spread the knowledge of Bright Virtue
to the world, first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well
their own states, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate
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their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their
persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts,
they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in
their thoughts, they sought after true knowledge. The attainment of
knowledge depends upon the investigation of the nature of things and
relationships.69
To put it the other way around, the investigation of the nature
of things and relationships leads to true knowledge, which leads to
sincerity in thought, which leads to purity of heart, which prepares
for the perfection of the whole person, which conduces to an
orderly family, which helps to make a well-governed state, which
contributes toward the peace of the entire world. In fact, the
whole process is a continuous harmonious movement from the
innermost harmony to the outermost harmony. For the investigation
of things and knowledge represent the harmony of subject and
object; sincerity in thought and purity of heart represent the har-
mony of intellect and will; personal perfection represents the har-
mony of body and soul; while the orderly family, the well-governed
state, and the peaceful world form a progressive series of concentric
expansions of transpersonal harmony.
Although in ancient China the "world" designated no more
than the whole of the then-known empire, this does not prevent
modern Chinese thinkers from extending their mental horizons
pari passu with the growth of the actual horizons of the world.
Thus, Chinese ideology envisages an open society rather than a
closed one. Nor does it consider the authority of the state in terms
of absolute sovereignty. The family and the state are but stations,
albeit necessary stations, to a harmonious world. When the head
of the Chinese delegation to the United Nations Conference in
San Francisco said, "If there is any message that my country . . .
wishes to give to this Conference, it is that we are prepared . . . to
yield if necessary a part of our sovereignty to the new international
organization in the interest of collective security," he was but voic-
ing the traditional spirit of China, the idea of universal harmony.
The Chinese idea of harmony comprehends not only unity but
utmost diversity. It is something cosmic. Let me borrow a magnifi-
cent description of it from Chuang Tzu (399-29S? B.C.). "The
breath of the universe is called wind. At times, it is inactive. But,
when active, every aperture resounds to the blast. . . . Caves and
dells of hill and forest, hollows in huge trees of many a span in
girth; these are like nostrils, like mouths, like ears, like beam-
--
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sockets, like goblets, like mortars, like ditches, like bogs. And the
wind goes rushing through them, sniffing, snoring, singing, sough-
ing, puffing, purling, whistling, whirring, now shrilly treble, now
deeply bass, now soft, now loud, until, with a lull, silence reigns
supreme. . . . The effect of the wind upon these various apertures
is not uniform. But what is it that gives to each the individuality, to
all the potentiality, of sound? Great knowledge embraces the
whole: small knowledge, a part only. Great speech is universal:
small speech is particular." 70
The interesting point is that it is precisely thanks to the utmost
oneness and impartial universality of the breath of the universe
that all the diversities of sound are given the fullest expression. It
is only when a particular part in the human world claims to be the
universal whole that disharmony appears on the scene of history,
disfiguring even the cosmic harmony. But cosmic harmony cannot
be disturbed for long without avenging itself by disharmonizing
the disharmony, until the original harmony is restored.
Chinese historians conceive of the process of history as consist-
ing in an unending series of cycles of ups and downs. They take
the moon as a symbol of human affairs with its unceasing succes-
sions of waxing and waning. The sages have drawn from this
Weltanschauung some wisdom of life peculiarly Chinese. We are
not to be elated when the winds are with us, nor are we to despair
when the winds are against us. But we are tempted to fold our arms
and hide our heads during the stormy days, in the confidence that
by virtue of the cosmic dialectic the storm will soon blow over.
Fatalism is our besetting sin.
I cannot help thinking that the Chinese conception of har-
mony is not entirely adequate. We are inclined to think of it too
exclusively in terms of concord or a succession of concords. When-
ever there is a discord, our harmony is disrupted. In other words,
we seldom if ever think of a discord as an opportunity for rising to
a new concord. The West is more adept in the art of resolution of
discord, thus continuing the harmony through the discordant inter-
val. When confronted with such a discordant interval, the Chinese
too often feel utterly at a loss as to what to do except to wait
patiently for the turning of the tide, and, when patience is ex-
hausted, to burst out in uncontrollable passion and emotion. We
have much to learn from the West in the way of resolution of
discord. On the other hand, the West should remember that the
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discordant intervals are, after all, not the norm and that we cannot
rest in restlessness.
The present crisis of the world in general and of China in
particular calls for a revival of faith in the super-eminent justice
and humanity of God as against the belief in the stars and the
blind operations of dialectical materialism. No astral destiny or
dialectical process can decide the fate of a nation and of mankind.
In Western history, as Mircea Eliade has pointed out in his Cosmos
and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return, "Christian thought
tended to transcend, once and for all, the old themes of eternal
repetition, just as it had undertaken to transcend all the other
archaic viewpoints by revealing the importance of the religious
experience of faith and that of the value of the human personal-
ity." 71 It is submitted that Confucian humanism, before it had
degenerated into a kind of anthropomorphic cosmogony by being
wedded to the philosophy of Yin-Yang and the mechanical alter-
nation of the Five Elements (metal, wood, water, fire, earth),
comes very near to Christian thought in its rational conception of
the Mandate of Heaven and in its emphasis on the value of the
human person.
In conclusion, I should like to call your attention to one more
contrast between the East and the West. The East generally puts
the Golden Age at the beginning, the West at the end. The East
is Epimethean, while the West is Promethean. It makes little or
no difference whether one looks backward or forward, so long as
one looks far enough, for, ultimately, the alpha and the omega are
absolutely one.
QUESTION: There is some agreement that "mediational law,"
in which cognizance is taken of the unique factors of a situation,
has been paramount in China (through Ch'ing times, 1644-1912).
Such "law" seems to contrast with the law of the Ch'ing written
penal code, in which comparatively less concern is paid to the
unique factors pertaining to the individual's commission of an act
even than in many Western codes. For example, the fact that an
act was accidentally caused is often of small matter in regard to
legal guilt, and there is frequent legal guilt by mere implication.
The fact that there was an act, plus its consequences, seems to be
more the center of focus.
Do you feel that such a contrast (exceeding the normal one
-
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between "mediational law" and determinate written rules) actually
existed? If so, how do you reconcile the two interpretations? Is it
that the written code embodies the strict focus on commission of
the act of the legalist tradition, while the Confucian tradition of
applying the spirit of the law is embodied in "mediational law"?
ANSWER: Strictly speaking, so-called "mediational law" is not
law, but merely a certain attitude on the part of the Confucian
magistrates in the administration of justice, especially in cases in-
volving family relations.
It is not quite true to say that in the old penal system even an
accidental act, that is, an act which is neither intentional nor
negligent, could constitute the basis of criminal responsibility. In
fact, from the earliest classics, it is clear that the greatest emphasis
was laid on the presence of intention as the most essential element
of a crime. Two basic legal maxims stand out prominently in The
Book of History: (1) "An intentional act should be punished, how-
ever small the injury: but an unintended mishap should be ex-
cused, however great the harm." (2) "Better miss the guilty than
slay an innocent person."
In all the penal codes of the different dynasties, the distinctions
between intentional wrong, negligence, and pure accident are
carefully preserved.
Mediation came into play when no grave wrongs were in-
volved and the litigation concerned property rights between mem-
bers of a family or between neighbors. Only in such cases would
a magistrate advise the parties to forget about their rights and
wrongs and to reach an amicable settlement.
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THOME H. FANG The Warld and
the Individual in Chinese Metaphysics *
I
THE TRENDS of Chinese metaphysical thought, taken in its entire
range, may be roughly likened to the bar-lines across the stave.
At regular or irregular intervals, different modes of speculation are
marked out in bars, each running in compound triple time with
beats in varying accentuation. From time immemorial to the mid-
dle of the twelfth century B.C., the metaphysical moods would be
the chords sounded in the triads of myth, religion, and poetry.
Thenceforward, until 246 B.C., for a creative period of more than
nine hundred years, there came to be the articulation of primordial
Taoism, Confucianism, and Moism. This period was followed by a
long epoch (246 B.C.-A.D. 960) of fermentation and absorbent
creation, tending to bring forth eventually a type of highly creative
speculation in Chinese Mahayanic Buddhism. From A.D. 960 down
to the present day, we have had a re-awakening of metaphysical
originality in the form of Neo-Confucianism somewhat imbued
with the spirit of Taoism and Buddhism. In this period of
regeneration, there have come into prominence three trends of
metaphysics: (a) Neo-Confucianism of the realistic type; (b) Neo-
Confucianism of the idealistic type; and (c) Neo-Confucianism of
the naturalistic type.
" In this paper, except in some of the notes, the author's capitalization, in
the large, has been retained, despite some inconsistencies.
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II
Let us now proceed with a discussion of the three major sys-
tems of Chinese metaphysics in successive order.
Two important features may be discerned in the metaphysical
system of Confucianism. The first asserts the creative power of the
heavenly Tao, whereby the dynamic world of all beings comes
into existence; the second emphasizes the intrinsic value of human
nature in congruence with the cosmic order. These two, together,
constitute the architectonic structure of Confucianism from classical
antiquity to the present day. The most important embodiment of
this mode of thought is found in The Book of Change to be sup-
plemented by The Book of Mencius and The Works of Hsiin Tzu,
which, apart from re-enforcing a set of original metaphysical ideas,
elucidate the cardinal doctrine of a philosophical anthropology.1
The Book of Change is a formidable historical document.
There are involved in it (1) a very complicated stratified historical
frame, (2) a complete system of symbolic constructions based
upon strict rules of logic, and (3) a set of interpretations making
out the meanings of these symbolic constructions, expressible in
the systematic syntax of language. All these three are the prelude
to a theory of time conducive to the working out of a set of meta-
physical principles explanatory of the cosmic order.
The revolutionary philosophy of change, initiated by Confu-
cius (551-479 B.C.) himself and, upon the evidences 2 of Ssu-ma
Tan and Ssu-ma Ch'ien further elaborated by Shang Chii (b. 522
B.C.) and others, was a long evolutionary product. Its new features
might be diversified into four different forms: (1) A new philos-
ophy of enlivened Nature permeated with the dynamic confluence
of Life. Nature is power, or vital impetus, creative in advance and
conducive to the fulfillment and consummation of Life capable of
being partaken of by all beings.3 (2) An exposition of intrinsic
moral goodness in human life adorned with beauty. Such a moral-
aesthetic perfection was characteristic of the unique human per-
sonality.4 (3) A general theory of value in the form of the Supreme
Good assimilating into it all the relative ranks of values prevalent
in the entire universe.5 (4) The final formulation of a value-centrit.
ontology asserting the fullness of Being in its entirety.
The archetypal time-man, represented by the Confucians,
deliberately chooses to cast everything-whether it be the life of
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Nature, the development of an individual, the frame of society, the
achievement of value, the attainment to the fullness of Being-into
the mold of time in the order of its authentic existence.
The question is, What is time? 6 The essence of time consists in
change; the order of time proceeds with concatenation; the efficacy
of time abides by durance. The rhythmic process of epochal change
is wheeling round into infinitude and perpetually dovetailing the
old and the new so as to issue into interpenetration which is
continuant duration in creative advance. This is the way in which
time generates itself by its systematic entry into a pervasive unity
which constitutes the rational order of creative creativity. The
dynamic sequence of time, ridding itself of the perished past and
coming by the new into present existence, really gains something
over a loss. So, the change in time is but a step to approaching
eternity, which is perennial durance, whereby, before the bygone
is ended, the forefront of the succeeding has come into presence.
And, therefore, there is here a linkage of being projecting itself
into the prospect of eternity. Hence, in the nexus of the dynamics
of time, "The Book of Change contains the measure of Heaven and
Earth, enabling us to comprehend the all-pervasive Tao and its
order." 7
Based upon the concept of time, three metaphysical principles
may be set out.
(1) The principle of extensive connection: Three essentials
are involved in its formulation. Logically, it is a system of con-
sistent deduction demonstrated rigorously.8 Semantically, it is a
syntax of language in which the rules of formation and transforma-
tion of significant statements indicate unerringly a relation of co-
ordination and a relation of dovetailing and mutual relevance so as
to discriminate what is licit from the illicit and to change the
latter into the former.9 Metaphysically, the philosophy of change
is a system of dynamic ontology based upon the process of contin-
uant creativity in time, as well as a system of general axiology
wherein the origin and development of the idea of the Supreme
Good is shown in the light of comprehensive harmony. Thus, the
principle of extensive connection asserts at the same time that the
confluence of life permeating all beings under Heaven and on Earth
partakes of the creative nature of time and achieves, as a conse-
quence, the form of the Supreme Good.
(2) The principle of creative creativity. Confucius in The
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Book of Change-the philosophical part of it designated as the
chiians-and his followers in The Book of Propriety-including The
Doctrine of the Mean-diversified the all-pervasive Tao 10 into (a)
the Tao of Heaven as the primordial creative power, giving rise
to all creatures, comprehending them in the cosmic order of
dynamic transformation conducive to a perfectly harmonious ful-
fillment, and issuing in the attainment of the Supreme Good; (b)
the Tao of Earth, which, as the power of procreation, is a continu-
ation and extension of the creative origination, sustaining all forms
of existence; and (c) the Tao of man, who, with an assured status
at the center of the universe, in communion with the creative
and procreative power of Heaven and Earth should come to the full
awareness of the Spirit and thereby become co-creative agents in
the perpetual continuance of Life as a whole. With the Confucians,
this spiritual awareness has given rise to a sense of individual
moral excellence, a fellow-feeling of the intrinsic worth of other
forms of existence, as well as a rational insight into the identifiable
unity of the equitable Being of all beings.
(3) The prinCiple of creative life as a process of value-
realization. In the "Hsi tz'u" we find a theory set out by Confucius
that "what is called Tao operates incessantly with the rhythmic
modulation of dynamic change and static repose, thus continuing
the creative process for the attainment of the Good and completing
the creative process for the fulfillment of Nature, which is Life.
. . . It manifests itself in the rational sentiment of humanity, but
conceals its great function unawares, propelling all beings in a
swing of vitality without inciting the anxieties of the ·holy. Its rich-
ness of virtue, its grandeur of enterprise is of all things the most
sublime. Superabundance is what is called the deed-act; forever-
more creativeness is what is called the supreme value. . . . The un-
fathomed mystery underlying the rhythmic modulation of the
dynamic energy and of peaceful repose is what is called the
divine." 11 Elsewhere Confucius said: "Embracing all in its compre-
hensiveness and investing each with its magnificence, it ensures
that anything and everything will enjoy the concordant bliss of
well-being." 12 "Of all values, the Good exhibited in the primordially
creative-procreative is towering in its supremacy. Concordance in
the sport of bliss is the convergence of all that is beautiful. Benedic-
tion in the realm of Life is the pervasiveness of all that is righteous.
Consummation in the deed-act is the fundamentum of the world
of enterprise." 13
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In the light of the above principles, the objective order of the
universe is constituted by the superabundant power of creativity in
the dynamic process of time. The human individual is thus con-
fronted with a creative world. He must be equaIly creative in
order to fit in with it. And, therefore, the Confucian dynamic
value-centric ontology, once completed, evoked a system of philo-
sophical anthropology. It was averred in The Doctrine of the Mean
that the most truthful and sincere man in all the world, after
completely fulfilling his own nature in the course of life, would
extend his boundless sympathy by doing the same with other men,
as well as with all creatures and things. In doing so, he could
participate in the cosmic creation through the process of transfor-
mation and thereupon become a co-creator with Heaven and
Earth. 14
As the natural and moral order of life was initiated by the
creative power of Heaven, so man can cope with the most high
in creative potency. In some such way the Confucians developed
a homocentric conception of the world as a prelude to the value-
centric conception of man. This is why Mencius (372-289 B.C.)
maintained that the spiritual stream of a superior man's life was
concurrent with that of Heaven and Earth. He went further in
asserting that a real man, relying upon his own intrinsic goodness,
could, in virtue of his beautiful endowment, develop himself to the
utmost into a great man. This greatness of character, enhanced by
a subtle touch of spiritual exaltation in the process of transforma-
tion, would make him, first, a sage and, finaIly, a holy man invested
with inscrutable magnificence.15
Not only Mencius. Even Hsiin Tzu (313-238 B.C.), who
started with the empirical observation of the ill nature of man,
ventured to assert that man through a course of perseverent en-
deavor of cultivation could come to achieve greatness. Among the
primordial Confucians, Hsiin Tzu was the only one who seemed
to be "fed up" with the value-centric conception of Heaven. Just
for this reason, he wanted to set up the supremacy of man apart
from unnecessary complication with Nature, which is nothing more
than a neutral order 16 with physical energies in store for human
utilization. According to Mencius, man, by virtue of his inborn
goodness, is spontaneously great. In the opinion of Hsiin Tzu, man's
greatness is cultured in the best sense of the word. AIlowing this
difference between them, man is ultimately great just the same.
What, after all, is the rationale of human greatness? In The
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Book of Propriety 17 compiled by Senior Tai Te, Confucius is re-
ported to have said, in reply to the queries of Duke Ai of Lu, that
there are five types of men in a rational linkage of development.
Among (1) the common run of men, the individual can be edu-
cated to be (2) a learned and enlightened person who, with an
insight of knowledge and with sagacity in action, issuing in the
noble art of life, will become (3) a superior man, adorned with
beauty of character and balance of mind. Through further edifica-
tion he can come to be (4) a man of excellence. His choices and
forsakings are in accord with the high standard of values accept-
able to mankind as a whole. He always tries to act in the right
without sacrificing the least part of the fundamental principles.
His utterance of truth sets a good standard to the world without
the loss of his own integrity. Finally, he becomes (5) a sage, or
holy man. With perfect wisdom at his command, he acts in congru-
ence with the ways of the great Tao, adapting himself to any
circumstance of life in the flux of change without confronting any
crises of danger or encumbrance. This he does because he
thoroughly understands the true nature and disposition of all things.
In virtue of such perfect understanding, all his decisions of value
are made in accordance with the great function of reason. And,
therefore, the achievement of greatness knowingly keeps abreast
of Heaven and Earth in creativity. This development of man from
the natural capacity to the ideal perfection by way of the function
of reason is the Confucian rationale of human greatness. In the
light of this rationale man copes with the most high in potency.
All of this leads to the natural conclusion that the world
and the individual must always be in reciprocal communion.IS In
such communion, the cosmic status of the individual is firmly estab-
lished for the reason that the full capacities constitutive of his
personality are, now, developed to the utmost.
To the Chinese, the Confucian type of man is near and dear,
like an ideal figure who has been cut by his own noble art of life
in a set of expanding spheres representing gradually enlarged and
qualitatively perfected humane relations, and toward whom all
other persons, intimate in spiritual linkage and sympathetic in
moral aspirations, are subtly attracted in such a way that there is
always an interfusion and interplay of exultation in the influence
of exalted personality. This is what makes of the Chinese world
and Chinese society a natural domain of moral democracy inces-
santly leveling up to a higher plane of ethical culture which has
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sustained the Chinese national state ever since Confucianism came
into vogue.
III
But, when we come to a consideration of the Taoists, we are
suddenly transferred to a different world-a visionary dream-
world. The Taoists make the best type of space man. They are
wont to take flights into the realms unfrequented by the common
run of people, in which they uplift us, level after level, each more
exalted and mysterious than the last. From their vantage point at
a height, unafraid, they gaze disinterestedly upon the stratified
world below in which the tragi-comic persons are involved in the
regressive lapse into folly and wisdom, illusion and truth, appear-
ance and reality, all falling short of supreme Perfection, the Truth,
and Reality.
Tao is the supreme category in the system of Lao Tzu (S61?-
467? B.C.). It may be diversified into four cardinal points.
(1) Ontologically, Tao is the infinite ontic substance which
was multifariously characterized by Lao Tzu (a) as the fathomless
unity of all beings, prior in existence even to God; 19 (b) as the
fundamental root of Heaven and Earth, infinite in nature, invisible
in shape, but really great in function because all creatures are
begotten from it; 20 (c) as the primordial One haVing ingression
into all forms of beings; 21 (d) as the unique pattern of all kinds
of activities, discursive but wholesome, twisted around but straight-
forward, emptying out but remaining full, worn out but forever
renovating, eventually comprehensive of all perfection; 22 (e) as the
Great Form, or the receptacular Matrix, wherein all creatures are
embraced, free of harm, and full of peace, like babies held close
to the bosoms of their mother; 23 and (f) as the final destiny
whereto all creatures, after emptying out every kind of "quixotic"
energetic activities in the course of life, will return for the ease and
peace of rest conceived under the form of eternity and achieved
in the spirit of immortality 24-thus, on the score of eternity, con-
sciously discerned, all come to be complaisant, equitable, noble,
natural, and spontaneous, in full accord with the imperishable Tao.
(2) Cosmogenetically, the infinitely great Tao is the all-per-
vasive function with an inexhaustible store of powerful energy
exerting itself in two different ways. On the one hand, being in-
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visibly subsistent up in the transcendental realm of Nothingness
and deeply sheathed back in the noumenal realm of unfathomed
Mystery, it darts itself out and down into the realm of Being. Thus
we can say that in the beginning there was Being, and Being was
with Nothingness.25 Henceforward, the Tao is the primordial be-
getter of all things. On the other hand, the supplied energy, within
the bounds of Being, may be spent and exhausted through disper-
sion and waste. The immanent world of Being, in a state of urgent
want, will resort to the transcendental world of Tao for a fresh
impartation of energy. Hence, Lao Tzu has every reason to lay
emphasis upon "the reversal of procedure in the dynamic transfor-
mation of Tao."
The function of Tao is dyadic in track. Progressively, the
fundamental Nothingness in Tao gives rise to the being of all forms
in the world,26 whereas, regressively, the immanent Being in the
whole world depends upon the Nothingness of the transcendental
Tao for the performance of adequate function. Hence the pro-
nouncement: "The fulfillment of Being leads to eudaemonia,
whereas the attainment to Nothingness fulfills the performance of
function." 27
(3) Phenomenologically, the attributes of Tao can be classi-
fied under two headings, namely, natural attributes and arbitrary
attributes. The natural attributes are discerned as so many proper-
ties inherent in tne Tao conceived under the form of eternity. They
may be enumerated as follows:
1) Integrity of Tao revealing itself as substance in the realm of
Nothingness and as function in the realm of Being;
2) Conformation of non-action in which nothing is left undone;
3) The primordial incentive in the begetting of all things with no
claim of origination;
4) Accomplishment of work on the cosmic scale with detachment;
5) Sustenance of all things without domination;
6) Creation without possession;
7) Energizing activity with no egocentric claim of merit.
On the contrary, the arbitrary attributes are those which are af-
firmed from the subjective viewpoint of men and inappropriately
portrayed in terms of inadequate human language. Apart from
these, the Tao conceived per se is the really real Reality, or, what
is the same thing, the mysteriously mysterious Mystery intelligible
only to men of supreme wisdom like the sage.
(4) Characterologically, the supreme excellences, manifested
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as the natural attributes, originally pertain to the nature of Tao
but will come in ingress into the integrity of the sage, who is really
the exemplar of the Tao in this world. The sage, as an ideal man,
has transcended all limitations and weaknesses by reason of his
exalted spirit and by virtue of his assessment of ever higher worth.
He knows how to gain a world of love and reverence by employing
himself generously for the world. Having lived for the benefit of
other men, he is richer in worth; having given all he has to other
men, he is more plentiful in being. "And, therefore, the sage is
always skillful and whole-hearted in the salvation of men, so that
there is no deserted man; he is always skillful and whole-hearted
in the rescue of things, so that there is no abandoned thing." 28
Thanks to Lao Tzu, we have come to the consciousness that the
essence of each individual man, when realized in full, consists in
an endeavor to attain to the ideal of the sage. Man's mission is
constantly to make a campaign for the realization of this ideal. Thus
the "wages" of winning a sure status in the world is his own
inward sageliness.
Many perplexities in the system of Lao Tzu came to be cleared
away by Chuang Tzu (b. 369 B.C.) in an attempt to push through
the nullifying process far back into mystery after mystery, so that
there would be no final Nothingness in the serial regress. Similarly,
what was posited in the being of Being could be infinitely iterated,
back and forth, thus forming a set of endless bilateral processes of
progression. and retrogression. The original antithesis between
Nothing and Being was theoretically reconciled inasmuch as both
Being and Nothing should merge into the profound mystery in
such a way as to form an interpenetrative system of infinite integral
Reality.29 Finally, Chuang Tzu brought out the chief tenet of Lao
Tzu as positing both the eternal Nothing and the eternal Being
predominated over by the supreme unity, thus affirming the au-
thentic Reality in the form of vacuity, which would not destroy
the reality of all things.30 For the same reason and in the same sort
of way, the discrepancy between eternity and temporality was
dissolved.3!
Chuang Tzu could accomplish so much because, besides being
a great Taoist, he was also much influenced by Confucius and
Mencius,32 as well as by his bosom friend, Hui Shih, from the
logico-analytical camp. In the philosophy of change, Confucius
thought of time as though it had a definite beginning in the past
but an indefinite progression into the future. Chuang Tzu, however,
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accepted the indefinite stretch into the future but denied the
definite origination in the past through the agency of creation. This
is because he knew how, on the basis of "the reversal of procedure"
in the function of Tao, to probe mystery after mystery without
coming to a standstill in the remote past. Thus, time is literally
infinite in respect to the past as well as to the future. Time is a long-
enduring natural process of transformation without any beginning
and ending. Hence, the Confucian assumption of the primordial
power of creation-in fact, all necessity for the cosmic creation-
is theoretically extirpated.
Not only is time infinite in span; space, likewise, is infinite in
scope. Furthermore, with the metaphysical acumen of his poetic
vision, he transformed, by a subtle touch of imagination, the ob-
structive mathematico-physical space into the infinite "painterly"
space as a liberated realm of spiritual exultation whereunto he is
to infuse "the wondrous proceeding of the Tao" in order that his
own exalted "soul" may reach the most sublime for its ultimate
acquirement. In a word, the metaphysics of Chuang Tzu is an
elaboration of the great Tao, projected into the frame of infinite
space and time, into a way of exalted spiritual life.
Such is the metaphysical import implied in the story of "A
Happy Excursion" described in poetico-metaphorical language.
Like the great magic bird, p'eng, Chuang Tzu could lift himself up
into an intellectual solitude unafraid and exulting insofar as the
greatness of his liberated nature would partake of the omnipotent
with the support of the infinite Tao.
The "most fantastic" story of "A Happy Excursion" has been
variously interpreted by different thinkers. The true meaning
should be made out in the light of the philosophy of infinity under
discussion by following up the clues indicated by Chuang Tzu
himself in the context of the relevant chapters.
( 1) It is asserted that the supreme man should lead his own
spirit up to the primordial in its infinite regress, reposing blissfully
in the realm of Nowhere, doing away with all petty knowledge
about lowly things and getting entirely free from the bother of
their burdens.33 (2) At the culmination in the realm of perfect
truth and in abidance by the fundamentum of the eternal Tao, his
elevated spirit, being thus estranged from the physical world and
disencumbered of all material allurings, would become independ-
ent and free from all restraint.34 (3) Upon entering the gate of
infinitude, and having an excursion in the realm of supreme bliss,
i
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he would immerse his unique spirit in the exuberant light of the
celestial and lose his identity in the eternal harmony of cosmic
order.35 (4) At the attainment to sagehood, he would abandon
himself to the vast concord of all perfection. He is, now, the arche-
type of man in the full capacity of the omnipotent (Tao) to be
cast into the mold of cosmic life as a whole wherein he gains
nothing in particular and loses nothing in full. He forgets himself
and forgets that he is really immersed in the bliss of Tao, just as
fish swim in the river and sea and forget all about it.36 (5) The
perfected and perfect man is now what he is by virtue of his
identifiability with the "Creator," imparting his potency to all the
world without becoming the center of fame, the contriver of plans,
the director of works, and the claimer to knowledge. He embraces
infinity within the range of his experience and rambles in the
realm of the infinite with levity and freedom. 37 He fulfills all that
is natural in him without a sense of gain. In the spirit of vacuity,
he employs his mind and heart like a mirror, impartially reflecting
all that there is in the world without showing a trace of lure,
dejection, or injury. It is then, and only then, that the final status
of his exalted individuality is firmly established in the infinite world
of Tao.
All these spiritual modes of life are, as it were, the rockets
that launch the Taoistic type of space-man into the realm of the
infinite, in which he is to find a vantage point called by Chuang
Tzu "the acme of the Celestial" whereon he can survey the World-
All from height to height, from width to width, and from depth to
depth. The happy excursion into the realms of the infinite all along
embodies Chuang Tzu's philosophy of spiritual liberation in the
course of life. This is the Taoist temper of mind, which has incited
the best of Chinese poetry as an expression of inspiration.
The exalted individual, once achieved, becomes a true sage,
who, upborne by the wondrous procedure of Tao, can penetrate
in insight into the Very One Truth comprehending the entire uni-
verse. All partial appearances, viewed from different angles in
varying heights, will be facet-symbols for beauty susceptible of
being interfused into the integral whole of reality. All differences in
viewpoints will be reconciled in the over-all perspective which
forms a complementary system of essential relativity, going any-
where and anywhen, as well as everywhere and everywhen, with
the full swing of the all-pervasive Tao.
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This is the pivotal point of his theory of leveling up all things.3s
Thus it is that the system of essential relativity is an all-inclusive
system in which everything can find a place of its own fitness and
in which no one thing can claim to have an especially privileged
position so as to impose its surreptitious importance upon all others.
At the same time, the system of essential relativity is an interpene-
trative system wherein all entities come to be what they are by
interlacing their own essences with one another so that nothing in
it can stand alone in complete isolation. It is a system of inter-
relatedness and mutual relevance in which anyone thing has its
own intrinsic importance that will bear out valuable results as
unique contributions to the make-up of any other. Furthermore,
it is a system in which the infinite Tao operates as the uncondi-
tioned that will embrace all the conditions originally uncontrollable
by anyone individual outside the system. Especially the human
individuals before their entry into this infinite system have suffered
limitation, restraint, and bondage. Now that they, through the spirit
of liberation, being aware of what ridiculous figures they have
cut within the bounds of contracting narrowness, have discovered
the authentic sagely Self by sharing the nature of Tao, they must
cry for joy in uniting with the Ineffable and Inscrutable in the
realm of the infinite, which breaks forth entirely from the limita-
tions of any arbitrary scheme of thought, feeling, and action in life.
As a result of all these characteristics exhibited in the infinite sys-
tem of essential relativity, Chuang Tzu has set out a great theme:
"The universe and I sustain a relation of co-existence; I and all
beings have the same entry into the One." 39 Thus', being most
inward with the Infinite, the individual in the exalted mode of
life has well established himself in the world in congruence with
all others.
IV
For an epoch of some five hundred years (241 B.C.-A.D. 240)
China in the Asian world was not unlike Rome in the West. People
of all ranks were busy doing work in the conquest of the practical
world. Speculative interest waned in the intellectual realm.
The real revival of metaphysical contemplation dated from the
year 240, when Ho Yen (190-249) and Wang Pi (226-249) made
an attempt to reconcile the differences between Confucius and Lao
,
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Tzu by laying importance upon the category of Nothingness for
the interpretation of Tao.40 Historically, Ho Yen was primarily a
Confucian in that he tried to absorb Taoism into the system of
Confucianism,u whereas Wang Pi was essentially a Taoist with an
intention of assimilating Confucianism into the system of Taoism.
What was common in them consisted in an attempt to bring forth
the unity of infinite substance as the core of metaphysical inquiry.
In his Commentary on the Lao Tzu, Wang Pi elucidated the
central theme that all things considered as Being, taking shape in
manifolds subject to limitation, should be, in the last resort, redeem-
able by the integral Tao, which, though designated as Nothing, is
really everything transmuted into infinite perfection. It is in this
light that he came to see the import of the philosophy of change.
The whole world of dynamic being, begotten by the creative power
exhibited in a plenitude of incessant change and variegated trans-
formation, must revert to the fundamentum of Tao for its primor-
dial unity, which, reposing in the form of Reason and in the spirit
of eternity, will prevail over all multiplicities. Confucianism, as
understood by Wang Pi, reveals only the origin of all things in the
world of Being, while Taoism helps it to see into the ultimate
destiny in which all of Being in every mode of change is brought
back to a final consummation of perfection, which is Nothing, that
is, nothing in particular but everything in full,42 It is the end result
of all changes, borne out by the inexhaustible richness of function,
that should be grasped as the infinite substance.
The spirit of Buddhism encompasses two alternative realms of
thought: one conceived under the form of incessant change and the
other conceived under the form of eternity. Should we include
Hinayana Buddhism, we would find more causes to fight against
the fluctuating mundane world, in which bigoted individuals
plunge themselves into the deep waters of miserable blunders and
sufferings. The vehicle of deliverance would have to bear them up
through the fluctuations of time before reaching the other shore.
In this sense, the Buddhist is a time-man, and he is such not in the
blessed spirit of a Confucian. But, if we should take Mahayana
Buddhism into consideration, the enlightenment it attained would
illuminate before us an upper world of Dharma and Dharma-ful-
fillment in which the tragic sense of life in the process of time
would be superseded by the bliss of eternity.43 So, in this way the
liberated spirit of a Mahayanist would undertake a happy excur-
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sian into the poetically inspired space-world with the Taoist. He
could, now, afford to forget the tragic sense of life enmeshed in
the wheel of changing time. Under this circumstance, the spirit of
a Buddhist was quite congenial with that of a Taoist.
v
It had taken a long epoch of more than seven centuries (6;-
789) for Chinese Buddhism to run its course of full development,
which was, of course, conditioned by the continual works done
in translation 44 and by the creative works done in system-building.
From 789 onward until 960, the Buddhist tradition only went on
and slid down in elaboration. Chiefly in the sixth century, the
forerunning sects were to be formed and eventually in the period
of Sui-Tang (581-960) the ten different schools of Chinese Bud-
dhism were completed. I cannot here attempt to outline their
systematic theorizings, which, because of their doctrinal complexity
and elaborateness, should form an independent study by them-
selves.45 The most I can do now is select some features of Buddhism
as ways of expressing the singular power of the Chinese mentality.
Upon being first introduced Buddhism could have taken deep
root in the Chinese mind only by coming under the dominant
influence of Chinese thought. It goes without saying that Chinese
Buddhistic metaphysics was evoked and re-enforced by the spirit
of Taoism and not vice versa.46 The Taoists all along had claimed
fundamental Nothingness to be a supreme category in their own
system. And Buddhists such as Lokaksin (resident in 'China during
170-189), Chih Ch'ien (192-252), and K'ang Seng-hui (d. 280)
continually laid extreme importance upon the category (thusness)
of fundamental Nothingness, which they took to be equivalent to
Tathatii. 47 During the fourth century, the impact of Taoism upon
the philosophy of Prajiiii was most obvious in the school of Tao-an
(312-385) and his contemporaries.
As regards the controversies about Wu and Yu (Nothingness
and Being), there were, then, six or seven schools 48 diversified into
twelve trends 49 of thought discriminating the genuine truth from
mundane creeds. On the evidences successively given by monks
Tan-chi (ca. 473), Seng-ching (302-475), Hui-ta (ca. 481), and
Yuan K'ang (ca. 649) and on the further evidence 50 of Chi-tsang
(549-623), the above set of theories may be tabulated as follows:
Chih_tun~
monk Wen nullity of mind (by
implication: affirma-
tion of objective Be-
ing)
Yii Fa-kai =:.- nullity of matter~ (by implication: af-monk I flrmation of mind)Yii Tao-sui




3) nothingness exhibited in
the realm of matter













In the above tabular scheme, (1) is more fundamental than
the other six, which are all derived therefrom. According to Tao-an,
"The fundamental Nothingness is the prius of all transformations,
and vacuity is the beginning of all the visible world." All modes
of the true Dharma are by nature vacuous and pure, spontaneously
ensured from, and essentially identifiable with, the Bhiita-tathatii
(Thatness of Being) denuded of any contamination by defiled
elements. The trends of thought in the seven schools of Chinese
Buddhism during the fourth and fifth centuries were centered
around the metaphysical thesis which advocated the importance
of Nothingness. From now on, the Buddhists would join hands
with the Taoists and form a united front against traditional Con-
fucianism.
The influence of Chuang Tzu is even more prominent in the
school of Kumarajiva (343-413). His contribution lay in the field
of the philosophy of Siinyatii (Emptiness). Ultimate Reality is that
which has emptied out all fantastic whims so as to show its own
purity of essence in the form of Thusness. Among a great number
of his pupilS, Seng-chao (384-414) and Tao-sheng (374?-434)
stood out as the twin stars never waning in their spiritual
illuminancy.
The synoptic visions of Seng-chao are diversified into three
cardinal theses: 51 (1) correlative motion and rest; (2) reconcilable
Being and Nothing, or inseparable substance and function; and
(3) the dovetailing of knowledge and "no-knowledge" transmuted
into supreme wisdom.
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(1) I have no time here to go into his penetrative arguments
in this regard except to call attention to the two conclusions he
arrived at. (a) Men of the world, engulfed in the flux of change,
would have no sense of assurance, inasmuch as life in a shifting
course of action would lead to death likely to destroy everything
achieved in life. They are always sick of life and sick for unattain-
able NirviiT}a. (b) The man of wisdom can discern permanence in
the midst of change. He knows how to remain non-active in a state
of spiritual repose and yet will not dispense with the world of
action. It is only he who, being immortal in spirit, can plunge into
the deep waters of life with no danger of annihilation. In his
approach to NirviiT}a, he has attained it, yet he will not stand
attached to it, out of keeping with the changing world.
(2) Tao-an and his associates relied too much upon the funda-
mental Nothingness by asserting the vacuity of the ontic substance,
or the nullity of matter, or the illusiveness of mind. Seng-chao,
however, dissented strongly from all of them. Generally, in the
usage of linguistic expressions or "ostensible names" we talk about
an "objective" which is neither simply real as posited in Being nor
Simply unreal as denied in Not-Being or Nothing. The said "objec-
tive" may be either, and it may be both. In the light of the
Miidhyamika-siistra, to be or not to be: that is the one-sided ques-
tion. It takes a man of supreme wisdom to discern Nothing in all
modes of Being and to observe Being in the midst of Nothing. The
ontic substance and the complete truth thereof cannot be rent
into grotesque pieces.
(3) Seng-chao's metaphysics is a philosophy of the supreme
wisdom which is concerned with Ultimate Reality, NirviiT}a, the
Dharma-kiiya (Law-body), the Bhitta-tathatii, and Dharmatii
(Reality as such). All of these are to him different names of the
same "objective." In order to avoid misunderstanding, however, a
distinction should be made between supreme wisdom per se and
wisdom in the form of upiiya-kausalya, i.e., expedient wisdom.
The power of the former penetrates deep into the objective,
whereas the function of the latter adapts itself to all beings in the
changing world. In virtue of wisdom per se, we are to illuminate
the nature of the Void, while, by means of the expedient wisdom
we are to launch into the world of fluctuating being. In dealing
with Being in full, we shall have no misgivings with the nature
of the Void. And, therefore, we can encounter the realm of Being
without attachment. That being the case, we can illuminate what
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is essentially vacuous without falling back upon it tenaciously. In
the midst of knowledge in acquaintance with the world we shall
arrive at a wondrous state of the liberated spirit with no knowledge
whatever. The reason is that, if you know something in particular,
there will be numberless other things that you do not know. Just
because the spirit of the divine is with no knowledge in particular,
there will be nothing that it does not know, freely and all-perva-
sively. Hence, the knowledge of no-knowledge embraces all that
there is to be known. This may sound perplexing, but men of great
genius, e.g., Shakespeare in the West, have understood it quite
well.
0, out of that "no hope"
What great hope have you! No hope that way is
Another way so high a hope that even
Ambition cannot pierce a wink beyond,
But doubt discovery there. 52
The objective of the knowledge of no-knowledge is intent on
the spirit of the divine. The divine spirit reposed in a state of
vacuity, having no fumblings to get rid of, can be said to possess no
knowledge. No knowledge that way is not the same as the supposed
knowledge about Nothingness, which is something nullified into
nothing. It is far above mere knowledge correlative with the limited
modes of being. It is completely denuded of nescience, which is
sheer ignorance. In a word, it is Enlightenment and Prajilii fused
into the One. Enlightenment shades off what is extrinsic to itself
and is essentially inner light in the form of no-knowledge, while
Prajiiii is an out-pouring of the inner light over the world-all by
denuding it of fallaciousness.
I have mentioned Seng-chao and Tao-sheng as the twin stars
in the ethereal sky of Chinese Buddhistic speculation. But there is
a difference between them. Seng-chao formulated a system of
principles explanatory of the nature of wisdom, whereas Tao-sheng
turned the Mahayanic theory into a way of spiritual life wherein
human nature is fulfilled to the extent that it can partake of Buddha-
nature.
Hitherto, Chinese Buddhists had looked upon the mundane
world as a case of malady and thought about the actual individual
as a source of blunder. Any acceptance of the world in its illusory
appearances and any affirmation of the individual in his fantastic
grimaces would indicate a silliness of view. But monk Hui-yiian
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(334-416) had a different tum of mind. The world could exist in
the form of permanence constitutive of Ultimate Reality. The
human being could come to the possession of a real Self in intimacy
with the Buddha. This line of thought had quite an influence upon
Tao-sheng in formulating his philosophy of Buddha-nature. For
brevity's sake, his fundamental ideas 53 in this regard may be enun-
ciated as follows:
(1) The all-pervasive function of Prajfiii and the substantial
nature of Nirviir;ta are inseparable in the make-up of Ultimate
Reality, which will embody the true Dharma and the perfect
Buddhatii (Buddhahood) in the unity of Buddha-dharma.
(2) The ideal of Nirviir;ta is realizable in the midst of fluctuating
life and death. Hence, the pure land of the Buddha is not different
from the existent realm of all creatures. By way of moral purifica-
tion, all creatures dwelling in the defiled world of blunders will be
reinstated in the world of the noble and sublime, won over through
the employment of Reason. Abidance in the enlightening Reason
of the Buddha enables each and all to see every facet of the world
as pure as it can be.
(3) The conquest of the darkened mind by the potency of
Reason is the only way to emancipation. In pursuance of this, the
real self of spontaneous freedom is achieved by the righteous mind
which has been restored to the original purity of Nature through
the exertion of Reason. Thus all human beings-not even excepting
the icchantika (forsaken one )-endowed with intrinsic Reason,
can come to share equally the ubiquitous Buddha-nature and to
unfold the illuminating Buddha-wisdom implicit in their own con-
science. In this sense, human individuals are spiritual comrades,
equal in cosmic importance with the Buddha.
(4) As the light of supreme wisdom has a most direct penetra-
tion into his own rational essence, each man through devout
devotion can come to a sudden awakening of the Buddha-nature
within the inner constitution of his own nature and achieve
Buddhahood on his own accord. This is the chief tenet of Mahayana
Buddhism.
Tao-sheng's philosophy of Buddhahood is of great importance
for several reasons. (a) It evoked a number of interpretations of
Buddha-nature during the fifth and sixth centuries. (b) His
emphasis on the perfectibility of human nature after the model of
Budda-nature is quite congenial with the Confucian theory of the
original goodness of man. This is evidenced by the fact that the
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poet-philosopher, Hsieh Ling-yiin (385-433), in hearty sympathy
with Tao-sheng's idea of sudden awakening, made a very favorable
comparison of the spiritual achievement of Confucius with that of
the Buddha.54 (c) His theory of sudden awakening by reverting to
the inmost nature of the mind anticipated the later philosophy of
Ch'an (Zen). (d) His concept of the importance of Reason in
gaining an insight into Ultimate Reality even anticipated the Neo-
Confucianism of the Sung Dynasty (960-1279). In short, Tao-sheng
was, on the one hand, the culmination of the line of thought in the
linkage of Buddhism with Taoism, and, on the other, a bridge over
which several schools of Buddhism were to make headway in
alliance with some schools of Confucianism.
In the epoch of Sui-T'ang (581-g60) ten different schools of
Buddhism flourished in China. "A beggar of time" like me, finally,
cannot refrain from mentioning, in particular, the categorical
scheme of Hua-yen-the Avatarilsaka school-as a powerful expres-
sion of Chinese comprehensive harmony. Theoretically, if not
entirely historically, the Hua-yen school may be made the line of
convergence along which many systems of Buddhistic thought
would have their confluence.
The categorical scheme of Hua-yen 55 was an attempt to
integrate all the differentiating worlds, all the noble deed-acts, and
all the achieved end results of the buddhas in the past, present,
and future into a sum total of the True Realm of Dharma in the
form of supreme perfection with a view to showing that each
human being, inherently possessed of wondrous excellences, could
awaken in himself, all at once, buddha-nature, adequately, spon-
taneously, and congruently. The one real Realm of Dharma is not
far from this actual world of man, if everyone knows thoroughly
how to live and act wisely by way of participation in the funda-
mental wisdom of the Buddha. Buddha-nature in toto has the
potentiality of coming in ingress into the perennial spiritual con-
stitution of man. This is the equality and equanimity of Dharma.
The spiritual sun sheds its exuberant light over and into all living
beings, and all living beings, in turn, assimilate and reflect and
interfuse and re-enforce this spiritual light uniquely and reciprocally.
Thus, all modes of the spontaneous function of reason, manifesting
themselves in infinite varieties, would, at the same time, be actuated
into a concert of life activities, in unison with the One True Realm
of Dharma, equanimous in essence. In the midst of enriched
varieties, the light of Tathatii (Thusness) radiated by the Buddha
---
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and witnessed and shared by all men alike will gladden the differ-
entiating minds and the differentiating worlds into the non-differ-
entiation of Reality perfectly embedded in the integral truth, which
is Enlightenment, inherent in each and interpentrative into all.
Taken in its all-inclusive unity, this One True Dharma-dhiitu
(Realm of Dharma, or Law) evinces the omnipresence and
omnipotence of Mind constitutive of the noumenon of all the
phenomenal worlds, diversifying itself into (a) the differential
Realms of Events, (b) the integrative Realm of Reason, (c) the
interpenetrative Realm of Reason and Events, and (d) the inter-
lacing Realm of all Events.
The theoretical formulation of the categorical scheme,56 initi-
ated by Tu-shun (557-640), developed by Chih-yen (602-668),
elaborated by Fa-tsang (643-720), and further expounded by
Ch'eng-kuan (760-820) and Tsung-mi (d. 841), embraces three
grand views,57 i.e., (1) of the true Void, (2) of the congruence of
Reason and Events, and (3) of the dovetailing of all events in the
form of universal coherence.
In the first view, an attempt is made to show (a) that the
worlds of physical properties can be dissolved into the nature of
the Void, just as phenomena are transmutable into the noumenon;
(b) that the Void as the Ultimate Reality is constitutive of, and
identifiable with, the assemblage of purified physical phenomena;
(c) that the Void and the physical are mutually congruent; and
(d) that, eventually, after the impenetrable inertia of the physical
is explained away in terms of the efficacy of mental. and spiritual
transmutations and through the insinuation of the ontic essence-
the true nature of the Void-into the physical, all one-sided char-
acterizations in respect of the physical and the Void are tran-
scended in the highest integral truth of the middle path.
In the second view, it is maintained that reason and events
can be melded in a perfect manner. Reason is the wondrous func-
tion deeply rooted in the BhUta-tathatii and has its efficacy any-
time anywhere in virtue of the omnipresence of the Buddha. This
can be accounted for in the following ways: (a) Reason as a whole,
denuded of any specification, is universally present in all the
worlds of events, however differentiated the latter may be, inas-
much as the Dharmatii is manifesting itself incessantly without
limitation. And, therefore, even the minutest event-particles are
immersed in the integral truth and imbued adequately with Reason.
(b) The items of events which, as such, are differentiated must be
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restored into unity in the integration of Reason, just as the wavicles,
spreading forth far and away, are losing their own unique momenta
and can be re-enforced and saved only by taking up continually
with the oceanic ingratiation. Hence, it may be asserted that events,
each and all, are constituted according to the Reason which is
exhibited thereof. Though they are interrelated, the truth, however,
is not simply events which, once constituted, would overshadow
the Reason inherent in them, and the events are not simply the
truth which, if verified, would supersede the events limitative in
their differentiation.
In the third view, it is asserted that the dovetailing of all
events will vindicate the universal coherence of truth. This can be
shown as follows: (1) Reason operates for the sake of events. It
makes the events what they are in the mode of existence, in the
way of differentiation, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, and in
the process of change and transformation. Hence, the function of
Reason issuing in truth will come in ingress into all the differentiat-
ing worlds of events. (2) The events, each and all, abide by Reason
in virtue of which they would go through the process of change in
incessant successions and remain permanent in the realm of
eternity. And, therefore, the events in observance of Reason would
permeate all modes of Dharma. (3) The events, as implied in
Reason, would bring forth the following modes of implication: (a)
one implicates another; (b) one implicates every other; (c) one
implicates all others; (d) all others implicate one; (e) all others
implicate every other one; and (f) all others implicate all others.
Thus, the whole and the parts, the one and the many, as well as the
universal and the particular, will be intertwined.
The above consideration brings into prominence the principle
of mutual implication, the principle of mutual relevance, and the
principle of all-pervasive coherence. All these principles, taken
together, are explanatory of the integral infinite Dharma-dhiitu. In
the way of mutual implication, anyone (dharma) can gather up
any other one unto itself and enter into the constitution of that one;
anyone can gather up all others unto itself and enter into the
constitution of that one; all others can gather up all others unto
themselves and enter into the constitution of those others. Hence,
the principle of mutual relevance needs no further elucidation.
Furthermore, the principle of all-pervasive coherence holds on the
follOwing conditions: (a) one dharma gathers up another one into
itself and enters into that one; (b) one gathers up all other dharmas
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into itself so as to enter into that one; (c) one gathers up another
one so as to enter into all others; (d) one gathers up all others in
order to enter into all others; (e) all other dharmas gather up one
so as to enter into another one; (f) all other dharmas gather up all
others so as to enter into anyone; (g) all others gather up one so
as to enter into all others; and (h) all others gather up all others in
order to enter into them all. vVhen all of these are melded together,
the ultimate result is the integrity of the infinitely perfect Dharma-
dhiitu. If the above conditions are fulfilled, then the ten approaches
to the metaphysical profundity and the six characteristics of all
Dharma will be clear in the light of day without further elucida-
tion. In view of such a philosophy, if any person is to gain a firm
footing in the One Real Dharma-dhiitu, he must live and have his
being in the spirit of infinity.
In the above I have tried to depict tersely the ways in which
the Chinese contemplative minds have been fascinated with the
world and the human individual, which are taken, however, not so
much in natural as "in dramatic regard." 58 The world and the
individual, taken "in natural regard," would be the exhibitions of
related facts, definite in content, determinate in nature, specific in
conditions, articulate in forms, full in being, or substantial in essence.
All of these, characteristic of scientific explanations, are, of course,
very important for the understanding of man and the world. But
Chinese philosophers choose to take a step further than this in
their modes of contemplation. From their viewpoints, the world,
taking shape in Ultimate Reality, must transcend the,limitations of
these relatively specific characterizations before all of its complete
nature can come to the light of day. The actual world, strictly
philosophically conceived, should be transformed into an ideal
pattern adorned with the axiological unity of supreme perfection.
The Chinese always aspire toward the transfigured world of lib-
erating art, of edifying morality, of contemplative truth, and of
religious piety. Any other world short of these will be a realm of
anxiety making us look pale and tired. This is why Confucians
have craved so much for the continually creative potency of the
heavenly Tao in the shaping of the cosmic order as a whole. This
is why the Taoists have whole-heartedly cherished the ideal of
Nothingness for its coming to the rescue of all things relative in the
realm of Being. And this is also why Chinese Buddhists have
vehemently struggled for the partaking of the Buddha-nature em-
bedded in the integral truth of the ultimate spiritual Enlightenment.
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As to the nature and status of man, the Chinese, either as a
unique person or as a social being, takes no pride in being a type of
individual in estrangement from the world he lives in or from the
other fellows he associates with. He is intent on embracing within
the full range of his vital experience all aspects of plenitude in the
nature of the whole cosmos and all aspects of richness in the worth
of noble humanity. Anything different from this would be a sign of
the impoverishment in the inner constitution of personality which is
miserably truncated in development. This accounts for the con-
certed efforts of Chinese philosophers to advocate the exaltation of
the individual into the inward sageliness and the outward worthi-
ness which together make up the intrinsic greatness of man as Man.
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T' ANG CHUN-! The Individual and the World
in Chinese Methodology
Introduction
I SHALL LIMIT this paper to the four important typical ways
of thinking about the individual and the world in Chinese epis-
temology:
1. To think of the individual as objectively existing as a part of
the world.
2. To think of the world as a part of, or the content of, or
identical with, the being of the individual subject.
3. To think that both the individual and world must be tran-
scended, and that there is then in reality neither individual nor
world.
4. To think that both the individual subject and the objective
world are to be asserted positively as existing, yet neither is asserted
as a part of, or the content of, or identical with, the other; nor are
they asserted as mutually exclusive, because their mutual tran-
scendence and mutual immanence are both accepted.
I. The Individual Known as Objectively Existing and as a Part
of the World through Class Names, Pointing, Spatia-temporal
Location, and Relational Thinking
First, the way of thinking of the individual as objectively
existing and as part of the world is that way of thinking which
starts from the world as the objective side of our knowledge
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(through the temporary forgetting of the individual as a unique
knowing or acting subject and the conscious-though not self-
conscious-activity of the objectivation of the subject as one of the
individual things in the world) and ends in the assertion that I,
as an individual, and all other individual things co-exist as parts
of the world. The problem here-how I as an individual person
can be objectively known or conceptually determined as an in-
dividual is included in the general problem as to how any indi-
vidual thing is objectively known or conceptually determined as an
individual. Since individual things are usually thought of objectively
by general concepts or class terms, which are universal in meaning,
the problems as to how the individuality of a particular individual
can be conceptually determined and how the individual can be
thought of objectively have been complicated and delicate prob-
lems from Plato to the present in Western thought. However,
Chinese philosophers have not taken the problem so seriously as has
the West, though we are not lacking in answers to the problem.
These answers are represented by the Moists, the Logicians, Hsiin
Tzu (313-238 B.C.), and the Yin-Yang school in classical Chinese
thought.
(a) Moists think of the individual objectively merely as a
member of a class. They stress the idea of class (lei) earlier than
Mencius (372-289 B.C.) and Hsiin Tzu. Mo Tzu (468-376 B.C.)
teaches universal love as based upon the idea that all human beings
are of the same kind. He teaches also that one should love the
father of another man as he does his own. Thus, Mo Tzu takes my
father merely as one member of the class of fathers. So, when
Moism is developed into a theory of epistemology and logic in Mo
Pien, an individual thing is called an individual or an actuality
(shih). A shih may have its proper name and class names such as
species name and genus name. As a proper name is arbitrarily
given to a shih, conceptual knowledge of a shih requires the use of
a class name. However, Mo Pien did not discuss the problem as to
how an individual can be conceptually determined by the class
name, which expresses the universal concept only. In Mo Pien's
thought, the use of a class name to denote an individual is a
practical matter. If a genus name is not enough to express the
peculiarities of an individual, then a species name or sub-species
name is required to differentiate one individual from another of the
same kind. As the process of using class names with more specified
meanings goes on, there is no problem as to how the individual
can be conceptually determined and expressed by a class name.
Consequently, this problem is not raised and discussed by Moists.
However, it has to be raised and discussed, because the process of
using names with more specified meanings cannot go on indefinitely,
since there is no infirm species or lowest subordinative class-name
to use; and, even if there were, it would still be a class name, and,
we could know the individual only as a member of the class.
(b) Another way to know the individual as existing objectively
is represented by the Kung-sun Lung (498? B.C.) of the logician
school of Pre-Ch'in (Ch'in, 221-206 B.C.) philosophy. This is the
way of knowing an individual by pointing to it. Kung-sun Lung is
famous for his insistence on the difference of meanings between
species name and genus name. Thus, "White horse is not horse" is
his slogan. If genus name is different from species name because
it has a wider denotation, it is implied that the lowest class-name
still can denote more than one individual, and so individuality
cannot be expressed by any class-name as such. Thus, the individual
can be pointed out or indicated only by names and not conceptually
determined by them. These are the topics of his two other treatises,
"Ch'i-wu lun" (On Pointing and Things) and "Ming-shih lun" (On
Name and Actuality), which are less mentioned than his theory of
the difference of species and genus as expounded in his treatise
"Pai-ma-Iun" (On White Horse). It is quite clear that Kung-sun
Lung thinks that the actuality (shih) of an individual thing can be
pointed to only by names and that the differences between species
name and genus name are based upon their different functions in
pointing.! We use names for pointing out the individual thing, and
the individual thing is shown and known to us in the very act of
pointing.
It is one thing to use a universal name to point to an individual
thing, and another for a person to be understood by others, as when
we use a certain universal name to point to a certain individual.
If the individuality of an individual is not capable of being deter-
mined in some other way, where can one get the guarantee that
one shall not be misunderstood? Thus, the third way of knowing the
individual, as propounded by Hsiin Tzu, needs consideration.
(c) The third way of knowing the individual as existing ob-
jectively is that of determining an individual in a spatio-temporal
system. When Hsiin Tzu discusses how an actuality or an individual
thing is determined in his chapter of the Cheng-ming (Rectifica-
tion of Names), he disagrees with the view that an individual is
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE WORLD IN CHINESE METHODOLOGY 267
determined by its appearances or attributes, which are usually
expressed by universal names. Two things may have the same
appearances or attributes but be in different places. Thus, they
have to be called two distinct actualities, two individual things. On
the other hand, in the process of becoming, "one [individual] thing
may have different appearances or attributes [at different times]
but must still be called one individual." 2 An actuality, or an indi-
vidual, is determined by its location in the spatio-temporal system,
with emphasis laid on the different spatial locations of different
individual things. However, when we differentiate the different
things according to their different locations in space and time, we
presuppose that the space-time system is already differentiated in
its structure prior to the things in it. Here the epistemological
problem is: if there are not things related differently to one an-
other in space-time, how can space-time, which is simply extended
in spatio-temporal dimensions and is thought to be homogeneous
everywhere, be differentiated by itself into different locations. If
we cannot find any other answer to this problem, we can look for
the principle of individuality only in the different things as differ-
ently related to each other.
( d) As things which are similar in appearances or attributes
and subsumed under a class name do not usually have the same
relations, such as causal relations, with other things, so any two
individuals can be differentiated according to their different re-
lations with different things. The Yin-Yang school is representative
of this way of thinking: the fourth way of knowing t~e individual,
that of relational thinking, the way of knowing the individual in its
many-sided relations with other things. This way, expounded first
by the Yin-Yang school, was adopted by many Confucianists after
the Han Dynasty (206 B,C.-A.D. 220).
The meaning of yin and yang are subtle and complicated.3
Originally, "yin" meant what is concealed and unknown to us, and
"yang" meant what is manifested and known to us. They were
originally concepts of attributes of things based on their status
relative to other things, and were not originally concepts of substance
or force. According to their derivative meanings, anything which
is in front of or before other things is called yang, and that which is
in back of or after other things is called yin. Consequently, what is
progressive or active or generative is yang, and what is retrogressive
or passive or degenerative is yin. All these meanings are relative.
Therefore, according to the Yin-Yang school, everything takes the
--
role of yin or yang relatively to other things, and anything of the
same class can be differently determined as having different rela-
tions of yin and yang to these other things. Even if we limit the
meaning of "yang" to "active" and "yin" to "passive," it is not difficult
to determine the things to which a certain individual thing is pecul-
iarly related, actively and passively, and then to differentiate it
from the other individual things of the same class, in order that the
uniqueness of a certain individual can be expressed through this
kind of relational thinking without confusion.
The way of relational thinking of the Yin-Yang school was orig-
inally a way of thinking of an individual thing as existing objec-
tively in the natural world. Yet, it is exactly like the Confucian way
of thinking of the status of the individual person through his ethical
relations in the human world. When an individual person is seen as
existing objectively in the human world, his action and personality
are regulated and determined by his reciprocal relations with other
persons. As there are no two individual persons who have the same
ethical relations to the other persons around him, so the unique
status of an individual person in the human world can be cog-
nized and conceptually determined through knowledge of his pe-
culiar ethical relations to others.
II. The Individual as a Self-Conscious Moral Subject
and the World as Seen by Such a Subject
I myself as a subject am a self-conscious subject. When I am
self-conscious, what I am conscious of can be known as the content
of my consciousness, and comprehended by my self-consciousness,
which therefore transcends the world, and can then include it as a
part of itself. If we say that only the self-consciousness which im-
mediately reveals itself to me exists, this is extreme individualism
or solipsism; and, if we say that there are different worlds belonging
to the different self-consciousnesses of different individuals, this is
pluralistic idealism or pluralistic spiritualism, and is a kind of in-
dividualism, too.
But, how can we know that self-consciousness is itself an indi-
vidual reality belonging to me exclusively or belonging to each
person separately? It is quite possible that self-consciousness, re-
vealed immediately as a self-conscious subject, is simply a subject
without being an individual, or a part of, or an expression of, a
universal self-conscious subject, which is the only reality, as objec-
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tive idealism or absolute idealism contends. Nevertheless, we still
have reason to call the self-conscious subject an individual, because
the self-conscious subject, since it transcends the world, can differ-
entiate itself from the world. Hence, it is a unique being and
capable of being defined negatively as different from everything
else in the world and from the world as a whole, and can be called
an individual, because any individual thing in the ordinary sense
is usually defined as that which is different from everything else.
Although we may not be able to define the self-conscious subject
positively as an individual in the ordinary sense, we should leave
open the question as to whether it is a part of or an expression of a
universal self-conscious subject. If it is legitimate to call the self-
conscious subject an individual, then any thought which thinks the
world-being as the content of, or a part of, or identical with, the
subject is a process of thinking of the world subjectively.aa
There is no eminent philosophy of pure Chinese origin-other
than Buddhist Vijiianavada idealism, and it came from India-
which argues for a subjective idealism or for individualism by tak-
ing the self-conscious subject as a purely knowing subject and
taking the world simply as the object known. However, there is a
very important trend of Chinese thought which takes the self-
conscious subject as both acting and knowing, and thereupon thinks
of the world-being as subjectively included or comprehended as
a part of, or the content of, or identical with, the subject.
This trend of thought may be called a kind of ethical idealism.
Mencius, Lu Hsiang-shan (1l3g-1192), and Wang Yang-ming
(1472-1528) are the leading philosophers involved: All of them
emphasize the self-consciousness of the subject as a moral subject,
which is not purely a knowing subject but a subject which knows
its moral ideal, acts in conformity with it, and then knows itself
self-consciously as a subject of both knowing and acting. There is
here the thesis that "the universe (the ten thousand things) is
perfectible in myself," 4 and "The universe is my mind, and my
mind is the universe," 5 and "Pervading Heaven and Earth, there is
just this spiritual light . . . my spiritual light is the master of
Heaven, Earth, and deities . . . leaving my spiritual light, there
is no Heaven, Earth, deities, or ten thousand things." 6
It would be quite misleading, however, to interpret this thesis
from the point of view of epistemological idealism or ordinary
mysticism. Chinese philosophers who have held this thesis have
never stated in a strict sense their epistemological arguments for
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this kind of idealism, nor have they said that the meanings of their
thesis are mysterious as beyond the reason of man.
In ethical idealism, we take those things which ought to be as
our ideal. This ideal determines what we ought to do to realize the
ideal, and then the realization of the ideal is itself a moral ideal and
moral action. The way of thinking i~ ethical idealism begins, in its
first step, with seeing the things of the world as what they ought
to be as our ideal prescribes, and then they are seen as full of
possibilities or potentialities. It then proceeds, in the next step, to
seeing things through our moral ideal and moral action. Henceforth,
things are seen as gradually transforming themselves and tending
to be what they ought to be; and their possibilities, when realized
by our moral action, are found as of the nature of what they ought
to be and of the ideal; while, on the contrary, what they are in
actual fact is thought of as not so in reality. Therefore, if the moral
subject has a moral ideal and moral action which are so high and
lofty as to realize the universal jen (the utmost goodness in the
world) through the self-consciousness of our good nature, or our
original mind, (pen-shin )-as held by Mencius, Lu Hsiang-shan,
and Wang Yang-ming-then all things in the world will be seen
through this high and lofty ideal and action of the moral subject,
and all things and the whole world will be seen as acted upon by
the subject's moral action and as tending to realize its moral ideal,
and will be thought of as of the same nature as the moral mind.
Consequently, it is quite natural for Mencius to think that the ten
thousand things are perfectible by me as a moral subject, for Lu
Hsiang-shan to think that the universe is my mind, and for Wang
Yang-ming to think of liang-chih (intuitive knowledge) as the
spiritual light of Heaven, Earth, deities, and the ten thousand
things.
The expression "see the world through the ideal and action of
the moral subject" states a way of thinking by a fully self-conscious
moral subject as a moral individual. It is not a way of thinking
of the world as an object opposite to the subject. It is a way of
thinking which begins by withdrawing the light in the ordinary
outward-knowing process back to our inner self; and then throwing
the light out again, along the very line of the extending of our moral
ideal and our moral action; and knows the world as mediated by
that very ideal and action, and as the realm for the embodiment
of that ideal and action. Here, the seeing "eye" of the moral subject
is immanent in the extending of the ideal and moral action, being
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acted upon by the action and transformed by the action. As the
world is itself transformed to conform to the ideal, the "eye" will
see the world as absorbed into the action and the ideal of the
subject, and will experience it as one in being with the subject.
When the subject is self-conscious and knows itself as transcending
the world as experienced, the "eye" will see the subject as above
the world, and the world will be seen as just a part of, or the con-
tent of, the subject as an absolute individual or an absolute 1. This
is the reason Liu Chi-shan (1578-1645), a great Neo-Confucianist
in the late Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), gives so high a place to the
idea of tu or tu-chih-the awareness of the solitary individual in
absolute morality.7
III. The Individua~ and the World as Transcended in Vacuity
and Receptivity of Mind and in Enlightenment and Spirituality
The third typical way of thinking of the individual and the
world in Chinese philosophy is to think that both the individual
and the world have to be transcended, such that there is in reality
neither world nor the I as an individual. This is the same type of
thinking as that of Western and Indian mystics and philosophers
who think of "before the day of creation," but with different em-
phasis about the way in which the world and the I, or the self as
an individual, are to be transcended.
Chuang Tzu (369? B.C.), one of the two most important
Taoistic philosophers, is representative of this way. He has a spir-
itual vision which is beyond the sense of self as an individual and
of the world as opposite to the self. "Forgetting of myself," "loss of
myself," "forgetting the world under Heaven," and "out of the
world under Heaven" are pertinent sayings of his. When Chuang
Tzu talked about the "upward wandering with the creator [and] '! \
downward having friends who are beyond death and life and of
no beginning and ending," 8 he was using a metaphor for the ex-
pression of his spiritual vision. His spiritual vision orginates from J \.'
his profound wisdom, aesthetic enjoyment, and inner spiritual ,
cultivation, rather than from his primary belief in the existence of
a mystic state.
Chuang Tzu has three ideas about the mind which are closely
related to the experience of "forgetting the world and the self as an
individual." The first idea concerns the nature of mind as hsii and
ling. "Hsii" means to be vacuous and receptive. Confucius and Lao
---
Tzu spoke of hsil mainly as a moral teaching. Chuang Tzu, followed
by Hslin Tzu and the Neo-Confucianists, takes hsil as one funda-
mental nature of the mind and connects it with the word "ling,"
which means knowing freely, spontaneously, and without attach-
ment. When the nature of the mind is seen as both vacuous and
receptive, the sense of ego or of self as an individual differentiating
itself from other things is uprooted in the depth of the mind.
The mind can be receptive without being a positive receiver.
When the mind is vacuous and receptive, all things of the world
can be received by it, and then pass through it without meeting
any barrier. This self-forgetting can be cultivated and continued
in prinCiple. Here, the most important thing is that the mind will be
revealed to itself as both vacuous and receptive simultaneously.
When it knows, it is receptive. But, if it is not simultaneously
vacuous, then what is received is attached to the mind, and the
mind is in tum attached to things. This is the ordinary way of
knowing with attachment. On the contrary, if the mind is revealed
to itself as both receptive and vacuous simultaneously, it can know
things without attachment.
Secondly, Chuang Tzu uses the idea of ming, which means
the lasting actual state of the mind when its nature, as purely vacu-
ous and receptive, is fully realized in its knowing. Literally, "ming"
means "light." As a state of mind, it is enlightenment of mind.
When Western religious thought talks about enlightenment of
mind, it usually means that the mind is enlightened by something
above. It is not so in Chinese thought. All Taoists, Confucianists,
and Buddhists use the word "ming" as self-enlightenment or en-
lightenment without self. For Chuang Tzu, enlightenment is a state
of mind which is purely transparent, and this transparency of
mind, which comes from that nature of the mind as both purely
vacuous and purely receptive, is fully realized in its knowing.
Ordinarily, we know things through concepts and names. When the
concepts and names are applied to the things coming to our atten-
tion, we meet the things halfway. Here the mind is not purely
receptive. The only remedy for such ordinary thinking is to tran-
scend and withdraw our ordinary concepts and names and let the
vacuity of mind be realized. Then the mind becomes purely re-
ceptive, and is willing to welcome things wholeheartedly, and all
the things are thus transparent to us. Here we have enlightenment
and also self-forgetting. Nevertheless, the enlightenment of the
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mind is difficult to achieve, because before things come to attention
we already have habits from the past, ready concepts or subcon-
sciousness. These are waiting for our use, and, when things come
to us, they pour out like fluids and fill the vacuity of mind and
sentence it to death, as it were. Chuang Tzu said that the death of
the mind is the greatest lamentation.\}
According to some philosophies and some religious thought, as,
e.g., in Buddhism, we must engage in practice of inner meditation
and concentration of mind to enlighten what is dark in our fore-
consciousness and subconsciousness. It is not clear whether Chuang
Tzu has the same point of view. In Chuang Tzu's philosophy,
besides the dialectic thinking used for canceling our presupposed
judgments, ready concepts, and names and habits of the past, there
is a third important idea about the mind, the idea of shen as the
function of mind which is complementary to the idea of mingo
Meeting things with shen is Chuang Tzu's way for attainment of
the state of self-forgetting and enlightenment. This is quite differ-
ent from the way of quiet meditation or serious concentration of
mind as generally understood. The word "shen" originally meant
deity or spirituality. Shen is usually connected with-sometimes
synonymous with-the word "ling," as explained above. Chuang
Tzu uses it to indicate a function of the mind which is not a definite
psychological process such as willing, feeling, perceiving, imagin-
ing, conceiving, or reasoning, but one which is pervading, and meets
the things in their changing processes with intuitive and sympa-
thetic understanding but without attachment. Shen is a function of
the mind when the mind is permeated with fully living life. Shen
is always characterized by freedom and spontaneity and is never
contracted and reflexive. When shen is extended and meets things
with intuitive and sympathetic understanding, we have self-forget-
ting immediately, and we transcend any things which fill our mind.
Thus, vacuity of mind can be realized, and enlightenment can be
attained through the very extending of shen.
In view of Chuang Tzu's three ideas of the mind, it is quite
clear that self-forgetting is possible of achievement. When such
self-forgetting is achieved, the sense of the self as an individual is
gone, and since, the world is correlated with the individual self,
the sense of the world can thus be forgotten also.
As self-forgetting and world-forgetting are both stressed by
Chuang Tzu, we call his way that of transcending the sense of both
the individual self and the world as dualistically related, and as
thinking that there is, in reality, neither world nor individual. We
may, interpret this as the way of experiencing the two as one.
Chuang Tzu says, "I am living with Heaven and Earth; I am one
with the ten thousand things." 10 However, experiencing the two as
one is not necessarily to be thought of or talked about. If it is
thought of or talked about, the very thinking or talking has to be
transcended again. Here we have paradoxical thinking and talking.
This is because, when the mind is vacuous, receptive, and knowing
without attachment, and enlightenment and spirituality of the mind
are realized, the concept "one" cannot be used. It, too, has to be
enlightened through and passed by the extending of spirituality,
and so the sense of the world and the individual as one has to be
transcended, too. Therefore, according to this type of thinking,
there is neither world nor individual. The state of mind of this
type of thinking is thus neither subjective nor objective. Instead, it
resides in the center of subject and object, and, hanging in vacuo,
escapes from the duality of these two.u
When Lin-chi I-hsiian (78S-867?), the Ch'an master, talks about
his way of teaching disciples, he says: "Sometimes I cancel the
[idea of] 'person' [as subjective], but not the idea of 'world' [as ob-
jective]; sometimes I cancel the [idea of] 'world' [as objective] but
not the [idea of] 'person' [as subjective]; sometimes, I cancel both
the 'person' and the 'world'; and sometimes I cancel neither the
'person' nor the 'world.''' 12 His first way of teaching corresponds
to the first way of thinking described above, with the difference
that the latter positively asserts the individual person as existing in
the objective world. His second way of teaching corresponds to the
second way of thinking mentioned above, with the difference that
the latter asserts positively the being of the objective world as
identical with, or part of, or the content of, the being of the indi-
vidual as subject. His third way of teaching is more like the third
way of thinking, as discussed in this section; it is a synthesis of the
earlier two, and rightly represents the spirit of Ch'an. Therefore,
the way of thinking of Ch'an also belongs to this type. His fourth
way of teaching is the negative of the third way in its logical
form, and is actually the same in the spirit of negativity. "I cancel
neither the person nor the world" is not the same as "I assert
positively both the existence of the subjective person as an indi-
vidual and the objective world." This will be discussed next.
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IV. The Individual and the World Known as Mutually
Transcendent and Immanent Through Knowledge of Virtuous
Nature and Sense-Knowledge
The fourth way of thinking of the individual and the world-
that both exist-is a general tendency of Chinese thought. Even
those thinkers who have been classified above as belonging to the
other three types never deny this explicitly. However, only the
Confucianists take the co-existence of individual and world seri-
ously, and only in Confucianism do we get the philosophical basis
of this way of thinking, a view of the mind which is more synthetic
than the other three views.
This fourth view takes the mind as both receptive cognitively
and active and creative morally, and insists that, when its nature
is realized authentically, enlightenment (ming) and spirituality
(shen) can be included. This view originated with Mencius and
was developed in The Doctrine of the Mean (Chung yung) and
the Commentaries on The Book of Changes (I ching), which can
be supposed to be later than Mencius, and was further developed
by Neo-Confucianism in the Sung and Ming dynasties (960-1644).
It is sometimes neglected by some Confucian thinkers who are
more practically oriented.
In this trend of thought, when the mind knows cognitively and
becomes intelligent or wise, it should also be as vacuous as it can
be. When the mind is vacuous, it is purely receptive and can be-
come transparent and enlightened. In this respect there is no funda-
mental difference between Confucianism and Taoism. Yet, on the
other side, the mind has its activity and creativity, and it can be
self-conscious of itself as an acting subject or a creative subject.
When the mind knows the objective world cognitively and has no
reflection of itself or thinks of its knowing subject or itself as a
thing existing in the world objectively, then we have the first type
of thinking, which neglects the subject as an individual which is
incapable of being objectified as one among the other things in the
world. When the mind is self-conscious of itself as a knowing and
acting subject, and thinks of the world-being as identical with its
own being or as the content or a part of itself, we have the second
way of thinking, which neglects the independent and transcendent
existence of the objective world. The first way of thinking may
lead man to lose the sense of individual dignity and go astray in
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the myriad things of the world. The second way of thinking may
lead man to assert his self as an absolute and in that case may
engender the sense of pride, which is contrary to the moral sense of
man. The third way of thinking considers the mind as vacuous,
and then self-pride is eradicated. The shortcoming of the third
way is its neglect of the mind of the individual self as a subject
which is active and creative and self-conscious of itself as such. As
it is active and creative, it is not simply vacuous as non-being, but
is being and existence also. As it is self-conscious of itself, it can
know itself as being an existing self-conscious individual self. On
the other side, as the mind is receptive and can know things other
than itself, the things also can be self-consciously known as exist-
ing. As it is possible also for the mind to forget itself as self-
conscious, it is not necessary for it to see things existing merely
as a part of, or the content of, or identical with, its being, and it
is quite possible for the mind in its self-forgetting to assert the
existence of the world and to see it as independent existence.
When the existence of the mind of the individual self and the
existence of the things of the world are both asserted, we have
the fourth way of thinking of the individual and the world. In this
fourth way, Confucianists have the idea of enlightenment and
spirituality, which are connected with the mind as active and
creative more than with the mind as vacuous and receptive.
According to Mencius, the mind is active and creative, because
it has moral nature, which is essentially good, with an inner light.
When man fully realizes his good nature and has sageliness, which
is unfathomable by knowledge, he has spirituality or holiness.13
As Mencius' thought is developed into the thought of The Doctrine
of the Mean and the Commentaries on The Book of Changes,
ideas about enlightenment and spirituality become more impor-
tant. In the former, the virtue of human nature is called "ch'eng,"
which means "creating and accomplishing oneself and all the
things of the world." 14 Ch'eng is Tao, the principle of the world
as well as of man. The highest ch'eng, as it is realized by the sage,
is a way of everlastingly creating and accomplishing, which is the
same as everlastingly creating and accomplishing Heaven and Earth.
When ch'eng is realized and is expressed, there is light or enlight-
enment, and from enlightenment one can also realize ch'eng.15
Therefore, the "everlastingly creating and accomplishing" is not
only a process of continuous activity; it is also a process illum-
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE WORLD IN CHINESE METHODOLOGY 217
inated by light and transparent from beginning to end; it is the
same as the way of the deity, which is a way of spirituality.
In The Doctrine of the Mean, one's inner self and outer things
are harmonized in the idea of ch'eng as a universal principle. This
is rightly called the way of thinking whereby both the individual
and the world exist in one ultimate harmony (t'ai ho), with light
illuminated through it. The inner self as subjective and outer
things as objective are then mutually reflected, as mutually creat-
ing, mutually accomplishing, and interdependent in a common
spiritual enlightenment. In the Commentaries on The Book of
Changes, the principle of Heaven is called "ch'ien," which is a prin-
ciple of knowing and creating, and the principle of Earth is called
"k'un," which is the principle of realization and accomplishment,1G
These two principles are embodied in man as his human nature, in
which intelligence or wisdom, and fen, generating love, originated.
Here intelligence or wisdom is receptive in knowing, and, at the
same time, knowing is an act and is creative also. Generating love
is creative, and, at the same time, is receptive to what is loved.
The mind as receptive may be called its yin aspect, and as creative
may be called its yang aspect,17 As yin and yang are two principles
or two aspects of the one ultimate Tao, and are mutually rooted in
each other, therefore the creative aspect and the receptive aspects
of mind are mutually rooted in its nature, and the mind, as know-
ing and acting, or as intelligence or wisdom, and generating love
(fen) are mutually implied in their meanings.
In the Commentaries on The Book of Changes., the idea of
enlightenment (ming) and the idea of spirituality (shen) are also
emphasized. Ch'ien, a universal principle of knowing and creating,
is also characterized as a "great enlightenment from beginning to
end," 18 and spirituality is taken as "pervading all things of the
world" and "without particular direction." 19 Here enlightenment
is not merely a static state of mind; it also resides in a dynamic
process of changing life; and spirituality is not only meeting things
with intuitive and sympathetic understanding and without attach-
ment, but also "pervading in creating and accomplishing all things
according to their particularities without remainder." 20 As spiritu-
ality and enlightenment exist in man, what should be sought is
the "preservation of them in silence and the realization of them in
virtuous action." 21 Thus, the "human nature of oneself is realized"
and "Heaven's decree is attained or fulfilled." 22 This is a way of
thinking which puts emphasis on both oneself as an individual sub-
ject and other individual things of the world as objects, and all
of them are seen as organically related in one ultimate harmony,
a universal principle of man or of human nature and of all things
in the world, and the co-existence of the world and the individual
was thus established in classical Confucianism.
Its development in the Neo-Confucianism of the Sung and
Ming dynasties consists in the clearer elucidation of the thoughts of
classical Confucianism with some new interpretations. One new
idea agreed to by almost all Neo-Confucianists of the Ch'eng-Chu
school is the idea of "one principle (or one reason) participated
in by different things," which is a metaphysical idea for the syn-
thesis of the one and the many, identity and difference, and the
universal and the particular individual. It is also closely related to
a new theory of mind and knowledge. As Chang Tsai (1020-1077)
and the Ch'eng brothers classify man's kinds of knowledge into
sense-knowledge (chieh-wen chih-chih) and knowledge of virtuous
nature (te-hsing chih-chih), the latter is always taken as universal,
self-identical, and one, and the former is always taken as particular
and as differentiated according to the many sensed objects.
As knowledge of virtuous nature can be expressed through
sense-knowledge, we have an example of "one principle partici-
pated in by different things." According to Chang Tsai and the
Ch'eng brothers, "knowledge of virtuous nature" is quite different
from "sense-knowledge." One of the differences is that we can have
knowledge of virtuous nature which comprises spirituality and en-
lightenment,23 but we cannot attain to spirituality and enlighten-
ment through sense-knowledge alone. The reason knowledge of
virtue can comprise enlightenment and spirituality is based upon
the fact that knowledge of virtuous nature is not merely knowledge
which takes virtuous nature as its object.
Knowledge of virtuous nature is knowledge through the very
virtuous practice of the moral mind. More adequately, it is not
knowledge about anything else; it is only self-knowledge of the
moral mind as such, or of the moral mind self-conscious of itself
as such, or the moral mind as transparent to itself as such, and
this is self-enlightenment. As the self-conscious moral mind is ac-
tive, creative, and pervading all things in the world, it knows no
limits in its creative and active extending, and it acts like deity
and comprises spirituality. However, sense-knowledge is directed to
the sense-object, which is opaque by itself, but can, so to speak,
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absorb the light radiated from our minds. Therefore, when isolated
from the knowledge of the virtuous mind, it does not comprise
self-enlightenment, and thus we can never attain spirituality
through it alone.
Sense-knowledge is distinctly different in kind from self-
knowledge of virtuous nature or spiritual enlightenment, but they
are not necessarily separated in existence and can co-exist. In fact,
they ought to co-exist, and the knowledge of virtuous nature can
fully exist only through sense-knowledge. This is because the virtu-
ous nature ought to be realized in moral action, and moral action
is purposive in creating and accomplishing objective things, which
can be known only through the senses. So far as our knowledge of
virtuous nature is realized and expressed in the outer world
through sense-knowledge about outer things, the knowledge of
virtuous nature is taken as one, and sense-knowledge about outer
things varies according to the differences of things. We thus
have an actual exemplification of "one principle expressed (and
participated in) by different things." Since knowledge about outer
things is the necessary condition for the expression of our knowl-
edge of virtuous nature, it ought to be sought and stressed even
from the point of view of the knowledge of virtuous nature. Since
things known by sense-knowledge are all individuals, "investigation
of individual things one by one" is included in the teaching of the
"investigation of things" as expounded by Ch'eng I (1033-1107)
and Chu Hsi (1130-1200).
Furthermore, since these two kinds of knowledge are related
and are differentiated only by their directions as outer-oriented
and inner-oriented, what is known through them as "I as self-
conscious moral subject" and "individual things of the world"
should both be posited as really existing. Here we have four points
of view about the mutual transcendence and immanence between
the world and individual self.
First, when I am known by myself mainly through my sense-
knowledge as an individual existence, I then co-exist with other
outer things and persons in one objective world, and I as one
individual and all other individuals are immanent in one objective
world.
Second, if all outer things, including my body and other per-
sons and things known as outer things, are taken as nothing but
those known only through my sense and immanent in my world
of sense, and, if I am convinced also that I have knowledge of
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virtuous nature, which belongs to a higher level above my knowl-
edge of outer things, then I, as an individual self-conscious moral
subject, can be taken as transcendent to all things of the world
known as outer, and, similarly, can be looked upon as transcendent
to the whole outer world,
Third, from a higher point of view, I know also that I am not
the only individual self-conscious moral subject, and that other
individual persons whom I know through sense as existing in the
outer world are each actually having their knowledge of virtuous
nature, and each is an individual self-conscious moral subject as
well as I am; and I as an individual am known by others through
their sense and by being seen by them as existing in their outer
worlds also; therefore, I have to acknowledge their transcendence
to me and that I am immanent in their sense of the outer world.
Thus, I am immanent in the outer worlds of others, which are
transcendent to me.
Fourth, from a still higher point of view, we should have the
self-conviction that I know all that has just been said. I know that
each person has the same self-conscious moral mind and knowl-
edge of virtuous nature. I know also that I have to act toward
them with respect and love. I know all of these through the reason-
ing of my moral mind (also the rational mind), which is based on
the knowledge of my virtuous nature. Consequently, nothing is
transcendent to this reasoning of my moral mind, which is based on
the knowledge of my virtuous nature. Thus, the reasoning of my
moral mind is without doubt mine. However, this reasoning leads
me to the acknowledgment of others as having the same moral
mind, the same outer world, and the same reasoning as mine. It is,
then, a transcendental reasoning which leads me to transcend the
"very reasoning as only mine," and such reasoning should be taken
as self-transcending reasoning and not only as belonging to me but
also as revealed to me. Thus it may be taken as heavenly reasoning,
or the heavenly principle, as participated in by me and flowing in
my mind. As heavenly, the reasoning or principle is universal and
of the world as well as mine. It is revealed to me and participated
in by me as an individual, as well as revealed to, and participated in
by, any different individual who is a self-conscious mind or moral
subject, as I am. Hence, we have an ultimate belief in "one
principle" or "one reason" participated in by different individuals,
which is closely related to the above ideas about the nature of moral
mind, the knowledge of virtuous nature, and sense-knowledge.
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In conclusion, though the world and the individual are either
immanent or transcendent to each other from the different points
of view of different levels of thinking, they are ultimately included
as moments of one idea of an ultimate harmony of mind and
Heaven, or one vision of the ultimate harmony of the individual
and the world which expresses "one principle expressed by (or
participated in by) different things," as in the Ch'eng-Chu school.
As the fourth way of thinking about the individual and the
world is not denied explicitly by other schools of Chinese thought,
the relation of the individual subject and the objective world is
usually thought of by Chinese thinkers as in one ultimate harmony.
The Chinese translation of the words "subject" and "object" of
Indian and Western philosophy are "chu" and "pin," or ";en" and
"ching," or "chien' and "hsiang". Originally "chu" means host, and
"pin" means guest; "fen" means man, and "ching" means environ-
ment or things in vision; "chien" means seeing, and "hsiang" means
what is seen and taking the role of assisting in the seeing. The
three pairs of words are reciprocally complementary as in a har-
monious whole or a harmonious experience. Taking the subject as
host, the object is the guest who is invited and loved by the host
(this symbolizes the object's immanence in the subject), and also
respected and sent out by the host (this symbolizes the object's
transcendence to the subject). On the other hand, the world can
be seen also by the poets and philosophers as host, and then the
man (or I as an individual) is guest of the world and is entertained
by the hospitality of the world. It is quite clear that there is no
dualism between host and guest. This metaphor is the best symbol
for Chinese thought about the relation of the subjective individual
and the objective world as mutually immanent and transcendent
in an ultimate harmony.
QUESTION: In Section III of your paper you have quoted the say-
ings of Lin-chi I-hsiian and have translated the fourth sentence as
"I cancel neither the person (as subject) nor the world (as object)."
The same sentence is translated by Suzuki as "to make both the
subject and the object remain." Which of the two translations is
closer to the original, or do they both have the same meaning?
ANSWER: According to the Chinese original, Lin-chi I-hsiian used
the expression "ch'u-pu-to" in the fourth sentence, which means to
"cancel neither," as I have translated it. Suzuki's translation has
converted the negative sentence into a positive one, as if to "cancel
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neither" may imply to "assert both." Nevertheless, in the spirit of
Ch'an, a double negation does not necessarily imply an assertion;
therefore, to "not cancel" or to "cancel neither" may simply imply
the negation of canceling, and nothing more. So, I think my trans-
lation may be closer to the original.
QUESTION: You have classified Chinese thought about the indi-
vidual and the world according to four types, yet most of your illus-
trations are taken from the schools of pre-Ch'in philosophy. I would
like to know how you classify the different schools of Chinese Bud-
dhism of the Medieval Ages and Neo-Confucianism of the Sung-
Ming and Ch'ing dynasties according to these four categories.
ANSWER: The reason most of my illustrations of the categories
come from schools of the pre-Ch'in period is that the thoughts of
these schools are more original and purer in type, and their essential
ideas are more easily grasped. As to the classification of Chinese
Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism, the problem is somewhat com-
plicated. Roughly speaking, in the different schools of Buddhism,
the Madhyamika school, which takes sunyata as objectively per-
vading all individual things, is a way of thinking belonging to the
first category in a superseded form; the Vijiianavada school, which
begins with epistemological idealism and ends in a kind of ethical
idealism through the transformation of viifiiina, has to be classified
as beyond the individual and the world, and belongs therefore to
the third type. The schools of Hua-yen and T'ien-t'ai, which are
schools of Buddhism created by Chinese monks and which empha-
size, not only the teaching of co-existence of the one and the many,
of the world and the individual, but also their mutual inclusion and
interreHexive relations in a most comprehensive and subtle meta-
physical system, may be taken as a Buddhist version of the Chung
yung and The Book of Changes, and thus belong to the fourth
type.
After the Sung Dynasty, the thoughts of Chou Tun-i and
Chang Tsai, who take the cosmological approach to philosophy and
see man as part of the objective world, which is not pervaded
simply by sunyatii but exists objectively, belong to the first category.
The Lu-Wang school and the Ch'eng-Chu school are classified as
belonging to the second and third types, respectively, as explained
in my paper. Some thinkers of the Lu-Wang school, such as Yang
Chien and Wang Chi, who emphasize the sense of "beyond the self
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as individual ego and the world as opposite to the self," and some
forerunners of the Ch'eng-Chu school, such as Shao Yung, who, in
his philosophical poems expresses his pure contemplation of the
changes of the universe without recognition of the individual or
the world, are all of the third type of thinking.
At the end of the Ming Dynasty and the beginning of the
Ch'ing Dynasty, there was Wang Fu-chih, who went back to
Chang Tsai's way of thinking and emphasized the status of the
individual against the background of an objective, natural, histori-
cal world. Tai Chen, Yen Yuan, and many scholars of the Ch'ing
Dynasty all laid emphasis on the knowledge of individual things as
objectively determined by their spatio-temporal locations, their ac-
tual functions of and relations to other things of the world, and
thus encouraged the study of history, ancient classics, and historical
remains. It seems that, in the later period of the Ch'ing Dynasty,
the profound Chinese philosophical wisdom sank to acceptance of
what is actually existing in the objective historical world. The
reason the historical materialism of Marx and Engels could conquer
the mind of recent China is that it takes advantage of this trend of
thought, though the other three typical ways of thinking in tradi-
tional philosophy will come back again, according to the historical
fluctuations of Chinese thought.
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WING-TSIT CHAN The Individual
in Chinese Religions
THERE ARE conflicting phenomena in Chinese religions, espe-
cially where the individual is concerned. On the one hand, in
popular religions the life of the individual is strongly influenced,
if not controlled, by his ancestors and other spiritual beings. In
ancestor worship, his duty is to serve the deceased, and he sub-
merges himself in group ancestral rites, in which the spirit of the
ancestor is central. He believes in fate, which is beyond his control.
The government used to regulate the number of temples, appoint
and dismiss priests, and even promote or demote the gods he
worshipped. On the philosophical level, the Confucianist aspires
to be one with Heaven; the Taoist aims at identification with
Nature "without differentiation"; and the Buddhist hopes to enter
nirvana, where all individual characteristics and differences dis-
appear.
On the other hand, aside from ancestral rites, group worship
has never been an institution in China, worship being largely a
personal matter. Even in religious festivals, worship is individual.
There has never been a central religious authority to dictate to
conscience, regulate the beliefs, or control the destiny of the indi-
vidual. National religious organizations were unknown until 1929,
when the Chinese Buddhist Society was established. That organiza-
tion was entirely for the purpose of the protection of temple
properties and for social and intellectual reforms, however, and had
nothing to do with personal beliefs or practices. It was not intended
to be a national church. In the Taoist religion, there was not even
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an attempt at a national organization until 1958, when the National
Taoist Society was formed in Peking, obviously for political con-
trol. The so-called Heavenly Teacher, presumably the head of the
Taoist religion, had no more than local contact with Taoist priests
and had very little influence over the faithful. His very title implies
that he was custodian of a body of religious knowledge but was not
an arbiter of morals or an authoritative spiritual leader. The last
Heavenly Teacher merely conducted a school in the bastion of
the religion, the Dragon and Tiger Mountain area in Chiangsi,
and acted as an astrologer and a miracle performer, believed by
some to be able to "command the wind and produce the rain."
The Taoist or Buddhist priest was essentially a technician and a
consultant whose duty it was to advise on and to perform cere-
monies, usually for a consideration. He was in no sense an agent
of the worshipper before the gods or a link between them. The
worshipper's approach to the gods was his own-direct, individual,
and personal.
These facts clearly show that there are conflicts in the Chinese
religious picture, particularly with respect to the individual. How-
ever, these conflicts are more apparent than real. When the
fundamental aspects of Chinese religious life and thought are un-
derstood, these conflicts will be resolved.
The best way to understand the status of the individual in
Chinese religions is to see, first, what the goal in Chinese religions
is; secondly, the way to achieve that goal; and, thirdly, the position
of the individual in relation to ultimate reality, namely, Heaven in
Confucianism, Tao in Taoism, and NirviiT}a, or' Thusness, in
Buddhism.
The Goal of Self-Realization
Like any other people, the Chinese aim at many things in
their religious beliefs and practices, but their ultimate goal is sim-
ply the survival of the individual and the realization of his nature.
Historically, the question of survival came first-we shall consider
it later.
From the very early days of Chinese history, the Chinese be-
lieved in personal survival. Records found in the oracle bones dating
back to the Shang Dynasty (1751-1112 B.C.) contain numerous
references to sacrifices to ancestors, with offerings of food and other
daily necessities and luxuries. Daily utensils and, in extreme cases,
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their bodyguards or even concubines were buried with them so that
they could be served. These sacrifices, however barbaric, clearly
indicate a definite belief in individual survival after death. Grad-
ually the concept of the Highest God, Ti, or the Lord, developed.
The interesting thing is that illustrious ancestors were believed to
co-exist with Ti in Heaven. As The Book of Odes says of the
founder of the Chou Dynasty (1111-256 B.C.), "King Wen is above
On the left and right of the Lord." 1
During the Chou Dynasty, another practice became common,
that of recalling the soul of the individual. Mter a person died, his
family immediately went up to the roof and, waving some of his
clothing, called, "So-and-so, please come back," and then descended
to the house to offer him food.2 The assumption was that the man's
soul ascended to the sky and could return to receive the offerings.
Ancient Chinese literature, especially that of the fifth and fourth
centuries B.C., is fairly rich in essays and poems devoted to recalling
the soul. The soul is called "hun-p'o." According to ancient belief,
at death a white (p'o) light leaves the human body and joins
the moon's light. To this was later added the concept of hun,
which etymologically includes the element of yiin (cloud), which
is more active than light. Thus, according to the traditional theory,
hun is the soul of man's vital force, which is expressed in man's
intelligence and his power of breathing, whereas p'o is the spirit
of man's physical nature expressed in his body and his physical
movements. At death, hun-p'0 survives.
This strong belief in personal survival after death certainly
affirmed the importance of the individual after death, but at the
same time tended to undermine his importance before death. In
the Shang Dynasty no important activity was undertaken without
first obtaining the approval of spiritual beings. Holes would be
drilled halfway through the oracle bones. They would then be
thrown into fire, and priests would interpret the message of spiritual
beings by the cracks.
This practice continued into the Chou Dynasty, which suc-
ceeded the Shang, but a radical change began to take place. The
new dynasty needed human talents to build a new state. When
irrigation produced more water than prayer for rain, man naturally
assumed an increasing importance over spiritual beings. Man came
to the fore, and spiritual beings were kept more and more at a
distance. As The Book of Rites says, "The people of Yin (Shang)
honored spiritual beings, served them, and put them ahead of
THE INDIVIDUAL IN CHINESE RELIGIONS 289
ceremonies. . . . The people of Chou honored ceremonies and
valued highly the conferring of honors. They served the spiritual
beings and respected them, but kept them at a distance." 3
This trend was highly accentuated by Confucius (551-479
B.C.). He would not discuss spiritual beings.4 He told one of his
pupils that "to honor spiritual beings and keep them at a distance
may be regarded as wisdom." 5 When he was asked about serving
spiritual beings, he replied, "If we are not yet able to serve man,
how can we serve spiritual beings," and, "If we do not yet know
about life, how can we know about death?" 6 Actually, Confucius
neither denied the existence of spiritual beings nor ignored an-
cestors. He declared, "How abundant is the display of power of
spiritual beings. . . . Like the spread of overHowing water, they
seem to be above and to be on the left and on the right." 7
He taught people "to serve the dead as they were served
while alive, and [to] serve the departed as they were served while
still with us." "This is the height of filial piety," he added.s But his
way of serving was radically different from the traditional. Even
during his lifetime there were two cases of human sacrifice.9 He
bitterly denounced such an inhuman practice and even the use of
dummies to bury with the dead.10 What he wanted was to replace
such barbaric customs with moral principles and social decorum.
He urged his pupils to serve parents according to the rules of
propriety while they are alive, bury them according to the rules
of propriety when they die, and sacrifice to them after death ac-
cording to the rules of propriety.u Since his emphasis was on rules
of propriety, spiritual beings came to occupy a secondary position.
In this way, whether Confucius meant to or not, he weakened, if
not destroyed, the belief in personal survival after death.
But the chief rivals of the ancient Confucianists, notably the
Moists of the fifth and fourth centuries B,C., strongly attacked them
and upheld the belief in spiritual beings. Mo Tzu (H. 468-376 B.C.)
defended the belief on the grounds that people had actually heard
the voices of spiritual beings, that their existence had been re-
corded, and that belief in spiritual beings was helpful to personal
conduct and national peace.12 In his basic doctrine of promotion
of welfare and removal of evil, he always insisted that what was
beneficial to Heaven, spiritual beings, and man is good.13 Although
he never proved the existence of spiritual beings, nowhere else in
ancient China was the belief in personal immortality more strongly
held.
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Eventually, this belief grew in two different directions, namely,
in the Taoist religion and in Buddhism. The Taoists wanted im-
mortality on earth, while the Buddhists wanted it in paradise.
Eventually, this belief grew in two different directions, namely,
in the Taoist religion and in Buddhism. The Taoists wanted im-
mortality on earth, while the Buddhists wanted it in paradise.
The Taoist search for earthly immortality goes back to antiq-
uity. Chuang Tzu (b. 369 B.C.) mentioned immortals.14 From the
first to the sixth century, Taoist priests pushed this search with
great effort. They practiced alchemy, promoted exercises, devel-
oped medicine, and delved into breathing, concentration, and sex
techniques, all in an attempt to achieve immortality on earth.
Until recently, to become immortals remained a fervent hope for
many of the faithful in the Taoist religion.
In about the same period, Buddhism began to flourish in
China. One of its greatest attractions to the Chinese was its prom-
ise of eternal life in paradise, for there had been no such idea in
China. The belief in paradise was especially strong in the Pure
Land school founded in China in the fourth century. It has been
the most popular Buddhist sect in China for the last 800 years,
testifying to the strong belief in and the earnest hope on the part
of millions of Chinese for rebirth in the Pure Land. So far as the
masses are concerned, there is no question that the individual con-
tinues to live after death.
The story with the intellectuals, however, has been entirely
different. With a few exceptions, such as the Moists, they have
been consistent in rejecting belief in personal survival after death.
In the first century A.D., Wang Ch'ung (27-100?), one of the
most rationalistic and critical philosophers in Chinese history, and
one of the most influential, wrote a treatise to disprove the existence
of spiritual beings. He argued that "the dead do not become spirit-
ual beings, do not possess consciousness, and cannot harm people." 15
'When a person dies," he said, "his blood becomes exhausted. With
this, his vital forces are extinct, and his body decays and becomes
ashes and dust. What is there to become a spiritual being?" 16
Furthermore, "If a spiritual being is really the spirit of a dead
man, then, when people see it, they ought to see the form of a
nude.... Why? Because garments have no spirit." 17 He offered
other reasons against the existence of spiritual beings. While they
sound very naive, for almost 2,000 years no one in Chinese history
has successfully refuted him.
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Just as Wang Ch'ung criticized the traditional belief in spirit-
ual beings, Fan Chen (b. 450) attacked the Buddhist belief. He
argued that physical form and spirit were identical and that, as
the physical form disappears, so does the spirit, as the sharpness
of a knife disappears with the knife.1s Later, Neo-Confucianists,
from the twelfth century on have unanimously attacked both the
Taoist and the Buddhist belief in everlasting life. Wang Yang-ming
(1472-1529), for example, said, "The Buddhists lure people into
their way of life by the promise of escape from the cycle of life
and death, and the Taoists, who seek immortality, do so with the
promise of everlasting life." 19 To him, as to other Neo-Confucian-
ists, the motivation is selfish and immoral. For them, as for Chinese
intellectuals from the sixth century B.C. on, immortality consists
in social immortality, or immortality of influence. When the ques-
tion was asked in 546 B.C. about what the ancient saying, "dead
but immortal," meant, the answer was that "the best course is to
establish virtue, the next best is to establish achievement, and still
the next best is to establish words. When these are abandoned
with time, this may be called immortality." 20 Confucius certainly
contributed to this feeling, and it has been the feeling of the
intellectuals ever since.
Does this mean that the intellectuals reject the individual?
Not in the least. They, like the masses, firmly believe in the central
importance of the individual, but in another way, namely, full
realization of one's nature, instead of everlasting life on earth or
eternal existence in paradise. .
The Confucianists were the first in ancient China to propagate
the doctrine of fulfillment of human nature. Mencius (371-298?
B.C.) said, "He who exerts his mind to the utmost knows his nature.
He who knows his nature knows Heaven. To preserve one's mind
and to nourish one's nature is the way to serve Heaven. Not to
allow any double-mindedness regardless of longevity or brevity of
life, but to cultivate one's person and wait for destiny (ming, fate,
Heaven's Decree or Mandate) to take its own course is the way
to fulfill one's destiny." 21 This doctrine reached its zenith in the
Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi (1130-1200) and has remained cen-
tral in the Confucian tradition. Ch'eng I (1033-1107) said, "The
investigation of principle to the utmost, the full development of
one's nature, and the fulfillment of destiny are one thing. As prin-
Ciple is investigated to the utmost, one's nature is fully developed,
and, as one's nature is fully developed, one's destiny is fulfilled." 22
. i
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His brother, Ch'eng Hao (1032-1085), said, "The investigation of
principle to the utmost, the full development of one's nature,
and the fulfillment of one's destiny-these three are to be accom-
plished simultaneously. There is basically no time sequence
among them. The investigation of principle to the utmost should
not be regarded merely as a matter of knowledge. If one really
investigates principle to the utmost, even one's nature and destiny
can be fulfilled." 23 Chu Hsi considered preserving the mind and
nourishing one's nature, and cultivating and controlling them, to
be "the fundamental task," and it must be thorough.24
This trend of thought finds its modern expression in the con-
temporary Neo-Confucianism of Professor Fung Yu-lan (1890- )
and Hsiung Shih-li (1885- ). Fung said, "People in the moral
sphere fulfill human relations and human duties. In doing so, they
investigate human principle to the utmost and fulfill human nature.
People in the transcendental sphere serve Heaven and assist in the
natural transformation of things. In doing so they investigate the
principle of the universe and fulfill the nature of the universe. . ..
To penetrate the mysteries and to know the transformation of the
universe are to complete the work of the universe. . . . And this
is serving Heaven." 25 Hsiung has expressed the same idea suc-
cinctly, saying, "One's self-nature is true and real. There is no
need to search for a heavenly Lord outside oneself. One can de-
velop one's own nature to the fullest extent. One need not desire
nirviiTJa." 26
The word "hsing," meaning the nature of man and things, is
not mentioned in the Lao Tzu, but it runs through the Chuang
Tzu.27 In both, the ultimate goal is to preserve the essence and
vitality of man. Consequently, in the Taoist religion the aim is to
realize the Three Original Principles-Essence, Vital Force, and
Spirit. From the third through the seventh century, both the devel-
opment of ideas and the practice of alchemy were directed to this
goal. In the Southern school of the Taoist religion, the emphasis is
on the cultivation of one's nature, while in the Northern school it
is on the cultivation and development of one's vital power.28 This
is one reason why the Taoist religion has paid special attention to
the human body. It has promoted exercises, refined Chinese cook-
ing, and developed medicine, all dedicated to the fulfillment of
human nature.
In Buddhism, the idea of the realization of one's nature was
not prominent. In the quest for rebirth in paradise, the chief
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methods were to repeat the name of the Buddha and to express
faith by making offerings, reciting scripture, etc. The Buddhists
said, "Take refuge in the Buddha." While the ultimate objective,
rebirth in paradise, was centered on the individual, the method
certainly was not. In the seventh century, a revolt arose and de-
manded the shift to self-effort, and that was the realization of one's
own nature.
The movement was led, or probably started by Hui-neng
(638-713), generally regarded as the founder of the Southern
school of Buddhist Meditation (Ch'an, or Zen). In his famous
Platform Scripture, he emphatically urged his followers to take
refuge in the nature within oneself instead of taking refuge in the
buddhas outside, for what is called the great wisdom by which to
reach the Pure Land is nothing but this self-nature, and all bud-
dhas, all dharmas (elements of existence), and all scriptures are
immanent in it. Reading scriptures, building temples, doing char-
itable acts, making offerings, reciting the name of the Buddha,
and praying to be reborn in the Pure Land are all useless. The
Pure Land is nothing but the straightforward mind. If one sees
his own nature, he said, one will become a buddha.29
The Way to Self-Realization
So far we have dealt with the goal of self-realization in
Chinese religions and have said something about the way to
achieve that goal, but much more can be added. Each of the three
religions has its own way, but in each case the way can be summed
up in one word, namely, vacuity (hsii) in Taoism, calmness (ting)
in Buddhism, and sincerity (ch'eng) in Confucianism.
The term "vacuity" (sometimes translated as "emptiness") is
not to be taken in the literal sense of being empty. Rather, it means
absolute peacefulness and purity of mind and freedom from selfish
desires and not being disturbed by incoming impressions or allow-
ing what is already in the mind to disturb what is coming into
the mind. As a feature of reality, it means a profound and deep
continuum in which there is no obstruction. Lao Tzu taught people
to "keep their minds vacuous," "attain complete vacuity," and
"maintain steadfast quietude" in order to become enlightened and
to be in accord with Tao. SO Elaborating on this theme, Chuang Tzu
said, "Do not be the possessor of fame. Do not be the storehouse
of schemes. Do not take over the function of things. Do not be the
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master of knowledge [to manipulate things]. Personally realize the
infinite to the highest degree and travel in the realm for which
there is no sign. Exercise fully what you have received from Nature,
without any subjective viewpoint. In a word, be absolutely
vacuous." 31 Chuang Tzu called this state of vacuity "fasting of the
mind." 32 Later, in the Taoist religion, quiet sitting, which is Taoist
"fasting of the mind," re-enforced by Buddhist meditation, became
an institution. It was the Taoists' chief way of preserving one's
nature and nourishing the spirit.
For a similar reason, the Buddhists advocated calmness. In
The Platform Scripture, Hui-neng repeatedly asserted that one's
self-nature is originally pure, and when one becomes calm he will
see this pure nature and attain buddhahood. Calmness will be
achieved when one is freed from thoughts, from the characters of
things, and from attachment to them. This does not mean not to
think at all or to have nothing to do with the characters of things.
Rather, it means not to be carried away by thoughts in the process
of thought, to be free from the characters of things while in the
midst of them.33 Thus, the conventional method of sitting in medi-
tation, in which one attempts to eliminate thoughts, is not good.
One should not sit motionless trying to look at his own mind or his
own purity.34 Imperturbability is not motionlessness but freedom
from attachment t-J erroneous thought.35 When no erroneous
thoughts arise, there is calmness, and, when one's inner nature is
unperturbed, there is true meditation.36 If one sees his own nature,
he will become enlightened, that is, achieve buddhahood, suddenly.
This is the new and radical doctrine of sudden enlightenment
of the Ch'an school. One can easily detect the Taoist elements of
naturalness and individualism in this doctrine, but the Ch'an school
has pushed the individual element much further. One of the most
famous sayings of Ch'an is, "Everyone will be self-contained, and
everyone will be perfectly realized." 37
This Ch'an saying should remind one of Mencius' well-known
sayings. "All things are already complete in oneself' and "All men
may be Yao and Shun [sages]." 38 In the Confucian school, the
doctrine of self-realization is just as strong and was developed
much earlier. There the method is neither vacuity nor calmness but
sincerity. The thesis is very simple. When one's will becomes sin-
cere, one's feelings will be correct and one's moral life will be
perfect. As said in The Great Learning, attributed to the Confucian
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pupil Tseng Tzu (50S-ca. 436 B.C.), 'When the will is sincere, the
mind is rectified; when the mind is rectified, the personal life is
cultivated; when the personal life is cultivated, the family will be
regulated; when the family is regulated, the state will be in order;
and, when the state is in order, there will be peace throughout
the world." 39
The Doctrine of the Mean, attributed to Confucius' grandson
Tzu-ssu (492-431 B.C.), goes even further. It says, "Only those who
are absolutely sincere can fully develop their nature. If they can
fully develop their nature, they can then fully develop the nature
of others. If they can fully develop the nature of others, they can
then fully develop the nature of things. If they can fully develop
the nature of things, they can then assist in the transforming and
nourishing process of Heaven and Earth. If they can assist in the
transforming and nourishing process of Heaven and Earth, they can
thus form a trinity with Heaven and Earth." 40
The reason for the all-importance of sincerity is that it makes
things real. Significantly, the word "ch'eng" means both sincerity
and realness. It contains as its basic element ch'eng, an independent
word meaning "to complete." According to The Doctrine of the
Mean, "Sincerity means the completion of the self, and the Way
is self-directing. Sincerity is the beginning and end of things. With-
out sincerity there would be nothing." 41 As Chu Hsi explains it,
"In the moral realm, there can be the deed of filial piety only if
there is first of all the mind sincerely devoted to it." 42 "If every
word comes from the bottom of one's heart," he said, "what is said
is true. On the other hand, if one tells a lie, what he says amounts
to nothing. This is why it is said that sincerity is the completion of
things." 43 Wang Yang-ming also said that, if there is sincerity in
being filially pious to one's parents, filial piety will take care of itself.
One of the most important passages in his Instructions for Practical
Living says, "If it is the mind that is sincere in its filial piety to
parents, then in the winter it will naturally think of the cold of
parents and seek a way to provide warmth for them, and in the
summer it will naturally think of the heat of parents and seek a
way to provide coolness for them. These are all offshoots of the
mind that is sincere in its filial piety." 44
But sincerity is not only the way to realize one's own moral
nature, but also to realize the nature of things. The Doctrine of
the Mean says, "Sincerity is not only the completion of one's own
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self; it is that by which all things are completed." 45 Thus, sincerity
has a metaphysical meaning. Perhaps the best illustration for it,
so far as we here are concerned, is religious sacrifice.
Curiously enough, Confucius had very little to say about sin-
cerity in The Analects. The word hardly occurs there. However, it
is recorded there that, when he offered sacrifice to his ancestors,
he felt as if the ancestral spirits were actually present. When he
offered sacrifice to other spiritual beings, he felt as if they were
actually present. He said, "If I do not participate in the sacrifice,
it is as if I did not sacrifice at all!'' 46 Commentators agree that what
Confucius wanted was to be sincere. As Chu Hsi remarked, "This
means that, when it is time to offer sacrifice, if one cannot do so
personally because of one reason or another, but asks someone else
to do it for him, it will be impossible for him to extend his sincerity
to the point of feeling that the spiritual beings are actually there." 47
In the case of Confucius, the idea is that he was so sincere that,
when he offered sacrifices to spiritual beings, he felt as if they were
really there.
Sincerity, however, not only makes spiritual beings seem real
to the person who offers the sacrifice, but also makes the spiritual
beings themselves real. To explain this, we have to explain what
spiritual beings are.
The Chinese words for spiritual beings are "kuei" and "shen."
Etymologically, "kuei' means "to return to the source," and "shen"
means "to expand," but in ancient times, and for the masses even
today, "kuei-shen" means merely spiritual beings. We have seen
how important they were in the Shang Dynasty, how Confucius
avoided discussing them, and how Chinese intellectuals have per-
sistently denied their existence for the last two thousand years. To
them, kuei and shen are cosmic forces, more especially the activity
of the negative cosmic force, yin, and the positive cosmic force,
yang. As the Neo-Confucianist Chang Tsai (1020-1077) put it,
"Kuei and shen are but the spontaneous activity of the two material
forces (ch'i) ," that is, yin and yang.48 In the Neo-Confucian view,
everything is the product of the interaction of these two material
forces. In the case of the human being, for example, innumerable
elements of the two forces integrate, culminating in the father and
the mother, and a person is born. As these elements disintegrate,
he dies, and the material forces return to where they came from or
expand. He has ceased to exist as a human being, and does not
continue to exist as a ghost, but his forces continue to operate. This
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is the philosophical basis of the theory that sincerity can make the
objects of religious sacrifice real.
Confucius said in The Doctrine of the Mean, "How abundantly
do spiritual beings display the powers that belong to them! We
look at them, but do not see them. We listen to them, but do not
hear them. Yet, they enter all things, and there is nothing without
them. They cause all the people in the kingdom to fast and purify
themselves, and array themselves in their richest clothing, in order
to attend their sacrifice. Then, like overflowing water, they seem
to be above the heads and on the right and left of their worshippers.
The Book of Odes says, "The coming of spiritual beings cannot be
surmised. How much less can we get tired of them.' 49 Such is the
impossibility of suppressing the outgoing of sincerity." 50 To the
Neo-Confucianists, this does not mean that there are ghosts that
go around and possess things. Rather, it means that the forces that
used to constitute ancestors pervade everything. Sincerity can cause
them to interact and integrate, even to the point of being like
real persons.
Chu Hsi was once asked whether, in sacrificing to Heaven,
Earth, and the spirits of mountains and rivers with offerings of
silk, meat, and wine, it was merely to express one's sincerity or
whether some force actually comes to receive the sacrifice. He an-
swered, "If you say that nothing comes, then why sacrifice? What
is it that is so solemn above that causes people to make offerings
with awe and reverence? But, if you say that some spirit comes
riding in a chariot, that is just wild talk." 51 What he meant was
that, while no force comes like a ghost, certain forces are affected
by one's sincerity, and so they react as if spiritual beings were
coming to accept the sacrifice. In other words, although the forces
of ancestors have scattered, one can, through his will to practice
sincerity, cause them to come together.
The reason this is possible is that the material force of one
thing is basically the same as the material force of another. The
material forces of yin and yang interact, and integrate and dis-
integrate, in countless ways, thus producing an infinite number of
things, but the material forces of these things are essentially the
same. This being the case, there is a continuity between the one
who offers the sacrifice and the object of his sacrifice. As Chu Hsi
said, ancestors and descendants share the same material forces. 52
There is not only common blood. There is also the family heritage,
which is also a kind of force combining ancestors and descendants.53
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The continuity of a family is very much like the sea, to use Chu
Hsi's analogy. Each generation is comparable to a wave. The wave
in the front and the wave behind are different, and yet the water
pervading both is one.54 Just as the wave behind can affect the
wave in front, so people offering sacrifice to ancestors can affect
them.
In the act of sacrifice, then, if sincerity is extended to the
utmost, the spirit of the ancestors can be collected. This means
that the condition of the spirit of one's ancestors depends very
much on one's sincerity. Chu Hsi said, "Wherever the human mind
concentrates, there is the spirit." 55 As another Neo-Confucianist
put it, "When there is sincerity, there will be the spirit. When
there is no sincerity, there will not be the spirit." 56 A third Neo-
Confucianist even went so far as to say, 'Whenever we want spirit,
there it will be. Whenever we do not want spirit, there it will
not be." 57
The Individual in Relation to Ultimate Reality
From the foregoing, it is clear that Chinese religions are based
on the sincerity of the will, and that means the individual's own
will. In this sense the individual is of great importance in Chinese
religions. The question inevitably arises, however, since the goal
of self-realization and its methods of vacuity, calmness, and sin-
cerity are only for the ultimate purpose of serving Heaven in the
case of Confucianists, identification with Nature, or Tao, in the case
of Taoists, and buddhahood in the case of Buddhists, does this not
mean that in the ultimate state, whether it is Heaven, Tao, or
nirviil.w, the individual is in the end dissolved or absorbed, since
in that state all distinctions and differences, and thereby all in-
dividuality, disappear? This is the question of the relationship be-
tween the undifferentiated continuum, so to speak, and the specific,
individual, differentiated units. In other words, it is the question
of the relationship between the one and the many, a basic question
in Chinese philosophy, of which religion may be regarded as only
a part. It is not within the scope of this paper to go into this
question at length. Suffice it to say that in all the three systems,
Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, the solution of the apparent
conflict between the one and the many is essentially the same,
namely, that each involves the other. In none of the three systems is
the one understood as absorbing and thereby obliterating the many,
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or vice versa. The common conviction has been that each requires
the other.
In Taoism, the question arose with the Neo-Taoists, notably
Wang Pi (226-249) and Kuo Hsiang (d. 312). To Wang Pi, ulti-
mate reality is original non-being (pen-wu). According to his
thinking, which is developed in his Commentary on the Lao Tzu,
original non-being transcends all distinctions and descriptions. It is
the One, pure and simple, which underlines and combines all
things. To Kuo Hsiang, on the other hand, ultimate reality is
Nature. According to him, things exist and transform according to
principle, but each and every thing has its own principle. This
doctrine is fully developed in his Commentary on the Chuang Tzu.
His emphasis is the many rather than the one. He and Wang Pi
seem to stand at opposite poles, with no possibility of reconciliation.
But the many of Kuo Hsiang all function according to principle,
and, for Wang Pi, both function and substance, that is, the one
and the many, are identified. The one and the many are not
mutually exclusive, after all.58
The point is more clearly made in the Buddhist view, in
which the one and the many explicitly involve and penetrate each
other. In his famous treatise on the golden lion, Fa-tsang (643-
712) says, "The gold and the lion are mutually compatible in their
fonnation, the one and the many not obstructing each other. In
this situation, the principle and the facts are different, but, whether
the one or the many, each remains in its own position. This is called
the gate of mutual compatibility and difference bet~veen the one
and the many." 59 That is to say, in the case of the golden lion, the
lion and every part of it involve the gold, and, at the same time,
the gold involves the lion. Neither can exist without the other in
the golden lion. Fa-tsang was using this simple and crude analogy
to explain the one and the many, or the individual person and
buddhahood. When the Ch'an school reiterates that all people have
buddhahood in them or that the Buddha and the common people
are not different, they are expressing the same idea.
The Buddhists had a decided influence on the Neo-Confucian-
ists, whose solution of the seeming conflict between the one and
the many follows the same pattern. The founder of Neo-Confucian-
ism, Chou Tun-i (1017-1073), said, "The many are ultimately one,
and the one is actually differentiated into the many. The one and
many each has its own correct state of being. The great and the
small each has its definite function." GO This is the famous Neo-
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Confucian doctrine that principle is one but its manifestations are
many. As Ch'eng I said, "Principle in the world is one. Although
there are many roads in the world, the destination is the same,
and, although there area hundred deliberations, the result is one.61
Although things involve many manifestations and events go through
infinite variations, when they are united by the one, there cannot
be any contradiction." 62 In Chu Hsi's words, "Fundamentally, there
is only one Great Ultimate [the sum total of principles], yet each
of the myriad things has been endowed with it and each in itself
possesses the Great Ultimate in its entirety. This is similar to the
fact that there is only one moon in the sky, but, when its light is
scattered upon rivers and lakes, it can be seen everywhere. It
cannot be said that the moon has been split." 63 Chu Hsi seems to
be arguing for the oneness of principle, but it must not be for-
gotten that he said that each thing has in itself the Great Ultimate.
One is reminded of Leibniz' monad. Chu Hsi's analogy of the
moon is probably a specific, though indirect, borrowing of the
famous Buddhist metaphor of the ocean. The Buddhists, especially
of the Hua-yen school, were fond of saying that the ocean consists
of many waves, and the many waves form the ocean, each involving
the other, and one cannot be fully realized without the other's
being fully realized also.
This metaphysical principle definitely lies behind the ancestral
group-rites, for example. These rites involved all male descendants
of an ancestor, each in his proper position according to seniority
of generation and age, and performing under the direction of a
master of ceremony, who was often a scholar in the clan. These
rites were traditionally directed by the head of descent of the clan,
but he was neither an authority nor an agent, but a symbol of the
unity of the clan. It may be argued that, since the scattered forces
of the ancestor required the total sincerity of the whole clan before
there could be enough influence on them to gather, the head of
descent was an authority insofar as he was a necessity. It is cer-
tainly true that he was a necessity, but the necessity was socio-
logical rather than religious. The system of heads of descent goes
back to Chou times. By the eleventh century, it had ceased to
function. Neo-Confucianists, such as Ch'eng I, strongly urged its
revival. He said, "In order to control the mind of the people, unify
one's clan, and enrich social customs so that people will not forget
their origin, it is necessary to clarify genealogy, group members
of the clan together, and institute a system of heads of descent." 64
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His interest was mainly sociological. While in these rites the clan
acted as a group, each person had his unique place and function,
and his sincerity toward his ancestor was personal and direct.
Government regulations and control of temples, priests, and
even gods were not regular practices, nor did they have any direct
relationships with the individual's religious beliefs and behavior.
The measures were mostly economic and political, treating temples,
priests, and even gods as civil matters. Undoubtedly there were
abuses and corruption. But, even in these matters, there is some-
thing very interesting, philosophically speaking. For instance, only
a higher official could promote or demote an inferior deity. The
assumption was that, just as waves can affect the ocean, so human
beings can influence the spiritual world, and in this case it happens
that the human force is greater than that of the spirit. From the
earliest times, it was the rule that the emperor worshipped Heaven,
the feudal lords worshipped the spirits of mountains and rivers,
higher officials worshipped the Rve deities, and the common people
worshipped their ancestors. Scholars are not agreed what the Rve
deities were. Up to the end of the Manchu (Ch'ing) Dynasty
(1644-1912) the emperor alone could offer sacriRce to Heaven.
During the Republic, President Yuan Shih-k'ai (1858-1916) once
tried it. It has been suggested that the system shows that the
Chinese believed simply that spiritual beings lived in exactly the
same manner as human beings, so that, as there is a need for an
official hierarchy in this world, so there must be one among the
gods. This may well have been the case. But the philosophical
implication is that Heaven required the sincerity of the whole state,
of which the emperor was the symbol, to be activated. In other
words, in religious worship, there is a correspondence, even in
rank, between the worshipper and the worshipped. Put differently,
the two parties are equally important.
What can we say about the belief in fate? Here it seems the
influence comes from only one side. It is certainly true that many
ignorant people believe that their lives are directed by spiritual
forces beyond their understanding or control. In their ignorance
and ineptitude, they have failed to realize the mutual influence of
the one and the many. The educated, however, understand that
ming does not mean fate in the sense of mysterious control by
spiritual beings but means Heaven's Mandate, or Heaven's Decree,
that is, what Heaven has given to a person, what Heaven has
endowed him with. This is what The Doctrine of the Mean means
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when it says, "What Heaven imparts (ming) to man is called hu-
man nature." 65 This is the nature to be realized, and the way to
realize it, as already brought out, is through one's own effort at
moral cultivation, such as sincerity of will. This does not mean that
the individual is the master of the universe, for there are things,
such as life and death, and longevity or brevity of life, that are
beyond his control. But, as we have learned from Mencius,66 the
Confucian injunction has been to cultivate one's moral life, develop
one's nature, and let Nature take its course. The individual does
not completely control his own destiny, but he is the master of
his own ship in a sea that is not entirely devoid of uncertainties.
QUESTION: Is sincerity a material substance?
ANSWER: No. The translation of "ch'i" as material force is most
unfortunate. The word ch'i involves, not material substance, but
some force. It is translated as "breath" or "vital force" when related
to the body. But when you talk about the ch'i of the universe,
you cannot call it "breath" or "vital force." Ch'i in the universe is
negative or positive force, or yin or yang, conditioned by material
elements.
QUESTION: You say, "The Buddhist hopes to enter mrvaIJa,
where all individual characteristics and differences disappear." But
later you say, "In none of the three systems is the one understood
as absorbing and thereby annihilating the many." Perhaps there is
no conflict here, but some people might think that the Buddhists
say that there is a change in China. Is that what you had in mind?
ANSWER: There was a change. In an earlier stage, nirviilJa
meant a state in which everything is transcended. But in the Hua-
yen, or Kegon, school, which is based on the Avatamsaka-sutra,
there was a distinctly Chinese development. This school developed
the idea of the correlation of the one and the many. They penetrate
each other.
QUESTION: Sometimes you use the word "fate," but sometimes
you use "destiny." In English the word "fate" normally implies that
life is somewhat blind, but on the whole nobody speaks of destiny
as being blind. Now, which of the two would you like, or do you
have both?
ANSWER: The word "ming" has not only both of these meanings
but also the meaning of the verb to order, to give, to endow. To
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the ignorant, the uncertainty leads to superstitions. For them, the
word "ming" should be translated as "fate." But, to the educated,
the scholars, the word "ming" means "fate" only to the extent of
covering life and death and the length and the shortness of life. It
also covers success and failure, but not success and failure in the
sense that we cannot do anything, but only ultimate success or
failure. The general sense of "ming" is that, if you know what your
nature is and if you do your best, you can fulfill it. The idea is that
anybody trying his best can become a sage. In that sense, the word
"ming" should be translated as "destiny."
QUESTION: What is the status of the individual woman in Chi-
nese religious thought?
ANSWER: SO far as salvation is concerned, woman is absolutely
on a par with man. There has never been the idea that a woman
could not become an immortal, or enter paradise.
QUESTION: Just what is the status of the individual in Chinese
religion? You have spoken of individual perfection or the perfection
of the capacities of human nature. Besides individual perfection,
is there any sU,ch thing in Chinese religion as individual immor-
tality? That is, if I were a sage and of perfect nature, when I die,
will I completely disappear? Will I be immortal only through my
influence on my society? So, religiously considered, is there any
such thing in Chinese thought as individual immortality of the
perfect sage? .
ANSWER: For the uneducated there is belief in individual im-
mortality, but immortality does not mean a ghost living in paradise,
but social immortality, or immortality of influence.
QUESTION: The individual is eternal in the view of immortality
in all the major religions, Hindu, Muslim, Christian. What about
China?
ANSWER: The individual is neither eternal nor non-eternal in
the absolute sense. He is a combination of many elements. The
combination changes from time to time, most radically at what
we call birth and death. But, even at death, certain things continue,
like influence, work, children. A sage can organize the various ele-
ments in him and make himself into a perfect harmony, which can
last for a long time, not in a physical sense, but in the sense of the
influence of the individual.
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QUESTION: How individual?
ANSWER: Confucius, for instance, is still considered to be living,
not as a living person, but a living force.
You see, the idea of life among Chinese thinkers is not just
one's body. We live not only as oneself but also as fathers to our
children or as sons to our fathers. We live as members of society.
We live in the exchange of ideas with others. At death, our bodies
perish, but many other parts of our life will continue, like blood
and flesh in our children, our interests, our words, and our contri-
butions in society. Shall we say that we at death are no more or
that we are still there? So, the word "immortality" as you people
have been using it does not apply in the case of China.
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HSIEH YU-WEI The Status of the Individual
in Chinese Ethics
WHAT IS THE STATUS of the individual in Chinese ethics? As
we all know, there are different systems of ethics in the history
of Chinese thought: Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Moism, and
others. It is impossible to discuss all of them here. So, since Confu-
cian ethics has always been the most influential and the most
widely practiced ethics of the Chinese people, I shall answer the
question from the standpoint of Confucian ethics.
Confucian ethics never downgrades the status of the individ-
ual; on the contrary, it always emphasizes the value and dignity
of the individual. Confucius and his followers, in fact, recognized
and asserted the equality of man's value in every individual. What
the West calls "the equality of the individual," "the freedom of the
individual," "the individual's relations to other individuals," and
"the individual's relations to the community, i.e., to the family, the
state, and to mankind," were all advocated in one form or another
by Confucian ethics, too.
I. The Equality of All Individuals
The central idea of Confucian ethics is ten, "humanity." Con-
fUcian ethics could not ignore the significance of any individual;
otherwise, it would be in conflict with ten. What is ten? In The
Analects (Lun yu), "Fan Ch'ih asked about fen. The master said,
'It is to love all men.'''1 Since ten is to love all men, the importance
of the individual is necessarily emphasized. But, owing to historical
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accidents and to wrong interpretations by emperors for centuries,
the importance of the individual in Confucian ethics was not always
made explicit. Also, owing to the lack of clear discussion about
the individual's equality, freedom, and rights in Confucian ethics,
the suspicion naturally arose that it neglected the importance of the
individual. But the implied affirmations of the importance of
the individual, the individual's equality, freedom, rights, and duties,
are clear.
Confucian ethics asserted the equality of all individuals, but
what Confucius called equality is the equality of humanity. It is
the equality of man's value insofar as man is man, equality a
priori, that is to say, all men are born equal. In The Doctrine of the
Mean (Chung yung), it is said, "What Heaven has conferred is
called the nature," 2 and this "nature" is human nature. Human
nature is what everybody has received from Heaven. And what
everybody has received from Heaven must be equal. This is the
justice of Heaven. It is the equality of every man's possibility, the
opportunity to be a man.
How Confucius maintained the equality of "human nature"
can be seen from the Confucian conception of jen. len is the
reality of the universe, and also the essence of man, that which
makes him man. In Chinese philology, man is defined as jen.3 In
The Doctrine of the Mean, it is said, "len is man, and the greatest
exercise of it is in lOVing relatives." 4 And in the Mencius it is said,
"len is the distinguishing characteristic of man. As embodied in
man's conduct, it is called tao [the way]." 5 Thus, jen is clearly the
distinguishing characteristic of man, according to the central idea
of Confucian ethics.
But, how do we know that the distinguishing characteristic
of man is jen? We know this by our own experience and by our
own observation. As Mencius said,
The ability possessed by men without having been acquired by
learning is intuitive ability, and the knowledge possessed by them
without the exercise of thought is their intuitive knowledge. Children in
arms know how to love their parents, and, when they have grown a little
older, they all know how to love their elder brothers. Filial affection for
parents is the working of ien. Respect for elders is the working of
righteousness. There is no other reason for those feelings-they belong to
all under Heaven.6
That is to say, the fact that every man has intuitive ability
and intuitive knowledge, or the fact that every man has "jen," is
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a fact that can be verified by children's unquestionable love for
their parents.
Furthermore, the fact that every man has jen can be verified
by the feeling of commiseration that every man possesses. As
Mencius said,
. . . if men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will
without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress. They will
feel so, not as a ground on which they may gain the favor of the child's
parents, nor as a ground on which they may seek the praise of their
neighbors and friends, nor from a dislike of hearing such a noise. From
this case we may perceive that the feeling of commiseration [etc.] is
essential to man. . . . The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of
;en.7
This inability to bear to see the suffering of others, this feeling of
commiseration, is a fact that we can see everywhere. How can we
deny that men have jen?
But, though every man has jen, what a man has is merely the
"beginning of jen," or just a seed of humanity. How, then, can we
affirm the equality of all individuals? It was precisely in order to
emphasize this seed of humanity that Confucius built up his ethical
system. Confucius considered this seed of humanity as what is most
valuable in men and what makes man man. The difference be-
tween men and animals lies in this seed of humanity. The dignity
and value of man which enable him to achieve unity with Heaven
also lie in this seed of humanity. If there were no such seed of
humanity, ethical education would be impossible; b~t it is clearly
possible to educate man as man, as wise man and sage.
Since every man has this seed of humanity, Confucian ethics
claims that men are born equal refers precisely to the universal
equality of this seed of humanity, though not equality in other
respects. When man is born, he is in possession of this seed of
humanity, and what he possesses is no more and no less than any
other man.
Because of this seed of humanity Confucian ethics also main-
tained that every man can become a sage or can become Emperor
Yao or Emperor Shun. It is clearly declared, "What a man is Shun?
And what am I? All those who try can be the same." 8 If every
man can be a sage-and to be a sage is the highest ideal of man-
does this not demonstrate the basic equality of all individuals?
Of course, to say that every man can be a sage is not to say
that every man is a sage. Only a few can be considered sages.
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Hence, in fact, men are not equal. What is called equality is
equality of opportunity or equality of possibility, and not equality
of achievement. The highest ideal of Confucian ethics is to educate
men to be sages, and, if every man has the possibility of becoming
a sage, what more can we want or require?
Furthermore, the equality asserted by Confucian ethics is
fundamental. All other equalities are implied by this one basic
equality. Hence, the fact that other equalities, such as equality of
rights, equality before the law, etc., were seldom discussed does
not mean that they were denied. They were all clearly implied.
At least, they are implied in principle, with this basic equality. The
reason why Confucian ethics seldom talked about other equalities
is that, if a man wants to become a sage, he should do his best by
himself and should not depend on other men or other conditions.
Even if all other conditions are unfavorable, if one does one's best,
one can still become a sage. All other equalities are within this
concept of jen. This interpretation is also asserted by most con-
temporary Chinese scholars. I may mention Ch'ien Mu 9 and
T'ang Chiin-i 10 as representatives.
Thus, since Confucian ethics has the spirit of "the great
equality," the principle of equality in traditional Chinese ethics is
undeniable.
II. The Freedom of the Individual
Confucian ethics also asserted the freedom of the individual.
The meaning of freedom, as we all know, is very complex. Gen-
erally speaking, freedom means political freedom, such as freedom
of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of belief, etc. Such free-
doms were little or seldom discussed in Confucian ethics; hence,
it is often suspected that Confucian ethics denied the freedom of
the individual. In fact, the freedom asserted in Confucian ethics is
also fundamental and can include or at least imply all other
freedoms.
The freedom advocated in Confucian ethics is the freedom to
do good or the freedom to choose what is good. It is ethical
freedom of choice. But such freedom of choice has its own ground
and its own limits. It is a limited freedom. There is no such thing
as an unlimited freedom. "Free" does not mean "free from." To be
free from everything-free from other men, free from law, free
from morality, free from thought, free from sense-as F. H. Bradley
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points out, "is to be nothing." 11 Unlimited freedom is impossible in
fact and should not be demanded by ethics.
The truth that the freedom which is possible and which ought
to obtain must have some ground or limitation is recognized in
Confucian ethics. This ground or limitation is goodness. One should
choose good; one should not choose evil. If we grant that every
individual has the freedom to choose evil, then the freedom of
everyone will be threatened by the evil. If evil prevailed, freedom
might disappear. Hence, from the point of view of ethics, we
should allow only the freedom to choose good and not the freedom
to choose evil. Confucius says in The Analects, "When I walk
alone with two others, they may serve me as my teachers. Choose
what is good and follow it, but avoid what is bad." 12 Again, he
says, "Hear much and select what is good and follow it." 13 Such
expressions clearly indicate the idea of freedom to choose good.
Later, in The Doctrine of the Mean, such sayings as "Choose the
course of the mean" 14 and "He who attains to sincerity is he who
chooses what is good and firmly holds it fast" 15 indicate the S2-me
attitude. Freedom to choose is freedom to choose, within the com-
plex of good and evil, what is good and not what is evil. This is
man's freedom, and the only freedom which is permitted in Con-
fucian ethics.
If freedom means freedom to choose good, then what is good?
What is good in the opinion of Confucius is the same as fen. Jen
is good, and good is fen. All values created by men will be af-
firmed and protected by fen. Jen is most unselfish and least obsti-
nate. What is firmly upheld by fen is fen itself, and not just any
man's private opinion. Confucius strongly opposed such obstinacy.
Confucius was not obstinate in his own opinion. It is said in The
Analects, "There were four things from which the Master was en-
tirely free. He had no foregone conclusions, no arbitrary predeter-
minations, no obstinacy, and no egotism." 16
Confucius did not like forced uniformity of belief or opinion-
even in ethics. "The superior man is catholic and not a partisan."
He said, "The mean man is a partisan and not catholic" 17 and
"The superior man is seeking for harmony but not sameness. The
mean man is seeking for sameness but not harmony." 18 Later,
Mencius expressed the same attitude in saying, "The superior man
seeks just for jen and cares not for sameness." 19 This means that,
if one's words and actions are in accordance with jen, it is not
necessary for them to be the same as mine. To choose good is to
312 HSIEH YU-WEI
choose the good in accordance with fen, and not me good in any
man's private opinion. This is the true meaning of freedom to
choose the good in Confucian ethics.
As indicated above, the freedom to choose the good implies
or justifies the other important freedoms, ethically. To illustrate,
Confucius traveled to different states during his lifetime. The pur-
pose of his travel was to choose a good prince to serve. Now, the
relation between prince and minister is a political relation. If one
has the freedom to choose which prince to serve, one is not held
in bondage by the relation between prince and minister but has
political freedom. Such political freedom Confucius indicated in
the following sayings: "My doctrines make no way. I will get upon
a raft, and float about on the sea." 20 "When called to office, to
undertake its duties; when not so called, to lie retired." 21 "When
right principles of government prevail in the kingdom, he will
show himself; when they are rejected, he will keep concealed." 22
"Some men of worth retire from the world. Some retire from par-
ticular states." 23
Confucius also maintained, in social affairs, the freedom to
choose friends. The saying quoted above-"When I walk along
with two others, they may serve me as my teachers. Choose what
is good and follow it, but avoid what is bad" 24 -indicates his atti-
tude clearly.
The freedom to choose a place to live was also affirmed by
Confucius. He said, "It is fen which constitutes the excellence of
a neighborhood. If a man in selecting a residence does not fix on
one where fen prevails, how can he be wise?" 25
As to freedom of speech, Confucius affirmed this in his own
deeds. Confucius himself was free to speak as he pleased. He
edited The Book of Odes (Shih ching) and wrote The Book of
History (Shu ching) in accordance with his own ideas. Certainly,
he would not oppose freedom of speech. He would oppose only
the speaking of bad words or empty words, that is, words without
corresponding actions. Good words, or what should be said, one
must say; otherwise, it is not ethically right. Confucius said, 'When
a man may be spoken with, not to speak to him is to err toward
the man." 26 He also said, "What the superior man requires is just
that in his words there may be nothing wrong." 27 Hence, the only
condition for the freedom of speech is whether your speech is right
or not. If it is right to speak, you should speak freely even to those
high above you, such as the prince or your parents. To argue with
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prince or parents is permitted by Confucius. He said, "In serving
his parents, a son may remonstrate with them, but gently." 28 Such
freedom to argue with the prince constituted one of the most im-
portant kinds of political freedom under the Chinese political
system. Mencius, too, enjoyed freedom of speech. Mencius
argued freely with the princes of several states, and sometimes he
even scolded them. But Mencius confessed that he did not like to
argue. He argued because he had to.29 It was under the compulsion
of goodness, or fen, that Mencius felt he had to argue. Conse-
quently, freedom of speech has its limitation, and that limitation
is goodness, or fen. The saying "Speak not what is contrary to
propriety" 30 demonstrates this attitude of Confucian ethics.
Thus, in view of the freedom to choose the good, we have
freedom to choose our prince, freedom to choose our friends,
freedom to choose our residence, and freedom of speech. On con-
dition that we choose within the limits of goodness, we can choose
freely. Outside the limits of goodness, one should not be free. This
is the true meaning of freedom. Freedom to choose the good is
thus the same as to assert all other freedoms. No other freedoms
should be allowed to violate goodness. If you act in accordance
with goodness, you are free. Otherwise, you may lose your freedom.
Whatever freedom you want, you should not violate this ethical
principle of freedom to choose the good.
This freedom to choose the good may also be interpreted as
the freedom to develop one's humanity or one's true self. Every
man has fen, and this constitutes his true nature or .true self. But
this true nature needs cultivation or development. And this must
be done by oneself. It is said in The Analects, "Yen Yuan asked
about fen. The Master said, 'To subdue one's self and return to
propriety is fen. If a man can for one day subdue himself and
return to propriety, all under Heaven will ascribe fen to him. Is the
practice of fen from a man himself, or is it from others?'" 31 This
state is one of freedom. For the flowing of fen, or humanity, is free.
It comes from one's own self, and no outside force can interfere
with it. Hence, such practice of fen, or the development of one's hu-
manity, must of necessity be free. In The Doctrine of the Mean
it is said, "It is only he who is possessed of the most complete
sincerity that can exist under Heaven and can give full develop-
ment to his nature. Able to give full development to his own
nature, he can do the same to the nature of other men. Able to
give full development to the nature of other men, he can give full
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development to the natures of animals and things. Able to give
full development to the natures of animals and things, he can
assist the transforming and nourishing powers of Heaven and
Earth. Able to assist the transforming and nourishing powers of
Heaven and Earth, he may with Heaven and Earth form a ter-
nion." 32 When a man may with Heaven and Earth form a ternion,
then he is really free. But it all depends upon the full development
of his own nature.33
III. The Duties of the Individual
From the above we know that Confucian ethics called for the
freedom of the individual. And freedom is one of-or expresses-
the rights of the individual. Every individual has the right to be
free, that is, free to choose the good. In this sense, Confucian
ethics also asserted the rights of the individual. But, it was not the
rights of the individual that were considered most important. Of
most importance were the duties or obligations of the individual.
According to Confucian ethics, in order to be a man or to be a
sage, it is necessary, first, to perform one's duties, not to claim one's
rights. It is the fulfillment of duties that can make a man into a
man or into a sage.
The duties of the individual are the moral principles accord-
ing to which one should act with regard to oneself and to others.
In order to be a man or to be a sage, one must observe these
moral principles in the cultivation and development of one's hu-
manity. The equality and freedom that one enjoys are mere pos-
sibilities for becoming a man or a sage. They will not be realized
unless one has done one's duties in accordance with these moral
principles.
Every individual has duties, first of all, to himself. In order
to fulfill one's duties to oneself, the important work one has to do
is "self-inspection" (tzu-hsing). Self-inspection is what is nowadays
called self-criticism or self-examination. The belief is that the in-
dividual himself has the clearest insight into what he has done
and whether it has been done in accordance with fen.
If one fails to carry out self-inspection, the question as to
whether or not one can fulfill other duties, or the question as to
whether or not other duties one performs can be considered ful-
filled, cannot be answered. The reason for those acts which deceive
oneself, and others, derives precisely from the failure to carry out
J
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this first duty. So, Confucius emphasized this duty of self-inspec-
tion. In The Analects, it is said, "The philosopher Tsang said, 'I
daily examine myself on three points-whether in transacting busi-
ness for others, I may not have been loyal; whether in intercourse
with friends, I may not have been sincere; and whether I may
have mastered and practiced the instruction of my teacher.''' 34
This expression, "daily examine myself on three points" explicitly
advocates self-inspection. It is also said, "When we see men of
worth, we should think of equaling them; when we see men of a
contrary character, we should tum inward and examine our-
selves." 35 "Turn inward and examine ourselves" means "self-
inspection," but also more than that.
Self-inspection is the inspection of actions that one has done.
But Confucian ethics taught something more than "self-inspection,"
what is called "taking care of one's own will" (shen-tu) in The
Great Learning (Ta hsiieh). It is said, 'What is meant by making
the will sincere is the allowing of no self-deception, as when we
hate a bad smell and as when we love what is beautiful. Tbis is
called self-enjoyment. Therefore, the superior man must take care
of his own will." 36 This "taking care of one's own will" is self-
inspection before action. It is concerned with our will or intention
rather than with our conduct. One's conduct can be seen by all,
but one's will or intention is known to oneself alone. When action
has taken place, although it is necessary to examine it by self-
inspection to see whether it is in accordance with fen or not, it is
too late to do anything when it is wrong. In order to avoid wrong
action, self-inspection alone is not enough; the work of "taking care
of one's own will" must be added. "Prevention is much better than
cure." This taking care of one's own intention or making the will
sincere constituted the outstanding characteristic of Neo-Confu-
cianism in the Sung Dynasty (960-1279).
Self-inspection and taking care of one's own will are two im-
portant duties of the individual to himself. In regard to other men
-between individual and individual-the relation should be that
of "propriety" (Ii). This is of first importance-to treat others with
propriety.
The most obvious meaning of "propriety" is respect of man
for man. Each man should pay respect to other men because such
respect is respect for man as man, for the humanity (fen) which
is possessed by every man. Though this respect is paid to others,
it is in fact paid to oneself, too. It may be called the self-respect
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of man as man. If one does not pay respect to other men, one does
not care for the humanity possessed by other men. In that case,
the humanity possessed by oneself may be questioned. If one
really has humanity in one's heart, one will naturally pay respect·
to the humanity in other men. So, Confucius considered "self-
control and return to propriety as fen." 37 In propriety we can see
the manifestation of fen. The importance of propriety lies here.
Propriety must be based upon fen. If not, it can hardly be called
propriety. It is said in The Analects, "If men are without fen,
what use is there for propriety?" 38 It is for the sake of fen that one
should treat others with propriety. And in such propriety, in such
respectful conduct toward other men, one affirms the personality,
the value, and the rights of other men. If every man has such
respectfulness in regard to other men, then the relation between
man and man will be in perfect harmony and without conflict.
Propriety means, then, the cultivation of harmony between
man and man. "Propriety" is always connected with "concession"
(jang). If one knows propriety, one must also know concession.
In case one does not know concession, and quarrels with other
men, one still does not know propriety. But concession is concession
of rights and not concession of duties. One should not concede
one's duties, such as the duty to practice fen. "He may not yield
the performance of fen even to his teacher." 39 In that case, if
every man were to concede rights and not duties, there would be
no basis for quarrels between man and man. So, it is said in The
Analects, "In practicing the rules of propriety, harmony is to be
prized." 40 Accordingly, the aim of propriety is peace among men.
Confucian ethics maintained propriety and concession as the
duties of the individual toward others. Moreover, Confucian ethics
also required loyalty (chung) and reciprocity (shu) as principles
in one's conduct toward others. It is said, "The doctrine of our Mas-
ter is nothing but loyalty and reciprocity." 41 But loyalty and re-
ciprocity also come from fen.
For Confucian ethics, it is incorrect to interpret loyalty as
loyalty to king or prince. Loyalty means self-devotion, that is,
doing one's duty with all one's strength. Loyalty is loyalty to one's
duty as prescribed by fen, or the humanity within oneself. It might
be described as one's own conscience determining one's duty. And,
in accordance with his conscience, or fen, every individual has the
duty to help others. It is said in The Analects, "Now, the man of
fen, wishing to be established himself, seeks to establish others;
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wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others." 42
For the sake of carrying out this duty, one has to do one's best,
that is, one must be loyal.
The word "loyalty" first appears in The Analects in connection
with Philosopher Tsang's saying, "... whether in transacting busi-
ness for others, I may not have been loyal." 43 This shows clearly
that loyalty is not reserved for the king only; rather, it is an attitude
toward all men. Though Confucius paid due respect to the king,
his respect was paid to the position of the king, and not the king
himself. The relation between the king and the minister, for Confu-
cius, should be one of mutual respect. Hence, he said, "A prince
should employ his minister according to the rules of propriety.
Ministers should serve their prince with loyalty." 44 Loyalty may
be paid to the prince, on condition that the prince treats his minis-
ter with propriety. Loyalty is self-devotion to the duties to other
men; the prince is included, but not the prince alone.
Based upon fen, we have the duty of loyalty to other men.
Also based upon fen, we have the duty of reciprocity toward other
men. Loyalty and reciprocity go together in one's relationships
with other men. The way to treat others is to be loyal, on the one
hand, and to pra.ctice reciprocity, on the other. Reciprocity clearly
comes from fen. It is the natural consequence of fen, when it is
developed. A man of fen, in establishing himself, seeks to establish
others, and, in enlarging himself, seeks to enlarge others. This is
reciprocity. It consists in treating others in the same way as you
treat yourself. It is the Golden Rule. It is said in.The Analects,
"Tzu-kung asked, saying, 'Is there one word which may serve as a
rule of practice for all one's life?' The Master said, 'Is not reciprocity
such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do
to others.''' 45 Reciprocity is a fundamental principle for the rela-~
tions between man and man. If this principle is followed by all,
then peace will be established among men.
IV. The Individual and the Community
For the moral duties of the individual to himself, Confucian
ethics maintained self-inspection and taking care of one's own will;
and maintained propriety, loyalty, and reciprocity as one's moral
duties to others. But what about duties of the individual to the
community? The duties which the individual should perform with
respect to the community were expressed clearly in The Great
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Learning. Here, it is said, "The ancients who wished to illustrate
illustrious virtue throughout the world first ordered well their own
states. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their
families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated
their persons." 46 This means everybody has the duty to regulate
his family, to order the state, and to bring about peace in the
world. Family, state, and the world (or mankind as a whole)
are communities to which every individual owes a duty.
Though Confucian ethics called for duties of the individual
to the community, it did not overemphasize the community and
ignore the individual. In fact, Confucian ethics considered the
individual even more important than the community. Confucian
ethics regarded individuals as roots, and communities as leaves-
or individuals as foundations and communities as roofs. The duty
to cultivate oneself should come first; then come the duties of
regulating the family, ordering the state, and making peace in the
world. One's duties to the community depend upon one's duties to
oneself. It is said, "From the Son of Heaven down to the masses
of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the
root of everything else. It cannot be that, when the root is neg-
lected, what springs from it will be well ordered." 47 Hence, the
cultivation of the person, or the individual, is fundamental. With-
out such cultivation of the person, or the individual, no other
duties can be fulfilled by the individual.
But, before proceeding, let us see what duties of the individ-
ual to the community were prescribed by Confucian ethics. First
of all, every individual has a duty to his family. Duty to the
family was especially emphasized in Confucian ethics. But this
emphasis on duty to the family was in fact for the good of the
individual. The common mistaken view is that, since Confucian
ethics emphasized the importance of the family, Chinese ethics
took the family as the unit of its system, that Chinese ethics con-
sidered the family as the basis or the center to which all individ-
uals must be subordinated, that the family is everything, and that
individuals are nothing, that individuals must submit to the family
and work for the family. This is not correct.
The importance of the family is specifically for the sake of
realizing the individual, that is, for the fulfillment the seed of fen
possessed by every individual. This seed of fen comes directly
from the family. We all get our humanity originally from the
family. Since we all get our lives from our parents and grow up
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in the family, the cultivation and development of our humanity
must begin within the family. But how do we cultivate and develop
our humanity within the family? Individuals should do their duty
to the family. The two important duties of the individual to the
family are filial piety (hsiao) and brotherliness (ti).
Filial piety and brotherliness are moral principles which teach
men to love and respect their oWn parents and elder brothers.
These principles were based upon the seed of humanity inborn in
all men in loving their parents, and were intended to preserve and
develop it by ethical education. Confucius considered the rudi-
mentary instinct of loving one's parents as the root of fen. Without
cultivation, it may wither away or disappear. In order to cultivate
and develop such a root of fen, Confucius taught the doctrine of
filial piety and brotherliness in the family. So, in The Analects it
is said, "Filial piety and brotherliness-are they not the root of
fen?" 48 For the practice of fen, filial piety and brotherliness should
be practiced first. The reason is obvious. If a man does not love his
own parents, can he be a man of fen? And, if a man has the duty
to love men, whom should he love first? Is it not his own parents?
The doctrine of filial piety and brotherliness is intended to teach
men to love and respect their own parents and brothers first, and
then extend their love and respect to the parents and brothers of
others. This is the way to cultivate and develop one's own hu-
manity. It is a way to educate men in the family, in order that
they can develop and realize their true selves. What is important
is individuals in the family and not the family as such.
As a matter of fact, Confucian ethics considere"d the individ-
ual and the family equally important and mutually dependent.
Individuals cannot be separated from the family. The develop-
ment of an individual's humanity must begin in and with the
family. Without the family, or in neglect of the family, one's fen,
or humanity, is rootless. Can those who do not love their own
parents love other men? The importance of the family lies here.
On the other hand, the family can be regulated only through the
development of the individual. Without the development of the
individual, the family cannot be regulated. Herein lies the im-
portance of the individual.
Just as Confucian ethics asserted the mutual dependence of
the individual and the family, it also asserted the mutual depend-
ence of the individual and the state and the whole of mankind.
Confucian conceptions of the state and of mankind were not too
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clear, but what is clear is that, as a community, the state is larger
than the family, and the whole of mankind is larger than the state.
But, no matter how large the community is, the status of the in-
dividual remains unchanged for Confucian ethics: what is all-
important is the cultivation of the person, or the development of
jen in the individual. Without such cultivation or development,
one cannot talk about duties to the family, to the state, and to
the whole of mankind. Since every individual has his duty to the
family, naturally every individual also has his duty to the state
and to the whole of mankind. This is due to the development of
fen in the individual, which will not stop short at the family, but
will necessarily extend to the state and to the whole of mankind.
Although Confucian ethics asserts the duties of the individual
to the community, when conflicts arise between the individual and
the community, the individual must maintain his own independent
decision. The individual should decide by his own conscience
whether he should obey the authority of the community or obey
his own conscience. There were two cases in the works of Confu-
cius and Mencius which showed the independence of the individ-
ual in conflict with the community. One case is: if one's father has
stolen a sheep, one may conceal the misconduct of one's father.49
The other case is: if Emperor Shun's father was a murderer,
Emperor Shun might abandon his empire and run away with his
father.50
This does not mean that the individual can be independent
of the community. The individual needs the community, and the
community needs the individual. The relationship between the
individual and the community is one of mutual dependence and
equal importance.
It is not a relationship of ends and means. One cannot say
that the community is an end and that individuals are means only.
Nor can one say that individuals are ends and that communities
are means only. In fact, for Confucian ethics, the individual and
the community are both ends and are realized throughout by the
development of fen in the individual. The key lies wholly in fen.
If fen prevails, then the importance of the individual and of the
community will be equally affirmed.
QUESTION: Concerning the concept of freedom, do you use the
word "freedom" in a different sense than its Western origin, for
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"freedom to choose what is good" is not freedom in the Western
sense?
ANSWER: From the ethical point of view, we should allow
only freedom to do the good and not freedom to do evil. No
ethics of any kind would allow freedom to do evil. This is the
meaning of freedom in Confucian ethics, and it is almost the same
as self-determination in the Kantian sense.
QUESTION: Concerning the conflict of values, in Confucian
ethics is there room for individual conscience against one's family?
For instance, if a man's father stole a sheep, to use an example you
cite, should he tell the truth to the police or not?
ANSWER: For Confucian ethics, there is no abstract standard
by which to resolve the conflict of values. The only solution is that
every man should decide by his own conscience, or jen. Whatever
you do, you should do in accordance with jen.
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Y. P. MEl The Status of the Individual
in Chinese Social Thought and Practice
THE PREDOMINANT molding force of traditional Chinese society is
Confucianism. Confucianism places dual emphasis on the impor-
tance of the proper development of the individual for the well-
being of society, and, at the same time, on the importance of social
responsibility for the perfection of the individual. While this
double-barreled Chinese outlook on the status of the individual
in society has been cultivated mostly by the teachings of Confu-
cianism, its roots to a considerable extent go back to social thought
and practices antedating Confucius. We shall take up some samples
of pre-Confucian Chinese social thought and practice in the first
section of the paper.
I. Early Chinese Social Thought and Practice
Valuable glimpses of the status of the individual in Chinese
social thought and practice in its prototypal forms can be gained
by consulting Chinese mythology and Chinese classical literature.
Mythology is employed here, not for its religious significance, but as
an expression of time-honored, deep-rooted, and widespread atti-
tudes on the part of the Chinese people. We have in mind
specifically the status of man in the concept of a cosmic triad as
manifested in the legend of the Three Sovereign Groups. The
Three Sovereign Groups, the earliest rulers China had, are said to
have consisted of the Celestial Sovereign Group of twelve brothers,
each reigning 18,000 years; the Terrestrial Sovereign Group of
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eleven brothers, each reigning 18,000 years; and, interestingly, the
Human Sovereign Group of nine brothers, reigning for a total of
45,600 years in 150 generations. Of course, nobody believes in
such tall tales, not even the Chinese. The thing that is notable in
this legend is the Chinese insistence on the importance of the
generic man. Man is so important that he is matched from the
beginning of time with Heaven and Earth to make a cosmic triad.
In Chinese, the term for the triad of Heaven-Earth-man is san
ts'ai, meaning three powers, three forces, three origins, etc.
Throughout the long history of Chinese thought, in the popular
mind as well as in classical literature,l there has been persistent
emphasis on the importance of man. Man is often spoken of in the
same breath with Heaven and Earth. It is doubtful whether any
other major world-civilization has laid emphasis to a comparable
degree on the cosmic importance of man. The emphasis on the
importance of the generic man in relation to Heaven and Earth has
provided the undergirding, in Chinese thought and practice, for
the collateral emphases on the importance of the common man in
relation to his ruler, as well as the importance of the individual in
relation to society.
The social significance of man and his life in the early Chinese
tradition manifests itself further in the Chinese attitude toward
immortality. Until the introduction of Buddhism and related ideas
from India, the Chinese had only the vaguest ideas about heaven
and hell and about future life in general. Insofar as they had any
sense of or interest in immortality, it was mainly some form of
social immortality. In the Tso chuan is kept the following record
of a conversation on immortality:
When Muh-shuh (P'aou) went to Tsin, Fan Seuen-tsze met him,
and asked the meaning of the saying of the ancients, "They died but
suffered no decay," ... Muh-shuh said ... "I have heard that the
highest meaning of it is when there is established [an example of] virtue;
the second, when there is established [an example of] successful service;
and the third, when there is established [an example of wise] speech.
When these examples are not forgotten with length of time, this is what
is meant by the saying-"They do not decay." 2
This conversation on immortality, which took place in 549 B.C., is
instructive in itself and significant for the tremendous influence it
has exercised. While the masses may be thinking about their future
life in terms of heavens and hells, to this day educated Chinese
STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 325
are much more interested in "leaving behind a fragrance lasting
for millenniums" (liu-fang ch'ien-ku). And the way to attain this
distinction lies in one's achievement during one's lifetime, in virtue,
in public service, and in teaching,3 as stipulated in the conversation
just quoted.
Among the pre-Confucian social practices in China, probably
the most noteworthy for us is the trend of the gradual rise of the
worth of the individual. In the dim, distant past, China had her
share of inhumane social practices, including human sacrifice.
When a great lord died, his harem of women and his household of
servants were buried alive with his corpse. Eventually, clay
figurines were used as substitutes for real people at these burials,
and this type of human sacrifice became extinct. Prisoners of war
at first were killed as a matter of course, but later they were en-
slaved rather than killed. At one stage there was the practice of
what might be called "fixture slavery." Under this practice, the
slaves were treated as part and parcel of the land they worked.
When (and only when) the land changed hands, then did the slaves
change hands. The eventual appearance of slave trade and the
slave market was in fact a significant step in social and humani-
tarian reform. The scattered records of slave trade in ancient China
showed a definite upward trend in the value of the slave. One
bronze vessel of the reign of King Hsiao of Chou (9°9-894 B.C.)
bears an inscription recording the exchange of five human beings
for one horse plus one skein of silk. Some four hundred years later,
Yen Ying (died 493 B.C.), the Prime Minister of Ch'i, offered one
of his superb horses for a slave whose appearance iinpressed him.4
The worth of the individual increased about five times over the
period of four hundred years. These accounts are isolated instances,
to be sure, but the trend of the rising worth of the individual in
ancient China, as signified by his market price, is unmistakable.
By the time of Confucius, China was dominated by a number
of powerful feudal states. The imperial house became more and
more a figurehead as the rivalry among the leading feudal states
became more fierce and militant. The condition of chaos and dis-
unity in the empire, however, notably enhanced the increasing
worth of the individual. The contending feudal lords were con-
tending for power, and power consisted of troops and food, both
of which depended in turn on the size of the population. Although
the ambitious feudal lords uniformly regarded the views about
government of Confucius and the other idealistic teachers as coun-
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sels of perfection and impracticable, they could well appreciate,
from their own selfish interest, Confucius' yardstick of good govern-
ment: "Good government obtains when those who are near are
made happy and those who are far off are attracted." 5 The prac-
tice of a measure of benevolence in their despotic rule evidently
became the best policy under the circumstances. Whatever the
motivation, be it self-interest or human compassion, there was a
decided trend of the rising worth of the common man in Ancient
China.
II. Status of the Individual in Confucian Social Thought
Confucius (551-479 B.C.) lived in an age of growing confusion
and chaos. Dedicating himself to the task of bringing order out of
chaos, the sage became firmly convinced that a society could be
only as good as its members. Even if it should be too much to
expect every member of a community to be a superior man, at least
the leaders and rulers must be exemplary individuals before the
community could expect to achieve its well-being. The relation
of the individual to society is here envisaged, not in terms of a
collection of disparate atomistic units to form an aggregate, but in
terms of a continuing permeation of the quality of the character
of the individual throughout the ever-broadening circles of society.
This qualitative relation of the individual to society is categorically
stated in the celebrated passage of the Ta hsiieh (The Great
Learning), as follows:
The ancients who wished clearly to exemplify illustrious virtue
throughout the world would first set up good government in their states.
Wishing to govern their states well, they would first regulate their
families. Wishing to regulate their families, they would first cultivate
their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they would first rectify
their minds. Wishing to rectify their minds, they would first seek sincerity
in their thoughts. Wishing for sincerity in their thoughts, they would first
extend their knowledge. The extension of knowledge lay in the
investigation of things. For only when things are investigated is
knowledge extended; only when knowledge is extended are thoughts
sincere; only when thoughts are sincere are minds rectified; only when
minds are rectified are our persons cultivated; only when our persons are
cultivated are our families regulated; only when families are regulated
are states well governed; and only when states are well governed is there
peace in the world.
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From the emperor down to the common people, all, without
exception, must consider cultivation of the individual character as the
root. If the root is in disorder, it is impossible for the branches to be in
order. To treat the important as unimportant and to treat the unimportant
as important-this should never be. This is called knowing the root; this
is called the perfection of knowledge.6
This passage is important in several respects. Particularly note-
worthy is the conclusion that everyone, whether he is in high place
or low, must consider cultivation of the individual character as
"the root" of social well-being and harmony. One of the outstand-
ing characteristics in Chinese social thought is the emphasis on
obligations rather than rights and prerogatives of the individual in
relation to society. Do not ask what society can do for you; ask
what you can do for society-exhortations such as this fall right in
line with the Chinese spirit. And what can the individual do for
society? Of course, the specific answers will vary with each individ-
ual. But there is a basic answer common to all men, and this is
what the Chinese sages have been insisting upon, namely, the
cultivation of one's character. The cultivation of the character of
the individual, according to the Ta hsiieh, as quoted above, in-.
cludes five inward steps of self-perfection and three outward steps
of social extension spreading to the family, the state, and the whole
world. This eight-step scheme has served in China as a master plan
of moral and educational development as well as a blueprint for
social and political administration.
While the individual in China does not ask what society can
do for him, he cannot do without society for his achievement of
the good life. The Chinese ideal for the individual is sometimes
described as "sageliness within and kingliness without," 7 a kind of
double-barreled ideal. An individual is expected to be a man of
enlightenment and a man of affairs. He is to be a citizen of the
universe and at the same time a member of society. His is a life
that is in the world and yet not of the world. It is in society that
the individual lives, moves, and has his being, and, furthermore,
grows into the fullness of his manhood, even sagehood. According
to Confucian teaching, there is in some sense an identification of the
sage with the universe, but the identification is here achieved by
way of society and not in spite of it. Social well-being depends on
the proper cultivation of the individual, to be sure, but the individ-
ual can achieve the full realization of his destiny only through
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public service and social participation. Social obligations and re-
sponsibilities of an individual are not chains and burdens to be
escaped from, or to be borne and suffered. To the contrary, it is in
the fulfillment of these social responsibilities that the individual
realizes his complete personal fulfillment. In a very fundamental
sense, the individual and society in Confucian social thought are
mutually dependent.
While social service and participation are indispensable to
the perfection of the individual, his status in society is defined,
according to Confucianism, not by social esteem or other external
circumstances, sometimes in spite of them, but by one's inner sense
of personal integrity and dignity. "Man is born for uprightness," 8
said Confucius. It is well known that the key concept in Confu-
cianism is jen, or human-heartedness, or love, or, according to
James Legge's translation, virtue. I presented a summary statement
on this central concept of Confucianism earlier in this volume,9
and repetition will be avoided here. Attention is directed specif-
ically to the intuitive and spontaneous quality of jen. The following
are some of the sayings of Confucius from The Analects (Lun yii) :
Is virtue (jen) a thing remote? I wish to be virtuous, and lo! virtue
is at hand. lO
Is anyone able for one day to apply his strength to virtue (jen)? I
have not seen the case in which his strength would be insufficient.ll
Thus it is evident that jen is not the special endowment of some
privileged class, but the "spark of divinity" planted in every man
without exception. For the seed of jen to grow into the full-blown
virtue of jen, it takes, of course, cultivation and education. Confu-
cius declared in feudalistic China, some two thousand five hundred
years ago, "In teaching there should be no distinction of classes." 12
No one could have said such a thing under the circumstances of
Confucius' day, if he did not have an unswerving conviction in the
native integrity and dignity of the individual. Both Mencius and
Hsiin Tzu, the great followers of Confucius, maintained that every
man on the street could become a sage-king like Yao and Shun,
according to Mencius, and like the Great Yii, according to Hsiin
Tzu. Chinese thinkers have not interested themselves in human
rights as such. But the conviction of the inviolable worth of the
individual lies at the heart of Confucian teaching and accounts for
a good measure of the democratic spirit in Chinese life.
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The character of integrity and the dignity of the individual
gives him a sense of confidence and serenity. He is not easily
swayed, or rumed, or affected by the fortunes of the day. He has an
inner frame of reference and scale of values, and his life is ordered
through self-control. In one passage in The Analects of Confucius
several of Confucius' sayings on this point are recorded, and we
quote some of them as follows:
The Master said, "The commander of the forces of a large state may
be carried off, but the will of even a common man cannot be taken from
him" (chapter XXV).
The Master said, "Dressed himself in a tattered robe quilted with
hemp, yet standing by the side of men dressed in furs, and not ashamed-
ahl it is Yii who is equal to thisl" (chapter XXVI).
The Master said, "When the year becomes cold, then we know how
the pine and the cypress are the last to lose their leaves" (chapter
XXVII).
The Master said, "The wise are free from perplexities; the virtuous
from anxiety; and the bold from fear" (chapter XXVIII) .13
This ancient list of three freedoms of Confucius should be heeded,
we submit, as much as the contemporary list of "Four Freedoms."
Similarly, both Mencius and Hsiin Tzu left a description of the
great man, and what they considered as the great man was the
man of integrity. In spite of the radical disagreements between
these two great Confucian teachers on several basic subjects, the
two descriptions are almost identical. We quote first Mencius and
then Hsiin Tzu as follows:
He who dwells in the broad house of the universe, stands firm on the
true base of the universe, walks in the great way of the universe, if
successful, walks in the way for the good of the people, if unsuccessful,
walks in the way all alone; he whom riches and honor cannot corrupt,
poverty and obscurity cannot move, threats and violence cannot make
bend-he it is that may be called a great man.14
Therefore, power and gain cannot influence him; mobs and
multitudes cannot sway him; the whole empire cannot move him. By this
[perfect character] he will live and by it he will die, and this is what is
meant by moral integrity. With moral integrity one could achieve
firmness, and with firmness one could achieve flexibility. Possessing
firmness as well as flexibility, he may be said to be a perfect man.
Heaven is prized for its brilliance; the earth is prized for its vastness; the
superior man is prized for his perfection.15
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III. Status of the Individual in Non-Confucian Social Thought
Chinese social thought is not limited, of course, to Confucian
thought. Mo Tzu (47°-391? B.C.), for instance, taught the doctrine
of universal love. On appearance, this teaching might be expected
to uphold egalitarianism of all individuals. But, in social and polit-
ical thought, Mo Tzu actually advocated "identification with the
superior," i.e., submission of one's individual will in conformity with
that of one's superior.
The Taoists had little use for society, and were completely
indifferent about the social status of an individual. Organization of
any kind was regarded by the Taoists as anathema, and social
participation as an impediment to the life of freedom and
spontaneity.
The Legalists placed the state above the individual, and the
status of the individual was determined solely according to his
usefulness to the state, that is, the sovereign.
Buddhism, with its monastic order, introduced what might be
called extra-societal egalitarianism of the individual. In the eyes
of the Buddha, all men are blinded by their passion and ignorance
and are equally in need of compassion and enlightenment. The
status of the individual in ordinary society is immaterial, except as
an indicator of the desert of his accumulated past deeds, according
to the Law of Karma.
While these various systems have exercised their influence in
various degrees, the main current of Chinese social thought has
been Confucian social thought since the second century B.C., when
in the early Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 26) Confucianism began
to assume supremacy over indigenous systems.
IV. Status of the Individual in Chinese Social,Practice
The phenomenon of the status of the individual in Chinese
society extends over a broad spectrum. Topics like slavery, prostitu-
tion, women, children, the aged, etc., would all make interesting
material for discussion, but such discussions belong more naturally
elsewhere.
Concerning the more relevant considerations regarding the
status of the individual in social practice, this paper will confine
itself to the two outstanding Chinese characteristics of social cohe-
sion and social fluidity. Generally speaking, it is the family system
and the civil service examination system that over the centuries
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have fostered, respectively, these qualities of Chinese society, and
cast a unique light over the status of the individual in society. We
shall proceed to consider these two institutions briefly.
The central position of the family in Chinese society is well
known. The family in China is not only the primary social group,
as it is everywhere, but it is also the prototype of all social organ-
ization. The term for emperor in Chinese is "Son-of-Heaven," the
local magistrate is addressed by his charges as "parent-official,"
and good friends become sworn brothers.15a Social organizations
and social relations in China are patterned after the family. A
system of five social relations-those between father and son,
sovereign and subject,16 husband and wife, brother and brother,
and, finally, friend and friend-together with the respective obliga-
tions pertaining to each relation has been developed. The individ-
ual achieves his inner stature as well as his social status through
his participation in the social process and his contribution to society,
and the family is the point at which to begin. Take, for instance,
the basic virtue of jen, or human-heartedness, of Confucius. While
the seed of jen is inborn in all men, its flowering and flourishing
depend on proper cultivation. The family situation provides the
first and most favorable opportunity for the exercise and develop-
ment of this virtue, a sort of nursery for nurturing the seed of jen.
If battle was to Homer the furnace for the forging and testing of
heroes, then the family must be to Confucius the gymnasium for
the developing and the perfecting of men of jen. Looked at in this
light, filial piety is but an expression of jen in the specific context
of the child-parent relation. The cultivated individual is prepared
for regulating the family, and thereby governing the state, and
then, in tum, bringing peace to the world, according to The Great
Learning, as we have learned. Chinese society might be said to be
a system of "familiocracy," and the basis for familiocracy lies in
jen and agape.
For ordinary purposes, an individual is a member of a family,
i.e., a father, a son, a brother, etc. An individual is an individual
only rarely and by abstraction, as it were. A wedding in China, for
instance, is as much an exciting affair for the young man's family
(clan) as for the two individuals involved. But, since it means an
addition of a permanent member to a close-knit intimate group,
which only death can alter, all members of the group might well
take a personal interest in the occasion. Divorce is provided for
only on the strictest conditions, and is resorted to very rarely
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indeed. The family shares in the successes of its members and is
held responsible for their failures. Hence the widespread practice
of nepotism and the feature of family-group responsibility in the
administration of law and social justice in China.
Such a family system has naturally generated a high degree of
cohesion and stability. An individual thinks twice in making a
decision-once about the consequences to himself and once about
the consequences to the family. The quality of social cohesion in
traditional Chinese social practice makes itself conspicuous in Chi-
nese communities located in a contrasting cultural setting, such as
the Chinatowns of New York and San Francisco. During the year
1955, for instance, the phenomenon of the absence of juvenile
delinquency among the Chinatown teenagers in the United States
was discussed in three popular American magazines, namely,
Saturday Evening Post, America, and Coronet,17 In these articles,
the point is repeatedly made that the Chinese children keep off
the streets and keep out of trouble because they feel that the home,
no matter how humble, is the place for them to live in and because
consideration for their folks and family is in their minds whenever
they have to decide what to do and what not to do. Lately, how-
ever, we begin to hear of isolated cases of "Chinese-American
J. Ds." Perhaps some Chinese youths are beginning to "progress"
away from the traditional "social stagnancy," terms not infrequently
used by modern Western observers in discussing Chinese society.
The force of modernization has, of course, already affected the
family system in China considerably, and it will influence it much
more in the years ahead. Modernization, however, is a universal
phenomenon affecting for better or for worse everyone without
exception, with a stronger impact on the older societies, to be sure,
than on the newer ones. The problem everywhere is one of devising
a structure of family organization that will permit a large degree
of initiative and freedom of thought and action on the part of the
individual and yet assure a proper measure of family cohesion.
Individuals crave not only freedom but also belongingness, to-
getherness. Robinson Crusoe, until the appearance of Friday, was
completely free and completely miserable. Human rights should
indeed be emphasized and fought for where necessary, but human
rights are only the minimal conditions for man. Human obligations
should be at least equally emphasized, because they are essential
for the fulfillment of the supreme mission of man, for man to break
out of his individual shell and become completely social, human,
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and therefore divine-a point that Confucius realized clearly two
thousand five hundred years ago, and a point that the Chinese have
learned to insist upon ever since.
Finally, a few remarks on social mobility in China and the
operation of the Chinese civil service examination system. Chinese
society is said to consist of four classes, namely, the scholar, the
farmer, the artisan, and the merchant. It is to be noted that this
fourfold classification is nothing more than an indicator of the pro-
fession of the individual at the moment. It is entirely possible for
people to change their profession and classification, and this is
done all the time. There are the natural factors of inertia, tradition,
and material advantage for the son to follow the profession of the
father, but there is little in the form of arbitrary barrier preventing
anyone from making a change. The degree of social mobility in
China is remarkable. The American cliche "from shirt sleeves to
shirt sleeves in three generations" is not inapplicable to the Chinese
social scene.
Probably the most potent factor contributing to social fluidity
and mobility in China is the politico-educational institution of
civil service examinations.18 According to Confucianism, some
men, because of their talent and virtue, are fit to lead and some
to follow. That the leaders should be given the responsibility of
government is a matter of natural law as well as one of noblesse
oblige. But how are such men to be discovered and identified?
This was a perplexing problem even in Confucius' day.19 The
Confucian doctrine of government gave rise to the institution of
the civil service examination system in China. The 'first attempts
at discovering men of virtue and talent and appointing them to
public office go back to 165 B.C. The full-fledged system of exami-
nations had operated in China for well over a thousand years
before it was abolished in 1905 in favor of the modem Western-
styled school system. While the examination system was in opera-
tion, it occupied the center of attention of all young men of
ambition in the land. The competition was keen, but the reward,
in honor, glory, riches, and beautiful wives was high. Over the
centuries, the system brought about a unity of culture for the
nation, and produced a class of government leaders and an intel-
lectual elite who stood at the top of the list of the four social
classes.
The remarkable feature about the civil service examination
system for our purpose is the fact that, by and large, it operated
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as an open system. With minor exceptions varying from dynasty
to dynasty, the examinations were open to all men who had
properly prepared themselves. Youths of well-to-do families and
children of degree-holders had an advantage over boys from poorer
families, to be sure, but Chinese folklore is filled with success
stories of self-made men. The Chinese self-made men were the
successful candidates, who, coming from destitute families, had
prepared themselves by studying under moonlight and even by
the light of fireflies kept in a bag of gauze. The civil service
examination system served as a social equalizer, and contrib-
uted to social mobility in China through the ages. This means
there has been a considerable degree of fluidity in the status of
the individual in Chinese society.
Certain modern investigators have questioned such assump-
tions by enlarging upon the differences of opportunities between
children of the high-born and of the low-born, and the tendency of
the degree-holders to attempt the perpetuation of special privi-
leges within their own families and class. Such phenomena are
present in every land. They are not completely absent in China.
The important point is, however, that these open examinations in
China served to an appreciable degree as a corrective to such
tendencies and as an agent for social equalization. The signal
significance of the examination system in itself and in relation to
the social history of China is evidenced by the recent publication
of several English-language studies on this problem within a period
of two years.20 The most thoroughgoing work is the one by Professor
Ping-ti Ho, from which we quote one of the author's noteworthy
conclusions as follows:
So common was the fact that trade and other productive occupations
either alternated or were synchronized with studies that many Ming-
Ch'ing [1368-1g11] social observers were of the impression that the
status distinction among the four major occupational categories (scholars,
farmers, artisans, and merchants) was blurred. What is more, all types of
literature agree that the most striking characteristic of the post-T'ang
[ca. goo-] society was that, on the one hand, social success depended
more on individual merit than on family status, and that, on the other
hand, high-status families had little means of perpetuating their success
if their descendants were inept.21
The phenomena of social cohesion and fluidity are outstand-
ing features of Chinese life, and they are factors that should not
be lost sight of in any consideration of the individual and society
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in China. The status of the individual in Chinese social thought
and practice admittedly leaves room for improvement, particularly
in the context of modern life. However, while we stress the im-
portance of independence for the individual, we should not over-
look the importance of interdependence for his happiness and
perfection. In this respect, the relation between the individual and
society rather resembles that between the individual nation and
the "family of nations," a term and a notion with a noticeable
Chinese flavor, and a note on which it would not be inappropriate
to conclude a paper on Chinese social thought.
QUESTION: Do you want to comment on alleged authoritarian-
ism in Confucian social thought?
ANSWER: One might speak of a degree of authoritarianism in
Confucius in the same way, and only in the same way, as one
might speak of a degree of authoritarianism in Immanuel Kant.
The authority lies within the individual with Confucius as it does
with Kant. The Categorical Imperative indeed carries authority
with it, but this authority is self-realized and is in no way ex-
ternally imposed.
QUESTION: Since there is the conviction of the inviolable worth
of the individual at the heart of Confucian teaching, why is it
that Chinese thinkers have not interested themselves in human
rights as such?
ANSWER: The difference between Western thinkers, who have
placed a great deal of emphasis on human rights, and the Chinese
thinkers, who have been interested in the inviolable worth of the
individual, is mainly a difference of idiom. The idiom of thought
and expression is, of course, a growth out of a whole cultural back-
ground. It would not be very rewarding to expect every culture
to be employing the same idiom, even when these cultures are
directing their attention to the same human experience. It is possi-
ble, for instance, to conceive of formulating a set of philosophical
concepts and issues in the idiom of, say, Indian philosophy and
require Western writers to discuss Western thought in terms of
that idiom. There would then be a good deal of embarrassment
and perhaps not much enlightenment. My plea here is for a readi-
ness on the part of participants in a discussion of East-West
philosophy to appreciate and, insofar as possible, translate the
other man's philosophical idiom into his own.
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QUESTION: What has been the status of freedom of thought in
your tradition? Or, expressed otherwise, has there ever been any
serious curtailment of freedom of thought-either in theory or in
practice-in the Chinese tradition?
ANSWER: The problem of freedom of thought has many facets.
Religious and political freedom ranks perhaps ahead of social free-
dom in importance. Within the sphere of social thought and prac-
tice, there was a remarkable measure of freedom of thought in
traditional China. The classical period of Chinese philosophy, from
the time of Confucius to the unification of the empire in the late
third century B.C., is referred to among the Chinese as the "Period
of the Hundred Philosophers." (Curiously, the 1957-1959 period
of communist rule in China is now known as the "Bloom-Contend
Period." This is because Mao Tse-tung, in urging the nation to
speak out their criticisms of the communist administration, used
two of the popular sayings among the Chinese: "Hundred flowers
bloom together" and "Hundred philosophers contend together.")
Historically, the "hundred philosophers" did contend together, and
taught a great variety of doctrines. The worst punishment that
could happen to a thinker was to be considered a queer fellow and
to have few listeners. If a teacher, like Confucius, did not get the
proper kind of attention and respect from one feudal lord, he pro-
ceeded to the next feudal state and tried his luck with the next
ruler. Confucius did not emerge supreme among the "hundred
philosophers" until several centuries after his death. Eventually
there developed an orthodoxy, i.e., Confucianism, as the ruling ide-
ology of the nation, and the civil service examinations were tailored
very closely along orthodox Confucian lines. But, then, not everyone
needed to take up civil service, and no one was subjected to these
examinations just to be tested on the point of orthodoxy. Actually,
dissidents existed in China in large or small numbers in every age.
In the course of Chinese history, there have been religious per-
secutions and literary proscriptions. The actual causes for these
limitations of freedom have usually consisted of political threats to
or economic encroachment upon the authority of the throne. Such
discussions, however, belong elsewhere in this volume.
QUESTION: In the American social tradition, the concept of
"equality of opportunity" plays a very prominent role. Is this con-
cept equally prominent in Chinese social thought, and equally
emphasized in Chinese social practice?
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ANSWER: Yes. I have quoted the saying of Confucius, "In edu-
cation there should be no discrimination." (The wording I actually
used was the standard translation by James Legge, which says,
"In teaching there should be no distinction of classes.") This saying
should be read together with another by the Master, "By nature
all men are pretty much alike; it is by custom and habit that they
are set apart." 22 (Significantly, this quotation is used, and is the
only one used, in UNESCO's pamphlet, The Race Question,23
published in 1950.) In a popular rhymed primer, which for cen-
turies countless Chinese school boys have been made to commit
to memory in traditional China, there are these lines: "Generals and
high ministers do not come from designated stocks;jEvery man
should exert himself to the utmost," Hsiin-meng yu-hsiieh shih
(Rhymed Primer for the Training of Beginners). There is a deep-
rooted and widespread conviction among the Chinese, since Con-
fucius' day, that, with the necessary effort on the part of the
individual himself, any man should and could have the oppor-
tunity to "make good." The most ,effective and influential Chinese
institution giving expression to the conviction of the potentiality
and educability of the individual, is, of course, the wide-open civil
service examination system.
'--One has to admit that traditional China did not develop the
idea or institution of universal education, i.e., the requirement by
law that all boys and girls must attend school for so many years.
But, then, universal education is a very recent phenomenon every-
where in the world and is operating in contemporary China, but
our business here is to discuss characteristics of traditional cultures.
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JOHN C. H. WU The Status of the Individual
in the Political and Legal Traditions
of Old and New China!
I. The Individual and the State: A Diversity of Views
How does the individual in China stand vis avis the state? Here
we meet with a refreshing diversity of views.
The Taoists set the highest value on individual freedom. For
them, that government is the best which meddles and taxes the
least. The ancient "Chi-jang kou" (Song of Mud Balls) 2 was evi-
dently of Taoist inspiration:
As the sun rises I get up.
As the sun sets I go to rest.
I dig a well for my drink.
I till the fields for my food.
What has the power of the emperor t9 do with me?
This love of personal freedom is well exemplified in the life
of Chuang Tzu (bet. 399 and 295 B.C.),3 the greatest Taoist after
Lao Tzu.4 Once a certain king sent some emissaries to invite him to
be his prime minister. He declined because he wanted to "wag
his tail in the mud" like the tortoise.5 On a similar occasion he said
that he would rather be a free bird seeking its food in the hills
than be domesticated and petted to death.6
To the Taoists, then, everybody is free to lead the quiet tenor
of his life, and no government has the right to interfere with his
freedom, much less to compel him to take office. They chose to
be recluses.
Confucius (551-479 B.C.) was of a different mind. When some
THE INDIVIDUAL IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL TRADITIONS 341
recluses 7 warned him against his vain attempts to turn the current
of the age, he said with a sigh, "It is not in the nature of man to
find his social life among the beasts and birds. If we do not remain
in the society of men, with whom else can we associate ourselves?
Moreover, if the world were in good order, I should not be trying
to change it." 8
However, to remain in human society is one thing, but to join
a government is another thing. Confucius would serve; only a prince
whom he considered worthy of his service. He traveled from one
state to another for many years in search of a princely prince who
would go along with his principles and ideals.9 As he found none,
he returned a disappointed man to his native state, where he con-
tinued to teach his pupils and compile his books.
In this connection, two points are worthy of note. First, both
Confucius and the rulers seem to have taken for granted that an
individual was free to choose the prince he would like to serve, and
that he was even free to leave his office if he was displeased with
the prince's ways.lO Second, in all his travels from state to state,
there is no record to show that there was any need of a passport
and a visa. This shows that in those days there was complete free-
dom of movement among the states.
In The Book of Changes we find this significant saying: "Ab-
sorbed in the high and noble interests of his own, he refuses to
serve the prince and duke." 11 The book was a common source of
inspiration for Taoists and Confucians alike, although in this partic-
ular instance the Taoists followed its teaching more uncondition-
ally than the Confucians. Later, when Buddhism came to China,
it re-enforced the Taoist stand. The Buddhists went to the extent
of declaring that "monks owe no veneration to the king." 12
Thus, the three main traditions of Chinese thought and religion
have, each in its way, upheld the freedom of the individual vis-a.-vis
the state, because all of them recognized a sort of Natural Law
which derives its authority from a higher source than the state.
For the Confucians, this higher source is found in Heaven and
Heaven-ordained human nature,13 For the Taoists, it lies in Tao,
the Law of Nature. For the Buddhists, Buddha-dharma is the
Supreme Law transcending the laws of this world. Taoists are in
the world, but not of it. Buddhists consider themselves as neither
of nor in the world, but out of the world, the world being, in their
view, an impermanent phenomenon.14 As· to the Confucians, they
are both in and of the world. They are resolutely involved in human
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relationships and wholeheartedly committed to the fulfillment of
all the duties entailed. Still, they are not without a transcendental
dimension in their total involvement, for the Law which ordains
those duties is not made by man but by Heaven. The Buddha and
Lao Tzu soared into the heights and dived into the deeps, but
Confucius walked on the solid ground, coping with all situations
of life according to the dictates of his conscience. He did not with-
draw from the world, but played the part of a "mu-to" (wooden
bell), "i.e., a teacher and a conscientious objector." 15
Mo Tzu 16 (47Q-391? B.c.) was even more positive in spirit
than the Confucians. He was willing to sacrifice himself for the
welfare of others, and worked most strenuously to stop the states
from going to war. Like Confucius, he found the Higher Law in
the will of Heaven, and he preached the noble doctrine of universal
love. But it is regrettable that he seems to have by-passed human
nature and the family,17 With vigorous logic he stressed uniformity
at the expense of diversity.
If the Taoists tended to ignore the state, the Legalists 18 tended
to ignore the individual. To them, the state is the all-important
thing. The state is the end, while the people are merely means to
the end. They rejected all private standards of right and wrong.
They recognized no authority above the state, nor any law higher
than the positive laws of the state. Theirs was a radical positivism.
To them, "right" meant what the rulers want, and "wrong" what
the rulers do not want,19 Under their Rule of Law, all individuals
are indeed equal; only, they are equal in being slaves of the state.
They denounced and outlawed all the traditional moral virtues as
subversive of the public order of the state. Nor did they tolerate
the traditional emphasis on family relationships. In their ideology,
the individual does not belong to the family or even to himself.
He belongs exclusively to the state. They wanted the people to
work, fight, and die for the state. In the words of Lord Shang
(d. 338 B.C.), "A people that looks to warfare as a ravening wolf
looks at a piece of meat is a people that can be used. In general,
fighting is a thing that people detest. A ruler who can make the
people delight in war will become the king of kings." 20 It was by
means of the Rule of Law, with its system of penalties and rewards
working as inexorably as fate, that they succeeded in expanding
the State of Ch'in (255-207 B.C.) into an empire. But, by isolating
the Rule of Law from the fundamental humanity of men, they
foredoomed it to a catastrophic collapse.
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It is a pity that the Rule of Law should in the hands of the
Legalists be wedded to a totalitarian, materialistic, and militarist
ideology, so that, instead of securing the rights and freedom of the
individual, as it normally should, it became actually a ruthless
instrument for dehumanizing the people and turning them into
tigers and wolves. So far as China was concerned, this unhappy
wedding spoiled the chance of a genuine balanced Rule of Law
for over two millenniums.
Of all these lines of thinking, the way of Confucius would
seem to be the most balanced. It excels Moism by its catholicity,
and excels Buddhism by its sense of reality. It steers between the
anarchistic tendencies of Taoism and the totalitarianism of the
Legalists. It recognizes the need of unity, but at the same time it
sees the desirability of diversity. As Confucius himself put it, "Men
of superior quality aim at harmony, not uniformity; while the small-
minded aim at uniformity, not harmony." 21 This is in the best
tradition of political wisdom, and is still a living ideal.
At this point I wish to enter a caveat. In this paper I will speak
rather critically of the "legalization of Confucianism," or, what
amounts to the same thing, the "Confucianization of the law." 22
This must not be taken to indicate criticism against Confucius and
his teachings. He would be the last person to approve of the
legalization of Confucianism. He was a great teacher and respected
the personal ideals of each of his pupils.23 He often asked them to
tell him their aspirations, and never tried to impose upon them his
own ideals, still less to reduce the diversity of their wishes into a
dead monotony. He saw clearly that each individual had his
unique qualities and peculiar faults, which were but the defects of
his qualities.24 He was a pioneer of individualization in pedagogy.
Extremely many-sided in his interests, he was appreciative of dif-
ferent types of excellence in others.25 He had an almost religious
respect for the free choice of each and every individual,26 Even
in inculcating moral principles in the minds of his pupils, he would
use only the method of dialogue and persuasion.27 Compulsive
morality would be inconceivable to him.28
It is true that Confucius laid great stress on the rites and rules
of propriety, but his attention was focused on the underlying spirit
rather than on the formalities and the letter of specific rules.29 Con-
fucius knew that the basic principles of morality, e.g., the Golden
Rule, are immutable and of universal validity. But he also knew
that their applications and expressions must vary according to the
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changing conditions and circumstances of life.30 It was for this that
Mencius called him the "Sage of Timeliness." 31 Solid like a moun-
tain, he was yet as flexible and adaptable as water.32 He was too
broadly human to be a mere familist, too pure to be puritanical,
too moral to be moralistic, too reasonable to be rationalistic, too
thoroughgoingly moderate to be immoderate even in the virtue of
moderation, and, finally, too genuine and well-integrated an in-
dividual person to be an individualist.33 It is most regrettable that
his moral teachings have been distorted beyond recognition and
rigidified into an official system since the period of Han, (206 B.C.-
A.D. 220), when Confucianism was wedded to the cosmic philoso-
phy of the Yin-Yang school and lost its original rationality, purity,
and flexibility.34
II. The Status of the Individual Under the Old Legal System
The old legal system of China began to take form in the
Former Han period (206-23 B.C.), came to its maturity under the
T'ang Dynasty (618-g07 A.D. ),35 and remained stagnant through
the succeeding dynasties until the end of the nineteenth century,
when the legal-reform movement was set on foot. This defective
system of law was formed under the influence of "Yin-Yang Confu-
cianism," which polarized morality and law as the positive and
negative aspects of government.36 Morality sets up the norm of
conduct; law sanctions it by penalizing its violation. When morality
and law are thus wedded, the result is a system of compulsive
morality, under which individual freedoms and rights can hardly
be developed. What the Yin-Yang Confucianist brought about was
the enforcement of Confucian social ethics, as they interpreted or,
rather, misinterpreted it, by the machinery set up by the Legalists.
Confucius himself would have condemned such a queer combina-
tion. Not that there was nothing good in it, but it could have been
much better.
Let us look at some of its characteristic features insofar as
they bear upon the status of the individual.
1. All law was penal in nature. There was no civil law. Even
breaches of contract and injuries by negligence were penalized.
The underlying philosophy was that law is the handmaid of ethics,
and that any acts which are morally wrong constitute crimes, which
it is the function of the law to inhibit and punish. In all the codes
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from T'ang (618-g07) to Ch'ing (1644-1911), there is a general
provision to the effect that whoever does what ought not to be done
shall be punished.37 Although in practice this article was rarely
invoked, in theory at least it must have been like the sword of
Damocles hanging over the head of everybody.
2. The problem of equality. Were all persons equal before the
law under the old system? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that all
persons, including the emperor himself, were required to respect
and observe the law as it was. In an early case, Chang Shih-chih,38
the Commandant of Justice under the reign of Emperor Wen of
Han (reigned 179-156 B.C.), maintained the sovereignty of law
against the Emperor's wish to impose a heavier penalty than was
prescribed by the law, and uttered these unforgettable words: "The
law must be upheld by the Son of Heaven as by everyone in the
whole empire. Seeing that the penalty that I have imposed in the
present case is what the law prescribes, to impose a higher penalty
would be to discredit the law in the eyes of the people. . . . It is the
duty of the Commandant of Justice to hold the scales of justice even
and equal for the whole empire. If once the scales were overturned,
the entire legal system of the empire would fall into confusion, and
the people would not know where to put their hands and feet.
May I ask Your Majesty to give serious consideration to this?" After
a long silence, the Emperor said, "I believe you are right." 39 Chang
Shih-chih established the principle of judicial independence, which
became a sacred tradition for the judges of succeeding genera-
tions; and the good example set by Emperor Wen was seldom if
ever departed from by later sovereigns. .
Although there was no written constitution like the Magna
Charta, the powers of the emperor were severely restricted by
immemorial constitutional customs and by the unquestioned author-
ity of the Confucian classics, effectively sanctioned by the fear
of being called a "wicked monarch" in the ages to corneY' From
the Hans to the Manchus, there were some mediocre and weak
monarchs, but there have been no despots or tyrants who placed
themselves above the law. In this sense, it can be truthfully as-
serted that under the old system all persons were equal before the
law.
Yet, in another sense, not all persons were equal before the
law. For, although no one was above the law, yet the law itself
created categories of people for special treatment. Prominent in
all the codes were the eight categories of persons who were en-
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titled to special consideration when guilty of crimes not of a
treasonable nature.41 They were: (1) relatives of the sovereign,
(2) old friends of the sovereign, (3) persons of great virtue, (4)
persons of great ability, (5) persons who had achieved great merit,
(6) high-ranking officials, (7) persons who had served the govern-
ment with exceptional zeal and diligence, and (8) the guests of
the dynasty, that is, the descendants of the superseded dynasty.42
Now, what were the privileges they were entitled to? For one
thing, they could not be arrested or investigated before special
permission was granted by the emperor. In some dynasties, they
could not be fettered.43 In other words, they were not privileged
to commit crimes, but only to have their cases reported to the
emperor for his final decision, and be immune to certain procedures
and methods of trial. Taken all in all, these privileges did not
amount to much.
3. The legal status of the individual in the family. Tradition-
ally, a Chinese seldom thought of himself as an isolated entity. He
was his father's son, his son's father, his elder brother's junior-in
other words, an integral member of his family. He was a con-
crete individual person who moved, lived, and had his being in
the natural milieu of the family. The ties of blood and, to some
extent, of marriage created for him a network of human relation-
ships in which he had his proper place. Each family had a head, to
whom his wife, his children, his daughters-in-law, his grand-
children, and the domestics owed unquestioning obedience. I
know of no other system of law which is so meticulous in enforcing
the duties of filial piety. So long as the parents were living, it was
a crime for the sons, including those who were married, to set up
a separate household.44 Children were betrothed by the mutual
agreement of the heads of the families involved, and the parties
themselves had no voice in the choice.45 Nor were the young man
and girl supposed to see each other before their wedding. Marriage
within the period of mourning for one's parents entailed heavy
penalties and was null and void.46 It was a crime for a married son
to beget a child within the mourning period.47 This rule was in
force for many centuries until it was abolished at the instance of
Emperor T'ai-tsu of Ming (reigned 1368-1399), who held that it
was against human nature and therefore could not be the teaching
of Confucius.48
Confucius himself would have seen eye-to-eye with Emperor
T'ai-tsu. Confucius was indeed insistent on the three-year mourning
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for parents, but his epigones have out-Confucianized him in this,
as in so many other respects. When we speak of the "Confucian-
ization of law," we must take care not to think that Confucius
would have been happy to see some of the extremities to which
his teachings were made to go at the hands of his later followers.
For instance, Confucius did say that it was all right for father
and son to conceal each other's crimes.49 If the father had com-
mitted a crime, the son had no duty to testify against him. This
privilege not to testify against one's parent was extended after
the T'ang Dynasty to all members of the family living under the
same roof, and the prosecutor was forbidden to ask anyone who
was thus allowed to conceal the crime to bear witness.50 So far,
this seems to be reasonable, and it has its counterparts in other
systems of law. But what was peculiar to Chinese law was the
rule that anyone who accused his parents should be put to death,
even if the accusation proved to be true.51
In all crimes of one member of the family against another,
the degrees of relationship between the offender and the victim
were used as an index to the degrees of punishment. Generally
speaking, in crimes against the person, such as killing and wound-
ing and slandering, the closer the relationship the higher the
punishment; while in crimes against property, such as stealing and
embezzlement, the closer the relationship the lighter the punish-
ment.52
Chinese law was so geared to the idea of the family that it
treated even religious communities as families. The relationship of
master and novice was assimilated to that of uncle and nephew.
The objects of worship were probably regarded as ancestors, as
may be inferred from the following provision of the Code of T'ang
(T'ang-lii shu-i): "Whoever steals or destroys an image of the Lord
of Heaven (the supreme deity in Taoism) or the image of the
Buddha shall receive three years' imprisonment. If a Taoist priest
or nun should steal or destroy an image of the Lord of Heaven, or
if a Buddhist monk or nun should steal or destroy an image of the
Buddha, the penalty shall be banishment with penal labor. If
the image in question is that of a True Man, or a bodhi-sattva, the
penalty shall in each case be reduced by one degree." 53
From the above examples, it is easy to see the legal status of
the individual in the family. Each family was a little kingdom,
which may be called a "familiadom," in which each member oc-
cupied a unique status different from all the others.54 He might be
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superior to some and inferior to others, but never altogether equal
to anyone, for the simple reason that even brothers were classified
into elder and younger with important legal differences. But this
does not mean that their status was static; for, if the sons survived
their parents, they could set up their separate households and thus
become family heads themselves.
4- Inequality between sexes. Under the old legal system, the
status of woman left much to be desired. In the eye of the law, a
woman was under a perpetual coverture. According to an old say-
ing, a woman was subject to threefold dependence. Before her
marriage, she was dependent on her father; after marriage, on her
husband; when widowed, on her sons. But nowhere is the inequal-
ity more glaring than in the law of divorce. The wife could under
no circumstance divorce her husband, but the husband could di-
vorce his wife on no fewer than seven grounds, namely, childless-
ness, adultery, negligence in serving her husband's parents,
loquacity, stealing, jealousy, and loathsome disease.55 Some of these
grounds, as you will see, are simply ridiculous. Especially negli-
gence in serving the parents-in-law as a ground of divorce became
a prolific source of heart-rending tragedies in family life. In some
cases, the husband and wife were in perfect harmony with each
other, but they were forced to be divorced because her mother-
in-law did not like her. A story of this kind is told in the well-known
poem, "The Peacock Flies to the Southwest." 56 And Lu Yu, a great
poet of the Sung period (960-1279), divorced from his beloved
wife at the instance of his mother, continued to exchange love
poems even after she was remarried into another family.57
However, the law enumerated three conditions under which
the wife could not be divorced on any of the seven grounds, except
adultery. The conditions were (1) that she had no close relatives
to whom she could return, (2) that she had worn three years'
mourning for her husband's parents, or (3) that her husband's fam-
ily was poor at the time of their marriage but had grown prosperous
afterwards.58 The third condition is particularly significant, for it
indicates that the law was not blind to the fact that the building
up of a home usually depended upon the co-operation of the wife.
In actual life, the Chinese woman's role was as important as
her legal status was low. There is no telling how many monarchs
and statesmen and scholars have attained greatness with the silent
help of their wives and their mothers.59 There was a popular
proverb on the lips of everybody: "The mother is as lovable as the
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sun in winter; the father is as severe as the sun in summer." Poor
man, what he had gained in legal authority was more than offset
by his loss in spontaneous affection and devotion on the part of his
children.
5. Equality as the rule. From the above, one may have been
led to conclude that there are no general principles of law and
justice underlying the legal system of Old China which are applica-
ble equally to all persons. This would be an erroneous impression.
Although family relationships did modify the general principles
to a notable extent, they did not exclude them altogether. It would
not be far from the truth to observe that particular relationships
and general principles formed the warp and woof of the law.
Then, too, we must realize that most cases that came before the
magistrate were between parties not in any way familially related
to each other, and they were governed by the general rules of the
law. In all such cases, there was perfect equality of all persons
before the law.
As the magistrates were drawn from the ranks of Confucian
scholars, they were, as a rule, steeped in the spirit of classical
teachings. Two passages in the ancient classics seem to have had
the greatest influence on their minds. One is a saying of Tseng
Ts'an as recorded in The Analects. A friend of his, newly appointed
to a judicial office, came to call on Tseng Ts'an and asked for some
words of advice. Tseng Ts'an said, "The rulers have departed from
the right Way, and the people have been demoralized for a long
time. In trying a case, if you should get at the truth of the charge,
cherish a sense of sorrow and compassion for the culprit and by no
means feel elated." 60 It seems as though Heaven itself were speak-
ing through the mouth of honest Tseng Ts'an.
But the locus classicus of the fundamental principles of crim-
inal justice is to be found in a dialogue between Emperor Shun
and Kao Yao as recorded in The Book of Documents.61 This re-
markable dialogue between a sage-emperor and a sage-minister
presents in a nutshell all the essentials of the Chinese philosophy
of penal justice. It teaches that penal law is a subsidiary means of
education, that the ultimate end of punishment is to bring about
the cessation of all punishment, that intention is an essential ele-
ment in a crime, and that, although an act may fall within the letter
of the law, one should sacrifice formal regularity rather than run
the risk of punishing an innocent person. All these ideas would
seem to belong to the perennial philosophy of justice, springing
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directly from the natural reason of man. They constitute the living
fountain from which Confucian magistrates through the ages have
drawn their inspiration and their guidance. Even Su Tung-p'o,
who used to declare airily that he had never in his life set his eyes
upon the statutes, wrote a beautiful eulogy of Kao Yao's ideas of
justice.62
6. A touch of humanity in the judges. Although Confucian
scholars did nothing to develop the law, they had the merit of not
forgetting that the law was made for man and not man for the
law, and that punishment was but a means of education. That is
why, in hearing litigations between family members on property
rights, for example, the first impulse of a magistrate would be to
try to reconcile the parties. Let me relate a typical case. Two
brothers were disputing for farms. Su Ch'iung, the magistrate, said
to both of them, "The most precious thing in the world is brotherly
affection, and the least precious is a piece of land. Why should you
quarrel over the least precious at the expense of the most precious?"
Moved by this sagacious admonition, the brothers embraced each
other and, after ten years of estrangement,63 were reconciled. In
this kind of atmosphere it was impossible to develop a rigid law
of property. Instead of trying to solve the case by threshing out
the rights and wrongs involved in the dispute, the magistrate sim-
ply disposed of it by dissolving the dispute itself. Nevertheless, this
typical way of settling a case of this nature has an irresistible
charm which will cast such a spell upon one's mind that one
would sooner have a judgment like that than read a dozen learned
treatises on the law of property.
Another case is even more interesting. When Chen Shih was
a magistrate in a certain district, a thief entered his house one
evening and hid himself on the top beam. Chen Shih espied him
but pretended not to notice him. He called the members of his
family together and began to preach a moral lesson to them. "Each
of you," he said, "must diligently attend to his duties. You should
know that robbers and thieves are not bad by nature. They become
such only through the habit of laziness. For example, the gentleman
on the top beam is a case in point." The burglar was so frightened
that he fell to the ground. Chen Shih spoke gently to him, "Judging
by your appearance, you are not a bad man. I only hope you will
correct your mistakes and do good. Probably your wrong-doing
is due to your proverty; I here give you two pieces of silk to help
you start anew." The gentleman was profoundly moved and after
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that became a refonned man. When this was known to the public,
all the people were converted by the report of Chen Shih's kind-
ness and magnanimity.64 There was neither thief nor robber in his
district after that. The Chinese have a euphemism for thief: "The
gentleman on the top beam." After all, Old China had its unique
qualities, and the lack of legal experts was but a defect of its
qualities.
III. The Status of the Individual under the New System
1. The Influence of the West. Communications between China
and the West began long before the last century, but China did
not feel the real impact of the West until the latter part of the
century, the heyday of Western individualism. The good Emperor
Kuang-hsii (reigned 1875-1908) saw the urgent need of a thorough-
going overhauling of the old institutions. He wanted to introduce
a constitutional monarchy after the pattern of England and Japan.
Unfortunately, this was frustrated by the infamous Empress Dow-
ager. But the Emperor's initiative in the refonn of the criminal law
proved fruitful. In 1902, he issued an edict appointing a commis-
sion to revise the laws "on the basis of a comparative study of the
laws of all nations, to the end that our new laws may be applicable
both to our own people and to foreigners, and that our administra-
tion of justice may be improved." 65
In the end, the penal system was considerably modernized.
The new penal code was promulgated in 1910, but. the Emperor
did not live to see it. Although it has been superseded by later
codes, it marked the beginning of the new legal system.
There was also some attempt to produce a code of civil law,
though it did not pass beyond the drafting stage. But the very fact
that the law was now divided into penal and civil was a tremendous
gain for the rights of the individual. Moreover, the legal profession
was for the first time recognized by the law, and law schools began
to appear.
2. The "San-min chu-f' as the Foundation of the Present Sys-
tem. As we have seen, the old legal system was based upon the
Yin-Yang philosophy. It was not until this all-embracing cosmology
was replaced by the San-min chu-i,66 the philosophy of the three-
fold well-being of the people-the people's nationhood, the people's
political powers and legal rights, and the people's livelihood-that
a truly Chinese system of law could be established. The San-min
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chu-i, which Sun Yat-sen formulated, was based, on the one hand,
upon Lincoln's idea of government "of the people, by the people,
for the people," 67 and, on the other hand, upon the best political,
legal, and economic traditions of China from the earliest times to
the present day. Horizontally, it draws from the collective experi-
ence of Western democracies. Perpendicularly, it makes itself heir
to the inexhaustible legacy of Old China. Consequently, it is broad
and cosmopolitan in spirit; and, at the same time, is deeply-rooted
in the native soil. It represents a magnificent harmony between the
one and the many, doing justice at once to the urgent claims of
unity and universality and to the vital urges of diversity and
uniqueness.
In the present Constitution, a whole chapter is given to the
formulation of the basic rights and duties of the people. It begins
with a declaration of the equality of all citizens before the law,
"irrespective of sex, religion, race, or party affiliation." 68 Time does
not permit me to enumerate here all the freedoms and rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. The author of the first draft made
it a special point to incorporate the institution of habeas corpus
in his draft; and it has been preserved in the permanent Consti-
tution.69 Only two duties are mentioned, namely, paying taxes and
performing military service in accordance with law. Another note-
worthy point is that the constitutionally guaranteed rights cannot
be restricted by law "except by such as may be necessary to
prevent infringement upon the freedoms of other persons, to avert
imminent crisis, to maintain social order, or to advance public
welfare." 70 This is similar to the "Due Process Clause" of the
American Constitution.
All these provisions, inspired by the spirit of the San-min
chu-i, would seem to furnish a firm legal foundation for the de-
velopment of a vibrant and full-blooded individual person and a
working democracy.
3. The Civil Law. Although the civil law as an independent
branch of the law had emerged in the early years of this century,
it was not until 1930 that the civil code was promulgated. This
code is a major accomplishment in the history of modern Chinese
law. With the San-min chu-i for its guiding spirit, it embodies
general principles drawn from comparative law, and at the same
time it gives specific articulation to many of the prevailing customs
and attitudes of the people.n Thus, both the universal and the
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unique have found a hospitable abode in its spacious premises, in
which every individual in China may feel at home.
a) The Place of Good Morals in the Civil Law. To tum a
moral wrong as such into a crime would constitute a great threat
to individual integrity; but to tum a moral wrong into a civil
wrong, or a tort, would involve, at most, a question of compensa-
tion. This is why the civil law can afford to be more hospitable to
moral considerations in the determination of liability. There is a
plethora of provisions in which "good morals" is made a decisive
criterion of civil liability or of the validity of a transaction. Let two
samples suffice: "A juristic act which is contrary to public order
or good morals is void." 72 "A person, who, intentionally or by
negligence, unlawfully infringes upon the rights of another is bound
to compensate him for any damage arising therefrom. The same
applies when the injury is done intentionally in a manner contrary
to good morals." 73
It is true that many such provisions are adopted from modem
European codes. But the Chinese legislators have done so not
blindly but selectively. They have selected precisely those new
principles of Western law which are most congenial to the spirit of
Chinese tradition. By a fortunate coincidence, the Chinese civil
code was produced at a time when Western juristic thought had
for several decades been turning away from the extreme individ-
ualism of the nineteenth century and heading steadily toward a
humanistic and sociological position strikingly similar, in spirit, to
the Chinese philosophy of the human-minded and well-integrated
individual, who thinks of his duties more than his rights.
b) The Equality of the Sexes Before the Law. The most
revolutionary feature of the civil code was the complete legal
equality between men and women. In the first place, all provi-
sions of the code applied to both sexes alike. In the second place,
for the first time in the history of China, women were entitled to
inherit in equal shares with men in the law of intestate succession.74
In this, the principle of agnatia, which had prevailed for at least
three millenniums, was replaced by the principle of cognatia.
Marriage is no longer a matter arranged between two families,
but is based strictly upon the mutual consent of the parties them-
selves.75 Only when a minor makes an agreement to marry or con-
cludes his marriage is parental consent required.76 The only
material difference that the law makes between the sexes is with
354 JOHN C. H. WU
regard to the marriageable age, which for a man is eighteen and for
a woman sixteen.77 In all other ways, they are equal before the law.
4- The Penal Law.
a) The present criminal code starts out with a recognition
of the democratic principle of Nulla poena sine lege: "An act is
punishable only if expressly so provided by the law at the time of
its commission." 78 This means that, however evil the act may be
from a moral point of view, it is not subject to punishment as long
as there is no explicit prohibition by the law. The object of this
law is not to encourage the people to do evil, but to secure their
freedom from the possibility of arbitrary judgment of the court.
b) While all the old codes highlighted the eight classes of
persons entitled to special consideration, the new code puts all
offenders on an equal basis. The law has equal respect for all
persons, special respect for none. If there is special respect at all,
it is for certain persons against whom a crime has been committed,
as may be seen from Article 116, which provides that any crime
against the person or reputation of the chief executive of a friendly
state or its duly accredited representative is subject to a higher
punishment than that which is provided for a crime of the same
nature committed against other persons.79
c) It is interesting to note that family relationships still
play an important part in the measurement of punishments in
certain situations. This serves as a link between the old system
and the new.
The accusing of one's family relatives is no longer prohibited
as in the old law; but in a number of situations the existence of
family relationships controls the degree of punishment. In offenses
such as false testimony, malicious prosecution, profaning the dead,
homicide, causing bodily injury, and abandonment, the presence
of a family relationship between the offender and the victim raises
the degree of punishment.8o On the other hand, in offenses such as
fraud, breach of confidence, theft, and embezzlement, the presence
of a family relationship reduces the punishment. In some cases the
judge is authorized even to remit the punishment.81
In all such cases, the law is doing nothing more than being
responsive to the realities of human relationships and family soli-
darity so deep-rooted in the Chinese tradition.
d) The last but not the least significant feature of the crim-
inal code is the large scope of discretionary powers it gives to
the judges in meting out punishment. In almost all cases, the law
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prescribes a maximum punishment and a minimum; between these
limits there is often a large leeway, thus making possible the
individualization of punishments.82 Besides, the code permits sus-
pension of punishment in cases where the sentence is no more than
two years' imprisonment.83 It has also adopted a system of parole.84
But the most typical example of individualization of punish-
ment is to be found in Article 16: "Criminal responsibility may not
be avoided on the ground of ignorance of the law, but punishment
may be reduced according to the circumstances. If a person be-
lieved with good reason that his act was permitted by law, punish-
ment may be remitted." In this, the Confucian empathic principle
of consideration toward every individual finds a happy expression.85
While the whole movement of the individualization of punish-
ment is one of the most advanced developments in Western
jurisprudence, it accords surprisingly well with the old Chinese
tradition of fitting the punishment to the concrete individual person
rather than to the abstract nature of his crime. This is but an
instance of the intriguing paradox that the East in seeking to be
Westernized has often encountered its dormant self, just as in
some other spheres, especially in philosophy of life and spiritual
cultivation, the West is beginning to discover its original self in
exploring the profundities of the Eastern mind. In each case, the
excursion is really a homecoming.
The East and the West so closely interpenetrate each other
that one is often tempted to say that East is West and West is East.
Perhaps it is more accurate to say that, while East is East and
West is West, there is East in the West and West" in the East.
Each instinctively seeks the other for its own completion and ful-
fillment. Let us therefore treasure their differences; for, without
differences they would not be able to enrich each other. And let
us also treasure their essential oneness, without which their exis-
tential differences would not be able to evolve into a harmony.
But, thanks to their real unity and real diversity, there is great
reason to hope that all the bewildering multiplicity of cultural
processes can be an inexhaustible source of counterpoints to feed
an ever-expanding and ever-deepening symphony of humanity, in
which unity becomes infinitely vital and rich and diversity acquires
eternal meaning and significance.
QUESTION: In the last part of your paper, where you speak
of the features of the present criminal code of China, you cite
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Article 16 as an example in which the Confucian principle of
consideration finds a happy expression. Now, the legal principle
underlying this provision is familiar to all students of modern
criminology. My question is: Is this Article an original Chinese
invention or is it adopted from the West?
ANSWER: It is not a Chinese invention, but an adoption from
the West. But, although it is not original with the Chinese, the
choice is conditioned by Chinese preferences, which are Confucian.
QUESTION: Your description of the legal system of modern
China is particularly interesting to me as a student of Japanese
law. You point out that, even in the modern modifications of the old
legal tradition, Chinese lawmakers managed to preserve a certain
continuity with the spirit of the past. What strikes me is that these
modifications coincide on so many points with the Japanese modifi-
cations. This must be because there is a fundamental similarity in
the social structures of the two countries-which condition their
choice of exactly the same elements from the legal systems of the
West. Or, is it because there have been mutual influences between
China and Japan?
ANSWER: The similarity of social structures of the two coun-
tries can be traced to a great extent to the fact that in her formative
days Japan absorbed Confucianism quite thoroughly. Of the con-
temporary Chinese lawmakers, not a few received their juristic
training in Japan, although a greater number have studied in the
West. Anyway, mutual influences between China and Japan have
been inevitable. However, the greatness of a nation does not de-.
pend so much on its originality as on its capacity to assimilate
congenial ideas from others.
QUESTION: You mention the eight categories of privileged per-
sons, giving the impression that under the old Chinese legal system
not all persons were really equal before the law. Were there no
counterbalancing responsibilities against those privileges? For
instance, there was a well-known maxim prevailing in olden
times: 'When those who should know the law transgress it, the
punishment should be doubly severe." That is to say, the greater
your knowledge, the greater your responsibility. Now, the privi-
leged classes are usually more educated than the unprivileged
ones. So, in fact, the inequality was not as great as your presentation
would make it seem to be.
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ANSWER: There is a point in your question. But there is a
distinction between "de jure" and "de facto." I have pointed this
out in connection with the legal inequality of the sexes: '1n actual
life, the Chinese woman's role was as important as her legal status
was low." Similarly, on this question of privileged classes, there
were certainly some counterbalancing responsibilities. Politically
and constitutionally, for instance, the supreme privilege of the
emperor was coupled with his supreme responsibility, to such an
extent that in case of grave breaches of the trust imposed upon him
by the Mandate of Heaven, the leaders of the people had not
only the right but the sacred duty of revolution. But there is one
thing I have to bring out in connection with your question, and
that is that, although many persons belonging to the privileged
classes were educated, not all educated persons belonged to the
privileged classes.
In this connection, let me introduce a pet theory of mine-the
principle of neutralization. Where, for instance, the starting point
is equality, inequalities creep into the system in practice, thus
neutralizing the official theory. On the other hand, where the
starting point is inequality, equalities creep into the system in
practice, thus toning down the harsh consequences of the theory.
Truly, as Justice Holmes once remarked, the life of the law has
not been logic; it has been experience.
The same is true of women's "right of inheritance." Legally,
it is absolutely correct to say that a woman had no right of in-
heritance. Yet, this does not mean that therefore all women were
in danger of starvation. In fact, rich families as a rule' provided fine
dowries for their daughters on their marriage; and although a girl
did not inherit from her father, she "inherited," together with her
husband, from his father. Of course, in a legal sense, she could not
be said to "inherit," but, if the husband became rich, she could
not remain poor in fact, at least in normal cases.
Notes
1. This paper is strictly confined to the question of individual freedom
and equality. For a general background of legal and political
thought and institutions, the reader is referred to my article on
"Chinese Legal and Political Philosophy," in Charles A. Moore, ed.,
Philosophy and Culture East and West (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 1962), pp. 611-630; also this volume, pp. 213-237.
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2. See Shen Te-ch'ien, Ku-shih yuan (Origins of Ancient Poetry, An
Anthology of Old Poems). This anthology was first published in
1719, but has been reprinted innumerable times. The song quoted
in the text is the first poem in the anthology. It is purported to date
from the third millennium B.C. This is of more than doubtful
authenticity. The first two lines of the poem are found in Chuang
Tzu XXVIII with reference to any such song. It is likely that the
song was produced after the time of Chuang Tzu. But, whatever the
date, it was certainly of Taoist inspiration.
3. Chuang Tzu.
4. Lao Tzu, author of the Tao-te ching, was, traditionally, an elder
contemporary of Confucius. His dates have been perhaps the most
controversial question in the history of Chinese philosophy. Some
scholars have put him even later than Chuang Tzu. But the latest
tendency among Chinese scholars is toward a confirmation of the
traditional date.
5. Chuang Tzu, XVII.
6. See, for instance, the Chuang Tzu, XVIII, containing the following
story: "Formerly a sea-bird alighted in the suburbs of Lu. The
marquis went out to meet it and brought it to the ancestral temple,
where he treated it to a banquet. Exquisite ancient music was
played for it; an ox, a sheep, and a pig were killed to feed it. The
bird, however, looked at everything with dim eyes, and was very
sad. It did not venture to take a single bit of meat, nor drink a single
cupful; and in three days it died."
7. Several such encounters are recorded in The Analects. See, for
instance, Analects, XIV.34,41,42; XVIII.S,6,7.
8. Analects, XVIII.5.
9. Confucius had great confidence in his statesmanship. "Were any
prince to employ me, in a twelvemonth something could be done,
and in three years there could be some worth-while result"
(Analects, XIII.10). This does not mean that he would accept any
kind of employment. When he was in the State of Wei, Duke Ling
asked him about military tactics. He replied curtly, "With sacrificial
rites I have indeed an acquaintance, but as to military matters I
have never studied them" (Analects, XV.1). The next day he left
the state (ibid.).
10. When he was the Minister of Crime in Lu, as the Prime Minister,
the neighboring state Ch'i was afraid that Lu would grow so strong
as to constitute a menace to its safety. So, Ch'i presented a company
of eighty beautiful dancing girls as a token of homage to the ruler of
Lu, with the result that the latter neglected to attend to the business
of government. Eventually, Confucius went abroad. (See Ssu-ma
Ch'ien, Shih chi, XLVII, "Confucius: His Life and His Family.")
11. I ching, under the Ku (eighteenth) Hexagram. The quoted words
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constitute the oracle attached to the sixth and topmost line.
12. See Hung-ming chi (An Anthology of essays in defense of Buddhism,
compiled by Seng-yu of the Liang Dynasty [s02-SS6]). Book S
contains a thoroughgoing exposition by Hui-yuan (344-416) of the
reasons why Buddhist monks do not venerate the king.
13. The Chung yung opens with a clear-cut statement: "What is
ordained of Heaven is called 'Nature.' The following of this 'Nature'
is called 'Tao,' or 'Moral Law.' The refinement of the Tao is called
'Culture.' "
14. This does not mean that Buddhists believe this world to be nothing.
It is a conglomeration of elements which is only temporary. Because
of its intrinsic impermanence, human existence is not real in the
same sense as nirviilJa is.
IS. "Wooden bell" (mu-to) is really a metal bell with a wooden tongue.
Its function was to awaken people and call them together,
especially in times of danger at night. Analects, III.24.
16. See Yi-Pao Mei, trans., The Ethical and Political Works of Motse
(London: Arthur Probsthain, 1929). Refer also to A Source Book in
Chinese Philosophy, translated, compiled, and edited by Wing-tsit
Chan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 211 ff.
17. His doctrines suffered from excessive asceticism. For instance his
wholesale condemnation of music ignored the fact that music is a
necessity of life and can be turned into a potent factor of education.
His exaltation of uniformity of thought at the expense of salutary
diversity unwittingly paved the way for the Legalists' unification of
thought by the force of the state.
18. See J. J. L. Duyvendak, trans., The Book of Lord Shang (London:
Arthur Probsthain, 1928), and W. K. Liao, trans., The Complete
Works of Han Fei Tzu (London: Arthur Probsthain,.1939).
19. See Arthur Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1929), p. 200.
20. Ibid., p. 221.
21. Analects, XIII.23. In this, as in so many other aphorisms, Confucius'
merit did not lie in originality but in his unsurpassed gift of
expressing a whole tradition in a living epigram. Yen Tzu, an elder
contemporary of his, had eloquently said the same thing to Duke
Ching of Ch'i by means of some interesting illustrations, such as the
preparation of a soup and the composition of music. "If water is
flavored with water, who can enjoy its taste? If the lute and the harp
had but one note, who could enjoy their music? Such is the
undesirability of uniformityl" See Ch'un ch'iu, Tso chuan, under year
XX of Duke Chao (S22 B.C.).2
22. See Ch'u T'ung-tsu, Law and Society in Traditional China (Paris:
Mouton & Co., 1961), pp. 267 ff.
23. Analects, XI.2S, where Confucius was asking his disciples to state
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their ideals of life. When one of them hesitated to speak, because his
ideal of life was so different from those of the others, Confucius
urged him on, saying, "What does it matter? After all, each of us
may speak of his own ideals."
24. For instance, Analects, XVII.16, where he pointed out that, even
though the ancients, too, had their defects, those were the defects
of their qualities, while the moderns have the same defects without
any corresponding qualities to counterbalance them. Also in
Analects, XVIII.10, Confucius quoted the advice that the Duke of
Chou gave to his son that he must not seek perfection and all-
aroundness in anyone man.
25. See, for instance, Analects, XVIII.8, where he praised the different
types of excellence among ancient worthies, while admitting that he
himself was different from all of them, since he refused to be pinned
down to any definite pattern. The important thing is to be true to
oneself: in the choice of styles, there is "no must and no must-not."
26. Analects, IX.25: "You can take away the commander from the forces
of a large state, but you cannot take away the free will from a
person, however humble he may be."
27. Cf. Analects, III·7; I.15.
28. It is well known that Confucius laid emphasis on the transforming
influence of virtuous example; he would be the last person to try to
reform popular morals by resorting to legal measures and punish-
ments.
2g. Analects, III.3: "If a man is not human, what has he to do with
rites? If a man is not human, what has he to do with music?"
30. According to Confucius, one must, first of all, have a sincere desire
to learn; then he must be able to stand on the principles he has
learned; finally, in applying the principles, he must be able to weigh
the exigencies of the times and circumstances. See Analects, IX.2g.
31. Book of Mencius, VB.I.
32. According to Confucius, the good take delight in the mountains,
while the wise take delight in the waters. (Analects, VI. 21.)
Confucius himself seems to combine the two.
33. Just as true virtue is not self-righteous, so a truly integrated person
cannot be deliberately individualistic.
34. Confucius' conception of Heaven (T'ien) , like those of Mo Tzu and
Mencius, was fundamentally theistic. When, in the Western Han
period (206 B.C.-A.D. 25), Confucianism was wedded to the Yin-
Yang philosophy, Heaven-and-Earth began to take the place of
Heaven, and there emerged what may be called a cosmic pantheism.
In the hands of Confucius and Mencius, "T'ien-ming" was Divine
Providence. With the Han scholars, it became equated with fate.
35. The T'ang-lii shu-i (The Code of T'ang with Annotations), which
was drafted by a committee consisting of eight high-ranking
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ministers and ten Doctors of Law (under the chairmanship of
Ch'ang-sun Wu-chi) was submitted to the Throne in 653. It
contains 502 articles divided into twelve parts. Each article is
followed by annotations, which were considered an integral part of
the Code. The Code summed up the best elements handed down
from the previous dynasties after the Han, and served as the model
for later codes.
36. In the introductory commentaries to Book I of the Code, we find the
polarity. of law and morality formulated in these words: "Virtue and
morals are the foundation of government and education, while laws
and punishments are the operative agencies of government and
education. The former and the latter are necessary complements to
each other, just as it takes morning and evening to form a whole
day, or spring and autumn to form a whole year." However excellent
the Code of T'ang was, it was limited by the cosmological
framework of Yin-Yang Confucianism, which was by that time
deeply intrenched in the Chinese mind.
37. See Article no. 450 of the Code of T'ang. All the later codes contain
a similar provision. See, for instance, Ta Tsing Leu Lee, Sir George
Thomas Staunton, trans. (London: T. Cadell & Davies, 1810), p.
419: "Whoever is guilty of improper conduct, and such as is
contrary to the spirit of the laws, though not a breach of any specific
article, shall be punished, at the least, with 40 blows; and when the
impropriety is of a serious nature, with 80 blows."
38. Ssu-ma Ch'ien's biography of Chang Shih-chih has been translated
by Burton Watson in his Records of the Grand Historian (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1961), Vol. I, pp. 533-539.
39. Cf. ibid., pp. 536-537.
40. An important branch of Chinese literature consists of memorials to
the Throne. This forms an inexhaustible source of history and
wisdom which is still little explored.
41. For a detailed treatment, see Ch'i.i T'ung-tsu, op. cit., note 22, pp.
177 fr.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., p. 178.
44. See the Code of T'ang, Article No. 55.
45. Under the old law, to disobey the will of one's parents would be
an act of filial impiety, which was listed as one of the ten gravest
crimes. Marriage was primarily the concern of the family, meant to
continue the family lineage and traditions. To the Western reader,
this system must seem incredibly cruel; he is apt to think that every
marriage must have been a mockery of marital happiness. But, in
fact, unhappy marriages were the exception rather than the rule. On
the whole, parents were very careful in choosing spouses for their
children. Their children had implicit confidence in their judgment,
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and would feel too bashful to comment, even if they were consulted.
In Confucius' day, marriage was not primarily a matter for the
family. The parties knew each other before the wedding. This can
be inferred from the considerable number of poems on courtship and
marital happiness in The Book of Songs, which Confucius loved so
much that he set every one of the three-hundred-odd odes to music,
and never wearied of encouraging his pupils and even his own son
to read them. Confucius was certainly much more modern than his
later epigones. In this paradox lies the key to a proper understanding
of the cultural history of China.
46. See the Code of T'ang, Article no. 179.
47. Ibid., Article no. 156.
48. Ming T'ai-tsu hsiao-tz'u lu hsii (Emperor T'ai-tsu of Ming, Preface
to Models of Filial Piety and Paternal Affection), quoted in Yang
Hung-lieh, Chung-kuo fa-lii ssu-hsiang shih (History of Chinese
Legal Thought) (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), Vol. II, p.
290 .
49. Analects, XIII.18.
50. See T'ung-tsu Ch'u, op. cit., note 22, pp. 70-71.
51. Ibid., p. 72.
52. This is a beautiful expression of humanism in the law, laying greater
emphasis on the integrity of the person than on material interests.
53. Code of T'ang, Article no. 276.
5+ This unique status is not fixed once and for all in its content. It may
vary from day to day, from year to year. Let us suppose a family of
seven members, consisting of the parents and five grown-up sons.
The father is the head of the family. If the father dies, the sons
cannot yet establish their separate families, because the mother is
still living. The eldest son becomes the legal head of the family,
possessing an authority over his younger brothers similar to that of
the father. So far as the eldest son is concerned, his status has
undergone a radical change following the death of his father. If the
eldest son dies, the second son takes his place as the head of the
family. If the mother dies, all the sons are free to establish their
separate households. Thus, at any moment the status of each
member is determined by the law; but, at the happening of an
external event, he may be transposed from one status to another.
55. See the Code of T'ang, Article no. 189 et seq.
56. K'ung-chiieh tung-nan fei. For an English translation, see Robert
Payne, ed., The White Pony: An Anthology of Chinese Poetry (New
York: Mentor Books, 1960), pp. 117-125.
57. For an English translation of Lu Yu's poem and his former wife's
response, see Teresa Li, (Li Te-luan), "Fifty Poems from the
Chinese," T'ien Hsia Monthly, IX (1939), 286, 304-306.
58. Code of Tang, Article no. 18g.
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59. For some illustrious examples, see Albert O'Hara, S.J., The Position
of Woman in Early China: Including Translation of Lieh-nii chuan
(Hong Kong: Orient Publishing Co., 1955).
60. Analects, XIX.19.
61. See "Ta-Yii mo" (Counsels of the Great Yii), in Shu ching.
62. See his famous essay, "Hsing-shang chung-hou chih-chih lun" (The
Acme of Clemency in Punishment and Reward), in which he
expounded the principle laid down by Kao Yao that in doubtful
cases the sovereign should err on the side of leniency and generosity
rather than try to follow the strict letter of the law. This essay is
included in many popular anthologies.
63. See Pei-Ch'i shu (History of the Northern Ch'i Dynasty), Bk. 46.
64. See Hou-Han shu (History of the Later Han Dynasty), Bk. 92.
65. See Yang Hung-lieh, Chung-kuo fa-lii ssu-hsiang shih (History of
Chinese Legal Thought), Vol. II, p. 305.
66. Commonly translated as "Three Principles of the People."
67. See "Wu-ch'iian hsien-fa," in Kuo-fu ch'iian-chi, Chang Ch'i-yiin,
ed., (Taipei: United Publication Center, 1960), p. 165.
68. Constitution of the Republic of China, Article 7. On the spirit of the
present constitution, see Sun Fo, China Looks Forward (New York:
John Day, 1945).
69. Ibid., Article 8.
70. Ibid., Article 23.
71. For a more detailed account, see my article, "Chinese Legal
Philosophy: A Brief Historical Survey," Chinese Culture Quarterly,
I, No. 4 (April, 1958),7,39 ff. The Constitution of the Republic of
China, The Criminal Code, and the Civil Code are available in
English translation in Laws of the Republic of China: First Series-
Major Laws, (Taipei: Government of Taiwan, 1961).,
72. Civil Code, Article 72.
73. Ibid., Article 184.
74. Ibid. The expression 'lineal descendants" (Article 1138) denotes
both males and females without distinction. Even in the case of a
will, the testator has no power to deprive any heir of his or hel
"compulsory portion," which is one half of what he or she would
have received in the absence of a will.
75. Ibid., Article 972.
76. Ibid., Article 974.
77. Ibid., Article 980.
78. Criminal Code, Article 1.
79. This, of course, is motivated by the national solicitude to keep peace
with other nations.
80. The Code of T'ang, Articles 170, 251, 272, 280, 295, etc.
81. Ibid., Articles 162.V, 324, 343, etc.
82. Ibid. Some general standards are laid down for the guidance of the
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judge in meting out punishment; but these standards are flexible in
their application. See Article 57.
83. Ibid., Article 74.
84. Ibid., chap. X, on "Conditional Release"; also see Articles 77-79.
85. The Confucian doctrine of shu (which has been translated as
"mutual consideration" or "reciprocity") finds its expression,
negatively, in the formula: Not to do to another what you would not
like to have done to you (Analects, XV.z3). On the positive side, it
finds its expression in the formula: Try to extend to others what you
desire for yourself (ibid., VI.z8). These are the substantial
principles of shu, which merges in its farthest reaches into fen. In its
strict sense, shu is the functional aspect of fen; it is the "art of fen,"
which consists in the ability "from one's own self to draw a parallel
for the treatment of others" (ibid.). This means that one must step
into the shoes of another in order to understand him by seeing
things from his standpoint. The ideal judge should be able to do so
with the parties before him. Only thus can he avoid rash judgment
and render a truly impartial and fair decision.
86. I have adopted the term "aboriginal Self" from Emerson's essay on
"Self-Reliance," where he says, "What is the aboriginal Self, on
which a universal reliance may be grounded? What is the. nature
and power of that science-baffling star, without parallax, without
calculable elements, which shoots a ray of beauty even into trivial
and impure actions, if the least mark of independence appear? The
inquiry leads us to that source, at once the essence of genius, of
virtue, and of life, which we call Spontaneity or Instinct. We denote
this primary wisdom Intuition, whilst all later teachings are tuitions.
In that deep force, the last fact behind which analysis cannot go, all
things find their common origin." In this he anticipated the upsurge
of interest, in the contemporary West, in Far Eastern traditions,
especially in Zen, and the philosophical Taoism of Lao Tzu and
Chuang Tzu.
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Hsi.ian (King of Ch'i) 13
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Hsi.ieh Kuang-chien (Paul K. T.
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Hsi.in Ch'ing (Hsi.in Tzu)
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Hsiin-meng yu-hsiieh shih
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~)Jl (~JfU~)
T'ai-chi *tcii




T'ai-p'ing yii-lan :;tzp Ml~
T'ai Shang :;tJ:
Tai Te ~t§
T'ai-tsu (Emperor ofMing) :;t il. (Jm)
Tan-chi .~
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T'ien-chu shih-i X::'t II~
T'ien-ming X. ill-






Tsai shen-ching sheng-huo fa-chan
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Tseng Tien (Tien) ,@' :Il~
Tseng Ts'an (Tseng Tzu, or Tsang)
tf$ (fW=f-)
Tsin (Chin) (Dynasty) 'Wi
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Tu-ching shih-yao jlJUVj~ ~
Tu I HsHz'u lun-hsing
iiiHb J$i~Hffil M:.
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Tuan Yii-ts'ai W:3H~
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Tung Chung-shu Ii. {~ ~f
T'ungshu~~















Wang Shou-jen (Wang Yang-ming)









Wen (King) ;)( (X.)
Wen (Monk) flj! (1*8ili)
wen ;)(
Wen-chi ;)(~
Wen-hsin tiao-lung ;)( Ie., \'J!U~
Wen hsiian ;)(~
wen shih ;)(±
Wen-ti (of Han) ;)(*
"Wen yen" (chuan) ;)(13" Ii!
wu~
wu~




wu ching Ii. t~
Wu Ching-hsiung (John C. H.)
~~~~~
"Wu-ch'iian hsien-fa" Ii. :rEin!1*
"Wu-pu-ch'ien-Iun" ~:;f~ ~ifij
"Wu-shen lun" ~ jjj$ ~ifij
wu t'a ~ftl1
"Wu-te chung-shih shuo-hsia te
Cheng-chih ho Ii-shih" Ii.i.'1H.t







Yang Hu :f!a re
Yang Hung-lieh ~~X!~
Yang-mi~g ch'iian-shu Ml ~~*
Yao (Sage-Emperor) ~
Yen Hui M@1





Yin (Shang) (Dynasty) .J1!i
Yin-hsiieh wu-shu ff~.li~
Yin-ping-shih ho-chi iOz i7j(~.€i- ~
Yin-Yang (school) ~ ~~*
yin-yang ~1lBi




Yu (King of Chou) Wf.lx.




















Anna R. D. Gillespie Professor of Philosophy, Chatham College, and
Adjunct Professor of Chinese Thought, Columbia University.
A.B., Lingnan University, Canton; M.A. and Ph.D., Harvard
University; A.M. (honorary), Darhnouth College.
Formerly Dean of Faculty and Professor of Philosophy, Lingnan
University; Professor of Chinese Philosophy, University of Hawaii;
Chairman, Division of The Humanities, Darhnouth College; Visiting
Professor, New York University Teachers College; Summer Session,
University of Hawaii, Michigan State College, and Smith College.
Guggenheim Fellow, 1948-1949; Honorary Research Fellow,
Institute of Far Eastern Research, Chung Chi College, Hong Kong, 1963
to present; Honorary Fellow, Institute of Oriental Studies, University of
Hong Kong, 1964; Honorary Research Fellow, New Asia College
Institute of Research, 1963 to present. Has held research grants from
many societies and foundations.
Goldwyn Smith Lecturer, Cornell University, 1943; Class of 1907
Lecturer in Oriental Civilization, Bryn Mawr College, 1943; Mayling
Soong Foundation Lecturer, Wellesley College, 1948; American Council
of Learned Societies Lecturer on Chinese Religion, 1949-1950; Haskell
Foundation Lecturer, University of Chicago, 1950; Machette Foundation
Lecturer, Wesleyan University, 1950. Has also lectured at many American
colleges and universities and at Naval War College, Brooklyn Institute of
Arts and Sciences, and Foreign Policy Association.
Member, American Council of Learned Societies Committee on Far
Eastern Studies, 1950-1953.
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Panel Member, East-West Philosophers' Conference, 1939, 1949,
1959, 1964.
Author of Religious Trends in Modern China; Historical Charts of
Chinese Philosophy; and An Outline and an Annotated Bibliography of
Chinese Philosophy. Translator and compiler of A Source Book in Chinese
Philosophy. Translator of Instructions for Practical Living and Other
Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming; The Way of Lao Tzu;
The Platform Scriptures; and Reflections on Things at Hand, Neo-
Confucian Anthology. Co-editor with Charles A. Moore, Junjiro Takaku-
su's The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy; and co-editor and author,
with William Theodore de Bary and Burton Watson, Sources of Chinese
Tradition.
Associate Editor, Lingnan Journal, 1929-1936; Contributing Editor,
Philosophical Abstracts, 1940-1947; Member, Board of Editors, Philoso-
phy East and West, 1951 to date; Consulting Editor, Tsing-Hua Uni-
versity Journal of Chinese Studies, 1955; Editor for Chinese Philosophy,
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1963 to date.
,
THOME H. FANG (Fang Tung-shu)
Professor of Philosophy, National Taiwan University. Visiting
Professor of Philosophy, Michigan State University (1964-1966).
Educated at the University of Nanking, Ohio State University, and
the University of Wisconsin.
Professor of Philosophy, the Central Institute of Political Sciences,
1927-1936 and 1945-1948; the University of Nanking, 1927-1932; and
the National Central University, 1929-1948. Director of the Institute of
Advanced Studies in Philosophy, National Central University, 1938-1948.
Visiting Professor of Philosophy, State University of South Dakota
and University of Missouri. Has lectured at several American colleges.
Awarded the Medal of Distinguished Service Professor by the
Chinese Ministry of Education, 1956 and 1964-
Panel Member, Fourth East-West Philosophers' Conference, 1964.
Principal writings: (in Chinese) The Sentiment of Life and the
Sense of Beauty; Essentials of the Chinese Philosophy of Life; Science,
Philosophy, and the Significance of Human Life-A Study in the History
of European Ideas; Joint Studies in the Philosophy of Change (in
collaboration with Professor Li Cheng-kang); Collected Poems (1938-
1953); Philosophy of Hegel, 2 vols. (with several co-authors); (in
English) Chinese View of Lite: the Philosophy of Comprehensive
Harmony.
HSIEH YU-WEI
Professor of Philosophy and Dean of the Research Institute, New
Asia College.
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B.A., Soochow University, 1926; M.A., Harvard University, 1931.
. Formerly Professor, National Kwangtung Law College, Canton;
Professor and Chairman of the Department of Philosophy, National
Chekiang University, 1937-1948; Professor of Philosophy, National
Cheng Chi University, 1954-1959.
Panel Member, East-West Philosophers' Conference, 1959, 1964.
Publications (in Chinese): An Introduction to Ethics: A Critical
Exposition of Major Contemporary Philosophical Works; Lectures on
Philosophy; The Spirit of Chinese Culture; The True Meaning of
Freedom; Mankind and Culture; On Whitehead's Philosophy; The
Metaphysics of F. H. Bradley; On Hegel's Dialectic; The Logical Theory
of F. H. Bradley; On Bertrand Russell's "Prejudice" and Western
Philosophy; History of Western Philosophy, Vol. I. Editor-in-chief, Hsin
Paa, Batavia, Java; The Free Press, Djakarta, Indonesia; and Editorial
Director, The Central Daily News, Taipei.
HU SHIH
President, Academia Sinica (until his death in 1962).
B.A., Cornell University; Ph.D., Columbia University. Recipient of
over thirty honorary degrees from American and European universities.
. From 1917, a leading figure in the Literary Revolution of China.
Professor of Philosophy and, later, Chairman, Department of English
Literature, National Peking University, 1917-1927; President of the
China National Institute, 1928-1930; Dean of the College of Arts,
National Peking University, 1930-1937; Ambassador to the United States,
1942-1945; Chancellor of the National Peking University, 1938-1942.
Major publications: (in Chinese) A History of Chinese Philosophy;
History of Vernacular Literature; The Philosophy of Tai Chen; Collected
Essays; Recent Essays on Learned Subjects; Forty Years: An Autobiogra-
phy; (in English) The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient
China; The Chinese Renaissance.
Died February 24, 1962.
E. R. HUGHES
Formerly Visiting Professor of Chinese, Claremont Graduate School;
missionary in the interior of China, 1911-1929.
Reader in Chinese Religion and Philosophy, Oxford, 1934-1941;
Acting Professor of Chinese Language and Literature, Oxford, 1941-
1947·
M.A., Oxford.
Panel Member, East-West Philosophers' Conference, 1949.
Author, editor, and translator of numerous works on Chinese
thought. Recent publications: The Invasion of China by the Western
World; The Individual in East and West (editor and contributor);
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Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times; The Great Learning and the
Mean-in-Action; The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy (translator); Religion
in China (co-author); The Art of Letters: a Chinese Point of View.
Died in October, 1956.
Y. P. MEl (Mei Yi-Pao)
Professor of Oriental Studies, Chairman of Chinese and Oriental
Studies, and Director of Center for Far Eastern Studies, State University
of Iowa.
B.A., Oberlin College; Ph.D., University of Chicago. Studied at the
University of Cologne. Honorary degrees: LL.D., Oberlin College;
L.H.D., Wabash College.
Professor of Philosophy, Dean of the College of Arts and Letters,
and Acting President, Yenching University, Peiping, 1928-1949. Visiting
Professor of Philosophy: University of Chicago, University of Hawaii,
Indiana University, University of Cincinnati, Princeton University,
Wabash College, Bowdoin College, and Oberlin College.
Panel Member, East-West Philosophers' Conference, 1949 and 1964.
Formerly member, Chinese Cultural Mission to U.S.; President, Oberlin-
in-China; President, American Association of Teachers of Chinese
Language and Culture, 1961-1962.
Major Publications: The Ethical and Political Philosophy of Motse;
Motse, The Neglected Rival of Confucius; and numerous articles in major
encyclopedias and in several scholarly journals. Member, Editorial Board,
Tsing-Hua University Journal of Chinese Studies. .
T'ANG CHVN-I
Dean of the Faculty of Arts, New Asia College.
Educated at Sino-Russian University, Peking University, and Na-
tional Central University.
Formerly, Lecturer, West China Union University; Professor of
Philosophy, National Central University, 1945-1949.
Helped to found New Asia College, at which he has served as Dean
since its beginning.
Member, Philosophical Association of China and of Oriental
Idealistic Humanists Society; Advisor, Buddhistic Cultural Association.
Panel Member, East-West Philosophers' Conferences, 1959 and 1964.
His major publications (in Chinese) are: Comparative Studies in
Chinese and Western Philosophies; Reconstruction of the Moral Self;
Experience of Human Life; Spiritual Values in Chinese Culture; Recon.
struction of the Humanistic Spirit; and Cultural Consciousness and
Moral Reason.
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JOHN C. H. WU
. Professor of Asian Studies, Seton Hall University.
LL.B., Comparative Law School of China, Shanghai; J.D., Michigan
University School of Law. Honorary degrees: LL.D., University of
Oregon, Boston College, and St. John's University; Litt.D., Rockhurst
College.
Formerly Professor of Law and, later, Principal, Comparative Law
School of China; Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.
Judge, Chief Justice, and President, successively, of the Provisional
Court (later, Special High Court), International Settlement of Shanghai;
Member, Legislative Body of National China, 1933-1946; Advisor,
Chinese Delegation to the first General Assembly of the United Nations,
1945; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of China to the
Holy See, 1946-1949; Member, The Permanent Court of Arbitration,
The Hague, 1957-.
Panel Member, East-West Philosophers' Conference, 1959 and 1964.
Major publications: Chinese Versions of The Psalms and The New
Testament; Beyond East and West; The Interior Carmel; Fountain of
Justice; translator, Tao Te Ching. Managing editor, T'ien Hsia Monthly,
1935-1941.
Index
PREPARED BY E. MURIEL MOYLE
Abhidharmakosa school (Bud-
dhism), 53f
abstractions, 85 fl, 94, 132
"accumulation" of virtue, 37 f
"Acme of Clemency in Punishment
and Reward," 363 n
action and words, 14 f, 26
aesthetics, 204, 212 n; and spirit-
ual values, 189 f
agnosticism, 110
Ai, Duke, of Lu, 243
air pressure, 129
iilaya, 206 f




American way of life, 226 f
Amida Buddha, 196
an (self-peace), 211 n
Analects, 27, 28 n, 29 n, 30 n,
33, 67 n, 68 n, 82, 99, 117,
148 n, 152 f, 164 n, 170 f, 178,
181, 185, 186 n, 187 n, 211 n,
216, 235 n, 236 n, 296, 304 n,
305 n, 307, 311, 313, 315 fl, 319,
32 1 n, 322 n, 328 f, 339 n, 349,
358fl
Analects of Confucius (W.E.
Soothill), 67 n
Analects of Confucius (A. Waley),
67 n,148n
analogy, 96
analysis, Western tendency to-
wards, 3
ancestors/ancestor-worship, 32,
154, 179 f, 185 f, 207, 286 fl,
297 f, 300 f, 347
ancestors, and Buddhism, 21
Ancient Chinese Philosophy ac-
cording to the Chuang Tzu
(Y.P. Mei), 338 n
Annotated Edition of the Ch'u-
t'zu, 124, 131 n
anomalies, doctrine of, 112 fl
Anthology edited and written by
Huang Tsung-hsi and Critical
Accounts of the Neo-Confucians





apocryphal works on prognostica-
tions, 113
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 105
archaeology, 107, 128
Aristotle, 83, 85, 89, 95, 151,
164n, 211 n
art/artists, 22, 48, 212 n; and
ethics, 151; and scholars, 92,
97, 101
Art of Love (J.C.H. Wu), 236 n
asceticism, 192, 235 n
astrology, 13, 113, 287
astronomy, 13, 114, 129
atomic physics, 105
atoms, Democritean, 96, 105
Augustine, St., 105




54 f, 133, 256, 302
aVidyii, 196
Ayer, A.J., 92, 103 n
Bacon, Francis, 101
Balanced Inquiries, 73 n, 112,
131 n, 304n
Bary, William T. de, 237 n, 338 n
Basis of Social, Ethical, and Spirit-
ual Values in Chinese Philos-
ophy (Y.P. Mei), 338n
Baynes, Carl F., 237 n
being and non-being, 133 ff, 137,
160, 246, 252, 299
benevolence, see fen
Bernard, Henri, 148 n
Bhagavadgita, 25










Book of Ceremonials, 304 n
Book of Change: A Study in Syn-
tax, 261 n
Book of Changes, 16, 28 n, 50 ff,
73 n, 81, 102 n, 116, 125, 148 n,
161, 227, 239 ff, 262 n, 282,
341, 358 n; Chu Hsi and, 120 ff,
306n
Book of Documents, 349
Book of History, 15, 22, 28 n, 109,
113, 129, 213, 215, 228, 234,
235 n, 312, 363 n; authenticity
of, 118ff
Book of Lao Tzu, 110 t, 261 n
Book of Lieh Tzu, 70 n, 73 n
Book of Lord Shang, 236 n, 359 n
Book of Mencius, 28 n, 29 n, 30 n,
68 n, 70 n, 75 n, 140, 148 n,
155, 163, 164 n, 165 n, 166 n,
186 n, 187 n, 196, 211 n, 234 n,
235 n, 236 n, 237 n, 239, 304 n,
305 n, 308, 321 n, 322 n, 360 n
Book of Odes, 28 n, 109 f, 116,
218, 221, 237 n, 288, 297, 312;
interpretation of, 121 ff
Book of Propriety, 241, 243, 261 n
Book of Rites, 22, 28 n, 69 n, 182,
186 n, 187 n, 229, 237 n, 288,
30 4 n
Book of Songs, 362 n
"both-and" attitude, 6 t, 55, 67,97
Boyle, Robert, 129
Bracton, 219
Bradley, F.H., 185, 310
Brahman, 190, 196 f
brotherly affection, 177 ff, 221,
3 19, 350
Browning, Robert, 130
Bruce, J.P., 75 n, 136, 148 n,
166n
380 INDEX
Buddha, 20, 196, 206, 212 n, 255,
342, 347
buddha-nature, 21, 56, 141, 205 f,
254 fj, 259, 293 f, 298 f, 341
Buddhism/Buddhists, 14, 16 fj,
24, 27, 31, 53 fj, 60 f, 77 f, 93 f,
115, 132 fj, 139, 141 f, 144,
146f, 161 fj, 178, 180, 191,
196, 204 fj, 208, 238, 250 fj,
272 f, 281, 286 f, 290, 292,
298 fj, 3°2, 324, 330, 341, 343,
359 n; conception of time, 135;
and humanism, 20 If, 24, 30 n;
and the individual, 25; and the
philosophy of change, 135; and
Taoism, 48, 251 f, 256
Buddhist monks, 359 n
Buddhist Tripittaka, 262 n, 263 n
calculus, 129
calendar reform, 114
calmness (ting), 293 f, 298
capitalization, in romanized
Chinese, vi
Cases and Materials on Jurispru-
dence (J.C.R. Wu), 236n
catastrophes, doctrine of, 112 If,
213
categorical imperative, 83, 335
categorical thinking, 85 fj, 94 f,
146
causation, theories of, 54
cause and effect, 85
Centaurs, 105 f
Central Harmony, 148 n
ceremonies, see rites
Ceremonies in an Official's
Funeral, 304 n
Ch'an school (Buddhism), 55 f,
64, 77 f, 134, 161, 163, 206,
256,274,282, 293f, 299, 305 n
Chan Wing-tsit, vii, 28 n, 29 n,
69 n, 7on, 71n, 72n, 74n,
75 n, 76 n, 148 n, 304 n, 305 n,
359 n, 373 f
Chang Chan, 262 n
Chang Ch'i-yiin, 363 n




ch'iian chi, see Complete Works
of Chang Tsai
Chang Shih-chih, 345, 361 n
Ch'ang-sun Wu-chi, 361 n
Chang T'ai-yen, 261 n
Chang Tsai (Chang Heng-ch'ii,
1020-1077), 116f, 140, 162,
166 n, 198, 278, 282 f, 296
change, philosophy of, 132 fj,136,
150, 201 If, 239 f, 246, 250,
260n
Chao, Marquis, of Han, 222
Chao-lun hsii, see Preface to Seng-
chao's Discourses
Chao-lun su-hsU, see Commentary
on Seng-chao's Discourses
"che" (philosophy), 16
Che-hsiieh-kai-lun, see Treatise on
Philosophy
chemistry, 107, 129
Chen Shih, 350 f
Ch'en Ti, 124 f, 127 f
Chen Tu-hsiu, 211 n
Chen-yen, 55
Ch'en Yin-ko, 103 n
Ch'eng, King, 217, 235 n
ch'eng, 36, 38, 61, 276f, 284n,
293 fj, 313
Cheng Ch'iao, 122 f
Ch'eng Chu school (Neo-Confu-
cian) , 93, 116, 138, 143, 278,
281 fj
Ch'eng Hao (Ch'eng Ming-tao),
14, 58, 60 f, 76 n, 94, 115, 137,
162, 166 n, 198, 207, 278, 291 f
Cheng Hsiian, 128, 164 n
Ch'eng I (Ch'eng I-ch'uan), 15,
17, 58, 60 f, 76 n, 94, 115 f,





Cheng-ming, see Rectification of
Names
Ch'eng Ming-tao, see Ch'eng Hao
Ch'eng-shih, 53
Ch'eng-shih i-shu, see Surviving
Works of the Ch'eng Brothers
Ch'i State, 358 n
ch'i (material force or matter-
energy), 16, 41, 57f, 92, 98,
137 if, 141, 162, 302
Chi-Iu (Confucius' disciple), 178
Chi-tsang, 251, 262 n
Ch'i-wu lun, see On Pointing and
Things
Ch'i wu lun shih, see Commentary
on the Theory of Leveling All
Things
ch'i-yiin (ethereal rhythm), 204




Chiao Hsiin, 209, 260 n
Chiao Hung, 124
Chieh, King (1801-1752 B.C.),
207, 214
Chieh-huan, 263 n
ch'ien ("principle of Heaven"),
277, 284 n
Ch'ien Mu, 70 n, 310
Ch'ien Ta-hsin, 126, 129
Chih Ch'ien, 251, 262 n
Chih-tun, 252
Chih-wu lun, see Records of the




Chin shu, see History of the Chin
Dynasty
China (MacNair), 76 n
China News Analysis, 338 n
Chinese Buddhist Society, 286
Chinese Canon, 12
"Chinese Legal and Political Phi-
losophy" (J.C.H. Wu), 357 n
"Chinese Legal Philosophy: A
Brief Historical Survey" (J.C.H.
Wu), 237n, 363 n
Chinese mentality, 2; Western mis-
understanding of, 8 f
Chinese Philosophy in Classical
Times (E.R. Hughes), 73 n
Chinese Political Philosophy
(Liang Ch'i Chao), 236n
Chinese Renaissance, 131 n
Chinese Republic, 170, 209, 301
"the Chinese Sophists" (A. Forke),
72n
/Chinese View of Life (T.H. Fang),
260n
Ch'ing period, 57, 64, 74 n, 88, 94,
138, 143, 191, 206, 209, 233,
283, 345
Ching, Duke, 359 n
ching (Classics), 1~
ching ("warp teaching"), 84
Ching-i shu-wen, see Notes on the
Classics as I have heard from
my Father
Ching shi-tzu chang, see A Trea-
tise on the Golden Lion





Chou, Duke of (d. 1094 B.C.), 28,
179, 360n
Chou, King (1l75-1121 B.C.),
207, 214
382 INDEX
Chou-i-Weh-li, see Sketchy Ex- of the Philosophy of Kuo
emplifications of the Principles Hsiang, 29 n
of Change Chuang Tzu i Cheng, see Verifi-
Chou Tun-i, 74 n, 139, 282, 299 cations of Meanings in Chuang
Christianity/Christians,s, 25, 105, Tzu
180, 193, 196, 233, 303 Chiin-ch'en, 217, 235 n
Chu Ch'ien-chih, 103 n Ch'un ch'iu, see Spring and
Chu Hsi, 12, 14 f, 17, 57, 59, 61, Autumn Annals
65 f, 73 n, 74 n, 75 n, 76 n, 80, Ch'un-ch'iu fan-lu, see Luxuriant
92 if, 98 f, 101, 103 n, 116 if, Gems of the Spring and Autumn
120 if, 130, 137 if, 141, 143 f, Annals
146 f, 162, 195, 198,207, 279, Ch'un-Ts'ew (J. Legge), 29n
291 f, 295 if, 300 "chiin-tzu," 19
Chu Hsi and His Masters (J.P. chung, see loyalty
Bruce), 148n, 166n Chung-hui chih kao, see Counsels
"Chu Hsi and Leibnitz" (H. Ber- of Chung-hui
nard), 148 n Chung-kuan-lung shu, see Com-
Chu Hua-yen Fa-chieh kuan-men, mentary on the Miidhyamika-
see Elucidations of the Hua-yen siistra
View of the Dharmadhiitu Chung-kuo fa-lii ssu-hsiang shih,
Chii-she, 53 see History of Chinese Legal
Ch'u T'ung-tsu, 359 n, 361 n Thought
. Chu Tzu ch'iian-shu, see Com- Chung-kuo fen-wen ching-shen
plete Works of Chu Hsi chih fa-chan, see The Develop-
Ch'u-t'zu chi-chu, see An Anno- ment of the Chinese Humanistic
tated Edition of the Ch'u t'zu Sp'irit
Chu Tzu yii-Iei, see Classified Con- Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang tui-yii Ou-
versations of Master Chu chou wen-hua chih ying-hsiang,
Ch'uan-hsi lu, see Records of In- see The Influence of Chinese
structions for Practical Living Thought on European Culture
Chuang Tzu (Chuang Chou), 16, Chung-kuo wen-hua chih ching-
19 f, 47 if, 54, 60, 88, 98, 136, shen chia-chih, see The Spiritual
149, 159f, 200, 202if, 212n, Worth of Chinese Culture
231, 246 if, 252, 271 if, 290, Chung yung, see Doctrine of the
293 f, 340, 3~8 n Mean
Chuang Tzu, 17, 19, 29 n, 30 n, chung yung, 35, 38
72 n, 83, 165 n, 186 n, 212 n, circulation of the blood, 129
284 n, 292, 304 n, 305 n, 338 n, - civil service examinations, 13, 22,
358 n 25, 330, 333 f, 336 f, 339 n
Chuang Tzu, Mystic, Moralist, .....class distinction, 328, 333 f
and Social Reformer class names, 265 if
(H.A. Giles), 29n, 72n, 237n Classic of Changes, 337n
Chuang Tzu, A New Selected Classic of Filial Piety, 171 if, 176,
Translation with an Exposition 179, 181, 186 n
Classic of the Way and Its Virtue,
19, 39, 42, 47, 50, 70 n, 71 n,
131 n, 134, 136, 148 n, 165 n,
235 n, 236 n, 237 n
Classics, importance of the, 12 f,
144; Commentaries on, 209
classification, 83, 127
Classified Conversations of Master
Chu, 28 n, 73 n, 74 n, 75 n, 119,
124, 305 n
Code of T'ang with Annotations,
226, 347, 360 n, 361 n, 362 n,
363 n
Code of T'ang with Commentaries
and Annotations, 237 n
Collected Commentaries on The
Analects, 305 n
Collected Works of Lu Hsiang-
shan, 212n
Collection of Ten Critical Essays,
338n
Collingwood, R.G., 79, 102 n
comets, 112
Commentaries on The Book of
Changes, 275 fl, 284 n
Commentary on The Book of Odes
(Chu Hsi), 121, 124
Commentary on the Chuang Tzu,
299
Commentary on the Lao Tzu, 299
Commentary on the Mlidhyamika-
slistra, 262 n
Commentary on the Meaning of




Commentary on The Spring and
Autumn Annals, 22, 29 n, 121 f,
304 n, 305 n, 324, 337 n, 359 n
Commentary on the Theory of
Leveling All Things, 261 n
Common Law, 219, 224
Communism/Communists, 4, 9 f,
26, 2°9,336
Communist China, 338 n (
"Complementary Emphases ofJ
Eastern Intuitive and Western
Scientific Philosophy" (F.S.C.
Northrop), 103 n
Complete Works of Chang Tsai,
74 n
Complete Works of the Ch'eng
Brothers, 28 n, 29 n, 212 n
Complete Works of Chu Hsi, 29 n,
75 n, 305 n, 306 n
Complete Works of Han !Sei Tzu,
359 n
Complete Works of Lu Hsiang-
shan, 148 n, 284 n
Complete Works of Wang Yang-
ming, 75 n, 284 n
Conant, James B., 107 f, 131 n
"concession" (fang), 316
concubines, 177, 288, 325




Confucian Canon, 116, 118, 120 f
Confucian Philosophy (Liang
Ch'i-ch'ao), 186n
Confucianism, 4, 7 f, 11 fl, 24,
31 fl, 42, 47, 51 fl, 54, 64 fl,
78, 80 fl, 85, 93, 97, 102 n,
108 f, 132 f, 136, 140 f, 149,
160 fl, 167 fl, 206 f, 225 f, 238,
250, 275, 278, 298, 323 fl,
340 fl, 355 f; conception of
time in, 135 f; as the dominant
system in China, 27; and edu-
cation, 32; and ethics, 27 f,
34 f, 191 fl, 220 f, 230, 268,
307 fl; and the function of
poetry, 22 f, 35; Han State, 82,
84 f, III fl, 132, 343 f, 360 n;
and humanism, 18 f, 25, 32 fl,
'4
115; language of, 82; and
metaphysics, 35, 38, 53; and the
philosophy of change, 135; and
political philosophy, 215, 217 fl;
and psychology, 35 fl; and
religion, 32 f, 286; reverence for
the body in, 21; and society, 26;
spiritual values in, 191 fl
Confucius, 85, 99, 109 fl, 130,
135 f, 151, 171, 180, 183, 185,
190, 192, 194, 216 f, 227, 230,
235 n, 246, 271, 289, 296,
340 fl, 347, 358 fl; compared
with Lao Tzu, 41 f, 160 f; and
education, 32, 111, 328, 337;
and religion, 153 f, 158, 178
conscience, 320 f
Constitution of the Republic of
China, 352, 363 n
Contradiction, Law of, 83
Copernicus, 107
Correcting Youthful Ignorance,
148, 30 5 n
correlative thinking, 86 f
correspondence theory, 51 f
cosmic pantheism, 360 n
cosmogony, 226, 233
cosmology, 51, 85, 115
Cosmos and History: The Myth of
the Eternal Return (M. Eliade),
233, 237 n
Counsels of Chung-hui, 234 n
"Counsels of the Great Yli," 363 n
"Counsels of I and Chi," 235 n
Cowell, E.B., 148 n
"Criticism of Some Recent Methods
Used in Dating Tao Tzu" (Hu
Shih), 70n
culture comparison, 100 f
cyclical change, 150, 232
"Dark Ages," 99
Dasiisahasrika, 262 n
"Date and Circumstances of the
Philosopher Lao-dz" (H.H.
Dubs), 70 n
death, 33, 98, 109, 178, 180, 296,
30 3f
deductive method, 95 fl, 104 f,
126, 144
democracy, 6, 26, 155 f, 209,
214 fl, 226, 328, 352
Democritus, 96, 100, 105
Derham, William, 96
desires: as source of evil, 66,
141 f, 207; freedom from, 192,
200; and Neo-Confucianists,
66; satisfaction of, 2 0 9 f
Development of the Chinese
Humanistic Spirit (T'ang
Chlin-i), 211 n
Development of the Logical Meth-
od in Ancient China (Hu Shih),
32,69 n








Dialogue on the Great Learning,
163
diet, and Taoism, 20, 292
discord, resolution of, 232
"Disposition of Error" (Li-huo
lun), 20
divination, 16, 50, 86, 120,-
divorce, 177, 331, 348
Doctrine of the Mean, 15 f, 28 n,
30 n, 35, 38, 132 f, 135, 140,
148 n, 152, 154, 161, 164 n,
168, 173, 186 n, 196, 211 n,
241 f, 261 n, 275 fl, 282, 284 n,
295, 297, 301, 304 n, 305 n,
306 n, 308, 311, 313, 321 n,
322n,359 n
Donne, John, 101
"double-harness writing," 88 if,
92,94, 98
doubt, 109if, 117if, 122f, 127,
13°
drama, 23
dreams, 144 f, 189
dualism, 87, 139, 162, 281
Dubs, H.H., 69 n, 70 n
Dutch painters, 101
duties, see rights and duties
Duyvendak, J.J.L., 359 n
earthquakes, 113
East-West Philosophers' Confer-
ences, v, 3 f
Eastern Han period, 89
Eberhard, Wolfram, 339 n
eclipses, 112 if
ecology, 87
education, 13, 142, 155, 337,
349 f; and Confucius, 32, 111,
328, 337; and Hsun Tzu, 37
Edward VI, King of England,
102n
Einstein, Albert, 105
Eliade, Mircea, 233, 237 n
Elizabeth I, Queen of England,
102n
Elucidations of the Hua-yen View
of the Dharma-dhlitu, 263 n
emperor: powers of the, 13, 112,




empiricism, 74n, 79, 81, 84, 87f,
90 f, 94 f, 105, 107
end-rhymes, 121, 123 f
Engels, Friedrich, 283
England, 101, 351
English language, 103 n
INDEX 385
"enlightenment," 41, 47, 56, 77 f,
160, 205, 250, 254, 257, 259,
272 if, 276 if, 293 f
Epicurus, 96
epistemology, 67, 77 if, 145, 168 f,
2 64 if
equality, 308 if, 330; and the law,
345 f, 349, 352, 354, 357; of
opportunity, 336 f
"equality of things," doctrine of,
48, 54, 60, 139, 203, 249
Erasmus, 108
Erh-Ch'eng ch'iian-shu, see Com-
plete Works of the Ch'eng
Brothers
"Essay on the Nature of len"
(Ch'eng Hao), 166n
"Essay on the Stabilization of the
Self" (Ch'eng Hao), 166n
Essays Elucidating the Doctrine,
30n, 359 n
Essays in East-West Philosophy,
vn,131n
Essays on the Discrimination of
Doctrines, 263 n
Essential Points in the Study of
Classics, 305 n
Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy
(J. Takakusu), 262n
Essentials of the Avatsamsaka-
siltra, 263 n
Ethica Nicomachea, 164 n
Ethical and Political Works of
Motse (Mei Yi-pao), 71 n, 359 n
ethical idealism, 269 if
Ethical Realism in Neo-Confucian
Thought (P.C. Hsii) , 166n
ethics, 5 if, 13 if, 26, 48, 55(132,
139, 145 if, 150 f, 155, 167 if,
189 if, 226; Confucian, 27 f,
34 f, 191 if, 211 n, 220 f, 230,
268, 307 if; and the individual,
307 if; of Lao Tzu, 31 f, 39 if,
110 f; and law, 219 f, 344; of
',4
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Mencius, 35 f; of Mo Tzu, 158;
Neo-Confucian, 61, 64, 116,
207 f, 315; Taoist, 134, 160;
Western, 169, 172
Euclid, 100
Europe, 100, 106, 129
evide~ce, verification by, 117 f,
122, 125if
evil, see good and evil
evolution, 50, 81
Evolution of Rites, 304 n
"An Examination of the Absurdi-
ties about The Book of Odes,"
122
examinations, 13, 22, 25
exercises, Taoist, 20, 290, 292
expediency, 27 f
experimentation, 90 if, 96, 144
"Explaining the Rhymes in the
Ch'u t'zu," 123
Explanation of the Diagram of the
Great Ultimate, 74 n
Fa-hsiang, 53
Fa-tsang, 139, 257, 299
Fa Yen, see Regulatory Measures
family, 24, 26, 103 n, 175 if, 184,
222, 227, 234, 318 if, 326 f,
330 if, 342, 346 if, 350, 354,
362n
Fan Chen, 291
Fan Ch'ih, 171, 307
Fang Tung-shu (Thome H.
Fang), 128, 374
fate/fatalism, 49, 232, 301 if,
360n
feudalism, 19, 156, 325
filial piety, 5, 8 f, 21, 27 f, 34, 36,
42,62, 101, 154, 167 if, 197,221,
289, 295, 308, 319, 331, 338 n,
346,361 n
"Fifty Poems from the Chinese,"
362n
Five Agents, 51 f, 57 fl, 65, 86, 233
Five Books of Phonology, 125, 129
Five Classics, 12 f, 28 n, 84
Five Elements, see Five Agents
forgeries, literary, 118 if
Forke, A, 72 n, 73 n, 87
Former Han period, 344
fortune-telling, 120
Foundations of Empirical Knowl-
edge (Ayer), 92, 103n
"four beginnings," 36
Four Books, 12 f, 28 n, 68 n, 116,
148n
Fourth Gospel, 105 f, 131 n
fraternal affection, see brotherly
affection
freedom: of the individual, 310 if,
320 f, 332, 340 f; of movement,
341; political, 312 f; of speech,
312 f. 336; of thought, 336
French Academy, 96
Fu (old scholar), 118 f
Fu Hsi, 81
funeral rites, 179, 325
Fung Yu-Ian, 29 n, 32, 70 n, 72 n,
73 n, 76 n, 94, 100, 103 n, 165 n,
212n, 292
GaliIeo, 107, 129
General Commentary on the Book
of Change, 260 n




ghosts, see spiritual beings
Giles, Herbert A, 29 n, 72 n, 73 n,
235 n, 237 n
God, concept of, 105 f, 132, 136,
157 f, 196 f, 211 n
Golden Age, 233
Golden Mean, 7, 35, 40, 45, 64, 67,
142, 154
Golden Rule, 26, 152, 227, 317,
343
good and evil, problems of, 14, 35,
37 f, 63 f, 66, 141 f, 145, 162,
208
government, 19, 22, 34, 38, 43 f,
103 n, 110, 112, 134, 155, 202,
220 f, 223, 226, 231, 333, 340,
344; for the people, 215, 2 17f,
230, 236, 352; and religion, 301
"grace," 193, 196
Graham, A.C., 70 n, 73 n
"A Grammarian's Funeral," 130
the Grand Harmony, 229
The Great Law (W. Penn), 223
Great Learning, 28 n, 64, 68 n, 115,
148 n, 161, 167, 175, 186 n, 218,
230, 294, 305 n, 315, 318, 322 n,
326 f, 331, 338 n
Great Learning and the Mean-in-
Action (E.R. Hughes), 148 n,
237 n
Great Ultimate, 57 {f, 134 {f, 137,
139, 162, 166 n, 300
Greek language, 83, 85, 99, 103 n,
151
Greeks, 95, 100, 102 n, 106 f, 151
Gregory the Great, 101
habeas corpus, 352
Hamlet, 101
Han dynasty, 84 {f, 94, 99, 102 n,
111 f, 114, 118, 121, 128, 132,
140 f, 172, 192, 220, 224, 226,
33°,344 ,
Han Fei Tzu, 70 n, li2, ~21 {f
Han Fei Tzu, 164 n, 236 n
Han-hsi1eh (Philosophy based on
the Han Criticism of Ancient
Texts), 74n
Han-Wei Liang-Chin Nan-pei-ch'ao
fa-chiao shih, see History of Chi-
nese Buddhism During the Pe-
riod 67-588
Han Yii, 53, 94, 101
Hang K'ang-po, 262 n
"A Happy Excursion," 247
harmony, concept of, 6, 8, 26, 35,
38, 41, 52, 59, 65 {f, 136, 140,






Henke, F.G., 166 n
Hlnayana Buddhism, 141, 250
Hinduism, 31, 303
historical materialism, see material-
ism, dialectical
historical method: and comparative
philosophy, 106 {f; and episte-
mology, 78 {f
History of the Chin Dynasty, 262 n
History of Chinese Buddhism Dur-
ing the Period 67-588, 262 n
History of Chinese Legal Thought,
362n, 363 n
History of Chinese Literature (H.
Giles), 235 n
History of Chinese Philosophy
(Fung Yu-Ian), 29n, 32, 70n,
212n
History of the Later Han Dynasty,
363 n .
History of the Liang Dynasty, 304 n
History of the Northern Ch'i Dy-
nasty, 363n
Ho Kuan Tzu, 96
Ho Ping-ti, 334, 339 n
Ho Yen, 249 f, 262 n
Hocking, William Ernest, 7
Holland, 101
Holmes, Justice, 357
Holy Roman Empire, 99
homocentric conception of the
world,242
Hou-Han shu, see History of the
Later Han Dynasty




Hsia-tu, 217, 235 n
Hsiang, Duke, 29 n, 30 n
Hsiang-shan ch'uan-chi, see The
Collected Works of Lu Hsiang-
shan
Hsiao, King (9°9-894 B.C.), 325
Hsiao ching, see Classic of Filial
Piety
Hsiao T'ung, 80 ff, 84, 88, 90 f, 97,
102n
Hsieh Ling-yiin, 256, 263 n
Hsieh Yu-wei, 374 f
Hsin Yuan-fen, see A New Treatise
on the Nature of Man
hsing (the nature of man and
things), 292
Hsing-li-hsiieh (Philosophy of Na-
ture and Principle), 74 n
"Hsing-shang chung-hou chih-chih
lun," see "The Acme of Clemency
in Punishment and Reward"
Hsiung Shih-li, 292
Hsii, P.C., 166 n
hsii, 271 f
Hsii-t'an-chih-chiian, see Looking
around the Altar with Straight-
forward Illustrations
Hsiian, King (423-342 B.C.), 215
Hsiin Ch'ing, 99
Hsiin-meng yu-hsiieh, shih, see
Rhymed Primer for the Training
of Beginners
Hsiin Tzu, 32, 35, 37, 84, 136, 146,
223 f, 242, 265 f, 272, 328 f
Hsiin Tzu, 69 n, 72 n, 236 n, 283 n,
338n
"Hsun Tzu's Rectification of Names
and Three Schools of Logicians
in Pre-Ch'in Philosophy" (Tang
Chiin-i), 283 n
Hu Shih, 2, 9 f, 12, 32, 40, 67, 69 n,
70 n, 75 n, 235 n, 337 n, 375
Hu Shih lun-hsiieh chin-chu, see
Recent Essays on Learned Sub-
jects by Hu Shih
Hua-Heng-fang, 100
Hua-yen Buddhism, 54, 133 f, 137,
140, 256, 263 n, 282, 300, 302
Hua-yen ching yao-chieh, see Es-
sentials of the Avatamsaka-sutra
Huai-nan Tzu, 51
Huai-nan Tzu, 70 n, 73 n
Huan Tsung-hsi, 225
Huang-chi ching-shih, see Supreme
Principles Governing the World
Huang-Lao, 51
Huang Siu-chi, 166 n
Huang-ti, 51
Huang Tsung-hsi, 208, 212 n
Hughes, E.R., 9, 30 n, 73 n, 148 n,
152, 179, 237 n, 375 f
Hui-neng, 293 f, 305 n
Hui Shih, 45, 83, 246
Hui-ta (Buddhist monk), 251 ,
262n
Hui-yiian (monk), 254, 359 n
human body, importance of; in
Confucianism, 21; in Taoism, 292
human nature, 141, 145, 168,
196 ff, 277; in Aristotelian-Tho-
mian thought, 211 n; Buddhists
on, 141,254 f, 292 ff; Confucian-
ists on, 141,239,255,291 f,308,
313 f, 328, 341; Han Yii on, 53;
Hsiin Tzu on, 37, 223 f, 242;
Legalists on, 65 f, 223 f, 141 f;
Mencius on, 35 f, 156, 158, 162,
165 n, 194 ff, 224, 235 n, 242,
276, 291; and Mo Tzu, 342;
Neo-Confucianists on, 292; Tao-
ists on, 141, 292
human rights, see rights and duties
humanism, 5 ff, 11, 18 ff, 26, 32 ff,
67, 107 f, 115: and Chuang Tzu,
48; and Mo Tzu, 42 ff
hun-p'0 (the soul), 288
Hung-ming chi, see Essays Eluci-
dating the Doctrine
hyphenation, in romanized Chinese,
vi




I chang-chii, see The Book of
Change: A Study in Syntax
I ching, see Book of Changes
I Ching, or Book of Changes (C.F.
Baynes), 237 n
I hua, see Talks on the Philosophy
of Change
I li, see Book of Ceremonials
I-shu, see Surviving Works
I-t'u liieh, see Logical Structures
and Syntactical Scheme Exhib-
ited in The Book of Change
I t'ung-shih, see General Commen-
tary on the Book of Change
icchantikas, 141, 255
Idea of History (R.G. Colling-
wood), 102n
idealism, 62, 64, 67, 74 n, 138, 147,
268ff
"Identification of the Lao-Dz"
(H.H. Dubs), 70 n
immortality, concept of, 18, 291,
304, 32 4 f; Buddhist, 290 f; Con-
fucianist, 178, 180 f, 289; Fan
Chen on, 291; Moist, 289; Neo-
Confucianists on, 291, 296; per-
sonal, 287 f, 298, 303; Taoist,
20 f, 24, 290 f; Wang Ch'ung on,
29°
Immortals, 24, 42, 290
India, 3 ff, 20 f, 25, 31, 54 f, 78,
91, 94, 106, 132, 141, 161, 269,
271
individual: and the community, 26,
31 7 ff, 323 ff; and ethics, 307 ff;
INDEX 389
and religion, 286 ff; respect for
the, 5 ff, 9, 24 f, 156, 259 f, 29 1 ,
315 f; rights and duties of, 314;
rising worth of the, 325 f; and
the State, 340 ff
Individual in East and West (E.R.
Hughes), 30 n
individualism, 219, 283 n; excess of,
25f
inductive method, 104 f, 123, 125 f,
144
inference, 105
infinite substance, unity of, 250
Influence of Chinese Thought on
European Culture, 103 n
inheritance, right of, 24, 353, 357,
363 n
Inquiry into the Ancient Pronunci-
ation of The Book of Odes, 124
Inquiry into the Authenticity of the
Ancient-Script Portion of The
Book of History (Yen Jo-chii),
119
Inquiry on Goodness, 76 n
instincts, 188, 200
Instructions for Practical Living,
and Other Neo-Confucian Writ-
ings, 28 n, 74 n, 75 n, 76 n, 295,
305 n .
intellectual honesty, 109 ff, 114 f
Interpretation of Names, 321 n
Interpretations of the Four Books,
321n
intuition, 144, 153, 163, 308
intuition, concepts by, 9, 94 ff, 104 f










";en" (humanity, benevolence), 16,
26, 33, 36, 61, 64 {f, 97, 140,
152 {f, 158 f, 162 f, 164 n, 168 {f,
185, 190, 197 {f, 209, 270, 277,
307 {f, 328, 331, 364 n
len-wen ching-shen chih ch'ung-
chien, see Reconstruction of the
Spirit of Humanism
Jesuits, 103 n, 212 n
Jesus Christ, 173, 190,212 n
Jhering, Rudolf von, 227, 237 n
lu-chia che-hsueh, see The Con-
fucian Philosophy
judicial independence, 345
justice, see social justice
juvenile delinquency, 332, 339 n
kang chi (over-all binding princi-
ple), 101
Kang Seng-hui, 251
K'ang Yu-wei, 17, 66, 209
Kant, Immanuel, 86, 321, 335
Kao Yao, 216, 235 n, 349 f, 363 n
Karlgren, Bernard, 123
karma, 196 f, 207, 330
Kegon school, see Hua-yen Bud-
dhism
Kepler, Johannes, 129
knowledge, 33 f, 138, 151; and
action, 15, 142 {f, 163, 169, 269;
and Buddhism, 93, 142 f; and
the Ch'eng-Chu School, 93; and
Chu-Hsi, 130, 146; and Chuang-
Tzu, 47f, 232; and Confucius,
108 f, Ill, 13°,231; "innate"-,
36, 63f, 143, 163,17°,3°8; and
Lao Tzu, 47, Ill; and the Lo-
gicians, 45; and Neo-Confucian-
ism, 61, 63, 78 f, 115 {f, 142, 144,
278 {f; and the Neo-Mohists, 46;
and "no-knowledge," 252 {f; and
Taoism, 142 f
ko-chih, 143
Ko Hung (Pao-p'u Tzu), 53, 88
ko wu (examination of things), 93,
101
Korean language, 127
Ku Chieh-kang, 70 n, 102 n
Ku Hung-ming, 69 n, 148 n, 152
Ku-shih yuan, see Origins of An-
cient Poetry, An Anthology of
Old Poems




K'uei (Minister of Music), 228
kuei-shen, 296
Kumarajiva, school of, 252
k'un ("principle of Earth"), 277,
284n
K'ung-chueh tung-nan fei, 362 n
Kung-sun Lung, 45, 83, 266
Kung-sun Lung Tzu, 72 n, 93, 102 n
Kung-yang school, 209
Kuo-fu ch'uan-chi, 363 n
Kuo Hsi, 23
Kuo Hsiang, 17, 19, 88, 134, 299,
306n
Kuo Mo-jo, 338 n
Ladder of Success in Imperial
China, Aspects of Social Mobil-
ity, 1368-1911 (Ping-ti Ho),
339 n
laissez-faire, 182
landscape painting, 23 {f, 48, 56, 92
language, 99; controlled experiment
in, 88 {f, 95 f; and thought, 79 f,
84; see also pronunciation
Lao Tzu, 8, 17, 19 f, 31 f, 39 {f, 51,
54, 70 n, 110 f, 113, 136, 149,
159 {f, 200, 202 {f, 210, 215 {f,
227, 229, 245 f, 271, 293, 342,
358 n; compared with Confu-
cius, 41, Ill, 115,235 n
Lao Tzu, 250, 292, 305 n
law, 7, 22, 218 if, 332, 340 if; civil,
344, 351 if; codes, 344 f, 351 if,
354 f; Common, 219, 224; com-
parative, 352; equality and,
345 f, 349, 352, 354, 357; and
ethics, 218 if, 224 if, 342, 344;
and the family, 346 if, 354; hu-
manism in, 350, 362 n; of intes-
tate succession, 353; Japanese,
356; "mediational," 233 f; penal,
see punishment; positive, 342;
reform; 344, 351; Roman, 219;
schools, 351; Western, 218 if,
353; and women, 348, 353, 357
Law and Society in Traditional
China (Ch'u T'ung-tsu), 359 n
Law of Nature, see Natural Law
Laws of the Republic of China,
363 n
lawsuits, 227
learning, Chinese love of, 7
Lee, Peter H., vii
legal profession, 351
Legalists, 31, 216, 220 if, 234, 330,
342 if
Legge, James, 29 n, 30 n, 67 n, 68 n,
148 n, 152, 164 n, 211 n, 328,
337 n, 338 n
Leibniz, C.W., 5, 96, 103 n, 147,
300
li (principle, order), 16, 38, 58,
65 f, 79, 92, 94, 98, 116, 135 f,
137 if, 141 if, 146, 162, 195,
315 f
Li, Teresa (Li Te-Iuan), 362n
Li Ao, 94







Li-yun, see Evolution of Rites
INDEX 391
Liang dynasty, 80
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, 70 n, 168, 186 n,
236n
liang-chih (conscience), 195, 208,
27°
Liang ten-kung chiian-chi, see Col-
lected Essays of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao,
262n
Liang shu, see History of the Liang
Dynasty
Liao, W.K., 70 n, 164 n, 359 n
Lieh Tzu, 39, 53, 70 n, 73 n, 212 n
Lin-chi I-hslian, 274, 281
Lin Yutang, 28 n, 68 n, 69 n, 148 n,
152
Lincoln, Abraham, 352
Ling, Duke, 358 n
ling, 271 if
"linked pearls," 89
Literary Mind and the Carving of
Dragons, 102 n
Liu Chi-shan, 212 n, 271, 284 n
"Liu-Chi-shan chih ch'eng-i-chih-
hslieh," see "Theory of Authen-
ticity of Will of Liu Chi-shan"
Liu Hsieh, 102 n
Lo Chin-ch'i, 212 n, 284 n
"Lo Chin-ch'i chih li-hslieh," see
"On the Philosophy of Lo Chin-
ch'i" (T'ang Chlin-i), 284 n
Lo Ken-tse, 103 n
Lo Nien-an, 212 n
local self-government, 182 f
logic, 8, 35, 45 if, 67, 79, 83, 85 f,
92,97,132,147,239, 265
"Logical Formulations of the Phi-
losophy of Change" (T.H. Fang),
260n
Logical Structures and Syntactical
Scheme Exhibited in the Book of
Change, 260 n
Logicians, 31, 45 f, 86, 94, 265 f
"Logos," 131 n
Lokaksin (Buddhist), 251, 262 n
___________...:..J
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longevity, 20, 42, 160, 163
Longinus, 99
Looking around the Altar with
Straightforward Illustrations,
284n
loyalty (chung), 316 f
Lu,358n
Lu Chi, 99
Lu Chiu-yiian, see Lu Hsiang-shan
Lu Hsiang-shan (Lu Chiu-yiian),
62, 117, 138, 144, 162f, 198,
207 f, 211 n, 269 f
Lu Hsiang-shan-A Twelfth Cen-
tury Chinese Idealist Philosopher
(Huang Siu-chi),.-l.,66 n
Lu Hsiang-shan ch'uan-chi, see
Complete Works of Lu Hsiang-
shan
Lii Tsu-ch'ien, 122
Lu-Wang school, 143f, 282
Lu Yu, 348, 362 n
Lun heng, see Balanced Inquiries
Lun yu, see Analects
Lun yu chi-chu, see Collected Com-
mentaries on The Analects
Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and
Autumn Annals, 73 n, 102 n
Ma Hsii-Iun, 261 n
Machiavelli, 108








Mahii-parinirviina-siitra 141 262 n
263 n . " ,
Mahii-prajiiii-piiramitii-siitra, 262 n
Mahayana Buddhism, 25, 53, 141,
238, 250, 254
man: five types of, 243; importance
of, 22 ff, 33 ff, 107, 168, 260;
and the universe, 140 f, 168,
323f
Manchu (Ch'ing) dynasty, 301
The Mandarins, The Circulation of
Elites in China, 1600-1900
(R.M. Marsh), 339 n
Mandate of Heaven, 18, 32, 36,
2 13 ff, 233, 301, 357
Mantra, 55
Mao school, 121 f
Mao-shih ku-yin k'ao, see An In-
quiry into the Ancient Pronunci-
ation of The Book of Odes
Mao Tse-tung, 336
Marcus Aurelius, 101
marriage, 24, 176 f, 331, 346, 348,
353 f, 357, 361 n
Marsh, Robert M., 339 n
Marxism, 209, 283
materialism, 146 f; dialectical, 233,
283
mathematics, 94 ff, 97, 100
"mediational law," 233 f
medicine, Taoist, 20, 290, 292
meditation, 144, 207, 273, 294
Meditation school (Buddhism), 21,
55,61, 134
Mediterranean, 99 f
Meeting of East and West (F.S.C.
Northrop), 94, 131n, 164n
Mei Tsu, 119
Mei Yi-pao, 71 n, 72 n, 165 n,
235 n, 236 n, 338 n, 359 n, 376
Mencius, 25, 28 n, 32, 35, 37, 39,
64, 66, 83, 109, 111, 141, 146 f,
149, 152, 155 ff, 158 ff, 162,
165 n, 169 ff, 173, 175, 178, 180,
192, 194 f, 197 f, 211 n, 214 f,
221, 223 ff, 230, 235 n, 242, 246,
261 n, 265, 269 f, 275 f, 284 n,
294, 302, 308, 311, 313, 320,
328 f, 344, 360 n
"Mencius' Philosophy of Human
Nature and Natural Law"
(J.C.H. Wu), 235 n
Meng Tzu. see Book of Mencius
Meng Tzu tzu-i shu-cheng, see
Commentary on the Meaning. of
Terms in The Book of Mencius
metaphysics, 8, 16, 47, 66, 79, 85,
98, 132 if. 150, 168, 190, 238 if;
and Confucius, 35, 58, 239 if;
and the Neo-Confucianists, 61,
64, 66, 134 if, 162, 207 f; and
the Taoists, 202 f, 210, 244 if
Metaphysics (Aristotle), 99
methodology, 93, 95, 264 if
microcosm-macrocosm philosophy,
51,86,140,145,150,226
Middle Ages, 100, 107
"Middle Doctrine," 54 f
military service, 352
Milton, John, 101
Mind at the Crossways (Morgan),
263n
Ming period, 57, 65, 74 n, 94, 138,
144, 161, 163, 169, 192, 200,
206, 208 f, 212 n, 271, 275, 278,
283
ming, 272 f, 275, 277, 285 n, 301 if
Ming-i tai-fang lu, 225
Ming-ju hsiieh-an, see Anthology
edited and written by Huang
Tsung-hsi and Critical Accounts
of the Neo-Confucians of the
M ing Dynasty
Ming-shih lun. see On Name and
Actuality
Ming T'ai-tsu hsiao-tz'u lu hsii
(Emperor T'ai-tsu of Ming, Pref-
ace to Models of Filial Piety and
Paternal Affection), 362 n
Ming-tao, 15
l\littelungen des Seminars fiir ori-
entalische Sprachen. 73 n
Mo Pien, 265
INDEX 393
Mo Tzu, 42 if, 85, 157 if, 173, 218,
235 n, 236 n, 289. 330, 342,
360n
Mo Tzu. 46, 71 n, 72 n, 93, 304 n
moderation, 7
Moism, 31, 42 if, 47, 149, 238,
265 f, 284 n, 289, 343
monads, 96, 300
Mongol (Yiian) dynasty, 119
monism, 139
Montaigne, 108
Moore. Charles A., 103 n, 131 n,
357 n
morals, see ethics
Morgan, C. Lloyd, 263 n
Morgan, E., 70 n, 73 n
Motse the Neglected Rival of Con-
fucius. 165 n
Mou Tsung-san, 284 n
Mou Tzu, 20
mu-to (wooden bell), 342, 359 n
Muh-shuh, 324
music, 23, 34 f. 42 f, 154, 158, 176,
209, 221 f, 228, 359 n
Mystical school (Buddhism), 55
mysticism/mystics, 49, 146 f, 157,
160, 192, 201, 271
mythology, 106, 23~, 323
name-order, vi
"name specialists," 83
names: rectification of, 7, 15, 35,
38, 83; species and genus of, 266
National Taoist Society, 287
Natural Law, 13, 168, 203, 214,
218, 224, 235 n, 237 n, 341
"Natural Law in the Chinese Tra-
dition" (Hu Shih), 28 n, 235 n
"Natural Law Philosophy of Men-
cius" (P.K.T. Sih), 235 n
naturalism, 48, 51, 53, 110 f, 1l3,
115
Nature, control of, 37
______-.:..J
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Neo-Confucianism, 7, 12, 14 f, 27,
3 1 f, 37f, 56 f, 58 if, 74 n, 78,
115 if, 133 if, 149, 161, 166 n,
169, 192, 197, 206 if, 238, 256,
272, 275, 278, 281, 292, 296 if,
300, 315, 330





neutralization, principle of, 357
New Cultural Movement, 170, 209,
211 n
"New Rational Philosophy" (Fung
Yu-lan), 76 n
New Treatise on the Nature of Man,
30 5 n
New York Chinatown, 332
Newton, Sir Isaac, 129
nirvii1Jl1, 24 f, 55, 135, 253, 255,
286 f, 292, 298, 3°2, 359 n
non-being, see being and non-being
non-resistance, 110
Northrop, F.S.C., 9, 94 f, 97 f,
103 n, 104 f, 131 n, 153, 160,
164n
Notes on Chinese Literature (A.
Wylie), 103 n
Notes on the Classics as 1 have
heard from my Father, 128
Nothing, the wisdom of, 201 f, 210
Nothingness, 245 f, 250 if, 259
Novum Organum (F. Bacon), 101
numbers, theory of, 96, 103 n
O'Hara, Albert, 363 n
omens, 112 f, 213
On the Discussions of Human Na-
ture in the Appended Remarks of
The Book of Changes, 76 n
On Name and Actuality, 266
On Pointing and Things, 266, 283 n
On Understanding Science (J.B.
Conant), 107, 131n
On White Horse, 266
the One and the many, 138 if, 278,
282, 298 if, 301 f
ontology: Confucian, 239 if; Taoist,
244
open mind, importance of, in re-
search, 116 f, 121 f, 127, 130
opposites, in Nature, 59 f, 98, 140
oracle bones, 287 f
oracles, 16
original sin, 196 f
Origins of Ancient Poetry, An An-
thology of Old Poems, 358 n
Orphic communities, 151
Outline and An Annotated Bibliog.




Pai-ma-Iun, see On White Horse
painting, 23, 101; landscape, 23if,
48,56,92
pantheism, 160
Pao-p'u Tzu, see Ko Hung
paradoxes, 77; Ch'an Buddhist, 78;
of the Logicians, 45
parallelistic prose, 80, 88, 90 f
parole, 355
Paul, St., 105
Payne, Robert, 362 n
"The Peacock Flies to the South-
west," 348
Pei-Chi shu, see History of the
Northern Ch'i Dynasty
penal laws, see punishment
Penetrating The Book of Changes,
74 n, 148 n, 306 n
Penn, William, 223
"Period of the Hundred Philos-
ophers," 336




Phenomenological Study of the
Consciousness of Praise and
Defamation in the Development
of Spiritual Life (Tang Chi.in-i),
211 n
philology, 129
philosophy: comparative, 106 f;
Chinese: basic principles, 4 ff;
and divination, 16; legal, 6; po-
litical, 6; practical character of,
11 f; and religion, 1, 6; and social
affairs, 17
Philosophy and Culture, East and
West, vn, 357n
Philosophy-East and West, v n,
vii, 103 n, 131 n
Philosophy of Human Nature by
Chu Hsi (J.P. Bruce), 75n,
166n
Philosophy of Wang Yang-ming
(F.G. Henke), 166n
phonetics, 126 f
phonology, 121, 123, 126 f
physics, 95, 97, 105, 107
p'ien ("double-harness writing"),
88
Pien-cheng lun, see Essays on the
Discrimination of Doctrines
Platform Scripture, 293 f, 305 n
Plato, 83, 94 f, 99, 151, 190, 192,
2 65




poetry, 22 f, 35, 56, 94, 101, 238,
248
political authority, 2 1 3 ff
political life, 182
Position of Woman in Early China:
INDEX 395
Including Translation of Lieh-
nil chuan, 363 n
positive law, see law
positivists, 90
posterity, 180 f
postulation, concepts by, 94 ff, 105
praise, desire for, 193 f




Preface to Seng-chao's Discourses,
262n
priests, function of, 287
"A Primer on the Study of the
I Ching," 120
primitivism, 48 f
Princeton Institute of Advanced
Studies, 101
principle, see li
prisoners of war, 325
privileged classes, 356 f
prognostication, see omens
pronunciation, ancient, 121, 123 ff,
129
property rights, 24, 350
propriety, see li
Protestant reform, 101
psychology, and Confucius, 35
P'u-hsiieh (Concrete Philosophy),
74 n
"Pulling up the Root and Stopping
up the Source," 17
punishment, 216, 220 ff, 224 ff,
233 f, 236 n, 342, 344 fl, 349 f,
354 ff, 360 n, 361 n, 364 n
Pure Land school (Buddhism), 21,
55, 290,293
Pure Words, 28 n, 29 n, 75 n
quietism, 49, 56, 2 0 7
Rabelais, 108
The Race Question, 337
~--------------j
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rain-magic, and praying for rain,
2 87f
rationalism, 51 fj, 74 n, 76 n
reality, 150, 268; Buddhist con-
ception of, 252 fj; Confucian
conception of, 135, 216; Neo-
Confucian conception of, 135,
139; Taoist conception of, 216,
246, 248, 299
"recalling the soul," 288
Recent Essays on Learned Sub-
fects by Hu Shih, 70 n
reciprocity (shu), 152, 3 I 6 f,
364 n
reciprocal response, between
Heaven and man, 112 fj, 243
Reconstruction of the Spirit of
Humanism, 321 n, 322 n
Records of the Grand Historian
(B. Watson), 361 n
Records of the Historian, 38, 260 n,
338n, 358n
Records of Instructions for Practi-
cal Living, 17, 28 n, 29 n, 74 n,
211 n, 305 n
Records of the Pointing of the
Moon, 284n
"rectification of the mind," 64
rectification of names, see names
Rectification of Names, 266, 283 n
Regulatory Measures, 87
relational thinking, 267 f
religion, 1, 6, 8, 24, 102 n, 106,
238, 286 fj; and Confucius, 32 f,
45, 153 f, 178; definitions of,
178 f; Han State -, 82, 84 f,
111 fj; and Lao Tzu, 45; and
Mo Tzu, 44, 157 fj
"Religion and Philosophy in Chi-
nese History," 75 n
religious persecution, 336
religious tolerance, 199
Religious Trends in Modern China
(Chan), 305n
Renaissance, 100, 107
Revival of Learning, 128, 130
Revolution (1911), 94, 225
revolution, duty of, 214, 357
rhyming groups, 126




Ricci; Matteo, 212 n
rights and duties, 219, 227, 314,
316 fj, 327f, 332, 335, 352 f
rites, 34, 176, 179f, 183, 286f,
289, 300 f, 343
Robinson, Richard, 83, 102 n
Roman Law, 219
Rome, 99, 107, 249
"Round Doctrine," 55
ruler, duties and qualities of,
213 fj, 220 f, 223, 230
Rutherford, Sir Ernest, 105
sacrifices: to ancestors, 32 , 34,
179 f, 287 f, 2g6 fj; to Heaven,
301; human, 28g, 325
Saddharma-pur.u,larika-sutra, 263 n
the sage/sagehood, 6, Ig f, 150,
157, Ig8 fj, 211 n, 224, 246,
248 f, 30 3, 30 9 f, 327
"sageliness within and kingliness
without," 5, 20, 327
Sakamoto, Floris, vii
salvation: Buddhist doctrines of,
21, 24, 55, 141; Neo-Confucian
concept of, 142
San Francisco Chinatown, 332
San-Iun, 53
San-min chu-i, 351 f
san ts'ai (cosmic triad), 324
Satyasiddhi school, 53 f
sceptical tradition, 109 fj, 117 fj
Schafer, Edward H., vii
scholar-gentlemen, 22
scholasticism, 13
School of Mind (Neo-Confucian-
ism), 57, 62 fJ
School of Principle (Neo-Confu-
cianism), 57fJ, 63, 65, 74 n
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 147, 192
Science and Common Sense 0. B.
Conant), 131 n
scientific method, 8 f, 13, 43, 67,
86, 90, 94, 96, 100 f, 104 fJ,
115 f, 118, 127 fJ, 130, 143 f,
147, 169, 195, 206, 209, 239,
279; and spiritual values, 190
"searching in oneself," 192 fJ
self-consciousness, 268 fJ, 275 f,
278, 280
self"determination, 321
self-evaluation, 194 f, 314 f, 317




Seng-chao, 134, 252 fJ
Seng-ching (Buddhist monk), 251
Seng-yu, 30 n, 359 n
sense impressions, 82 f
sense-knowledge, 278 fJ
Sentiment of Life and the Sense of
Beauty (T.H.Fang), 260 n
sex techniques, Taoist, 290
Shakespeare, William, 101, 254
Shang dynasty, 18, 214, 287 f,
296
Shang (d. 338 B.C.), 342
Shang ChU, 239
"Shang" chuan, 260 n
Shang-ti, 136
Shang Yang, 221, 223
Shao Yung, 74 n, 75 n, 283
Sheldon, Wilmon Henry, 104
Shen (monk), 252
shen, 273, 275, 277, 285 n
Shen Te-ch'ien, 358 n
INDEX 397
shen-tu ("taking care of one's own
will"), 315
"shen-yii," 204
Sheng-ming ching-tiao yu mei-
k'an, see The Sentiment of Life
and the Sense of Beauty
"shih" ("event"), 14, 2 65f
Shih chi, see Records of the
Historian
Shih ching, see Book of Odes
"shih-fei" (true or false), 14
"Shih-jen p'ien" (On Understand-
ing len [Humanity]), 17
Shih ming, see Interpretation of
Names
Shih p'i-p'an shu, see Collection of
Ten Critical Essays
Shih-sang li, see Ceremonies in an
Official's Funeral
Shoo King 0. Legge), 29 n, 30 n
shu, see reciprocity
Shu ching, see Book of History
Shun (legendary Sage-Emperor),
12, 157, 178, 207, 211 n, 216,
228, 235 n, 294, 309, 320, 328,
349
"Shuo-kua" chuan, 260 n
Shushi school (Neo-Confucian-
ism), 57 .
Sih, Paul K.T., 235 n
"simplicity," 39, 41
sincerity, see cheng
Six Dynasties, 92, 94, 99
Sketchy Exemplifications of the
Principles of Change, 262 n
slaves/slavery, 18, 325
social cohesion, 330 fJ
social distinctions, see class
distinctions
social justice, 193, 2°9, 228 f, 332,
349f
social mobility, 333 f
Social Mobility in Traditional






social nature of man, 5, 173
social relations, 154, 181 f, 331
social service, 32 7 f
see also rights and duties
social values, 188 ff
Socrates, 109, 153
Socratic tradition, 107 ff, 116
solipsism, 268, 284 n
"Songs of Five Brothers," 235 n
SoothilI, W.E., 67 n
sound waves, 96
Source Book in Chinese Philosophy
(Wing-tsit Chan), 28 n, 29 n,
69 n, 71 n, 72 n, 73 n, 148 n,
304 n, 305 n, 306 n, 359 n
Sources of Chinese Tradition
(W.T. de Bary), 237n, 338n
space, 98, 132, 247
space-time continuum, 105, 267
spelling, vii
Spinoza, Benedict, 101, 147
"spirit," definition of, 188
spiritual beings, 33, 109 f, 114,
136, 146, 178, 288 ff, 296 f, 301
spiritual values, 188 ff
Spiritual Worth of Chinese Cul-
ture (Tang Chiin-i), 187 n,
2 85 n
spirituality, Chinese concept of, 5
Spring and Autumn Annals, 28 n,
113, 122, 359 n
"Ssu hsiian," see "Thought the
Transcender"
Ssu-ma Ch'ien, 38, 239, 260 n,
338 n, 358 n, 361 n
Ssu-ma Ch'ien: Grand Historian
of China (Watson), 237 n
Ssu-ma T'an, 226, 237 n, 239,
260n
Ssu-shu shih-i, see Interpretations
of the Four Books
standard and expedient, doctrine
of, 27f
Status of the Individual in East
and West, vn
Staunton, Sir George Thomas,
361 n
Struggle for Law (Jhering), 237 n
"Studies of Politics and History
under the [influence] of the
[study of the] Five Virtues,"
102n
Su Ch'iung (magistrate), 350
Su Shih, 92
Su Tung-p'o, 350
Sui-Tang period, 251, 256
Sun Yat-sen, 15, 169, 352
Sung period, 57, 65, 74 n, 86,
92 ff, 96, 98, 101, 116, 138, 144,
161, 163, 169, 191 f, 206, 256,
275, 278, 315, 348
"Sung" hexagram, 227
sunyata (emptiness), 205 f, 252 ,
282
"superior man," 19, 34 f, 153, 155,
162, 173, 32 9
superstitions, 112, 114 f
"Supplement on the Rhymes of
The Book of Odes," 123
"Supplement to the Standard
Rhyme-Book" (Yiin pu), 123
Supreme Being, belief in, 19, 49,
110, 136, 178
Supreme Good, 239 ff
Supreme Mystery, 87
Supreme Principles Governing the
World, 74n
Surviving Works, 28 n, 29 n,
305n,306n
Surviving Works of the Ch'eng
Brothers, 73 n, 74 n
Suzuki, 77, 281
syllogism, 89 f, 97
symbolism, 86
Symposium on Chinese Culture,
75 n
synthesis, in Chinese thought, 6,
54 f, 132 if, 142, 145, 147, 162
Ta hsiieh, see Great Learning
Ta Tsing Leu Lee, 361 n
Ta T'ung Shu: The One-World
Philosophy of K'ang Yu'wei
(L.G. Thompson), 237 n
"Ta-Yii mo," see "Counsels of the
Great Yii"
Tai Chen, 65 f, 76 n, 126, 129,
138, 147, 191, 209, 283
T'ai chi, see Great Ultimate
T'ai-chi t'u shuo, see Explanation
of the Diagram of the Great
Ultimate
T'ai Hsiian, see The Supreme
Mystery
T'ai-p'ing Yii-lan, 98
Tai Te, 243, 261 n
T'ai-tsu, Emperor (1368-1399),
346
Takakusu, Junjir6, 54, 262 n
Talks on the Philosophy of
Change, 260 n
Tan-chi (Buddhist monk), 251
T'an Ssu-t'ung, 66
T'ang period, 20, 56, 94 f, 99,
125, 344 f, 347
T'ang (founder of the Shang
dynasty), 214, 234 n
Tang Chiin-i, 181, 186, 187 n,
310, 376
T'ang-lii shu-i, see Code of T'ang
with Annotations
T'ang Yung-t'ung, 103 n, 262 n
Tao (the Way), 32, 36f, 51,
131 n, 199, 216, 250, 277, 341,
359 n; and Chuang Tzu, 47 if;
Confucian conception of, 84,
135, 239 if, 243, 259, 308; and
Lao Tzu, 210, 244, 293; and
Lieh Tzu, 53; and Mencius,
276; Neo-Confucian conception
INDEX 399
of, 62, 66, 207 f; Taoist con-
ception of, 39 if, 54, 110 f, 134,
136, 159 f, 201, 244 if, 287,
298; and Tai Chen, 65; and
Wang Ch'ung, 113
Tao, the Great Luminant (E.
Morgan), 70n, 73n
Tao-an, 251 if
Tao-hsueh (Philosophy of the
Way), 74 n
Tao-sheng, 141, 252, 254 if, 262 n
Tao-te ching, see Classic of the
Way and its Virtue
Taoism/Taoists, 14, 18, 24, 27,
3 1 f, 38 if, 51 if, 80, 82, 85,
132 if, 136 f, 139 f, 141 if, 149,
:1;59, 163, 178, 180, 226, 238,
250, 272, 275, 286 f, 290,
298 f, 330, 341, 343, 347; and
Buddhism, 48, 78, 206; and the
concept of immortality, 20 f,
24, 290 f; and the individual,
25, 340; naturalism in, 19 f, 32,
39if, 11of, 113; and Neo-
Confucianists, 115, 162; and
the philosophy of change, 135,
201 if; spiritual values in, 200 if,
210; and concept of time, 135 f
Tathatli, 251, 256 .
Tathata-parivarta, 262 n
taxation, 352
Te ch'ing (monk), 261 n




terminology, 16, 92, 95, 146; of
historians, 100
textual criticism, 127, 129 f
theory and practice, 11 f, 27
"Theory of Authenticity of Will of







Thompson, L.G., 237 n
thought, nature of, 79 f
"Thought the Transcender," 102 n
Three Dynasties, 225
Three Sovereign Groups, 323 f
"three-W theory of immortality,"
337 n
Three Ways of Thought in
Ancient China (A. Waley),
359 n
thunder, 114




T'ien (Heaven), 110, 112, 360n
T'ien-chu shih-i (M. Ricci), 212n
T'ien-t'ai, 55, 282
time, theory of, 98, 132, 135 f,
239fl, 246 f
Ting, Duke (509-495 B.C.), 216 f
"Ting-hsing shu" (On Calming
Human Nature), 17
tolerance, 6 f, 139, 199, 202
Torricelli, Evangelista, 129
tort, 353
"Totalism," 54, 58, 133
transcendentalism, 84, 86, 94, 137,
140, 151, 192, 196 f, 201,
271 fl, 280
"Transformation of Buddhism in
China" (Wing-tsit Chan), 30 n
translation, of Chinese terms, vii
transliteration, vii
Treatise on the Golden Lion, 139,
299,306n
Treatise on Philosophy (T'ang
Chiin-i), 283 n, 284 n
"Trends in Contemporary Philos-
ophy" (Chan), 76n
True Word, 55
truth, concepts of, 11 fl, 26
Tsai ching-shen sheng-huo fa-chan
chung chih hui-yii, see A Phe-
nomenological Study of the
Consciousness of Praise and
Defamation in the Development
of Spiritual Life
Tsang (philosopher), 315, 317
Tseng Hsi (Confucian pupil), 154
Tseng Tien (Confucian pupil),
135
Tseng Ts'an, 349
Tseng Tzu (Confucian disciple),
167, 174, 182, 295
Tso chuan, see Commentary on
The Spring and Autumn Annals
Ts'ui-yen, see Pure Words
Tsung-mi, 257, 263 n
tultu-chih, 271, 284 n
Tu-ching shih-yao, see Essential
Points in the Study of Classics
Tu 1 Hsi-tz'u lun-hsing, see On the
Discussions of Human Nature in
the Appended Remarks of The
Book of Changes
Tu-shun, 257
"Tuan" chuan, 260 n, 261 n
Tuan Yii-ts'ai, 126
T'ung chih, 122
Tung Chung-shu, 17, 51, 73 n,
102 n, 112
T'ung shu, see Penetrating The
Book of Changes
T'ung-tsu Ch'u, 362 n
tutor, status of, 182
Tzu-chih t'ung-chien, 98
Tzu-hsia (disciple of Confucius),
121
Tzu-kung, 317
Tzu-ssu (grandson of Confucius),
69 n, 295
tzu-te (self-satisfaction), 211 n
Ultimate Reality, 252 fl
UNESCO,337
Unesco and its Programme III,
339 n
United Nations Conference, 231
United States, Chinese youth in,
332





utilitarianism, 100, 158 f, 191,
194, 203, 209 f, 211 n
"vacuity" (hsii), 293 f, 298
Verifications of Meanings in
Chuang Tzu, 261 n
Vesalius, 107, 129
Vietnamese language, 127
Vijiianavada idealism, 269, 282
Vijiiaptimatrata school, 53 f
village meetings, 25
Vimalakirti-nirdesa-siitra, 263 n
Void, doctrine of the, 55 f, 58,
134, 253, 257
voting rights, 25
Waley, Arthur, 28n, 67n, 7on,
148n, 359 n
wan wu ("myriad things"), 103 n
Wang Chi, 282
Wang Ch'ung, 51 ff, 70 n, 73 n,
87, 98, III ff, 146, 290
Wang Fu-chih, 208, 283
Wang Lung-ch'i, 212 n
Wang Nien-sun, 126, 128f
Wang Pi, 84, 249 f, 262 n, 299,
306n
Wang Yang-ming (Wang Shou-
jen), 12, 14f, 17, 28n, 57,
62 ff, 66, 74 n, 80, 138, 145 f,
163, 16g, 195, Ig8, 200, 208,
211 n, 26g f, 291, 295, 305 n
Wang Yang-ming ch'iian-chi, see





Watson, Burton, 237 n, 361 n
the Way, see Tao
the Way and its Power (A.
Waley), 70 n
the Way of Lao Tzu (Wing-tsit
Chan), 70n, 148n
Wei State, 358 n
Wei-shih, 53
Wen, King (founder of the Chou
dynasty 1171-1122 B.C.), 179,
211 n, 288
Wen, Emperor (179-156 B.C.),
345
Wen (monk), 252
wen, 80 ff, 91, 99
Wen-chi, 29 n
Wen-hsin tiao-lung, see The
Literary Mind and the Carving
of Dragons
Wen hsiian, 102 n
wen shih, 84
"Wen yen" chuan, 260 n, 261 n
Western Han period, 360 n
"Western Inscription" (Chang
Tsai), 162, 166 n
Western thought, 3, 8 f, 8g, 9 1,
95 ff, 104 ff, 265, 271 f; and
Chinese philosophy, 16, 67,
76 n, 99, 133, 146 f, 20g f,
219, 232 f, 335, 355 f; influence
of, 351, 356; misconceptions
about China in, 24 f, 100, 332
the White Pony: An Anthology of
Chinese Poetry, 362 n
Wigmore, J.H., 236 n
Wilhelm, Richard, 102 n 227
Wisdom of China and India
(Lin Yutang), 69n, 70n
Wisdom of Confucius (Lin
Yutang), 28 n, 68 n, 6g n, 148 n
women: in Chinese religious
thought, 303; legal status of,
348, 353 f, 357
wooden bell, see mu-to
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words and action, 14 f, 26
Works of Chuang Tzu, 261 n,
262n
Works of Han Fei Tzu, 70 n
Works of Hsiin Tzu, 239, 261 n
Works of Hsiintze (H.H. Dubs),
69 n
Works of Lieh Tzu, 262 n-
Works of Mencius, 68 n, 261 n
Works of Mo Tzu, 165 n
Works of Motse (Y.P. Mei),
235 n, 236n-. .
World Conception of the Chinese
(A. Forke), 87
writing, invention of, 80 f
Wu, King (1121-1116 B.C.), 214
Wu, John C.H., 235 n, 236 n,
237 n,377




"Wu-ch'eng" (section of The Book
of History), 109
"Wu-ch'iian hsien-fa," 363 n
Wu-Te chung shih shuo-hsia te
Cheng-chih li-ho shih,
see "The Studies of Politics and
History under the [influence]
of the [study of the] Five
Virtues"
wu-wei, 19, 40 f, 48, 110, 216
Wu Yii, 123 f, 127
Wylie, Alex, 103 n
Yang Chien, 282
Yang Chu, 39, 283
Yang Hsiung, 87, 101
Yang-hu, 260 n
Yang Hung-lieh, 362 n, 363 n
Yao (legendary Sage-Emperor),
12, 157, 178, 207, 228, 294,
309, 328
Yen Hui, 109
Yen Jo-ch'ii, 119f, 128f
Yen Tzu, 359 n
Yen Ying (Prime Minister), 325,
337 n




Yin-hsiieh wu-shu, see Five Books
of Phonology
Yin-Yang Confucianism, 344,
360 n, 361 n
Yin-Yang Interactionism, 16, 31,
4 1, 50ff, 54, 57ff, 65, 67, 86,
97 f, 114, 132 ff, 150, 226, 233,
265, 267 f, 283 n, 296 t, 302,
35 1
yoga, 78, 206
Yogacara school (Buddhism), 53,
206
Yii. (emperor, Hsiadynasty), 216
Yu, King (781-771 B.C.), 228,
328
Yu (Being), 251
Yii Fa-kai, 252 .
Yii Tao'-sui, 252
Yu Tzu (Confucius' disciple), 170
. Yiian-K'ang (Buddhist monk),
251, 262n




yiieh (self-joy), 211 n







Zen, Sophia, 75 n
Zen, see Chan school
